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I 
1. ~rpose of the 
I 
This stu~y 
shared with othJ r 
I 
I 
"INTRODUCTION 
Present Study 
is undertaken in the beli ef, which is 
students of Indian philosophy at the pre~ 
I 
ent time, that the study of Western Philosophy provides at 
I least an interesting and possibly a fruitful basis for the 
I 
evaluation of I f dian thought. Further, the ultimate justi-
1 
fication of such a comparison as is pursued here, is that 
I 
it may contribu~ e to the general philosophical enterprise, 
I 
I 
which knows no r oundaries of race or clime, of achieving 
greater insigh~ into reality. 
I 
I 2. The Problem Stated 
I Any com/ arison between two philosophers is bound to 
be hazardous, r specially when they are philosophers as far 
apart in time r nd cultural setting as Ramanuja and Bowne. 
Yet, with the ~itfalls in mind, this dissertation undertakes 
I 
I 
to juxtapose ~he philosophies of these thinkers, divergent 
as their idioms are, in order to bring out as far as possi-
ble the point ~ at which they meet. Both thinkers may be 
called ideali~ts and, more than that, personal idealists. 
Indeed it is t his resemblance which provides the ground ror 
a meaningful ~omparison between their systems of thought. 
Having said t h is, however, it is necessary to emphasize, as 
I 2 
I 
I is done throughout this study, that R~~anuja•s conception or 
I 
reality in generrl and of the self in particular difrers 
i greatly from Bowne's conceptions of them. Hence throughout 
I 
the study while /every erfort is made to bring similarities 
I 
I 
to light, difre~ences are not overlooked, especially those 
pertaining to tqe two philosophers• views on the nature of 
I 
consciousness artd of the self. If we may sum up these dir-
1 
I ferences in a rew words here, they are that, rather surpris-
' 
ingly, Ramanuja ~ssigns a more important role to matter than 
does Bowne. At the same time that matter is for Ramanuja 
the source of finitude and evil, it is also, as in Western 
I 
Philosophical tradition, an individuating principle. Dir-
ferences apart,/ hawever, the important thing for us is that 
our thinkers m~ve in comparable universes or discourse. For 
I 
example, Raman~ ja of Perumbudur in the eleventh century says: · 
I~ has been previously stated that the 
Veda~tas establish the Brahman, as the sole 
cause of the entire universe. He alone is the 
efficient cause of the entire universe. At 
I 
the rame time He is in the form of the univers~ 
as He is its material cause also •••• He is the 
high~st object of human pur~uit; because His 
essential characteristic constitutes the unsur-
pass~ble bliss •••• the Prakriti and the individ-
ual 
1
selves are not :fit to be mentioned as the 
cause of the world. The Vedantas teach about 
the ~rahman only who is omniscient, who possess-
es a1 true will, who is hostile to all evils such 
as ~gnorance, etc., and Wh£ is the ocean of in-
num~rable noble qualities. 
1. VedaJ tasira, (ed. V.Krishnamacharya; tr. N.B.N. 
Ayyangar; Madras: Tfie Adyar Library, 1953) pp. 23-24. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
3 
And in the twent eth century, Bowne in a vein not too remote 
I 
rrom this, writes: 
Thel infinite is not a passive substance, but 
the ba al cause of the universe. As such, it 
is one and indivisible, and is forever equal to 
itself. Of the finite, two conceptions are log-
ically possible. We may view it merely as a 
rorm o energizing on the part of the infinite; 
so tha it has a purely phenomenal existence; or 
we ma view it as a substantial creation by the 
infin te. But in no case is it possible to iden-
tify t • finite fith the infinite, either total-
ly ·or partially. 
Accordingly this study will try to show by means of 
detailed compar,son o~ the method, epistemology and metaphy-
sics of these t } o philosophers that they stand upon common 
ground, raising the same questions and when all allowances 
are made for di ferences of time, place and philosophic id-
ioms, coming to somewhat similar conclusions. We begin with 
a chapter designed to place Ramanuja and Bowne, in their re-
I :~ec~:::i::i:::~::::t:::d:::::::ered in the Writing 
of this The~ is 
Until ve~y recently Indian Philosophy has been so im-
pregnated with religious thought that it is no easy task to 
isolate the stJ ictly philosophic ideas in the works of 
R~anuja. Mor j over, there is the danger of distortion in 
thus separating ideas from their setting. But the operation 
I 
I 1. Borde~ P. Bowne, Metaphysics, (rev. ed., New York: 
American Book 0ompany, 1898), pp. 98-99· 
4 
is not without ~ts advantages, for it enables us to see how 
well these ideaJ stand the test of philosophical analysis 
and criticism. It is an aid in the evaluation of Indian 
Metaphysics. ~rther, although the Sanskrit writings of 
R~anuja are av~ilable, his Tamil works have not yet been 
I 
I 
identified. The Sanskrit works themselves are not clearly 
dated and so it / is difficult to trace the development of 
I 
his thought. N~ither of these difficulties exist in the 
I 
I 
case of Bowne, i ll of whose works are extant and dated. 
4• Sources Use~ 
I 
1- - • . All of ~amanUJ&iiS works in Sanskrit have been trans-
1 lated into English. Both the translations and the original 
I 
Sanskrit have been used in the preparation of this thesis, 
I together with commentaries. The latter are used w1 th great 
I 
caution, for e~eh of RlmAnuja•s commentators has his partie-
/ 
ular bias. While studies about Bowne have been used, it has 
always been wi~h an eye upon his writings themselves. 
I 
I 
5. Status of the Present study 
So far ks I know the present work is the first to 
I 
undertake a coi parison of R~nuja and Bowne. The compara-
tive study of ~astern and Western thougnt is making headway 
I 
in India, alt~ough slowly. Although a number of Indian 
I 
I 
scholars have
1
attempted to compare Eastern and Western 
I 
Idealism, yet jeven such a comprehensive work as P. T. Rajuts 
5 
Idealistic Thou ht of India, makes no mention of Bowne. The 
American thinker has been the subject of much study and con-
troversy in his ~wn country where his influence has been 
considerable, so that a comparison of his thought with that 
of an Indian ph11 osopher of similar strain may contribute in 
a small way to t e mutual understanding of East and West. 
6. Method Emplqyed 
Our comp Jrison of Ramanuja and Bowne is oriented to-
1 . 
wards the persol alistic strain of thought evident in the 
philosophies of /both thinkers. We begin with an introductory 
chapter designel to place the two philosophers in their re-
spective historical contexts and to bring out the point that 
the elements in the thought of their predecessors of which 
they especially availed themselves were of a personalistic 
character. Fro thence we proceed to a comparative study of 
the methodologi es of Ramanuja and Bowne and of the closely 
allied subject of their theories of truth. Here we are con-
cerned to emphasize the synoptic nature of their approach tn 
I 
the problems oJ philosophy and the consequent preoccupation 
of both thinkers with experience as a whoLe. The resuLt of 
:~~:::o:::P:r::n:e::r:: :~t:: :::::e:~:::to:~::e::::ce, 
the,r do not for a moment neglect the role of reason in ex-
perience. Not reason versus experience, but reason and ex-
perience, is their guiding principle. We proceed next to 
6 
juxtapose the ep stemologies of the two philosophers and to 
show that neithe thinker is disposed to view the theory of 
knowledge apart trom its wider setting in a theory of being. 
The result is t~at neither thinker gets lost in the mere 
technicalities ~f epistemological discussion. Their aim 
always is to re~ate knowledge to life and practice. Next 
follows the chaJ ter which is central, on the metaphysics of 
R!m!nuja and Bofne wherein we discover that for both think-
ers reality is i othing if not concrete. Above all it is 
::::::a::·:::: t:::::.::: :::sn:: :::::.o::et:~:~ru:::~ly, 
in the last cha/ ter we undertake to point out some of the 
weaknesses in t r e views of Ramanuja and Bowne, and to link 
these with the ~ .eneral character of Eastern and Western 
thought. ThroJ ghout our comparison of Ram~uja and Bowne 
attempt has been made to constantly bear in mind their sys-
tems of thoughJ as a whole. It is in this light that we 
I 
shall try to eTaluate the similarities and differences be-
tween them. Ni edless to say we have depended upon proof 
texts in makin our points, at the same time that we have 
selected these so as to illustrate the thought of their 
authors in its totality. 
CHAPTER I 
I 
I 
RAMANUJA AN'D BOWNE IN THEIR HISTORICAL CONTEXTS 
I 
No philosophy springs fUll fledged from the mind of 
I 
its creator, in /a word, no philosophy is without a pedigre~ 
I 
I Whether it be i~ the East or the West, philosophies have a-
1 
risen in the attempt to answer certain questions, and these 
I 
questions as well as the answers given to them, have a his-
tory. Hence th~ object of the present chapter is to view 
I 
Ramanuja and Bo~ne in relation to their predecessors. In 
I 
this way the pr/oblems with which each deals are best defin-
ed and comparis/on between them best launched. More space is 
I devoted to Rimanuja than to Bowne, for the Indian thinker is 
I 
comparatively tlnknown to English readers. Furthermore his 
sources are fa~ more extensive than those of Bowne. 
I 
I_ -1. Ram.anuja' s Importance in Indian Philosophy 
I 
I 
After Sankara, the name that stands out most promi-
1 
I 
nently among ~pdian philosophers, is that of R~anuja. Over 
I 
I 
against the unrr>eality of the world and the "bloodless abso-
lute"1 of Sankl ra, Ramanuja is concerned to prove the real-
1 
ity of this wdrld with God as its Creator. He believes 
I 
I 
1. s. Radhakrishnan, Vedanta accordin* to Sankara and 
Ramanuja, (London: George Allen & Unwin, Lt ., 1929), p.22$. 
8 
that unless the reality of the individual selves and of the 
external world are affirmed, all of our experience remains 
meaningless. For if the world and the individual are unreal, 
so likewise must the experience of them be. To Ramanuja, 
then, Brahman is personal and the creator of persons, all of 
whom in consequencehav:e an equality of status, not only meta-
physically but also as a group.1 Such a view obviously cuts 
across the inequalities based on caste and race. All are 
creatures of the same eternal Brahman. 
Ramanuja rejects the mechanical repetition of the for-
mula "I am Brahmann2 and this because it contributes nothing 
to the individual's understanding of God or to the establis~ 
ment of any relationship with him. In Ramanuja•s system not 
only is the activity emphasized, but also the function of the 
will. Accordingly stress is laid upon the freedom of the in-
dividual. FUrthermore, salvation for Ramanuja is not absorp-
tion into the absolute but fellowship with htm.3 
A. Ramanuja•s Relation to the Principal Systems of Ideal-
istic Thought in India 
Before we go on to trace Rrumanuja•s relation to other 
1. s. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosobhy, (London: G. 
Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1929), Vol. II, p. 6 1. 
2. 
(London: 
3. 
I 
s. N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, 
Cambridge UniversitY Press, 1951), Vol. I, p.~77. 
S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p.662. 
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Indian systems of idealistic thought, it may be helpful to 
say something about idealism in general. 
(1) Definition of Idealism 
Although idealism has acquired a wide variety of sen-
ses,yet these have revolved around a common core of meaning. 
The term has been used to denote all those philosophies 
which maintain that spiritual values have a determining 
voice in the universe.! Dr. EWing objects to this defini-
tion because it implies that all believers in God are ideal-
ists.2 He further points out that all philosophers who caTil 
themselves idealists have in cormnon the view that there can 
be no physical objects existing apart from some experience. 
He believes that this can be taken as a definition provided 
we consider thinking as a part of experience and that we do 
not consider passivity as implying experience, and provided 
that we include under experience "Absolute Experience" or 
the experience o:t God.3 In line with this, Professor Gun-
ningham writes: 
Idealism is that philosophical doctrine 
which undertakes to show that, in order to 
think matter or the spatio-temporal order 
1. Norman K. Smith, Prolegomena to an Idealist Theoq 
of Knowledge, (;London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1924), p. • 
2. A. c. Ewing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, (London: 
Mathuen & co., 'Ltd., 1934), p. 5. 
3. A. C. rEwing, Idealism: A Critical Survey, p. 337. 
of events in its ultimate nature, we are logic-
ally compelled to think mind or spirit along 
with it as in some sense foundational to it.1 
10 
And Professor Hocking defines idealism as "The philosophy 
which holds that reality is of the nature of mind. 112 Clif-
ford Barrett strikes another note. To him idealism is a 
theory of reality which accepts the cosmic significance of 
value, coherence and systematic completeness. 3 But Hegel 
takes the position that every philosophy is idealistic, ar-
guing that the ideality of the finite is the chief maxim of 
philosophy; and for that reason every genuine philosophy is 
idealism. He says: 
The proposition that the finite is of ideal 
nature constitutes idealism. In philosophy 
idealism consists of nothing else than the re-
cognition that the finite has no veritable be-
ing. Essentially every philosophy is idealism, 
or at least has idealism for its principle, 
and the question then is only how far it is 
actually carried through. This is true of 
philosophy as of religion; for religion equally 
with philosophy refuses to recognize in fini-
tude a veritable being , or something ultimate 
and abso~ute, or non-posited, uncreated, and 
eternal.Lt-
1. Gustavus Watts Cunningham, The Idealistic Ar~ent 
in Recent British and American Philosophy, (New York: e 
Century do., 1933), p. 339. 
2. w. E. Hocking, Types of Philosophy, (New York: c. 
Scribner's & Sons, 1929), p. 247. 
3. Clifford Barrett, ed., Contemporary Idealism in 
America, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 21. 
c.f'. "Journal of Philosophy", Dec. 1933, p. 673 ff. 
4. W. G. Hegel, Scienee of Logic, "translated byn W. 
H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers (2 Vols., London: George 
Allen & Unwin, ,Ltd., 1929, 1951), Vol. I, p. 168. 
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Underlying these definitions and others that might 
be cited is the view that idealism is a search for an all-
comprehensive reality, in which t he difference between mind 
and matter is removed. Such a unity is considered as the 
Infinite, and even that form of idealism called spiritual 
pluralism or personal idealism attempts to relate all things 
to it. The absolute is considered as an organic unity of 
persons, each person having a noumenal status. It is to 
this view that the philosophy of Ramanuja conforms. 
We now proceed to consider Ramanuja•s thought with-
in the context of other systems of I ndian idealistic thought, 
though we shall have occasion to refer to Indian realistic 
systems as well. 
(2) Ramanuja•s Relation to the Jaina System 
Somewhat in the fashion of Bowne and Ramanuja, the 
Jains affirm that reality is not one, but a complex system. 
They contend that reality cannot be understood from just 
one point of view but must be looked at from various angles, 
if its nature is to be understood. 1 A particular way of 
looking at reality may serve of course a specific purpose, 
yet to the exclusion of other points of view such narrow-
1. S. Radhakrishnan, ''ed.", History of Philosophy 
Eastern and Western, (2 Vols.; London; George Allen & 
Unwin, Ltd., 1952), p. 139. 
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ness can only result in a partial and incomplete view of 
reality. 
According to the Jaina view, reality is best des-
cribed as "permanence in the midst of change, identity in 
the midst of diversity and unity in the midst of multiplic-
ity. 111 Appearance, disappearance and permanence, are the 
three outstanding features of reality. Without an under-
lying unity, the Jains believe growth and development are 
unintelligible. Objects in concrete experience exhibit the 
threefold nature of affirmation, negation, and comprehend-
ing unity, sonewhat in the fashion or the Hegelian dialec-
tical principle of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The 
Jains call this underlying unity in the midst of change 
dravya or substance. Substance is defined as that which 
possesses qualities and modes, so that the latter are in-
separable from the substance to which they belong. Further, 
it is stated that there can be no substance apart from its 
qualities. 2 They hold that substance, apart from its quali-
ties, and qualities, apart from substance, are mere intel-
1ectual abstractions. 
This idea leads to the logical crux of Jaina philos-
ophy, namely, the theory of asti-nasti-vada, according to 
1. s. Radhakrishnan, "ed.", History of Ph;ilosophy 
Eastern and Western, p. 140. 
2. Ibid., p. 141. 
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which two contradictory propositions can intelligibly be re-
lated to the same thing. It is possible to affir.m of the 
same thing that 11 i t is" and ·"is not '' at the same . time. What 
Jaina thinkers mean by this is that you can describe an ob-
ject as existing from one point of view and as not existing 
from another. Thus two propositions, one affirmative and 
the other negative, are significantly asserted of the same 
object, and both propositions are valid. This point is 
dealt with in detail by Jaina thinkers with regard to what 
is singled out by them as four aspects of a thing, its sub-
stance, place, time, and form. From the point of view of 
substance a thing is in respect to its own substance and is 
not with respect to other substances. A piece of furniture 
may exist or is jungle wood and it may not exist or is not 
rose wood. In respect to place, a thing exists or is in 
its own place and is not in any other place. The tiger in 
the cage is in the cage and is not in the woods. With re-
spect to time also, a thing is in its own time and is not 
in another time. Buddha existed before Christ and was not 
after Christ. Similarly with regard to form. Water as a 
solid exists below freezing point and does not exist then 
as a liquid •1 
For the Jaina thinkers, as for Ramanuja after them, 
1. S. Radhakrishnan, "ed. ", His tory of Philosophy 
Eastern and Wes'tern, pp. 142-143. 
the world consists o~ two classes o~ objects, namely, con-
scious objects and non-conscious objects. Conscious objects 
are living beings and non-conscious objects are matter. So 
reality consists of conscious selves and non-conscious mat-
ter. The relationship between conscious selves and matter 
is explained by a theory o~ psycho-physical parallellism. 
The mind parallels changes in matter and matter parallels 
changes in the mind, though there is no direct interaction 
between the two. But the Jainas are quick to point out 
that the mind-body relation (if it can be called a relatio~ 
is con~ined to the physical world. 1 The conscious sel£ is 
constantly striving to rise above this relation. When the 
mind reaches the stage o~ absolute consciousness of itself, 
the stage associated with infinite knowledge, infinite pow-
er, and infi~ite bliss, it exists in a state of per£ection. 
Another point of contact between the Jains and 
Ramanuja is the theory of Karma. Owing to their peculiar 
psychic disposition, individual selves become attached to 
matter, ~rom which however they struggle to free themselves, 
so that they can exist in a state of pure consciousness. 
For both Jaina philosophy and Ramanuja, this state is achiev-
able by means o:f that discipline of mind and body known as 
Yoga. By the practice o~Yoga the individual sel£ becomes 
1. s. Radhakrishnan, "ed.", History o~ Philosophy 
Eastern and Western, p. 143. 
progressively purer until it reaches a stage of spiritual 
perfection, the underlying presupposition being that the 
soul is born and reborn until it reaches suCh perfection.l 
Souls have to be born as human beings in order to attain 
perfection, since human beings alone are capable of per-
forming Yoga. 
So in Ramanuja•s philosophy, as in the Jaina System 
of Thought, reality consists of a plurality of individual 
selves which exist in a state of perfection. These selves 
together form a system and serve as ideals to which less 
perfect selves aspire. 
(3) Ramanuja•s Relation to Certain Buddhistic Schools 
Among the many schools of Buddhistic philosophy, the 
one with which Ramanuja•s affiliations are closest, is the 
Yogachara School of Subjective Idealism. For this school, 
as for Bowne and Ramanuja, ultimate reality is of the nature 
of consciousness or mind. External objects are merely ideas 
of the mind. The Yogacharas argue that just as in the case 
of dreams and hallucinations, things are fancied to exist in 
an outside worl.d though they do not really exist there, so 
also in waking or normal visions the objects which appear to 
be out there, are really ideas in the mind. There are no 
grounds for believing in the existence of an external object, 
1. S. N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philoso~hy, 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1951), pp. 199- 00. 
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for it cannot be shown that the object is different from the 
consciousness of the object. For example the blue color and 
the consciousness of blue color are identical since they are 
never perceived to exist separately. If they appear as sep-
arate, it is owing to an illusion, just as the moon may ap-
pear as two to a person under the influence of alcohol. Ob-
jects are never known except to consciousness; hence objects 
have no existence apart from some knower.l 
In addition to the mind-dependence of objects, there 
is another view characteristic of the Yogacharas, which 
Rrumanuja shares. lt is that the mind in one of its aspects 
acts as a storehouse of all impressions of the past. This 
aspect of mind is called the potential mind or Alaya-Vijnana. 
Mind in this aspect is not a static unchanging substance: 
but a stream of continually changing states. By proper 
self-discipline and by the use of physical culture, or Yoga, 
potential mind can be so controlled as to yield only desir-
able mental states and not the undesirable ones. In this 
way the potential mind becomes less and less attached to 
the external world and realizes its identity with the total 
stream of consciousness which is the mind. 2 
Like the Yogacharas then, Ramanuja not only considers 
1. Satischandra Chatterjee, An Introduction to Indian 
Philosophy, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1939, 1956), 
4th ed., p. 150~ 
I 
2. Ibid., pp. 151-152. 
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reality as of the nature of mind, but, more than this, it is 
possible to see that Ramanuja•s conception of individual 
selves is similar to the potential mind or selves of 
Yogachara, considered as created and given independent stat-
us. Further still both Ramanuja and the school of Yogachara 
emphasize the use of Yoga as a means of gaining detachment 
from the external world and achieving greater har.mony with 
the absolute Mind. In the case of Ramanuja it is the in-
dividual independent self which strives to achieve a closer 
relationship with the absolute Brahman, whereas in the case 
of YogochAra, it is the potential mind which strives for 
1 
closer uniV,r with the ultimate stream of consciousness. 
While Ramanuja, in conm1on with the Yogacharas, af-
firms that mind is the ultimate real.Lty, he, no · more than 
Bowne, denies the existence of an external world. It is at 
this point that he exhibits affiliations with still another 
school of Buddhistic thought, the Sautr~tikas. The latter, 
not only accept mind but a world over against it, their ar-
gwment being that if we never actually perceived external 
objects, the very conception of such objects would be mean-
ingless. In opposition to the Yogacbara school of thought 
which claims that external objects are in reality forms of 
consciousness, the Sautrantikas argue that whenever we per-
1. Satischandra Chatterjee, An Introduction to Indian 
Philosophy, 4th ed., p. 152. 
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ceive an object, say a pot, the pot is felt to be external 
and perception of it internal, that is, in the mind. So 
the object from the very beginning is felt to ·be different 
from and not identical with consciousness. If the perceived 
pot were one with the subject, that is, with the mind per-
ceiving it, the perceiver would identify himself with the 
pot, and so say, "I am the table, or apple, etc.," instead 
of saying I perceive the table or apple. 1 
For the Sautrantika school, then, external objects 
exist outside of all consciousness. It is these objects 
that account for the particular forms present in the differ-
ent states of consciousness. From these forms or represen-
tations present in the mind, we can infer the existence of 
their causes, i.e., the objects themselves. Veridical per-
ception consists in the similitude between the presented ob-
ject and the object itself. The senses present us with the 
object, and correctly, when they register those features 
2 
which belong to the object and to it alone. We cannot per-
ceive any object at will for perception depends upon the 
presence or four different conditions. They are: (a) pres-
ence of the object which imparts its form to consciousness; 
1. Satischandra Chatterjee, An Introduction to Indian 
Philosophy, p. 153. 
2. S. N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 
I, p. 154. 
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(b) presence at the same time of a conscious mind in a state 
ready to receive the form; (c) functioning of the sense or 
senses which determine the particular quality of conscious-
ness, whether tactual, visual, or other; and (d) presence of 
some favourable auxiliary condition, such as light, conve-
nient position, perceptible magnitude, et cetera. 1 All 
these conditions combined bring about the perception of the 
object. The for.m of the object thus generated in the mind 
is the effect of the object. But what the mind immediately 
grasps or knows, is not the existence of the object, but 
the copy or representation of it in consciousness. From 
this representation in the mind, the existence of the object, 
without Which the copy would not arise is inferred. 2 In 
this way the Sautrintika school of Buddhism emphasizes the 
function of mind in constructing the empirical world.3 
Although Ramanuja goes beyond this theory of knowledge, 
yet he accepts sensory and sense reflection as levels of 
knowledge.4 He accepts them as yielding partial truth. To 
Ramanuja knowledge consists of sense perception, inference, 
l.Satischandra Chatterjee, An Introduction to Indian 
Philosophy, 4th ed., p. 154. 
2. Ibid • , p • 154. 
I 
3. s. Radhakrislman, ''ed. 11 , History of Philosophy 
Eastern and Western, p. 200. 
I 
4- Ibid., p. 307. 
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testimony and spiritual intuition or Brahma-jnana or God-
knowledge. So then it .is with regard to the first two 
levels of knowledge that Ramanuja is in agreement with the 
Sautrantika school of Buddhism. 
<4) Ramanuja and His Relation to Sankhya System 
In the Sankhya system two principles figure as the 
ultimate feature of reality. They go by the nanres of 
Purusa and Prakriti. Purusa stands for ultimate selves or 
spirits which are unchanging and eternal and are character-
ized by pure consciousness. Prakriti stands for the physi-
cal order of phenomena. If Sarikbya, for which the number 
of selves is infinite, is to be described as dualistic, it 
is only by taking Purusa as a class and considering it as 
one kind of reality and Prakriti as another. Now the inde-
pendence of Prakriti or the material world derives from the 
Sankhyan theory of causation, called Satkirya-Vada. Accord-
ing to this theory , the effect, prior to its production, ex-
ists in the cause.I The argument is that were the effect 
really inexistent in the material cause, no agent could 
bring the effect into existence. No man can turn blue into 
red or sugar into salt. So when any material effect is pro-
duced, we are obliged to infer that it pre-exists in the 
cause, i that it lii:l nifests itself only under certain favourable 
1~ Satischandra Chatterjee, An Introduction to Indian 
Philosophy, p. 259. 
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condition:!, "a:! when oil is produced by pres:!ing seeds. ul 
If a thing produces only tho:!e effects which are already 
prefigured in it, causes are related to their effects only 
in so far as they contain the latter, and they are related 
to nothing else. That effects somehow exist in their causes 
is shown by the fact that only . ·certain effects ea.n be pro-
duced from certain causes, as, for example, curd from milk 
or cloth from threads. Unless this were so, the potter 
could dispense with clay in making his pots; he might use 
some other material equally well. But this is what he can-
not do. All this is to say that causes are potentially their 
effects. Indeed, Sinkhya insists that cause and effect are 
one and the same. If the cause exists, the effect must also 
exist, cause and effect are the implicit and explicit states 
of the same substance. A statue is the same as its material 
cause: shape and form are already present in the marble. Fi-
nally, it is pointed out that the only alternative to this 
Tiew is the supposition that something can came from noth-
ing, which is absurd. 2 
It is in terms of' this theor,- of' causation that 
Sinkhya undertakes to explain the world whose source is mat-
ter and which exists in independence of PUrusa or the self. 
1. Satischandra Chatterjee, An Introduction to Indian 
Philosophy, p. 260. 
2. Chandradhar Sharma, Indian Philosophy, (Banaras: 
Nand Kishore and Bros., 1952), p. 212. 
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The world in all its variety originates from rrakriti or the 
primal matter. The things in it occupy a limited space, are 
impermanent, and depend in their subsistence and functioning 
upon a cause necessarily greater than themselves. This cause 
is Prakriti, which is a complex unity of three elements, 
sattva, rajas, and tamas.l Sattva is light in weight and lu-
minous. It is the cause of the buoyancy of things. FOr ex-
ample, Sattva as present in the sense organs mike s them rit 
and competent for the apprehension of their ob:jects. Rajas 
is activity and movement and accounts for change. In its ab-
sence sattva and tamas would be rendered inactive. Tamas is 
characterized by heaviness and obstructiveness. It causes 
gravitation in material bodies and insensitivity in organs. 
These three elements co-operate although they are naturally 
opposed to each other, as, for instance, sattva illumine• 
while tamas obscures. The proportion in which they exist 
and the manner in which they co-operate accounts for the 
variety of phenomena. 
Sinkh7a holds that the whole process of development 
or evolution is teleological.2 But of this pervasive purpos-
iveness Prakriti is not in the least conscious. Yet Si.nkhya 
considers intelligence, understanding, feeling, willing, and 
all other psychical phenomena as products of nature. The 
1. Chandradhar Sharma, Indian Philosophy, p. 212 , . 
2. Ibid., P• 224. 
apparent contradiction involved in the development of in-
telligence from the unconscious Prakriti is explained by 
the theory of Purusa. 
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Purusa is the unchanging and abiding spirit. It is 
of the nature of pure consciousness. As devoid of sensible 
quality, it cannot be internally or externally perceived, 
for perception, whether mental or physical, is always of 
objects which are the products of gunas or qualities. 1 Ac-
cording to Sankhya, Purusa _  or the self is a conscious spir-
it which is the subject and never the _ object of knowledge. 
It is not a substance with the attribute of consciousness, 
but pure consciousness as such. Consciousness is its very 
essence and not mere quality of it. 
The self is above all change and activity. 
It is uncaused, eternal and all pervading re-
ality which is free from all attachment and 
unaffected by all objects. All change and 
activity, all pleasures and pains belong re-
ally to matter and its products like the 
body, mind and intellect. It is sheer ig-
norance to think that the self is the body 
of the senses or the mind or the intellect. 2 
Several arguments are advanced to pruve the existenoo 
or the selr as the transcendent subject of experience. For 
one thing, it is pointed out that all objects of the world 
are means to ends, never, as so many aggregates or colloca-
tions of parts, , but ends in themselves. They exist not for 
1. Sharma, Indian Philosophy, p. 214 ff. 
2. Satischandra Chatterjee, An Introduction to Indian 
Philosophy, p. 269. 
their own sake, but for the sake of beings whose purpose 
they serve, and these beings must be distinct and different 
from than. Of these beings it cannot be said that they are 
unconscious things made of parts, like physical objects, 
for in that case they themselves would be means and not 
ends. Hence they must be conscious selves to whose ends all 
physical objects are the means. Again, it is reasoned that 
all material objects including the mind and intellect, must 
be controlled and directed by some intelligent principle, if 
they are to achieve or realize their ends. A machine does 
its work only when placed under the guidance of some person. 
So Sankhya argues that if nature serves the ends it does, it 
is because there are selves who guide the operations of 
Prakriti and all her products. Further still, it is argued 
that all obje.cts of the world are inseparable from pleasure, 
pain or indifference. Since pleasure and pain have meaning 
only as they are experienced by a conscious experiencer, it 
follows that there must be a conscious self or selves for 
whom nature is pleasure, pain or indifference. Moreover, 
there is the ract that at least some selves sincerely endeav-
or to attain final release from all surfering. Such seeking 
is impossible for the physical world, for by its very nature 
the physical world causes suffering rather than relief from 
it. And here light is shed on the SBnkhya belief in the 
teleological character of Prakriti. Prakriti is purposeful 
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because it provides the psychical instrumentality by means 
of which Purusa enjoys the infinite variety of phenomena. 
Further yet, it points the way of liberation for the indi-
vidual Purusas. With regard to this matter, we read: 
Spirit exists (as distinct from matter}, 
since collocations serve a purpose of some 
(being) other than themselves, since this 
other must be the reverse of (what is com-
posed of) the three constituents, and so 
on, since there must be control (of the 
collocations), since there must be an en-
joyer, and since there is activity for the 
purpose of release (from three-fold misery). 1 
For Sankhya there are a plurality of selves each con-
nected with a material body. More than one reason is addu-
ced for this belief. For one thing, there is not one birth 
and death, but many; for another, there is the variety of 
sensory and motor endowments. The birth and death of one 
individual is not the birth or death of all; the blindness 
or deafness of one is not the blindness or deafness of all. 
So there are many selves and not just one. S~nkbya's posi-
tion concerning the plurality of Purusa or spirit is clear 
from the following passage. 
The plurality o~ spirits certainly follows 
from the distributive (nature} of the incidence 
of birth and death and of (the endowment of) 
the instruments (of cognition and action}, from 
(bodies) engaging in action, not all at the 
same time, and also from differences i~ {the 
proportion of) the three constituents. 
1. s. s. Suryanarayana Sastri, "ed.", The Sankhyaka-
rika of Iswara Krisna, {Madras: University of Madras, 1935}, 
p. 47. 
2. Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
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Thus Sankhya philosophy traces the whole course of 
the world to the interplay of two ultimate principles, 
Purusa or spirit, and Prakriti or primal matter. Prakriti 
is the cause of the world of physical things, organic bod-
ies, and psychical products like the mind (manas) and the 
intellect (buddhi). Prakriti is active and ever changing 
but is blind and unintelligent. Purusa is pure conscious-
ness. It consists of many selves which are eternal and un-
changing principles of pure consciousness. Although the 
selves are intelligent, they are inactive. It is in con-
tact with such conscious and intelligent selves that the 
unconscious and unintelligent Prakriti evolves the world 
of experience. It seems that the mere presence of Purusa 
or the self is sufficient to move Frakriti to act, although 
Purusa itself remains unmoved. Similarly, it is the reflec-
tion of the conscious self in the unconscious intellect 
that explains the cognitive and other psychical functions 
performed by the intellect. JUst how the proximity of 
Purusa can be the cause of changes in Prakriti, but not in 
the Purusa is not explained. Nor is it clear how an unin-
telligent material principle, like the intellect, can reflect 
pure consciousness, which is immaterial, and thereby become 
conscious and intelligent. With regard to the plurality of 
I 
selves maintain~d by Sankhya, there is the difficulty that 
the differences ,between them do not pertain to the self or 
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Purusa as pure consciousness, but only to the bodies asso-
ciated with it. So far as their intrinsic nature, which is 
pure consciousness, is concerned, there is nothing to dis-
tinguish between one self and another.1 
The foregoing suggests several points of comparison 
with the system of Ramanuja. For Ramanuja as for Sankhya, 
Purusa or the self and matter or Prakriti, are independent 
realities, with this difference that in the theistic view 
of Ramanuja, Purusa and Prakriti are related in God who 
comprehends than both, so that although they are independent 
of and different from each other, they are aspects of the 
supreme being ot: Brahman. We have already said that there 
1. It should be pointed out here that in certain of 
its aspects the early literature of Sankhya holds to a the-
istic conception and thus tries to remove the contradictions 
involved in Purusa and Prakriti. The absolute self is view-
ed as a self-conscious GOd who has Prakriti as one of his 
constituent elements, by means of which he appears in the 
empirical world. As a self-conscious system and as the 
source of all activity, the absolute is regarded as super-
personal. The individual soul is a differentiation of the 
absolute who is present undivided in each individual self. 
The theistic view of Sankhya overcomes many inconsistencies 
by viewing reality as a system of persons. But it reduces 
personality to three forms. One form is that of the per-
sonality of God, which is considered to be super-human per~ 
sonality, another is the human personality which is possess-
ed by human selves and still a third is called subhuman per-
sonality which belongs to all other beings and things. Ac-
cording to early Sankhya therefore, the universe is a system 
or different gr~des of persons, God is the supreme person 
and all other b~ ings such as man, animals m d things are 
Godts individualizations or moments or modes. For fUller 
treatment, see Mujumdar, Sankhya Conce~tion of Personality, 
Calcutta, Calcutta University Press, I 3o. 
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is no clear indication in Sankhya as to what exactly the re-
lation is between Purusa and Prakriti. It is supposed that 
Purusa influences the material world towards an end. If 
Sankhya is interpreted in a theistic sense, the difficulty 
is overcome as in the case of Ramanuja, by a theory of per-
sonality. Further, as in Sarikbya system, so in Ramanuja, a 
plurality of selves is subscribed to, and both systems hold 
that the individual selves are attached to matter, just as 
both systems speak of the striving of the self to gain re-
lease from this attachment to matte~ Finally like Sankhya, 
Ramanuja speaks of matter as uncreated and eternal but com-
prehended in God and controlled by Him. 
(5) Ramanuja and the Yoga System 
Unlike Sankhya, the YOga system views God as the 
supreme person who exists in and by himself. In har.mony 
with Sankhya though, Yoga posits the existence of Purusa 
and Prakriti two independent realities which by their 
proximity cause the world and account for the manifold 
things in it. In the Sankhya system, God is brought in to 
explain the initiation of the process of evolution; in other 
words, the Yoga
1
system seeks to prove the existence of God, 
I 
not by ne ans of 
1
the cosmological argument but resorts rath-
er to a theory of the continuity of knowledge and power. 
Briefly, the argument is that: 
Knowledge is found to vary in extent and 
scope from small to great in different sub-
jects. Whatever is possessed of degrees of 
excellence, must have its maximum in some 
substratum. For instance, magnitude which 
varies in degree is minimum in the atom and 
maximum in space. So there must be a person 
in whom knowledge reaches its maximum. That 
is God.l 
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But this is not the only argument that Yoga system employs 
to prove the existence of God. Another proof consists of 
an inference drawn from the association and dissociation 
of Purusa and Prakriti. The creation of the world of things 
is ascribable to the association of Purusa with Prakriti, 
while the dissolution of the world is owing to the disso-
ciation of Purusa from Prakriti. Purusa and Prakriti are 
two independent principles, so that there can be no natural 
relation between them; yet they are related and their rela-
tion is explicable only on the basis of an intelligent prin-
ciple that brings than together, as well as separates them. 
Moreover, such association and dissociation of the 
two principles are essential to the moral and spiritual ful-
filL~ent of each individual self. As in Sankhya, so in Yoga 
each self struggles to free itself from the overwhelming in-
fluence of Prakriti and to come to a clearer consciousness 
I 
of itself. FUrther, Yoga holds, as does Sankhya, that kno~-
edge of the distinction between self and not-self leads to 
' 
1. S. Radhakrishnan, "ed. 11 , History of Philosophy 
Eastern and Western, Vol. I, p. 256. 
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the search ~or release or emancipation ~rom attachment to 
Prakriti. And it upholds the view also that worshipfUl med-
itation upon the Absolute or purusa brings about enlighten-
ment and leads to the ~reedom of the self. Accordingly the 
Yoga system contains practical measures and teachings which 
are designed as aids to the process of self-knowledge or 
freedom. Yoga explains the details of such knowledge as 
follows: 
The purity and freedom of the self are 
obscured by the constant-fluctuations of 
mind with which the self identifies himself. 
This identification is due to primal ignor-
ance (avidya) which is a positive entity 
and manifests itse!f in the forms of per-
verted cognitions. 
So under the influence of ignorance, the self regards what 
is not eternal as eternal, what is impure. as pure, pain as 
pleasure, and not-self as self. It is also owing to the 
influence of ignorance that the self identifies itself with 
intelligence, which is a product of Prakriti or matter. 
When such identification occurs, the self begins to feel 
attachment and hatred, a will to live and constant fear of 
death. Fear, hatred and attachment are the sort of passions 
that block the emergence of the spiritual life. Hence, prac-
tical measures are prescribed by Yoga for the discipline of 
mind and body. Freedom of the mind or self is obtained by 
1. s. Radhakrishnan, "ed.", History of Philosophy 
Eastern and Western, Vol. I, p. 256. 
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means of spiritual insight, which enables the individual 
self to know that it is the pure immortal spirit. Spirit-
ual insight can be had only as the mind is purified of sJ.l 
types of wandering thoughts and evil designs. 
The disciplines aimed at purifying the mind are those 
involved 1n the cultivation of love and friendliness, com-
passion for the distressed, joy at the spiritual exaltation 
of pious men, and indifference to the careless. More still, 
"such propadeutic disciplines as non-injury (~sa), 
truthrulness (satya), non-stealing (a-satya), sexual con-
tinence (brabma-cirya) and non-appropriation (a-parigraha) 
are necessary. nl Among these non-injury is the most impor-
tant and essential, since all else is involved in it. It 
is the central truth. Any thought or action that leads to 
injury is false. But all these propaedeutic disciplines 
are indispensable to the practice of concentration. In con-
centration the mind develops detachment from the physical 
objects of sense and is constantly focused upon thought of 
the Infinite. In the Yl5ga system, no less than in Sankhya, 
mere knowledge o£ the distinction between matter and spirit, 
while it is necessary, is not sufficient condition for liber-
ation or freedom cC the spirit. In addition to such knowledge, 
The establiShed psychical tendencies (the 
Samskiras and the Vasinas) should be destroyed 
1. s. Radhakrishnan, "ed.", History of Philosophy 
Eastern and Western, Vol. I, p. 257. 
first by means of a regular and graded prac-
tice, for it is they which are the cause of 
the cycles of birth and death. When they 
are de~troyed, and only When they are des-
troyed, must the fondage of the body neces-
sarily disappear. 
32 
Such, briefly is the Yoga system, and in relating Ramanuja 
to it, we should bear in mind that although he considers 
Purusa and Prakriti as distinct entities, he yet includes 
them both in the absolute Brahman. To him Brahman ''is a 
personality which comprehends within itself all plurality 
and difference and is characterized by all the qualities 
cC perfection. 112 Individual selves are actually sparks or 
qualified parts of the absolute Brahman, and "though they 
are never outside Brahman, yet they enjoy a separate per-
sonal existence forever."3 Ramanuja subscribes to Yogic 
practices as a discipline enabling the individual self to 
achieve concentration upori the infinite self. Unlike the 
Yoga system,however, in which the final goal is -identifica-
tion of the finite and infinite, Ramanuja, while he sub-
scribes to Yogic practices as purifying the individual 
soul, believes fUrther that after leaving the body it as-
cends by means of the true knowledge of Brahman to a trans-
cendental sphere, where it exists in infiirijJt.e knowledge, 
1. 
(Nagpur: 
2. 
3. 
Jwala Prasad, Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 
Nagpur University Press, 1932), p. 111. 
Ibid.' .p. 137. 
Ibid • , p. 138 • 
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deified.1 Yet deified as it is, it does not have "cosmic 
2 
rulership." The distinction between the atman fthe indi-
vidual sel£7 and Brahman is eternal, but the sense of sep-
arateness disappears.3 
(6) Ramanuja•s Relation to Vedantic System 
Vedanta develops and systemizes the philosophical 
implications of the texts of the Upanishads. All forms of 
Vedanta stand for the principle that reality is ultimately 
traceable to the universal self, Brahman. 
The Upanishads conceive Brahman not only 
as the pure ground of all reality and con-
sciousness, but also as the ultimate source 
of all joy. Worldly pleasures are only the 
distorted fragments of that joy, just as world-
ly objec~s are limited manifestations of that 
reality.'+ 
Although the beginnings of Vedanta go as far back as the 
Rig-Veda and the Upanishads, yet the development of Vedanta 
depends on such individual interpretors and teachers "as 
Gaudapada, Sankaracharya, Ramanujacharya, Vallabhacharya 
and their followers. n.5 There are many points in connnon 
1. S. Radhakrisbnan, "ed.", History of' Philosophy 
Eastern and Western, Vol. I, p. 318• 
2. Ibid., p. 319. 
3 • Ibid • ' 1 P • 319 • 
4. Satischandra Chatterjee, An Introduction to Indian 
Philosophy, p. 364. 
i 
5. Jwala Prasad, Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 
p. l.24. 
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between these interpreters, even though they differ at spe-
cific points. It is therefore easy . to see the relationship 
of Rrunanuja to the total system of Vedanta. 
Along with other Vedanta systems, Ramanuja rejects 
the view that the world is a product of material elements 
which combine to form objects. To him, the world and the 
plurality of selves are a result of the creative activity 
of the absolute Brahman, which as a personality comprehends 
within itself all plurality.1 All schools of Vedanta deal 
with the problem of the external world, some affirming its 
reality, others denying it. Sankara, for exrunple, holds 
that the world of experience with all its variety is illus~ 
ory and knowledge of it therefore false. To Ramanuja, on 
tbe contrary, the world of experience is "real and forms a 
manifestation of the nature and powers of Brahman". 2 Hence, 
in his view knowledge of the external world is real knowl-
edge. 
There is, however, a difficulty in Ramanuja•s system. 
It is his conception of matter as something unconscious, 
which is yet contained in Brahma~who is conscious. lf the 
ultimate and all- comprehensive reality is conscious and ac-
tive, must not its manifestations also be ipso facto of the 
' 1. Jwala Prasad, Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 
p. 136. 
2. Ibid.' p. 138. 
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same nature? The problem is one to which Ramanuja appears 
to give no satisfactory answer. We shall have occasion to 
deal with the matter in greater detail later in the work. 
B. Vedanta Idealisms, Their Different Kinds and Ramanuja's 
Relation to Them 
(1) Advaita or Vedanta of non-duality. 
The main thesis of advaita is found in the Vedanta 
sutras of Badarayana as interpreted by Sankara. The open-
ing lines run as follows: 
It is a matter not requiring any proof 
that the object and subject, whose respec-
tive spheres are the notion or the 'Thou' 
(the non-ego) and the 'Egor, and which are 
opposed to each other as much as darkness 
and light are, cannot be identified. Hence 
it follows that it is wrong to super-impose 
upon the subject, whose self is intelligence, 
m d which has for its sphere the notion of 
the Ego - the object whose sphere is the 
notion of the non-Ego, and the attributes 
of the object, and vice-versa to super-
impose the subject and the attributes of 
the subject on the object. In spite of this 
it is on the part of man a natural procedure 
which has its cause in wrong knowledge - not 
to distinguish the two entities (object and 
subject) and their respective attributes, 
although they are absolutely distinct, but 
to super-impose upon each the characteristic 
nature and attributes of the other, and thus, 
coupling the real and the unreal to make use 
such expr!ssions such as 'Thou am I', 'That 
is mi-q.et. 
1.. Sankara Acharya, The Vedanta Sutras, "translated 
by " (George Thibaut, Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1890}, p. 3. 
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Now !'or Sankara, 'Brahman is the only reality, inf'inite, 
eternal and the cause of all things. This reality cannot 
be known or experienced. 
It is inapprehensible by logical knowl-
edge. ' It is pure inwardness of which no 
conceptual interpretation is possible. It 
is indivisible, inalienable. It is neither 
external or conditioned by external causa-
tion. To def'ine it is to transmute it into 
object. We c~nnot . say1that it is one. It is non-dual (advaita). 
Although indescribable and inexperienceable, Brahman is not 
a bare abstraction or a mere nothing. Thus commenting on 
the Chandogya Upanishad, Sankara says: ''Those who imagine 
that that which is f'ree !'rom all determinations is as good 
2 
as non-being are the f'eeble-minded." And the ultimate 
reality, being or Brahman, is that which gives meaning to 
lif'e, for being cannot be explained as arising !'rom non-
being. So the reality of' being is presupposed in the ex-
istEnce of' anything. By means of various adjuncts this 
ultimate being, which is non-dual, homogeneous, and eternal, 
assumes dif'f'erent f'orms. "When it (Brahman) perf'orms the 
fUnction of' living it is called the vital f'orce, when it 
speaks, the organ of' speech, when it sees, the eye, when it 
hears, the ear, ~nd when it thinks, the mind."3 
1. S. Radhakrishnan, "ed.", History of' Philosophy 
Eastern and Western, Vol. I, p. 275. 
2. s. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanishads, (Lon-
oo n: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), p. 491. 
3. Ibid., ,P• 491. 
I 
! 
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Consciousness, since it is of the essence of Brahman, 
is not predicable of it. 1 For the substance-attribute cate-
gory falsifies rather than expresses the relation between 
Brahman and consciousness. Brahman is neither an indepen-
dent something which somehow owns and possesses the attri-
bute of consciousness, nor is it something in which attri-
butes inhere. JUst as light is inseparable from the sun 
and heat from fire, so consciousness is inseparable from 
Brahman. Consequently, Sankara reasons that there is no 
intelligibile sense in which we can speak of Brahman as 
knowing or being aware of itself. In Brahman, there is no 
distinction between knower and known. 
The finite self as constituted of consciousness is 
immutable, though the objects known by it are in constant 
flux. All things change and pass away, but the self per-
sists and is indestructible. In other words, the self is 
2 
"free from change and perpetually the same." If it were 
otherwise and the self were as changeful as its objects, 
knowledge would be impossible, even knowledge of change. 
Hence there is the autonomy of' the self'. "As pure conscious-
ness, the self is self-existent. No one can disprove its 
1. Sri Sankaracharya, A Theus and Teachings, "trans-
lated by", ( Swanii Jorgadananda, Madras: Sri Ramakrishna 
Math., 1949, 2nd ed.), p. 91. 
2. Ibid. , 1p. 55., 
38 
independence of other things inasmuch as it never ceases to 
exist. ul Its eternal immutability is self-evident and is 
thus in no need of evidence. What is in need of evidence is 
the object of knowledge. Its being known depends upon evi-
dence. The self, on the contrary, ''being of the nature of 
pure knowledge does not depend on an evidence to prove that 
it exists or that it is the knower. 112 So the self is 11 of 
the nature of eternal and self-effulgent knowledge not de-
pendent on anything else. 113 In Sankara•s view, therefore, 
knowledge is of the very essence of Brahman. It is not an 
attribute which qualifies Brahman. 
Sankara takes a realistic position with regard to 
the function of knowledge. rts function is to reveal the 
real nature of things. Truth is the agreement between 
thought and reality. Where there is no parity between 
thought and thing, there is no knowledge. In this realistic 
vein, Sankara insists upon the relation of logic to reality. 
To deny this is to deny the relation of logic to truth. 
Further, according to Sankara, "the knowledge of the real 
nature of a thing does not depend on human notions, but on 
the thing itself. ,.4 
1. Sri Sankaracharya, A Thousand Teachings, p. 57. 
2. Ibid., p. 57. 
3 • Ibid • ' p . 62 • 
4. R. P. Singh, The Vedanta of Sankara, (Jaipur: 
Bharat Publishing House, 1949), p. 168. 
The reason is that there can be no option 
regarding the real nature of a thing: it can-
not be of this nature as well as of that na-
ture and also of a third one. Knowledge which 
satisfies this condition, i.e. , knowledge which 
reveals reality, which is controlled by it, and 
which is not relative to human notions, is real 
knowledge. It is tatvajnana.l 
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"At the same time it is Sanyagnana. 112 All real knowledge, 
whether it is spiritual or sensuous, intuitional or percep-
tual, is characterized by unchangeability. In this respect 
all knowledge is one and the same, whether its object is 
Brahman or some sensuous particular. The knowledge _that 
fire is hot, is as knowledge, on an equal footing with the 
knowledge of Brahman as absolute being, intelligence and 
bliss, or the knowledge that the world is transitory and 
without essence. 
True knowledge is independent of time, place, and 
circumstance. To Sankara this is so because the nature of 
a thing is eternal; it can never be other than what it is. 
It is with these eternal essences that knowledge is con-
cerned, so that the marks of knowledge are universality 
and necessity. The knowledge, for example, that fire is 
hot corresponds to the nature of the object and is true ir-
respective of time, place and circumstance, which is to say 
that it is universal and necessary. And so likewise are 
1. R. P. Singh, The Vedanta of Sankara, p. 168. 
2. Ibid., p. 168. 
all types of knowledge whether aprior1 or aposteriori, per-
ceptual or intuitive. Whether the knowledge is of God, or 
of the self or of empirical phenomena, it is as revelatory 
of eternal essences, possessed of the same logical status. 
Yet this equality of all knowledge does not prevent 
Sankara from drawing a distinction between universal and 
particular knowledge. But the distinction is one of value 
and not of logic. R. P. Singh writes that: 
Sankara calls it the distinction between 
Visesa Vijfiana and Mirvisesa Vijnana, i. e., 
knowledge or reality as limited by name and 
for.m, and reality as unlimited by any adjunct, 
because all limiting adjuncts are nothing 
other than Brahman which is the reality ani 
a thing cannot be limited by its own self. 
Universal knowledge alone is conducive to the attainment of 
the highest good. While the logical for.m of such judgments 
as that fire is hot and that Brahman comprises all selves 
is the same, still the one as particular has not the value 
or the other, which is universal. In judging that fire is 
hot, we have perfect knowledge, but perfect only in a cer-
tain sense, and not absolutely. For fire, as all other phe-
nomena, is an effect or being, and any true judgment about 
it is in the last analysis a judgment about being. To judge 
of it as fire m~rely is to judge of a mere name and form. It 
is only in rela~ion to pure being that it is truly known, 
for the basis of all true 
I 
knowledge is pure being. Particu-
1. R. P. Singh, The Vedanta of Sankara, p. 173. 
lar knowledge is knowledge ~ the real through its limiting 
adjuncts, and the essence of these lies precisely in their 
incompleteness. Such knowledge, when it assumes a guise 
not its own, 11is knowledge of a thing not having its being 
in and through the absolute but having a self-subsisting 
independence and enjoying an existence in its own right and 
for its own self. To view a thing thus is to view it 
falsely. nl This is to say that "particular knowledge is 
incomplete knowledge, which is the same as knowledge of an 
incomplete reality, the universal knowledge is knowledge of 
the reality in its absolute completeness. "2 And this for 
Sankara is Brahman knowledge. 
With regard to the relation of the world of things 
to the absolute of Brahman, Sankara does not assert the ab-
solute oneness of Brahman and the world, but only denies 
their difference. Brahnan, he opines, is the only reality, 
absolute, homegeneous, impersonal and transcendent. It is 
the universal, the only self. How, then, is one to account 
for the differences and plurality so characteristic of the 
world of experience? They are illusory and as such ascrib-
able of false knowledge, in a word, to Maya. Maya itself 
is inexplicable. 
I 
It covers true reality like darkness, and 
is the (-cause of all current distinctions of 
' 
1. R. P. Singh, The Vedanta of Sankara, p. 174. 
2. Ibid., p. 174. 
subject and object cause and erfect, good 
and evil, birth and death, etc. 
The doctrine or Maya is an attempt to explain, if •explain• 
is the right word, the relation between ultimate reality and 
the created world or things. The meaning or the term •ma:yar 
varies rrom one context ix> . another in Sankara. so he uses 
it to signify the phenomenal character or the world. Or he 
uses it to convey the incomprehensible character of the re-
lation between the world of things and the absolute Brahman, 
in that it rests upon Brahman, the world is caused by him, 
yet Brahman is not touched or influenced by the world. Again, 
Sankara uses Maya as the principle underlying the assumpticn 
that the world is really the appearance of Brahman. Or he 
may employ it to signiry the creative power or the perrect-
personality or Isvara by whose activity the world or things 
has come to be. 
It is this creative power of Isvara or God 
that is transrormed into Upadhi or limitation, 
the unmanifested matter (avyakta Prakriti), 
rrom which all existence issues. If knowledge 
or Brahman is true knowledge, then the knowl-
edge of the particulars, namely the empirical 
world, is false knowledge, the latter being 
the cause o£ the distinctions of subject and 
object, cause and errect, good and evil, birth 
and death, etc. And true knowledge, knowledge 2 of Brahman, is the only way of overcoming maya. 
Such knowledge is true enlightenment, 
1. Jwala Prasad, Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 
p. 133. 
2. Ibid., pp. 133-134. 
•••• a state of complete identification of the 
individual self with the universal self of 
Brahman. It is a state in which all distinc-
tions, even that of subject and object, dis-
appear, and consequently a bare identity or 
unity of Brahman is all that is left. 
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Where then do the individual selves fit into this pic-
ture? What is their relation to the absolute self? To San-
kara, the individual self or the jiva is a composite of self 
ani not-self. 
All experience is based on the confUsion 
between the two. The wrong identification 
(ad,aba) of the self with t~ not-self is 
the asis of all experience. Through asso-
ciation with the limitations (upadhi) like 
the internal organ (antah-karana) the self 
fUnctions as enjoyer subject to rebirth or 
bondage. When we speak of the individual 
1!!! as born or as growing we mean that its 
adjuncts come into being or grow and not 
tihat the spirit is born or grows. Jiva is 
an empirical form or manifestation or-Bran-
man. Its finitude and separateness are due 
to the limitations of the media. The human 
individual belongs to the object side, is 
an eteme~t in the perpetual procession of 
Samsara. 
Viewed in its true character, distinct from adjuncts, the 
individual self is consciousness. It is an objective cog-
nition, it is the very f .orm of consciousness. All changes 
are in this consciousness and not changes of it. The in-
dividual consciousness is really the witness or siksin of 
1. Jwala Prasad, Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 
p. 134. 
2. s. Radhakrishnan, History of Philosophy Eastern 
and Western, p. 280. 
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the infinite consciousness. The siksin is always present, 
while the changes which it witnesses come and go. The know-
er is implied in all empirical knowledge, but it is not it-
self an object of such knowledge. Nothing· can be both sub-
ject and object. For example, the eye can see other things 
but not itself. "When we say we know ourselves, it is the 
empirical self that we know. The true self cannot be known 
as an object, though as subject it is self-revealing. 111 The 
relation between the supreme self and the individual self is 
like the relation between the I and the Thou. The I element 
is so opposed to the not-self, or~ element, that they 
cannot be predicated of each other. Logically, no explana-
tion can be adduced for the relation between the I and the 
; 
not-I. There is a psychological tendency on the part of the 
individual selves to regard themselves as real, independent-
ly of the absolute self. This tendency of the mind is owing 
to ignorance or maya cannot be traced to any source, for 
"maya .covers the whole of cosmic manifestation. 112 When 
freed from maya or ignorance, the individual souls, no long-
er harbor the il~usion o~ distinctness ~rom one another. 
What happens in the state of ~iberation is not the disappear-
ance of all plur~lity but the loss rather of the ego sense. 
i 
1. S. Rad~akrishnan, History of Philosophy Eastern 
and Western, p. ;280. 
2. Ibid., fP • 280. 
! 
45 
And this is not loss of "life and existence."1 
We are now in a position to estimate Ramanuja's re-
lation to the Vedantic theory as interpreted by Sankara. 
To Sankara, as we have seen, Being is homogeneous conscious-
ness and perpetuity of blissful existence. In his view, 
further, particulars are determinations of Being, and as 
so determined, Being cannot be absolute. To Ramanuja, 
however, the Absolute is inclusive of particulars in all 
their infinite variety. The Absolute is the synthesis of 
I 
all its detenninations. It is precisely through, the vari-
ety of its attributes that the Absolute more completely ex-
presses its richness. Although Ramanuja agrees with Sankara 
that consciousness is the basis of all knowledge and exper-
ience, he yet differs from him in his conception of Being. 
Sankara distinguishes between the changing character of hu-
man thought and the immutable character of absolute thought 
or pure cognition, arguing that human thought involves re-
lations, whereas absolute thought does not. Sankara is 
therefore, obliged to assert the static character of abso-
lute cognition. For Ramanuja, all knowledge, whether human 
or divine involves relation, as is shown by judgment, which 
is the unit of all knowledge. Absolute cognition in the 
absence of all determination is not knowledge. Knowledge 
1. S. Radhakrishnan, History of Philosophy Eastern 
and Western, p. 281. 
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is knowledge just because it involves the recognition of 
the relation between thought and thing. It is this that 
makes knowledge a dynamic process in which as more and more 
relations are discovered, the more numerous the determina-
tions that are known and so synthesised. Knowledge when it 
is not fully synthesised, remains to that extent indetermi-
nate, so that what is known is not known in the fullness of 
its relations. 
\Vhile he agrees with Sankara that Being is the abso-
lute category, Ramanuja differs from him in emphasizing the 
concrete nature ' of Being , which in his view, as we have 
seen, is a synthesis of attributes. His Absolute is not of 
the abstract and impersonal sort which we have encountered 
in Sankara ~ For Ramanuja, the Absolute contains the phe-
nomenal world with all its categories as moments within it-
self. Again, although both thinkers come together in view-
ing the Absolute as being of the nature of consciousness, 
they also part company at this point. Sankara denies char-
acter or personality to the Absolute, considering the Abso-
lute as the highest abstraction of impersonal consciousness~ 
Being is identity, not unity, for if' attributes are posited 
of' Being, it follows that Being is capable of division. Nei-
ther divided or synthesised into a unity, Being for Sankara 
is absolute identity, with no place in it for attributes. 
The latter, if they are anything, are the same as Being. It 
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is true that Ramanuja himself emphasizes the identity of 
Being, but the identity he has in mind is concrete identity. 
He is aware that empty identity and sheer difference are in-
capable of synthesis, so that he conceives of a relation 
wherein the identity is noL merely formal. Thus in the case 
of Brahman on the one hand the individual selves and the 
world on the other, the relation between them is like the 
relation between body and mirid. The individual selves and 
the world are sakti or power or quality or Brahman. Sakti 
and its possessor are inseparable, yet different. Accord-
ingly, the Absolute is not indeterminate but determinate. 
That is, it is particularized by sakti or power. The lat~ 
ter has no existence apart from Brahman, and to that extent 
there is identity between the two, yet the one is not the 
other, and there is thus difference between than. 
Both Sankara and Ramanuja attach the greatest impor-
tance to liberation of the individual selves, with this 
difference that whereas for Sankara, the experiences of the 
individual self add nothing to its development, ending only 
in an identification with Brahman, for Ramanuja liberation 
is a gain in ~owledge, bliss and being. Unlike Sankara, 
he holds that individual experience is real, not illusory, 
and is a manifestation of the nature and powers of the 
Absolute Brahman. 
It should be clear from the foregoing that, while 
there is much in common between advaita Vedanta of Sankara 
and Visistadvaita, they also differ in important respects. 
But Advaita is only one branch of the Vedanta system and 
we proceed now to determine Ramanuja•s relation to other 
branches. 
(2} Rrunanuja's Relation to the Dvaita or Dualistic 
Vedanta • .. 
Madhva, the chief representative of the system we 
are about to consider, takes the view that objects can be 
known as they are. To dispute this view is to deny the 
very possibility of knowledge. All cognition has an ob-
ject, and could not exist without it. Further, true knowl-
edge directly presents itself as true. Indeed, the criter-
ion of such knowledge is self-evidence. Yet, since all 
true knowledge is accompanied by intellectual and volition-
al harmony, we have a criterion which may be applied in 
doubtful cases. For false knowledge is marked by the ab-
sence of harmony. Given the self-evident character of true 
cognition, it is a mistake to suppose that truth may be in-
ferred from the soundness of its source. Such a view would 
make truth, which is the very essence of knowledge, depend-
ent on conditiqns external to knowledge. If knowledge were 
not the apprehension of objects as the,y are, then it follows: 
"(a) that knowledge is objectless ani it has nothing in it 
to explain itself, and (b) that knowledge is dependent on 
external conditions. 111 
That things are presented in knowledge as they are 
in themselves is evidenced to the self acting as t'wi tness" 
(saksin). All selves are capable of acting in this capac-
ity and so of apprehending all that ha.pp ens in the process 
of cognition. At the same time Madhva points out that "the 
self, knower, knowledge, •witness• and their self-evident 
2 
nature are only distinctions in unity." If they were al-
together different, they could never be brought together. 
Nor can pure identity or non-duality be posited of knowl-
edge. Pure identity is a contradiction in terms, for every 
case of identity necessarily involves distinction of the 
things identified. No identity is conceivable, except as 
thus qualified (sa-visesa). 
The "witness,, or saksin is that Which endures throu81-
out the selfts varying states. We might say that it is the 
very core of self. For the waking state of the self it tes-
tifies to the knowledge derived from perception, inference 
and verbal testimony. Perception results from the operatim 
of this or that sense organ. Whatever the organ, however, 
it does not work undirected by the self. The self thus as 
an active principle is not determined by things that are ex-
1. S. Radhakrislman, "ed.", History of Philosophy 
Eastern and Wes'tern, p. 323. 
2. Ibid., p. 323. 
ternal to it, as !analysis of perception shows. Inference 
I 
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involves the presence of three terms, the major (sadhya), · 
the middle (~), and minor (fpaksa). This concomitance is 
discovered through repeated observation and is expressed: 
1 
"If the middle, then the major." The validity of verbal 
testimony (agama) depends upon the cognition of what the 
words express. The truth of knowledge so yielded remains 
true whether verbalized or not. In t he waking state, mind 
(manas) gives rise to memory as the result of past impres-
sions as it does in the dream state as well. If dream ob-
jects are real a,s such, yet they do not possess the same 
status as actually perceived objects. The external sense 
I 
organs do not function in sleep, which is to say that they 
are different f~om the self, for the self continues to 
function even irt sleep. The awareness produced by the sen-
ses is always of some object, which is apprehended by the 
self or •witness' or saksin as: 11This is external to self. 112 
In all such cases of objective awareness, a modification of 
mind takes place in the form of a •this•. In dreamless 
sleep the •witness' alone functions. It apprehends the 
I 
self as asleep, 1 an apprehension that memory recalls, as 
when I say, "t ijl.l now I slept happily. 113 
and 
I 
I 
I 
1. s. Radrakrishnan, 
Western, p. : 323. 
2. Ibid., p. 324. 
_.3. Ibid., p. 324. 
History of Philosophy Eastern 
The knowledge by fwitnessr or (s~sin) differs from 
that which comes about through the modification of mind. 
The •witness' (saksin) grasps the object as it-: truly is, 
vh ere as mind may fail to do so. For example, the knowledge 
by •witness' such as the awareness of the "I" as ''I'', or 
the awareness of happiness as enjoyed by "I" is always cor-
rect. On the other hand the mind may be mistaken in sup-
posing that "this is silver," for example. Further yet, 
knowledge by 'witness' is independent c:£ knowledge as a 
mental modification, and the latter moreover, is dependent 
upon the former.. Awareness of 11 ! 11 is independent of mind, 
but the knowledge that "this is silver, 11 since it necessar-
ily involves the knowledge of time is dependent upon wit-
ness, for such knowledge is owing to the latter. That 
knowledge of time does not come from mind is evident from 
the fact that, though mind ceases to operate in sleep, we 
are yet aware of the passage of time. Again, knowledge by 
•witness' is self-evident knowledge, as knowledge through 
mental modification is not. The one presents itself while 
presenting its object, the other presents us with items 
specified, but not by itself, as particulars. Now aware-
I 
ness of the particulars as particulars is possible only in 
,contrast to the rest of the universe, and awareness of the 
rest of the universe falls outside the scope of mental 
knowledge, which is confined to the particular as related 
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to the mind by sense. Hence knowledge that goes beyond the 
particular must be knowledge by 'witness'. 
I 
smcsin or ;witnessing intelligence, is "the knower it-
self acting as a~ instrument of knowledge. 111 It involves 
I 
perception but perception of a peculiar kind. In this kind 
I 
of perception the witnessing intelligence is not only the 
knower but also the instrument of knowledge. And the ob-
I 
I jects of this perception are the intrinsic nature of the 
self, the self's1 properties or attributes such as pleasure, 
pain, et ceter~. 2 What other schools consider as objects 
I 
of internal perc,eption, are regarded by Madhva as percep-
tions of the witnessing subject. 
I 
But as perceptions such witnessing cogni-
tions will be generated events and will thus 
lack the tine lessness involved in the witness-
ing c~nsciou~ness of temporal mental events 
as temporal.) 
For Madhva knowledge is never indeterminate but al-
' 
ways possessed 9f a definite character. It is a mistake to 
suppose that perception is in the first instance indetermi-
nate. Such a supposition is falsified by the fact that per-
caption involves modification of mind, which in turn is de-
i pendent on 'Witness' and Jwitnesss, as noted above, grasps 
' 
' 
the_ object as it is. No less a mistake is the supposition 
I 
I 
I 
i 1. S. K. Maitra, Madhva Logic, (Calcutta: Calcutta 
Unl.versi ty Pres!s, 1936), p. XX. 
2. Ibid.,/ p. XX. 
3. Ibid. ,f p. XX. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
that indeterminate knowledge may arise through reflection 
and meditation, for here too the contributions of mind and 
'witness' are undeniable. In a word, to claim that knowl-
edge is indeterminate contravenes the very nature of knowl-
edge. Here we find that Madhva is really arguing against 
the position taken by Sankara that knowledge is indeter.mi-
nate. 
In Madhva•s view reality consists of two sorts of 
reals, one dependent the other independent. Both being and 
non-being are included under the first. Being is either 
eternal or transitory, while the eternal is either con-
scious or inert. Further, Madhva, descr::D:> es being as that 
which is cognized in the initial perception, while non-
being is that which is not so cognized, or that which is 
cognized as non-existing in the initial perception. Al-
though non-being is the negation of a particular reference, 
Madhva yet assigns to it a locus with which it is identical. 
It is here with regard to the problem of non-being 
that Ramanuja specially differs from Madhva. To Ramanuja, 
non-being is a relative concept which is intelligible not 
in itself, but only with reference to a locus and object. 
It is therefore1 not an ultimate, but indicative ratmr of 
a change in the; condition of a t.h ing or being. So while 
I 
both thinkers accept the idea of non-being, they do not 
I 
agree about its meaning. Nor do they agree either about 
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1h e relation between the many ani the . one. Madhva differs 
from Sankara who asserts the one at the expense of the many, 
and from Ramanuja who makes the many a predicate of the one. 
Madhva cannot accept the position of Sankara, because it 
denies the truth of the many nor can he accept the position 
of Ramanuja, because it involves a relational individual 
consciousness and thus leads to an infinite regress·. By 
ne ana of his doctrine of specific particulars, Madhva be-
lieves he can introduce difference into the absolute without 
derogating from its character as absolute, and without in-
volving himself in the regress of relational consciousness. 
(3) The System of Unity-in-Difference or Bhedabheda 
Much in common exists between this system represent-
ed by Bhaskara, and the system of Ramanuja. The problem 
Bhaskara is most concerned with is that of the relation of 
the absolute or Brahman to the finite world of things. For 
Sankara, as we have seen, the absolute alone is real, so 
that the world of appearance, if it has any reality at all, 
cannot be different from the absolute; while for Madhva the 
world is absolutely different from Brahman. Now for Bhas-
kara too, the ~orld is real, at the same time that it is 
both different ' and not-different from Brahman or Bhednbheda. 
This appears to be the position of Rmnanuja as well, 
but with a difference of emphasis, as will be seen in a 
moment. Bh&skara•s system represents a new approach to the 
fundamental problem of the relation of the one and the many. 
He insists that the relationship of difference or bheda and 
of non-difference or abheda, apply with equal and simultan-
-eous validity to Brahman. His argument is based upon the 
cause-effect or whole-part relation. 
Causality, he reasons, is neither a relation nor pure 
identity, nor sheer difference, but one of identity-in-dif-
ference. An effect differs from its cause, having a nature 
and function peculiar to itself, as may be illustrated, for 
example, by a clay jar. The jar, but not the lump of clay, 
may be used to fetch water, and in this respect, as in others, 
differs from the lump of cls:y, its cause. Yet at the same 
time the jar is 'not different .from the clay, and as cause 
and effect here are one. On the other hand, the cause is 
more than the effect. Thus the lump or clay is capable of 
being moulded not only into a jar but a hundred other things 
besides. Still the cause is the effect, one with it and 
permeating the effect · throu~ and through. Both the clay 
and the jar are equally clay. On this basis, then, Bhis-
' kara argues that the absolute is different from the world 
of things and spuls, since these are only effects of Brah-
man, their cause, and the cause is not exhausted in its 
' 
effects. But it is true also that the absolute is not dif-
ferent from the' world, since the cause permeates its effects. 
Accordingly, the world, corporeal as well as incorporeal, 
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differs from the 'absolute, as possessing attributes and 
activities that are not as such to . be found in the absolute. 
Contrariwise, th~ world does not differ from the absolute, 
being merely a modification of it. 
All this is in substantial agreement with Ramanuja's 
own position. But there is a difference. While for him 
too the absolute is one and also many, its oneness is not 
quite like that of Bhaskara. It is rather like that of a 
system whose unity is a unity in and through differences. 
<4) visistadvaita or Ramanuja' s Theory of Vedanta 
The Bhedabheda theory, as we have seen, holds that 
identity and difference are equally real. Ultimate reality 
or Brahman as cause is one and identical, as effect it is 
many and different. Rronanuja is critical of this view, 
pointing out that unity and difference cannot be both sep-
arately real, nor affirmed of one and the same thing. The 
same ultimate r~ality cannot simultaneously express itself 
in two modes of ,being, the one identical and the other dif-
ferent. As already said, pure identity, no less than pure 
difference, is a mere abstraction without reality. Unity 
or identity, h~ insists, is always qualified by difference. 
"Difference as :such has no reality except as it modifies or 
determines the 'identical subject to which it refers."l Re-
1. 
vis~d 11 , 
p. 4-89. 
S. Raqhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, "2nd ed. re-
London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1929) Vol. II 
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jecting, therefo~e the theory of identity-in-difference, 
I 
Ramanuja substitJ tes for it the theory of ,.identity in and 
I 
I 1 
through and because of difference." In his view, it is 
I 
I 
absurd to suppos~ that the absolute really suffers bondage 
I 
or enjoys liberation. The personality of the absolute is 
always permanent, but the body of this absolute undergoes 
I 
I 
change. This bo1y is made up of individual souls and mat-
ter. Ramanuja 1 s /metaphysics is t h erefore called "Visistad-
vaita or non-dualism qualified by difference. 
The ' absolute is an organic unity, an iden-
tity w~ich is qualified by diversity. It is 
a concrete whole (visista) which consists of 
the inter-related and inter-dependent subordi-
nate e~ements which are called 'vishesanast 
and the immanent ar:rl controlling spirit which 
is called 'vishesha'. Unity means realizatio~ 
of being a vital member of this organic whole. 
I 
2. Bowne's Place in Western Idealism 
I 
I 
A. His Relation to Leibniz 
I 
I At the head of this inquiry here Leibniz must be 
placed, far in his work on metaphysics Bowne says that it 
I 
was Leibniz who !fUrnished the starting point for his own 
inquiry.3 The sense in which Leibniz sets the stage for 
I 
. I 
Bowne becomes apparent at once when it is recalled that 
I 
I 
for the German ~hinker reality consists of monads. The 
and 
I 
1. s. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol.II, p.489. 
I 
2. Ibid., IP· 497. 
3-. Borden 1 P. Bowne, Metaphysics, (New York: Harper 
Brothers, 1882), p. vii. 
I 
I 
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monads are indivisible, without extension and without parts. 
They are active, and are identified by Leibniz with selves. 
Each monad differs from the other, and all undergo change. 
As selves they retain their identity at the same time that 
they change. F\lrther, the monads have no external connec-
tion with one another, yet there is a connection or what 
Leibniz calls a pre-established har.mony between them. Each 
monad reflects the universe from its own point of view, but 
while doing this it is perfectly in accord with every other 
monad. such harmony, since it is not the result or inter-
action or inter-communication between monads, must be as-
cribed to a hannonizer, a supreme self, who is God. It is 
therefore possible for Leibniz to say: 
But in simple substances the influence of 
one monad upon another is only ideal, and it 
can have its effect only through the media-
tion of God, insofar as in the ideas of God 
any monad rightly claims that God, in regu-
lating the others trom the beginning of 
things, fh ould ba ve regard to it. For since 
one created monad cannot have any physical 
influence upon the inner being of another, 
it is only by this means thai the one can 
be dependent upon the other. 
Bowne develops a theory of coordination which is not entire-
ly unlike Leibn~z•s pre-established harmony. So Bowne writes: 
Interaction is possible in a manifold 
only as the members of the manifold are 
dependent upon some unitary being, which 
1. G. w. Leibniz, The Monadology, trans. by, (Robert 
Latta, London: Oxford Unlversltj Press, 1898), p. 246. 
either coordinates and mediates their inter-
actions, or of1which they are but phases or modifications. 
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Further, as in Leibniz, so in Bowne, reality con-
sists of individual selves whose chief characteristics are 
freedom, activity and independence, and all selves are com-
prehended by God, the Supreme Self. God is the source of 
their internal actions. While it is the case that there 
are differences between Bowne's theory of coordination and 
Leibniz•s pre-established harmony, just as there are differ-
ences between the monads of the one and the selves of the 
other, yet the two thinkers agree in ascribing all inter-
actions to God. So Bowne · takes over Leibniz•s spiritual 
pluralism of individual selves each possessing a certain 
completeness, perfection, and sufficiency, which makes in 
Leibniz' s words, "the sources of their internal activities. 112 
And Leibniz would no doubt readily understand Bowne's words 
when he writes: ' 
If the interaction of independent things 
were simply mysterious, there would be no 
reason for rejecting it; but since it invol-
ves contradiction, we must declare that all 
interaction between the many is really an 
immanent action in the one. How this action 
takes place, whether with free intelligence 
or with blind necessity we do not decide at 
present. It is enough to have shown that 
the ultimate pluralism of spontaneous thought 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 128. 
2. G. W. Leibniz, The Monadology, p. 229. 
I 
6o 
must be exchanged for a basal monism; and the 
unity thus reached is not ·the unity of a logi-
cal universal, nor of anw ideal classification 
of any kind, but the essential substantial uni-
ty of a being which alone is self-existent and 
in which all things have their being.l 
B. Bowne•s Relation to Berkeley 
Bowne describes his metaphysical system as Kantian-
. 2 
ized Berkeleianism. Certainly his debt to the English 
thinker is great. It stems especially from Berkeley's view 
of reality as consisting of immaterial substances, that is 
to say, spirits, human as well as divine spirits. To Ber-
keley "a spirit is one simple, undivided, active being: as 
it perceives ideas it is called the understanding and as it 
produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the 
will. u3 The being of things lies in their being perceived, 
for esse is percipi, so that the notion of an unperceived 
thing is a co~radiction in terms. What then happens to 
thi~ s when they: go unperceived? The answer is that they 
continue to be perceived by God in whose mind they have a 
continuous existence. But the important thing for Bowne 
is not Berkeley's immaterialism (if such it is), but his 
emphasis upon t~e activity of spirits. Indeed it is just 
1. 
2. 
p. 423. 
3. 
Jessop, 
I 
Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 130. 
Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, 11revis ed edition 11 , 
I 
I 
George Berkeley, "edited by", (A. A. Luce and T. E 
V~~. II, London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd.), p.52. 
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this activity that is the proof for Berkeley or the exist-
ence of spirits,, and their reality is proportionate to the 
degree or their 1activity so that the supreme reality is God, 
who is pure act~vity. The dynamic character or spirits 
stands in contrast to the purely passive character or ideas. 
I 
Ideas are inert and fleeting, subsisting not in themselves, 
but only in minds or spiritual substances. Given the depen-
dent and passive character or ideas, it is or course a mis-
take to suppose that ideas cause each other. The connection 
I 
between them stems !'rom God, and the laws or nature are 
I 
nothing but the excitement in the mind by God or these ideas 
I in a regular and constant order. 
I With regard to Bowne's relation to Berkeley, it shoUld 
be pointed out at once, that insof'ar as the latter's ide~sn 
is based partly upon epistemological considerations, in par-
ticular upon the egocentric predicrunent, Bowne parts company 
!'rom him. For, lin Bowne•s view, no tenable idealism can be 
based upon such ,considerations. On the contrary, it must be 
based not merell' upon the knowing process but also upon anal-
1 • 
ysis of the object known. In this respect his position dif-
fers somewhat from that or Berkeley. It af'tirms, in realis-
tic rashion, the existence or an objective order independent 
of the knower. Nevertheless Bowne insists at the same time 
I 
that :this order has a phenomenal reality and exists only in 
I 
and tor and through a supreme intelligence, which is God. 
I 
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I 
In common : with Berkeley, Bowne holds that the dis-
1 
t inctive mark of' 1 being consists in some power of action, 
! 
that to be is to , be a cause. For us things exist by vir-
' I tue of their activity whereby they appear as agents in a 
I 
I 
system. So Bowne, categorically asserts that being is not 
I 
I 
just inert substknce, but activity first and last. The 
i 
rule or law according to which a thing acts, represents 
I 
to our thought the nature of' the thing. But he insists 
I 
equally that the thing must remain identical with itself' 
in the midst of ~1 its changes. Such identity in diver-
I 
sity, permanence: in change is to be found in personality 
I 
I 
alone. Here, if; Bowne does not contradict Berkeley, he 
I 
certainly goes beyond him. 
thought is cert~nly to be 
I 
activity of' spi~it. 
I 
Yet one of the seeds of Bowne's 
found in Berkeley's notion of' 
Further, 'the two thinkers stand for a monistic view 
! 
I 
of the world, t~e monism based upon God as the ultimate 
I 
source of order 1in the world. God is the great coordina-
I 
tor. But to a greater extent than Berkeley, Bowne assigns 
an autonomy to fndividual spirits, which, however~ is not 
incompatible, hJ feels, with making God their ultimate 
source. Thus he! writes: 
In /calling it the infinite, we do not mean 
that ~t excludes the coexistence of the finite, 
but ortly that it is the self-sufficient source 
of' t~ finite. In calling it the absolute, we 
do not exclude it from all relation but deny 
only , xternal restriction and determination. 
I 
In calling it the world ground, we do not 
think of a spatial support, and still less 
of a raw material out of which things are 
made, but rather of that basal causality 
by which the world is produced and main-
tained. Everything else has its cause and 
reason in this being. Whatever is true or 
rational or real · in the universe must be 
traced to this b!ing as its source and de-
termining agent. 
He quickly adds that: 
I 
On all these accounts we must hold the 
~ersonal is possible only as dependent 
phenomenon, or process of an energy not its 
own. 10nly sel.fkood serves to mark off the 
finite as substantial reality, and to give 
it an~ ontological otherness to the infinite. 
Apart trom this, there is essentially noth-
ing bu~ the iotinite and its manifold activ-
ities.; . 
C. Bowne's Relation to Kant 
It is a measure or Bowne's indebtedness to Kant that 
' the categories of knowledge are almost the same for him as 
for the German ~hinker. To both men, categories are imm~t 
mental principles which orders experience and make it possi-
1 ble. FOr Kant, as Bowne writes, "experience is possible onlJ 
through a certaiin constitutive mental activity according to 
principles immanent in the understariiing. n3 '!'his is also 
Bowne•s own position, so that for h±m, too, the raw 
I 
1. Borden lp. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed.", p. 93. 
2. Ibid., p. 99· 
I 3. Borden ·P. Bowne, Personalism, (Boston: Houghton, 
Mifflin and Company, 1908), p. $$. 
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materials of the , sensibility, which are not intelligible 
I 
of themselves, can be organized into a rational world of 
experience and knowledge only through the ordering capac-
ity and interpre~ing function of mind itself. Examples of 
this ordering capacity are time and space, which are forms 
impressed by the mind upon experience. Another is the cat-
egory of causali~y without which events would be groundless 
and experience would fall asunder into chaos. So for Bowne 
' 
as for Kant, it 1. s only by means of forms and categories of 
the mind that we, reach intelligible objects. But Bowne be-
lieves that the Kantian categories need to be completed by 
I 
a higher category, namely, purpose, or the elevation of 
causality. And .such causality is only to be found in a 
I 
self-active, self-determining person. It is this category 
of the self-dete1rmining person that Bowne sets up as the 
ultimate basis of all understanding and explanation. But 
I 
it is not only in the emphasis that he places upon the self 
' that Bowne differs from Kant. He rejects the skeptical con-
elusions of Kant1 ar:d affirms the possibility of metaphysics. 
I 
D. Bowne•s Relation to Hegel 
Bowne aptly describes Hegelianism as a form of imper-
1 -
sonalism in which all concrete reality, including intelli-
gence, is generdted by some logical process from an ultimate, 
impersonal reality. To Bowne, idealism of this impersonal 
[ 
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I 
sort, although, in origin, 
outcome is orten lidentical 
I 
antipodal to naturalism, yet in 
with natural!~, and hence a per-
ennial source of latheistic reasoning.1 In impersonal ideal-
I ism "the individual" Bowne writes, "is merged in the class 
I term ani this soon passes for the universal and all em.brac-
' . I . 
ing Being.n2 w.n,reas for Bowne the finite self is a metapbJ-
' 
sically di~creet [ unit with a high degree of impenetrability, 
for Hegel it eve~tually becomes involved in the category of 
I 
neces~ity which ~es all reality one self-contained and cam-
plate experience f wherein finite persons are only model ex-
pressions of one /self-realizing absolute mind. 
Yet if the eventual outcome of the Hegelian system 
I 
I is the disappearance of the self, it is still true to say 
I 
I that Hegel•s account, for example in his Philosophy of 
Right, of the pr6cess leading to self.hood is full of in-
1 
structions for t~e personalist and that Bowne was not un-
1 
aware of the faci. What Hegel bas written of the charac-
. I 
ter of mind is ii accord with what Bowne has written of 
I 
the character of lthe self. 
The 1 a~ of mind, (says Hegel), is tore-
alize itself in its world; mind is not lost 
in thi~ other, rather it preserves and real-
izes itself there, stamps its own inward na-
ture on the other, giviq; the latter a mode 
I 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, pp. 218-219. 
I 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thouept and Knowledge, 
(New York: American Book Company, 1897), p. 247. 
I 
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o"lf being agreeable to the nature of mind, and 
fu.us by, .the sublation of the other of definite 
actual :difference, attains concrete explicit 
being and definite self-revelation. In this 
way what mind reveals in t£-e other is only 
itself , 1 its proper nature. · 
I Again, in agreement with Hegel, Bowne emphasizes that real-
ity is rational; 'for him too, what is real is rational and 
what is rational 1is rea1, 2 so that reality is in · some way 
an organic whole ~ And like Hegel further, he holds that 
I 
all reality must be viewed as conscious experience. Where 
I . 
he differs from negel is in his view of the status of per-
i . 
sons in reality • [ To him reality is always a self or person. 
Whereas for an impersonal idealist like Hegel the person is 
explained in terms of the categories, for a personalist like 
I 
Bowne the categories are explained in ternlS of personality. 
I 
I 
I It is no wonder, therefore, that Bowne takes exception to 
I 
Hegel's treatment of particular selves. Hegel, he f ee1s, 
I 
empties the particular self of its uniqueness in such a way 
as to make it relatively worthless. Whether rightly or 
wrongly, he also charges Hegel with failing to do justice 
to the volitional and cognitive aspects of human experience.3 
I 
' i 
1. Quoted pY Hugh Adam Reyburn, The Ethical Theory of 
Hegel, {Oxford: flarendon Press, 1921), p. 89. 
2. Ibid., p. 54. cf. Borden P. Bowne, Studies · in 
Theism, (New York, Phillips and Hunt, 1879), pp. 117-118. 
Note. It is to he pointed out however that reality is not 
Iiillited to humanj reason; it comprises the whole of exper-
ience. 
3. Borden ~ . Bowne, Personalism, p. 263. 
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i 
I 
I 
E. Bowne's Relation to Herbart 
I If Leibniz provided the starting point of Bowne•s 
' 
metaphysics, it was Herbart who, as Bowne acknowledges, sup-
:1 plied its method~ Now Herbart holds that the task of meta-
l 
I 
· physics is to bring experience under the law of non-contra-
' I 
I 
diction and so render it consistent and comprehensible. And 
I 
the method he elttborates to this end is one which he calls 
I 
the method of relations. 
I 
Philosophy begins with the general 
I 
and with the help of formal logic concepts of experience, 
I 
I 
discovers the inconsistencies in them, which it is the en-
1 
terprise of philpsophy to resolve, for Herbart holds that 
I 
nothing can be real that is contradictory. Accordingly he 
I . 
places the principle of identity at the basis of his theory 
I 
of reality. Rea!li ty consists of a variety of 11reals ", each 
I 
simple, changeless and constant. Further, these "reals 11 
I . 
are absolute, indivisible, not extended in space or in time. 
I 
' Unchangeable themselves, they enter into different relations, 
I 
and it is the r~lations not the reals, that change. Change 
I 
thus belongs to /the contradic.tory world of appearances, and 
is seen for whaJ it is when the "met bod of relations" is 
I 
applied to it. I 
Without l ccepting Herbartts rationalistic metaphysics, 
Bowne adopts thJ rationalistic method underlying it. For 
him, too, philoJ ophy is above all, a rational undertaking, 
I 
1. Borden /P. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. vii. 
I 
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I 
the logical clarification of conceptions.1 The philosoph-
ical ideal is, he says, 
I 
a ratibnal and systematic comprehension of 
reality, or, since experience is the funda-
mental [ fact in all theorizing, sad since 
reality can be known only in experience, in 
the largest sense of that word, we may say 
that philosophy aims at a rational and sys-
tematib comDrehension and interpretation or 
experibnce.2 
I 
In Herbartts system, metaphysics is divided into 
i 
methodology or the doctrine of principles and method; into 
I 
being 1 under whiph comes change; into synchology, which 
I 
deals with the cpnstant; and into eidology- or the study of 
! 
the phenomena. ~hilosophy and psychology are looked upon 
I · 3 
as applications r r general metaphysics, and united with it. 
Bowne's own sy~tem follows a similar scheme and procedure. 
Of hi~ categoricl l scheme he writes: 
I 
I . There are certain general conceptions 
which tnake up at once the .framework of 
knowle~ge and the framework of existence. 
Such ~e the categories of being and 
cause,
1 
change and identity, space and 
time; land our knowledge or particular 
things will depend on the conception we 
form o'r these basal categories.'+ 
! 
I 
i l . 1. Friedr ch Ueberweg, A History of Philosophy, 2 Vols. 
Trans. from the ,4th German edition, ed! ted h7 George S •. Morris, 
(New York: c. Sc,ribner and Company, 1872-1874), Vol.II, p.268. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought ani Knowledge, p.3. 
3. Carroll DeWitt Hildebrand, · "Borden P. Bowne's Teadl-
' . -·- •... ing Concerning ~e Speculative Significance of Freedom." (Un-
published PH.D. !Dissertation, Dept. of Philosophy, Boston 
University, 1929), p. 69. 
4. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, rev. ed., p. 1. 
Much in the spi~it of Herbart, Bowne follows up the initial 
task of reconstructing and correcting these common sense 
categories by d~veloping a critical and coherent view or 
the concepts of ·experience. 
I 
Herbart rejects the old faculty psychology, as does 
Bowne. But Herbart•s attempt to explain all psychic life 
I 
mechanically in ~ ter.ms of movement of ideas, of action and 
reaction, and his reduction of mental life to a mere com-
plication or ideas and feelings, together with his view or 
striving and impulses as modified ideas, were all largely 
I 
rejected by Bowne. No less unsympathetic to Bowne was Her-
I 
bart•s notion that the entire content of the mind could be 
brought under fixed laws and that all psychical processes 
I 
are capable of mathematical deter.mination.1 Herbartts de-
terminism reduces the ego from a primordial principle to a 
product, while :Bowne considers the self as a metaphysical 
first principle. 
F. Bowne's Relation to Lotze 
We bave seen that the starting point of Bownets meta-
physics is in Leibn1z and that its method derives from Her-
bart. His con6lusions he says 
are essentially those of Lotze. I have 
reached them, for the most part, by strict-
ly independent research; but, so far as their 
I 
I 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaph:ys1cs, revised ed., p.383 .• 
I 
character is concerned, there would be no 
I great 'ifrepresentation in calling them 
Lotzea~. 
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I And the fact is that Bowne's conception of reality and the 
I 
self are not verr different from Lotze's conception of 
I these things. Lotze regards all that is finite as being 
I 
I 
the action of thr Infinite. He writes: 
I 
Reaf beings are those of his actions which 
the Infinite permanently maintains as centers 
I 
of out
1
'-an-in-going effects that are suscepti-
ble of
1 
acting and of being affected; and, in-
deed, 
1
their reality, that is, the relative 
independence which belongs to them, consists, 
not in Being outside the Infinite, for suCh 
a Beidg no definition could make clear, but 
I 
only in this, that they as spiritual elements 
have Being for self. This Being for self is 
the es1sentiai factor in that which we, in a 
forma] ly unsatisfactory way~ designate as 
Being outside the Infinite. 
Thus for Lotze, 
1
souls or individual selves have at least a 
I 
relatively indeRendent existence; they possess a status a-
1 part from the Infinite. Not that the individuality of 
I 
! 
self-hood is owing. to detachment from the Infinite, but 
I 
rather that "it [is so far as something is an object to 
·I 
itself' relates [itself to itself' dist mguishes itself 
I 
from something else, that by this act of its own it detaches 
I 
itself from the j Infinite.~ In his view it is only "things 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. vii. 
2. Herman Lotze, Outlines of Metaphysics, trans. and 
ed. by George T. Ladd, (Boston: Ginn and Company,l886), p. 
229. 
3. Herman Lotze, Metaphysic, trans. and ed. by Ber-
nard Bosanquet, (London: The Clarendon Press, 1887), Vol. L, 
p. 122. 
without self and :without consciousness"1 that are fully 
immanent in God. 
Further, in Lotze, so in Bowne, the mark of being 
.is in some power ' of action. To both thinkers, being and 
I 
I 
act ion are inseparable; in the words of Bowne "to be is 
to act. 112 
I 
The truly real must not only have the capacity 
I 
to act and to be acted upon, that is, to change, but to 
remain the same 'in all change. But where do we find such 
I 
I 
permanence in change? In ourselves is Lotze's answer. 
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Only in the soul do we find unity and variety, persistence 
I 
I 
in change. The ,self, .then, is the type of reality. All 
else is to be interpreted by analogy to what we experience 
in our inner life.. Space, time, and the rest are not meta-
physical realities, or things-in-themselves, but products 
I 
in the last analysis of mental activity. In this way, with 
the self or soul as the central feature of his metaphysics, 
Lotze sought to , reconcile monism and pluralism, mechanism 
and teleology, realism and idealism. The result, as he 
I 
himself calls it, is teleogical idealism. The affinities 
of Bowne with ~1 this should by now be obvious. In addi-
i 
tion to the purely theoretical arguments for this position, 
I 
Lotze, ani Bown;e after him, adduce also practical or ethi-
I 
cal considera t:Lons. In fact the metaphysics of both think-
1. Hermaq Lotze, Metaphysic, p. 228. 
I 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 28. 
I 
12 
ers is rooted in lethics. Our deepest natures demand are-
I 
I 
ality ~at is absolutely good and we cannot believe that 
the universe is indifferent to our highest aspirations. 
I 3. Summary and Conclusion 
Like all other philosophers, Rimanuja, living in 
I 
the eleventh century, and Bowne in the nineteenth, had 
predecessors whose work influenced them, whether positive-
ly or negatively. Thus as against the view of Sankara 
that Brahman alone is real, R~nuja emphasizes the re-
I 
ality of tbe wo~ld and of selves and of God as their 
I 
creator. Deny the reality of the world, he argues, and 
I 
you deny the reality of experience. FaD RBmanuja, further, 
the self has freedom, so that unlike Sankara he views sal-
vation as· consisting not in absorption of the individual 
' I 
in the Absolute~ but in fellowship with the Absolute. 
In agreement with the Jaina system, Ramanuja holds 
I 
that reality is: not one but many, or rather one in many, 
an identity in the midst of diversity. Reality cannot be 
understood from: any one point of view, but only synopt.ic-
ally, as the Ja~ins rightly insist. Affirmation of one 
I 
point of view against all others yields only a partial pic-
' 
ture. 
I In commcm with the Jaina system, Rllm.~nuja adopts 
the theory of ~ar.ma. The soul is born and reborn until it 
reaches the st~ge of perfection. 
As for Ramanujats links with the Buddhistic school 
of subjective id~alism, it consists in his conception of 
ultimate reality 1as being of the nature of consciousness 
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or mind. The Yogachara school of Buddhism also influenced 
Ramanuja in whose system individual selves play a role con-
I 
I 
formable to that of the potential selves in Yogachara. For 
Ramanuja the selyes exist as potentialities in Brahman, 
yet when once cr'eated have an independent status. Not 
only do selves exist as potentialities, so likewise does 
the material wo~ld. And thus holding to the reality of 
I 
both, Ramanuja ralls in line with the Sankhya system, al-
l 
I 
thoug~ as a theist, he insists that self and matter are com-
prehended in God. As a means of concentrating upon the 
I 
I 
infinite self, Ramanuja accepts the disciplinary practice 
recommended by the Yoga system. 
But it is with various aspects or systems of Vedan-
1 
I 
tic thought other than his own that R~Anuja stands in 
closest relation. In co~mon with these systems he rejects 
the view that the world is a mere product of material ele-
ments which combine to form objects, at the same time that, 
like all schools of Vedanta he affirms the existence as well 
I 
I 
as importance of the external world. Unlike advaita Vedanta, 
Ramanuja there.fore considers knowledge of the external world 
to be real know,ledge. 
I 
No less :than Ramanuja, Bowne also has predecessors. 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
First of all the~e is Leibniz whose theory of monads un-
doubtedly influerlced Bowne to make selves the chief build-
ing blocks of t~ universe. Like those of Leibnizts ra-
tional monads whl ch are self-conscious and active, Bownets 
selves are free, J active and relatively independent, at the 
same time that t ey are under the control of God, the Su-
preme Self, whom /Bowne conceives as the source of their in-
ter actions. Nel t there is Berkeley in agreement with whom 
Bowne holds that lthe distinctive mark of being consists in 
I 
some power of action. FOr both thinkers, the final reality 
I 
is self-conscious, active, spirit. The particular view 
Bowne takes of t~s activity owes much to Kant. For the 
I 
one, as for the 0ther, the mind is constitutive of exper-
1 
ience, indeed tht pre-condition of all experience whatever. 
Less influenced oy Hegel than by Kant, and then more nega-
r 
I tively than positively, Bowne's debt to Hegel is none the 
I less unmistakeable. Opposed as he is to the impersonalism 
I 
of Hegel, he is r et in accord with Hegelts account of the 
development of the self. He is somewhat in accord also with 
I 
Hegel's dictum t~at reality is rational. This brings us to 
I Herbart•s inf2uence upon Bowne. For Herbart, too, reality 
. I 
is nothing if noy intelligible, and .his "method of relations,., 
accepted by Bownk , is designed to overcome the inconsisten-
cies and incohert nces of phenomenal experience. In the view 
or both thinkers , the task or philosophy is the rational and 
I 
I 
15 
systematic comprl hension of reality, and there is an anal-
1 
I 
ogy between Bowne 1 s selves and Herb art 1 s 11reals". Lastly, 
I 
runong Bowne's predecessors, there is Lotze with whom he 
. I . 
has much in common. Together they take much the same view 
I 
of the nature of !being as activity, and the selves as the 
buildin:tb::c::tl:e:::::~:. well as instructive, to ob-
serve that there is a parallelism between Ramanujal s and 
Bowne 1 s relations to their respective predecessors. Jls t 
as both thinkers I are out of sympathy with all abstract 
identities and a l l undifferentiated absolutes, so their 
borrowings from rhe past are of those ideas and conceptions 
which leave room lfor emphasis upon the world and upon the 
I 
I 
selves in it, both viewed as real creations of God or 
Brahman. 
CHAPTER II 
I REASON AND EXPERIENCE: METHOD AND CRITERION IN THE THOUGHT 
OF RAMANu JA AND BOWNE 
The subject matter of philosophy is of such complex-
! . ity, manysidedness, and diversity that the problem of method 
is one that the Jhilosopher can hardly avoid. How can the 
I 
multifarious data of philosophy be systematized? How can 
I . 
their inter-rela1ionships be ascertained?. What starting-
points are possible? Is one more fruitful than another? 
Philosophers havl lo~g pondered these matters, though it. 
I cannot be said that they have arrived at any unanimity with 
regard to them. But the types of method they have recommen-
ded can be roughiy classified, as Professor Brightman clas-
1· sifies them, intQ the rationalistic, the experimental, the 
I . . 
analytic, the Kantian, the dialectical, the romantic, .and 
synoptic. It is the latter method which we wish here to 
consider in a general way before passing on to Ramanuja and 
Bowne who employ this method. Our debt to Professor Bright-
man in this connfction will be obvious. 
The term ~ynopsis appears in Plato and is used by him 
to describe the rl ttempt to grasp things in one comprehensive 
view. To Plato, it was clear that so long as the special 
::::n::·h:::e~:r:e::::r:::~.:ed:::~::::dw:h:0:::.n:: ::uca-
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tion. No one i j modern times has expatiated upon the synop-
tic attitude mo illuminatingly than Professor Brightman. 
I . 
In his view synol sis is the characteristic method 9f philos-
ophy. "It means ~ 11 he writes, "the viewing of any object or 
I 
! 1 
complex of objects as a whole." And he declares further 
I that the synoptic method presupposes the methods mentioned 
above, and keeps ltheir results constantly in view. In syn-
optic reasoning r the mind does more than review the separate 
facts of deducti~n, analysis and synthesis, experiment, dia-
lectic and feelibg. n2 On the contrary, ''knowing these 
I facts, it sees t~an together and sees also the qualities of 
the object as a *hole, which the other methods tend to omit, 
I 
underestimate, o::h merely take for granted. "3 'While keenly 
I 
alive to the parts ani their relations, the practitioner of 
. I 
the synoptic method is aware that the whole is more than 
its parts, and c t nnot be truly understood merely by adding 
the parts together. The synoptic method does not renounce 
analysis, but it refuses to stop at analysis. At the same 
time it is imporf ant to distinguish the synoptic from the 
synthetic method. The two are not coterminous. 
Syn~hesis usually refers to a mere putting 
togethbr of parts which first existed separate-
lyi as j in a synthetic diamond, whereas synopsis, 
----------------~---
1. Edgar S ~ Brightman, An Introduction to Philosop~, 
"revised", (New York: Henry Holt aiil Company, 1951), p. 39. 
2. Ibid., pf 39. 
3. !!Lid, pr 39. 
I 
althou~h including synthesis, also includes a 
search both for properties of a whole that 
could not exist separately, and for parts 
which could not exist as suCh in separation 
from the whole -- such as the ideas and feel-
ings of a mind, which cannot be separated 
from the mind in which they exist and trans-
ferred l to another mind.l 
I 
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Always the synoptic method starts with some given datum of 
experience, applies thought and reasoning to the analysis 
I 
of this datum, and proceeds by testing each stage in the 
analysis by reference to the original datum as a whole. 
I 
I 
In an illuminating chapter which he has contributed 
to Professor Bri~htman•s posthumous work on metaphysics, 
I 
Professor Bertocbi speaks of the personalistic use of syn-
opsis. The datum with which personalism starts and which 
it seeks to inte~ret is that given in the immediate initial 
experience of the present. For both Brightman and Bertocci 
I this is the surest point of departure. Every attempt must 
be made to do justice to this experience in all its com-
plexity. Whatev~r its aspects, whether logical, sensory, 
emotional, volitional or valuational, none of them must be 
overlooked. Nor[ must one phase of the experience be given 
priority, at least to begin with, to any other phase, as a 
means to the und~rstanding of reality. The important thing 
is not to fall into the error of allowing one phase to speak 
I for the whole of1 reality. The underlying assumption of the 
1. Edgar S 1r Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, 
p. 4o. 
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synoptically mi~ded personalist is that we proce~d most cir-
cumspectly and iithout relinquishing the demand for accuracy 
only when we t~st our experience as a whole. Nothing less 
than this can form the basis for a frui t:t'ul method in phil-
1 
osophy. Starting with the immediate initial experience of 
the present and applying the synoptic method to it, the per-
sonalist is free to relinquish his tentative assumption that 
I 
all the parts of an experience are on an equal footing, if 
I further examina,ion reveals that some parts are more import-
ant or trustworthy than others. But to begin with "faith 
in the whole" iJ preferable to arr:r alternative procedure, 
precisely bec~,e it does not ab initio preclude the possi-
b il1 ty' as 1nver1gat1on develops' tba t it 1 tsel1' is false .1 
his Int:~:::1:Jl::wt::o::::::o~:;0:e:::::n:u::~::ll:n 
upon the notion of what he calls "growing empirical coher-
ence." Such co,erence is not just logical consistency. It 
is not the rationalistic coherence of a Bradley, for example. 
I . 
Empirical coherence does not abandon reason, but asks us to 
enlarge its scoJe with the result that we move "f'rom the 
conception of rJason as logical consistency between ideas 
or concepts 1ntJ the area Of reason as connectiv1tz between 
1.. Profes~or Bertocci has been good enough to show me 
the manuscript qr his chapter in Brightman's Metaphysics, 
to be issued under the title Person and Reality, by Ronald 
Press. 
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ideas and betweep. ideas and experience. 111 Professor Bertocci 
goes on to say: 1 
Tru
1
h about existing things or events must 
be based on the claim that our ideas are not 
only c9nsistent with other ideas but are con-
sisten~ with the observations of events (or 
with the facts, as we say). This difference · I . between strict logical consistency and actual 
connections in experience we ~hall now call 
grm~inr , empirical coherence. 
It is coherence I nderstood in this way that alone provides 
an adequate crit . rion of truth. 
The life of reason in this . fuller sense, 
is now l he constan nterre a 1ng o deas, 
experiences, and events. Like a general, 
reason 1 puts togetre r the reports which come 
from t~e front where ideas are being carried 
into aetion. Adjustment to our environment, 
to other people, and to whatever the struc-
ture of the world may be calls for more than 
necessary logical thinking. We need to car-
ry our llogical conclusions into action for 
checking. I n so doing , we find ourselves 
stimul~ted to develop other ideas whose log-
ical c6nsequences will once more guide us 
into f'tirther action. 
it f s this shuttling back and forth of 
ideas ~nd experiences, with each being al-
lowed ~o guide the other, that we have in 
mind when we use the words growing, empirical 
cdherertce. This full-blown process of think-
ing an this effort-for-coherence is what de-
serves the name of reason, for any other kind 
of rea ,on connects only part of life rather 
than all that is available.3 
Thus empirical cJherence is at once a criterion of truth and 
I 
a counsel to stal t with experience and employ reason upon it. 
1. Peter AJ Bertocci, An Introduction to Philosophy 
or Religion, (Nei York: Prentice Hall, 1951), p. 57. 
2. Ibid., ~ - 57. 
3. Ibid. , :B. 58. 
I 
.8:L 
It calls for the development of a hypothesis capable of 
relating all its parts when viewed together, that is, syn-
optically. , 
But can ai l the parts of experience be viewed to-
[ 
gether? Is not ~ynopsis an impracticable ideal? Certain-
ly, it .is beyond / the compass of any one man, or perhaps of 
all men together f Yet as a guide in the search for truth 
it is no mere empty ideal. Together with the criterion 
I 
of growing empirical coherence, it forbids us to tamper 
I 
with experience itself. 
I 
In ~ynoptic reason ~rites Professor Bright-
man) •• ! the mind does more than to review the separa~e facts of deduction, analysis and syn-
thesis ~, experiment dialectic and feeling. 
Knowing these facts, it sees them together 
:~h~~~~ !~~~ht~:eq~~~!!i!:t~~d:h~e~~j~~t as 
omit, ~n~erestimate, or merely take for 
grantej · 
No doubt it is t r ue that synopsis is not always capable of 
precise and rigo:rous application. I ts results are not sus-
I 
ceptible of mat~ematical demonstration. Yet it represents 
I 
I 
an approach that has contributed greatly to the philosoph-
ical. understand+ g of process, life and mind.2 
With the j e preliminary remarks concerning the empiri-
cal criterion al d the synoptic method, we turn to a consid-
1. Edgar J. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, 
p. 39. 
2. Ibid., p. 41. 
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eration of how and to what extent they are used by Rama-
nu j a and Bowne. 
I 1. Me"t1hod in Ramanuja 
There are 1 few explicit reflections in the works of 
Ramanuja on eith~r the method of philosophy or the criter-
1 
ion of truth; so 1 that we can only observe his actual pro-
, 
cedures and attempt to make inferences from them with re-
I 
gard to these topics. The fact is that Ramanuja pursues 
no one method, or perhaps it would be better to say that 
he employs a variety of approaches all of which add up to 
I 
the synoptic. He is concerned above all with the charac-
ter of reality as a whole and with elaborating a criterion 
I 
capable of encompassing this wholeness. Accordingly, it 
I 
may be said that,, though Ramanuja is no conscious practi-
tioner of any one method, the various approaches he em-
1 
I 
ploys tend to cluster round this preoccupation with whole-
ness, and that if he employs one method more than another, 
it is the synop~ic. 
I 
In what follows we shall attempt to sort out and 
characterize the methods as well as criteria used by Rama-
I 
nuja and to sho~ that underlying them all is a synoptic 
I 
attitude towards the problems with which he copes. 
A. Empirical P?int of Departure 
- - I Ramanuja ~ s point of departure in all his philosoph-
I 
!cal explorations is experience, and it is to experience 
I 
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that he returns. : In whatever field, this experience first 
presents itself as indeterminate and unclear. But it be-
' 
comes progressively more determinate as, through analysis 
I 
and synthesis, we come to see the multiplicity of its re-
I 
lations to other1 experiences. Now, in Rronanuja's view, 
central to all experience, is consciousness, and not merely 
I 
consciousness, b~t a conscious self. From consciousness 
all proof stems and consciousness is the witness of all 
proof. 
I 
If 'it is the nature of consciousness, 
~ says R~anuja, to be •proof' LTight, en-
lightenment_7, on the part of a person with 
regard to something, how can this conscious-
ness, which is thus connected with the per-
son, be itself conscious of itself? To ex-
plain: the essential character of conscious-
ness or ~nowledge is that by its very exis- . 
tence it rrenders things capable of becoming 
objects1 to its own substrate of thought and speech. 1 
I 
I 
What Ramanuja appears to be emphasizing here is that the 
most inductively certain of all things is personal con-
sciousness. It ' is the first indubitable datum of exper-
t 
ience. I He writ~s: 
This consciousness •••• is a particular 
attripute belonging to a conscious self 
and related to an object: as such it is 
knownl to everyone on the testimony of 
his o~ self - as appears from ordinary 
judgments such as 'I know the jar', 'I 
understand this matter', 'I am conscious 
I 
I 
1. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 56. 
I 
of (th~ presence : ofo) this piece of cloth.' 
That such is the essential nature of con-
sciousness you yourself admit; for you have 
proved 'thereby its self-luminousness. Of 
this consciousness which thus .clearly pre-
sents itself as the attribute of an agent, 
and as related to an object, it would be 
diffic~lt to prove indeed that at the same 
time it is itself the agent; as difficult 
as it would be to pr~ve t hat the object of 
action 1is the agent. 
I 
~le what we have here is an analysis of the nature of 
self-experience, 1 it is an analysis that implies the use 
I 
of a method that , starts with experience and will employ 
I 
an experiential criterion. 
(1) I Deduction 
- - I Ramanuja ~urns next to an analysis of what is in-
volved in the experience which reveals the self as a pri-
mary datum. He Will resort here to deductive processes 
I 
of reasoning, bu't always with an eye to the deliverance 
I 
of experience. 1Now he believes it is a fair inference 
from the facts that the subject of consciousness, unlike 
consciousness which is its attribute, is characterized by 
I 
permanency. 
Th~ subject of consciousness (he writes) 
is pe~anent (constant), while its attribute, 
i.e., 1consciousness, not differing herein 
from joy, grief, and the like, rises, per-
sists 1for some time, and then comes to an 
end. 2 I 
I 
I 
I 
1. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 56. 
I 
2~ Ibid., I p. 56. 
I 
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I 
The fact to which Ramanuja appeals in support of his infer-
ence concerning the· permanency of the self is the fact of 
I 
recognition: 
ed by me. t 
•This very same thing was formerly apprehend-
~ . 
I But permanency cannot be postulated of conscious-
ness. 
The 1 non-permanency of consciousness, on 
the ot~er hand, is proved by thought ex-
pressing itself in the following for.ms: 'I 
know at present•, 'I knew at a time•, '!, 
the knowing subject,1 no longer hgve knowl-edge o 1f this thing'. 
I 
Ramanuja continu;es, 
I 
How, then should consciousness and the con-
scious' subject be one'l If consciousness which 
c~ nges every moment were admitted to consti-
tute the conscious subject, it would be im-
possi~le for us to recognize the thing seen 
today ;as the one we saw yesterday; for what 
has b~en perceived by one cannot be recog-
nized ,by another. And even if consciousness 
were identified with the conscious subject 
and acknowledged as permanent, this would ho 
better account for the fact of recognition. 
For r~cognition implies a conscious subject 
persisting from the earlier to the later mo-
ment, ,and not merely consciousness. Its ex-
pression is, 'I myself2perceived this thing on a former occasion.' · 
I 
In so far as thls argument for the existence of a permanent 
sel~ suggests anything with regard to the nature of Rmnanujats 
I 
method, it is that not only experience but deductive reason-
1 
I 
ing plays a role in it. Further, since Ramanuja believes 
that a permanent self alone makes sense of our experience, 
I 
1. - 1 -Sri R~anuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 57. 
I 
z. Ibid.' I p. 57. 
I 
I 
I he would seem to 
1
be appealing to empirical coherence as a 
I 
criterion of truth. 
I 
I 
(2) Observation 
I 
In dealin$ with self and consciousness, as well as 
I 
86 
with other problems of philosophy, Ramanuja appeals not on-
I 
ly to experience
1 
and reason, but also to empirical observa-
1 
tion • . So, for example, he · raises the question why it is we 
perceive a white: shell, under certain conditions, as yellow. 
I 
Is the yellow du'e to the shell or is some other factor in-
' 
I 
volved? Ramanuja writes about the question in the follow-
1 
ing vein: 
I 
The case of the white shell being seen as 
yellow explains itself as follows. The visual 
rays 1;,ssuing from the eye are in contact with 
the bile contained in the eye, and thereupon 
enter ·into conjunction with the shell; the re-
sult is that the whiteness belonging to the 
shell :is overpowered by the yellowness of the 
bile, : and hence not apprehended; the shell 
thus appears yellow, just as if it were gild-
ed. The bile and its yellowness is, owing to 
its e*ceeding tenuity, not perceived by the 
bystanders; but thin though it be, it is ap-
prehended by the person suffering from jaun-
dice, ' to whom it is very near, in so far as 
it is~ues from his own eye, and through the 
mediation or the visual rays, aided by the 
action produced on the mind by that apprehen-
sion, 1 it is apprehende~even in the distant 
objec
1
t, viz, the shell. 
I 
To take 'another example, Ramanuja explains why a 
I 
fire brand, whe,n swung around rapidly, appears as a fiery 
1. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 122. 
I 
I 
. - I 
wheel. 
Its ;appearance as a fiery wheel explains 
itself , through the circumstance that moving 
very rapidly it is in conjunction with all 
points ' of the circle described without our. 
being able to apprehend the intervals. The 
case is analogous to that of the perception 
of a real wheel; but there is the difference 
that ih the case of the wheel no intervals 
are apprehended, because there are none; 
while 'in the case of the fire brand none is 
appre~end!d owing to the rapidity of the 
movement. 
I 
I 
In both these !~stances Ramanuja is seeking to confirm 
theory by reference to observation. In the case of the 
I 
87 
self, though as :we have seen, Ramanuja•s case for its per-
' I 
manence rests not upon observation but upon reason. Per-
' I 
manence needs to be postulated, for if there were no per-
' 
manent self, what happens ··in experience would be unintel-
ligible. 
(3) Logic~l Devices 
In addit:ion to his use of exp erience, reason and 
I 
I 
observation, Ramanuja resorts to certain logical devises, 
I 
though not mer~ly logical, especially in his critique of 
Sankarars philqsophy o~ Advaita or non-dualism. For ex-
ample, he takes up that philosopher's conception of Maya 
I 
(cosmic illusi~n or nescience), first stating the view 
I 
I 
which in dialectical fashion he will proceed to refute. 
. I 
I 
1. Sri R~anuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 122. 
Ace rding to the view of our opponent 
(Sankara), this entire world, with all its 
endles t distinctions of Ruler, creatures · 
ruled, and so on, is, owing to a certain 
defect, fictitiously super-tmposed upon the 
non-dif ferenced, self-luminous Reality; and 
what cpnstitutes that defect is beginning-
less Nescience, which invests the Realit,y, 
gives l ise to manifold illusions, and can-
not be defined either as being or non-being. 
Such N
1
-science, he says, must necessarily be 
admitted, firstly on the ground of Scriptural 
texts, j such as •Hidden by what is untrue •••• • 
and se~ondly, because otherwise the oneness 
of the individual souls with Brahman - which 
is tau ht by texts such as •Thou art that• -
cannotr be established. This Nescience is 
neithe •being• because in that case it could 
not be the object of erroneous cognition 
(bbr~) and sublation (badha); nor is it 
non-bel ng, because 1n that case it could not 
be the object of apprehension and sublation. 
Hence prthodox philosophers declare that 
this Njescience falls und~r neither of these 
two opr osite categories. 
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Ramanuja begins his refutation as follows: 
1 Nowl this theory of Nescience is altogeth-
er unt.enable. In the first place we ask, 
•What its the substrate of this Nescience 
which ~ives rise to the great error of plu-
ralit~ or existence?' You cannot reply 
•the individual souLt; for the individual 
I 
soul i~self exists in so far only as it is 
fictit~ously imagined through Nescience. 
Nor cae you say 'Brahman'; for Brahman is 
nothing but self-luminous intelligence, and 
hence ~ontradictory in nature to Nescien~e, , 
which I s avowedly sublated by kn:w~edge. • 
Fairly str aightforward until now, Ramanuja•s refUta-
tion assumes as 1it unfolds a markedly dialectical character. 
1. Sri Ramrnuja, Sri Bhashyam, pp. 102-103. 
I Ibid., p. 103. 2. 
I 
He admits one of lsankara•s arguments in order to refute the 
others. The ar~ment is that the essential nature of Brah-
man is knowledge J 
The !highest Brahman has knowledge for its essent~al nature; if Nescience, which is es-
sentially false and to be terminated by knowl-
edge, i iliT ests Brahman, who lhen will be strong 
enoughj to put an end to it. 
Wha puts an end to Nescience is the knowl-
1 
edge that Brahman is pure knowledge! - Not so, 
for th~t knowledge also is, like Brahman, of 
the nature of light, and hence has no power to 
put an /end to Nescience. - And if there exists 
the knC?wledge that Brahman is knowledge, then 
Brahman is an object of knowledge, and that, 
accord~ng to your own teaching, implies that 2 Brahmal is not of tm nature c:£ consciousness. 
What we have her j , it is true, touches upon criteriology 
I 
rather than meth~d, though it bears upon method as well. 
I 
Ramanuja is at 11ast suggesting a criterion of empirical 
coherence. He i J trying to show that a certain hypothesis 
is self-contradidtory, and not only self-contradictory but 
inconsistent wit! experience, 
Still another example of this manner of argumenta-
tion is Rfunii:nuja ~ s consideration of the question whetler 
; 
Brahman has a body or not. The argument is in the form of 
a dialogue betweJ n an Opponent (Sankarite) who denies that 
i 
Brabman has a body and a Questioner (Rl!m.anuja) who takes 
the opposite pos~tion. The debate proceeds as follows: 
I 
1. Sri Ram&nuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 103. 
I 2. Ibid., p. 103. 
I 
Questiolner: Let us put sore questions to the 
oppon!ent: In making the universe did I svara 
(God >I work in a body or without a body? 
Opponent: Without a body. . 
Questi9ner: He coul d not have done so; for we 
. have not seen any one without a body doing 
anyttling. Can you give an instance? 
Opponen!t: An operation of the mind takes 
plac~ without the help of a body. lt only requ~res the possession of the mind. Mind 
beind eternal, Isvara can therefore make 
the universe by mere willing. 
Questidner: Even mental operations are ob-serv~d only in those invested with bodies. 
Though the mind is a permanent entity (which 
by ttie way we do not accept}, the freed jiva, 
I being devoid of a body, does not give any 
indidation of its opera tion. 
Opponen! t: I svara worked in a body. 
Questiqne r: VVas that body permanent or perish-
able? 
Opponed.-t: it was permanent. 
Questiqner: If so, a body, though made up of 
b~~$h ~~~ ~~to~ep~b~~d~~~t i~~e~~!:e~:e, 
permanent, and the need for inferring the 
I exis~ence of a maker would not arise. 
~~~~~d~!r:Th~tb~~;tw~!v: b=~~s~~~!; ~~~·the 
body fby the exertion of which this body 
shoul d be made was not then available. 
Opponertt: Isvara was himself the cause. 
Questi6ner: This cannot be in one without a 
body J 
I Oppone~t: He had a body other than that made 
on the completion of evolution. 
Questi~ner: We will ask - how was that body 
made~ This would lead t o the assumption of 
a thi-rd body; 1 tben a fourth body, and so on ad iMinitum. 
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It is in I this manner, if not always explicitly in the dia-
logue for.m, that Ramanuja develops some of the chief points 
in his own system of thought. And it is fair to say that . 
I 
1. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhasbyam, pp. 121-122. 
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the procedure is one in which the reasoning is based on 
experience. 
I . 
<4> The Dialectic of Thought 
I - - . UnderlyinJ Ramanuja~s approach, especially in its 
synoptic aspects ~ is a theory of thought which may be call-
ed dialectical. lrt bears some resemblance to Hegel•s tri-
adic movement, wtthout the element of negation, or rather 
I -without the Hege~ian emphasis upon negation. In Ramanujats 
I 
view the progres! of knowledge is from the vaguely determi-
nate experience lo the more and more determinate. This 
progress comes a r out as the subject-object relation becomes 
increasingly evii ent. And this in turn involves the emer-
gence of more a~ more relations, and hence greater and 
greater determin~tion. But it must not be imagined that 
the 'vaguely detbrminate•, with which knowledge begins, 
does not already at the start evidence some degree of dif-
ference. All . co sciousness implies di fference, Ramanuja 
insists. 
All states of consciousness have for tnei r 
object something that is marked by some differ-
ence, ,as appears in the case of judgments like 
1 1 saJ this•. And should a state of conscious-
ness - although directly apprehended as imply-
ing difference - be determined by some falla-
cious reasoning to be devoid of difference, 
this etermination could be affected only by 
means of sane special attributes additional 
to th quality of mere being; and owing to 
these special qualities on which the deter.mi-
natio depends, that state of consciousness 
92 
I 
would 91tarly again be characterized by dif-
ference. 
I 
Even the most indeterminate experience involves some 
I 
differentiation, I though it may not be clearly discerned at 
I 
once. Ramanuja r rites: 
f erception •••• with its two subdivisions of 
non-determinate (nirvikalpaka) and determi nate 
(savikalpaka) perception - also cannot be a 
means br knowledge for things devoid of all 
difference. Determinate perception clearly 
has fot its object things affected with dif-
ference; for it relates to that which is dis-
tinguished by generic difference, and so on. 
But also non-determinate percep tion has for 
its object only what is marked out with dif-
ference; for it is on the basis of non-de-
terminate percep tion that the object dis-
tingui~hed by generic character, and so, is 
recognized in the act of determinate percep-
tion. I Non-determin~te pe r ception is the ap-
prehension of the object in so far as desti-
tute of ~ome differero es but not of all dif-
ference. · 
I 
A differentiating factor is thus present in the object of 
knowledge from the beginning. But the sort of dialectic 
I 
that Ramanuja haf in mind is not, like that of Hegel, sim-
ply the self-unfbldment of the idea. To the Indian think-
1 
er finite idea a
1
r.d object are distinct and different. The 
relations which thou ght seeks to grasp come about through 
I 
the immanent activity of Brahman who, if he is the r elating 
I 
principle of thihgs, is however not one with them. 
i 
1. Sri Ramr nuja, Sri Bhashyrun, pp. 39-40. 
2. Ibid., p. 41. 
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(5) Ramanu~a•s Practical Method (Yoga) 
Human natJ re consists not merely of reason but of 
feeling, and thit fact must be taken into account in deal-
ing with the problems of philosophy. In other words, there 
are practical as ~ there are theoretical methods in philosophy, 
both of which arr used by Ramanuja. 
He ~ho wishes to attain Brahman (writes 
Ramanulia) must acquire two kinds of knowl-
edge •• [ .an indirect one whiCh springs from 
the sttdy of the Sastras (Sacred Scriptures) 
and a direct one which splings from concen-
trated' meditation (Yoga). 
Yoga tries to capvass and satisfy the emotional aspects of 
I_ 
the self. And Yjoga itself is a method for controlling, dis-
ciplining and r~ionalizing the feelings, as Professor 
I Radhakrishnan pojints out. 
It lis quite true that there are wrong 
feeli~gs even as there are wrong cognitions. 
It is [also true that, in the lower level~ 
feeli~gs stand isolated even as cognitions 
do. ~t as the cognitions are systematized, 
so arel feelings tra~sformed and disciplined, 
i.e., rationalized. 
It will be note~ that this last sentence of ~rofessor 
Radhakr1sbnan is an excellent characterization of both the 
Now the ort of concentration which it is the a~ of 
~ga to achieve presupposes a devotion to God, which devot~ 
finds demonstra le forms of expression in the individual 
1. 
2. 
Sri R- anuja, Sri 
s. Rad~krishnam, 
I 
Bhashyam, p. 284. 
Indian Philosophy, p. 675. 
94 
I 
through love, charity, truthfulness, purity, composure, con-
I 
stant meditation, confidence, and sense of harmony. While 
I 
the supernatural lpowers associated with the different stages 
' 
' 
of the practice of Yoga are hardly reconcilable with the 
I 
known laws of the physical and psychical sciences, it is 
I 
not to be supposbd that Yogic experiences have anything to 
I 
do with magic. ~t is a solidly founded method of self-real-
I. ization as the experience of innumerable devotees who are 
I 
I 
not charlatans gpes to show. The mental concentration en-
I joined in the yoga is a mode of meditation on Brahman, says 
I 
Ramanuja, and he1 goes on to state that by means of it the 
j 
individual acqui~es a special capacity and power to dispel 
and overcome ignorance.l It eventuates in a mystical love 
I 
which transcends the ordinary ethical, aesthetic and relig-
! 
ious canons of human existence. The devotee feels the in-
1 
ner pulsations ~ f the absolute self whereby he is filled 
I 
with an ineffable joy. 
I 
All this :is set forth by Ramanuja, not as method of 
I philosophising, 1 but rather as a way of finding reality. Yet 
I 
it has a bearing on his method in so far as it reveals a re-
I 
ality the nature of which he seeks to define by reason con-
i joined with exp~rience. 
1. _ I - • Sri R~anuJa, Sri Bhashyam, p. 116. 
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I 
(6) Wholerless or Synopsis as Method 
I 
I Througho~t Rlmanuja 1 s various approaches to the prob-
1 
lems of philosophy there is the concern with wholeness. Not 
that the whole can ever be known, at least not in its en-
1 
tirety, but it is only as a method fUrthers such knowledge 
I 
that it can lay ;claim to any validity. We have seen that 
for Rimanuja th9ught begins with the relatively indetermi-
1 
nate and progresses towards greater and greater deter.minate-
1 
ness and in this process becomes more and more embracing. 
I 
From particulars we pass to class concepts, but class con-
I 
cepts are themselves inadequate wholes and we cannot rest 
I 
in them. Indeed, they are a means to a richer knowledge of 
I 
I the individual,
1
above all the ultimate individual, who is 
God. I God or .Brahman is the whole and it is only through 
I 
knowledge of Him, knowledge however imperfect, that we recog-
1 
nize the parts falling into an intelligible order. Rmm4nuja 
I 
writes: 1 
I 
that highest person who is the ruler of 
all; • 1 ••• whose purposes come true; who 
posse~ses infinite auspicious qualities, 
such ~s knowledge, blessedness, and so 
on; •• 
1 
•• that o:f which these beings are 
born,
1 
that by whiCh when born they live, 
that into which they enter at their 
deatb, try to know that: that is Brabman.l 
I 
It is only in terms o:f Brahman, the whole, "that all 
I 
else is -known. "~2 The philosopher starts -with the experiences 
I 
1. Sri Rimanuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 156. 
I 
2 • Ibid. , 1 p. 284. 
I 
I 
I 
of individual selves, tries to account for all their featuxes 
together, and tests his account at every stage by still fUr-
ther experiences. In this way he cames to see the presence 
of a principle implicit in experiemee, criticized by logic 
yet transcending both. This principle is God himself. If 
our rational knowledge grasps God only imperfectly, intui-
tion may succeed where rational knowledge fails. Rimanuja•s 
Yogic experience gives him what reason suggests. 
We are now in a position to assess more precisely the 
nature or synopsis as it appears in Rim!nuja. And it must 
be said at once that it, together with the criterion he em-
ploys, is closer to the rationalistic mysticism, say of 
Spinoza, than to the empiricism of Bowne and Brightman. To 
Rllmanuja it is only in tenns of the whole, that is, Brahman, 
that it is possible to know anything at all. On the other 
hand~ the proponent of empirical coherence demands that rea-
son develop hypotheses about experience, but never leave it. 
It cannot be said that R~nuja does this, except incon-
stantly. Yet he does do it on occasion, and our expositio~ 
we are t"rank to admit, has made the most of' this fact. 
B. The Methodological Aspects of Bowne's Thought 
As with R!dnuja, so with Bowne·, it is the regard for 
wholeness that dictates the character of his method, though 
we shall see that the latter•s method is marked by a far 
.. 
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more thorough-going empiricism. Bowne is explicit about the 
synoptic approach as Ramanuja is not, and our task of ex-
pounding Bowne, therefore, does not call for inferences from 
his actual procedure and words. 
The first thing that strikes us about Bowne in this 
connection is his distrust of any method that is merely lo~­
ical, any method that would dictate to experience. Not that 
he leans towards any species of irrationalism, quite the 
contrary, but he is ready to harken to other deliverances 
besides those of the logical intellect. We need, he s ·13.ys, 
to take into account all the facts, including, of course, 
those of the senses, before we proceed to make judgments 
;about the nature of reality. In the following words Bowne 
formulates the empiricistic base of his philosophizing: 
What is reality? How can we answer this 
question otherwise .than by opening our eyes 
and telling what we see? or by looking1into experience and reporting what we find? 
But if we must start with experience, we soon find that we 
cannot rest there, even if we must constantly come back to 
it. 
At a very early date in the history of re-
flective thought, it became clear that the 
conceptions we spontaneously and unreflect-
ingly form are not those in which we finally 
rest. If we attempt to rest in things as 
they appear, we find ourselves involved in 
all manner of difficulties; and thus we are 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed.", p. 4. 
compelled to revise our conceptions until we 
make them mutually consistent and adequate to 
the function they have to perform in our 
thought system. In this way arises the dis-
tinction between appearance and reality or 
between things as they appear and things as 
we must think of them; and thus, finally, 
the problem of metaphysics becomes a question 
for thought, and not o£e which can be answer-
ed by sense intuition. 
This passage taken by itself would, it is true, suggest 
mere logical coherence as a criterion, but taken in con-
junction with the previous passage what we have is a de-
~· 
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mand that we start with experience as well as end with it. 
So it is experience in all its aspects, and ex-
perience alone, that furnishes the data for any philos-
opher. For it is the facts of experience that pose the 
problems to the solution of which our theories are ad-
dressed. In a crucial passage Bowne writes: "We have no 
way of creating reality, and we also have no such a priori 
insight into its nature that we can tell in advance what 
reality must be. 112 A priorism is thus ruled out. In 
characterizing his method as critical, rather than creative, 
Bowne is concerned to emphasize that his method is not ra-
tionalistic. He writes: 
Experience, as a whole, is our datum, and 
the question is, How must we think about re-
ality on the basis of this experience as in-
terpreted by thought? We take, then, every-
thing as it seems to be, or as it reports 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed.", pp. 4-.5. 
2. Ibid. , p. .5. 
itself, and make only such changes as are 
necessary to make our conceptions adequate 
and harmonious. The reasons for doubt and 
modification are to be sought entirely in 
the subject-matter, and not in the possibil-
ity of verbal doubt. This method allows 
reason its full rights, and it also saves 
the natural sense of reality, which can never 
be needlessly violated with impunity. We 
take the theory of things which is formed by 
spontaneous thought, and make it the text for 
a critical exegesis in the hope of making it 
adequate and consistent. The method is one 
of faith, and not of scepticism. 
We have already said that if Bowne begins with the 
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data of experience, he does not end with them certainly as 
they are originally given. ''We find ourselves,'' he says, 
"compelled to transcend thE}m by giving them a rational in-
2 terpretation." As thought becomes reflective and sel.f-
conscious, that is, developing hypotheses to account for 
experience as a whole, it makes a discovery of the first 
moment. It finds that some elements of experience are 
given in sense-intuition and that others are given only in 
thought.3 Now the rational interpretation of experience, 
of which Bowne speaks, is not something imposed upon ex-
perience, but arises out of it. As has already been 
said, its fUnction is not creative but critical. Reality 
is not a function of thought, but thought a ~1nction 
of reality. The aim of method is not to tell how 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, ''revised ed. " , p. 6. 
2. lbid., p. 5. 
3. !bid. ' p. 7. 
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being exists or is made, but rather how we shall think about 
it.l And here experience is our only guide. 
!f we were trying to deduce the world 
trom the absolute stand-point, we might 
take the high a priori road, but as our 
aim is only to-ration81ize and comprehend 
experience, we must begin with experience. 2 
We begin with experience, without partiality for this 
or that aspect of it, and the goal is such a progressive 
refinement of our conceptions as will abolish contradictions 
and achieve wholeness. Bowne•s method here is the method 
of Herbart, as be himself says.3 The method is aimed at 
the elaboration of conceptions, conceptions which, as first 
given in experience, are infected with contradiction. For 
example, there is the conception of inherence, which is 
the notion or a thing with several attributes, implying that 
one is many. Other examples are the conception of causalit.1, 
of change, and of an ego regarded as the primary source of 
our manifold ideas. The task of metaphysics, for Bowne as 
for Herb art, is to bring experience under the law of non-
contradiction and thus to render experience consistent and 
comprehensible. And it seeks to do this by what Herbart 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed.", p. 9. 
2 e Ibid • 1 p • 9 • 
3. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, vii. 
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called the method of relations •1 Finding ourselves obli-
ged to reconstruct the concepts derived from experience, 
for the sake of greater empirical coherence, we seek out 
the necessary complementary conceptions through which the 
contradictions resident in the initial conceptions are re-
solved. This is the procedure adopted by Bowne throughout 
the development of his metaphysics, and we take up its clo-
ser study in the section that follows. 
(1) Reason and Method 
In Bowne •s words, "philosophy aims at a rational and 
systematic comprehension and interpretation of experience. 112 
But what is the meaning or •rational' here? The term ration-
alism has been used in a variety of contexts three of which 
are particularly noted by Bowne and criticized. First, the 
term may refer to the ~ priori method in philosophy follow-
ing whi~h the ultimate principles of reality are deduced 
from a few basic concepts, definitions and axioms. So, far 
example, Spinoza and Leibniz proceed by strict syllogistic 
formulae, by what Bowne calls "the method of rigor and 
vigor. n3 Can such a method be properly applied to the whole 
field of philosophy? Bowne's answer is no. The method pre-
1. F. Uberweg, Histori of PhilosoEhz, Vol. 2, p. 268. 
2. -:Borden P. Bowne, Theori of Thou~t and Knowledse, 
p. 3. 
3. Ibid., p. 16. 
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supposes that man is merely an intellect, whereas in fact 
he is a great deal more. 1 The other elements of human na-
ture such as will, conscience, emotion and aspiration, can-
not be brought under the dictation of the logical intellect 
alone, but must be related to each other and to sense ex-
perience. 
The second context of rationalism, as Bowne makes 
out, is ~at in which it is used to refer to the activity 
of the mind, and as in the Kantian teaching. According to 
Kant, the mind's role in the process of knowledge and exper-
ience consists in organizing, in terms of its own rational 
principles, the sensuously given, and thus render it know-
able. Without the mind's activity, experience would be 
nothing but a meaningless flux. Now, while Bowne is pre-
pared to grant some measure of validity to the Kantian posi-
tion, he cannot accept it in its entirety either as a method 
or a metaphysic; as a method because it is excessively one-
sided and as a metaphysic because of its subjectivistic im-
plications. 
In the third context, distinguished by Bowne, ration-
alism may be used to refer to the trustworthiness of the 
mind and to the intelligibility of the real world. Concern-
ing the assumptions underlying this application, he writes: 
We assume •••• the essential truthfulness of 
nature, so that the indications of all clearly 
1. Boroen P. Bowne, Theism, (New York: American Book 
Co., 1902), pp. 17-1~. 
determined £acts can be trusted. we assume, 
once more, that nature is not only essent~ally 
comprehens~ble, but that it is comprehensible 
by us; so that what our nature calls ror to 
make the £acts intelligible to us is necessary 
to the facts thans elves. For, a£ter all, our 
explanation or £acts always consists in saying 
that i£ we may assume certain £acts we can un-
derstand the actual facts. Thus back of the 
real universe or experience we construct an 
ideal universe of the intellect, and1we under-stand the former through the latter. 
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Here Bowne has begun to describe his own method and to indi-
cate the respect in which it may be called rationalistic. 
It will be observed that the method is one in which reason 
develops hypotheses about experience. The method is ration-
alistic, (perhaps reasonable is a better word) in the sense 
that its chief operation and assumption is that the universe 
is intelligible, that it is an expression ofmind 1 not of 
course of the human mind, but of the divine mind. And be-
cause it is an expression of the divine intelligence, it is 
possible to speak of the trustworthiness of the human mind, 
which is itself a creation of the divine mind . It is only 
by re£erence to the divine mind, further, that the true work 
of thought in relation to reality can be understood. To 
Bowne, as to Ramanuja, thought is above all "an organic ac-
tivity which unfolds from within, and can never be put to-
gether mechanically from without."2 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. 19. 
2. Borden p. Bowne, Theory of Thougpt and Knowledge, 
p. iii. 
Persons on the sense plane, he adds, per-
petually seek to build up thought from without 
by the mechanical juxtaposition and association 
of sense impressions •••• This unprofitable, and 
sometimes pernicious, externalism can be over-
come only by an insight into the activity and 
organic unity of thought itself •••• Knowledge is 
no longer something originating outside of the 
mind, possibly in the nerves, and passed along 
ready-made into the mind; it is rather some-
thing built up by the mind within itself in ac-
cordancr with principles immanent in the mental 
nature. 
The bearing of all this upon philosophical method is 
that the model for such a method is not to be found in the 
procedures of the physical sciences. It is to be found 
rather in the nature of intelligence itself. 
Living, acting intelligence is the source 
of all truth and reality, and is its own 
and only standard. And all the categories, 
abstract principles, instead of being the 
components of the mental life, are simply 
shadows of that life, and find in that 
life their only realization. This may 
be called the transcendental empiricism. 2 
In its methodological aspect the position. Bowne cha:r-
acterizes as transcendental, by which he means critical, em-
piricism consists on the one hand of the strictest regard 
· for experience and on the other of recognition of principles 
that go beyond experience, though they arise out of it. Ex-
amine the world in the light of reason, he would contend, 
and you will find that the clue to its nature resides in the 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
pp. iii-iv. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, ''revised Ed. 11 , p. 425. 
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activity of reasori itself, and you will find further that 
this activity points to a supreme reason. He thus envis-
ages a method for philosophy· which is at once empirical but 
in no narrow or onesided sense and which makes the fullest 
use of reason. It is a rationalistic method, if one will, 
but rationalistic without arrogance and not unmindful of its 
limitation to what is checked and checkable in experience as 
a whole. It might better be called a method of reason. 
Our earlier contention that knowledge a-
rises in the mind only through its own activ-
ity remains unshaken and unshakeable; but if 
we try to explain knowledge in its essential 
nature, or to justify by a~thing beyond it-
self, we soon find the task hopeless. After 
theory has exhausted its resources, there 
are deeps in the pr6blem of knowledge, which 
recall Jacobi's claim that all knowing in-
volves revelation. In any case knowledge 
must b~ its own standard; and in the deepest 
things we must be content wit~knowing not 
how we know, but that we know. 
Such a confession is not in the usual rationalistic vein. 
To Bowne intelligence is an ultimate datum, and what we 
know about it we know only from experience. From the fol-
lowing passage it is clear that by intelligence Bowne means 
something more than logic. It is akin to Dewey's conceptim 
of it as activity operating in and upon experience. 
We explain the work of intelligence by 
tracing it to intelligence, but intelligence 
itself simply is. It accounts for everything 
else, but it accepts itself. When we ·seek to 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed. 11 , p. 426. 
construe intelligence in any way we fall in-
to illusion. Component factors, antecedent 
mechanisms, . are fictions of unclear thought. 
When we come to intelligence we must s t op in 
our regress and understand it as intelli-
gence. Here our transcendental empiricism 
again appears. Intelligence has no means of 
understanding itself as product. It is the 
source of all products, and for knowled~e of 
itself it must fall back on experience. 
We may say then that Bowne places the highest value upon 
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reason, but reason anchored in experience, and thus guarded 
against the excesses of an ~ priori rationalism. 
(2) Logic and Method 
Logic, of course, plays a role in Bowne's method, but 
he is keenly aware of the deficiencies of logic as such. 
Logic, he complains, merely attempts to prove the truth or 
falsity of propositions and thereby limits the area of ex-
perience. It leaves out of account those extra-logical sec-
tors of human life which are certainly as vital as those 
that fall within the compass of logical reasoning. What 
interests him most in logic is the judgment, which for him, 
as for Rimanuja, is central. Bowne writes: 
Thought, as apprehending truth, exists 
only in the form of the judgment. The pre-
sence of ideas in consciousness, of their 
passage through it, is neither truth nor 
error, but only a mental event. Truth or 
error emerges only when we reach the judg-
ment. The fundamental conditions of the 
judgment, therefore, must be fundamental 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed. ", 
p. 428. 
conditions of thought itself. These are 
three: the unity and identity of the think-
ing self, the law of identity and contra-
diction, and the fact of connection mnong 
the objects of thought. The first is the 
condition of any rational consciousness 
whatever. The second is the condition of 
our thoughts having any constant and con-
sistent meaning. The third refers to that 
objective connection Which thought aims to 
reproduce, and without which thought loses 
all reference to truth •••• Or, without too 
great inaccuracy, they might be called re-
spectively, the psychological, the logical, 
and the ontological condition of thought.l 
This classification of the fundamental conditions of the 
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judgment, esJe cially in its emphasis upon the identity and 
unity of the thinking self, parallels that of R~nuja. 
Consideration of the judgment takes Bowne as it 
takes Raminuja far beyond the bounds of mere logic, beyond 
the merely for.mal laws of identity, non-contradiction and 
excluded middle. Besides leading both thinkers to empha-
size the activity of the mind, it leads them to a consid-
eration of freedom. With regard to the latter Bowne writes: 
it is clear that all investigation must 
assume the essential truth of our faculties. 
If we allow that these in their normal 
working may lead us astray, there is an . 
end of all faith in reason and knowledge. 
But since, as a matter of fact, we o:rten 
do go astray, the problem arises bow to 
combine the assumption of the trustworthi-
ness of our faculties with the recognition 
of actual and abundant error. Freedan •••• 
is the only solution of the p~oblem which 
does not wreck reason itself. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 20. 
2. Ibid., p. 239. 
If we were not free to err, error would have no meaning, 
nor truth either. Indeed freedom enters intimately into 
the structure of reason itself.1 Now reason supplies us 
with a standard, purely formal, it is true, of truth and 
falsehood, and 
the thought of a standard implies a pow-
er to control our thoughts, to compare 
them with the standard, to reserve our 
decision, to think twice, to go over the 
ground again and again, until the trans-
parent order of reason has been reached. 2 
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Lacking such a power, thoughts would simply come and go 1 
same displaced by others, not because of any superior ra-
tionality, but because the new conditions have produced 
new conceptions. 
or course the freedom which is indispensable to 
thought is not a power to make things true or false at will. 
1. 
p. 243. 
2. 
3. 
The rational connection of ideas and 
cosmic uniformities we can never make or 
unmake. If we have the Jr emises we can-
not change the conclusion. The laws of 
thought are secure from all tampering and 
overthrow. Yet though thus imperative, 
they do not of themselves secure obedience. 
If the,r did error would be impossible. 
Hence, in addition to 1 SJIS of thought 
founded in the nature of rationality, 
there is needed an act of ratification 
and self-control in accordance with these 
laws. Only thus does reason be.come reg-
nant in our thinking and only tbJs do we 
become properly rational beings.3 
Borden P. Bowne, Theo!:l of Thought and Knowledse, 
Ibid.' p. 243· 
Ibid., pp. 243-244. 
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So what is needed for the adequate comprehension of .reality 
is not only logic but free will, together with an adherence . 
to experience in its variety and relatedness. 
Not only does. Bowne emphasize the impotence of bare 
logic, but be warns against the pitfall into which it might 
lead us, that which he calls the fallacy of the universal. 
This fallacy consists, he says, "in mistaking class ter.ms 
tor things, and in identifying the processes or our classi-
1 tying thought with the processes of reality'." It is a mis-
take to which the logician is particularly liable owing to 
his preoccupation with thought apart from a thinker. To 
Bowne, who takes a synoptic view, thought is not the whole 
of reality, but is that aspect of our experience under which 
the rest is so organized as to remove inconsistency and pro-
duce greater harmony. By itself it is ·a mere abstraction, 
and Bowne ~trives always in his philosop~ for the concrete. 
There is always sanething deeper than 
thought; it is the thinking living person. 
And there is something deeper in the person 
than formal thought; it is life and aspira-
tion. Reality is not merely to be compre-
hended under logical forms; it is also to be 
lived and enjoyed. We have seen that the 
understanding gives only the for.m, and not 
the content of existence. Hence the aesthet-
ic, the ethical, and the religious nature, 
have always claimed to bring us nearer to the 
life of being and its true significance than 
the understanding can ever come. In the eon-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 24,4. 
templation or the beautiful, in devotion to 
the good, and in the service and worship of 
the perfect, we enter into the inaost life 
of reality, and become one with the universe. 
It is the gravest oversight on the part of 
intellectualism to overlook all this, a::'\ 
seek to reduce man to understanding only. 
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Here Bowne is speaking for an all-round vie~ or reality and 
by implication tor a method which does justice to experience 
in all its aspects. In speaking or "something deeper in the 
person than formal thought," Bowne recalls Rlmanuja, but 
with a difference. For the Indian thinker this recognition 
leads to the idea of mystical union, as it does not in Bowne. 
FUrther, it may be pointed out that Bowne•s oneness with the 
universe is an oneness of purpose, whereas for Rimlnuja, 
this is the sel r realization of the individual as being in-
separably connected with Brahman. This does not, however, 
involve tm loss of individuality but it is not the same 
type of individuality as it is understood in the West. 
(3) Method and the Extra-Logical 
We have just seen that tor Bowne mind is not merely 
a logic-making apparatus but includes many other interests 
besides. He writes: 
The mind is not a disinterested logic 
machine, but a living organism, with mani-
fold interests and tendencies. These out-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, pp. 529-530. 
line its development and fUrnish the driv-
ing power.l 
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Accordingly, anf adequate method in philosophy must be so 
devised as to do justice to the extra-logical interests 
of the mind. Among such interests are the moral and re-
ligious, the aesthetic and valuational. Theorizing in 
these domains, and in all others, Bowne would probably 
agree, are inseparable from qualities of heart and will. 
Otherwise they are simply logical exercises. "There is 
an element," says Bowne, "ot faith and volition latent in 
all our theorizing."2 He goes on to say: 
Where we cannot prove, we believe. Wbsre 
we cannot demonstrate, we choose sides. This 
element of faith cannot be escaped in any 
field of thought, and3without it the mind is helpless and dumb. 
And Bowne might even have added explicitly that it cannot 
be escaped in the field or logic itself. 
The fact is that the mind, in its concrete and es-
sential nature, is a unit,y of interests and feelings, with 
feeling as the motive force of mental life. Indeed, for 
Bowne the subjective side of mental activity is of the first 
importance. 
1. 
2. 
Harper & 
3. 
The whole mental life - springs out of 
feeling. It is extremely doubtfUl if a 
Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. 22. 
Borden P. Bowne, · PhilosoE!!l of Theism, (New York .: 
Brothers, 1887) J p. 111. 
Ibid. J p. iv. 
purely perceptive being without any subjec-
tive interests, could attain to rational! ty, 
even if its physical existence were secured. 
Indeed, it is demonstrable that our senti-
ments autline and control all mental devel-
opment. Before mental growth can begin, 
there must be an awakened interest, and when 
interest is awakened, the leaden chaos of 
sense-experience begins to take on intellig-
ible forms. The love of truth, which is the 
mainspring of science, is only one phase or 
religious reeling and worship. Truth, as 
simple correspondence of thought wit.h fact, 
cannot arouse enthusiasm. It has indeed a 
low value of utility, but nothing on which 
a soul may live. 
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Once more we observe Bowne attempting to do justice to all 
the facets of our experience, and not the least of these 
facets is feeling. And no method in philosophy-, which over-
looks this fact, can be satisfactory-. 
Again,it is not that Bowne is advocating an irra-
tionalist position, either with regard to method or phil-
osophy in general. He gives reason all due weight, but be 
is under no illusion that reason is a pass key to all of 
life's enigmas. or two beliefs neither of which is demon-
strable, we are justified in adopting that one which is the 
more lite-enhancing. To this extent Bowne•s method may be 
said to contain a pragmatic component. In any- case, he is 
constantly appealing to experience. In his Theism he writes: 
The justification or the world must be 
found in experience rather than in specu-
lation, in life rather than 1n the closet. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Studies in Theism, (New York: 
Phillips & HUnt, 1879), pp. 65-66. 
If we find life, with its furnishings of 
hopes and aspirations, worth living, that 
must be the end of all discussion. If we 
find the things we most rejoice in and 
would least forget are the struggles, the 
conquests, the sacrifices we have made, 
there is ~o need for their further justi-
fication. 
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All this is s:hnply to say that some things are not matter 
for argument, but for experience. Some problems, perhaps 
the deepest, are susceptible of only a practical solution. 
"In the cognitive world many practical convictions are so 
.. 
important that they are not left to reasoning, but are 
fixed .for us in the -spontaneous working of our intelli-
gence."2 This is true likewise in the moral world. 
Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that if, for 
Bowne, no method is valid which emphasizes reason at the 
expense of feeling, that the two are opposed, or that 
feeling may not in its own way be revelator.1 of the nature 
of things. 
(4) The Synoptic Point of View 
In all Bowne's thought : upon method, it is exper-
ience as a whole that is the underlying consideration. The 
scientific, logical, ideational and emotional need to be 
pooled together into· one integral whole, for it is only 
thus that they can be seen in true perspective, and their 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. 282. 
-2. Ibid., p. 283. 
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validity and value judged • . But this pooling together or 
partial experiences is not merely a process of juxtaposi-
tion, just as "a conception of all the parts of a watch 
in separation is not a conception of the watch. n1 Exter-
nal juxtaposition can never eventuate in the ~nitary con-
ception of which we are in search. This unitary concep-
tion must at once embrace the whole without extinguishing 
the plural! ty of its el aments. For, says Bowne, "there 
can be no true thought until the unity or the conception 
is distinguished into the plurality of its 1mpl1cations.n2 
Hence in a truly synoptic marmer, Bowne recommends a method 
which is analytic as well as synthetic. "Over against the 
plurality," he says, "we must affirm a unity; and equally 
over against the unity we must a:ffi:rm a plurality. Analy-
sis is as necessary as synthesis."3 
Adopting the synoptic point of view towards exper-
ience, Bowne cannot rest in any partial conception, so 
that the driving force of his philosopbJ, as it is the clue 
to his method, is the ideal of wholeness. And if he achieves 
t~s ideal to any extent, it is not by the use of reason 
alone, but by an integration of all our .faculties together. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theo!:l or Thous!!t and Knowle!!se, 
p. 21. 
2. Ibid., p. 22. 
3. Ibid., p. 22. 
2. Criterion of Truth 
If the met bods pursued by Ramlnu ja and Bowne are 
best described as being synoptic in character, their 
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theory of truth likewise emphasizes wholeness. At the smne 
time, it should be pointed out that the Indian thinker• s 
criterion of truth appears on the whole to be largely ra-
tionalistic, while Bowne's is empirical. Bowne would agree 
with Professor Bertocci' s definition of truth ttas the rele-
vance of statements about reality to reality, nl meaning by 
reality "the permanent ~d ultimate thing(s) or being(s) 
. 2 
which make up the world." To both thinkers coherence and 
consistency are the marks of truth, •coherence• being the 
important word for Bowne. Por Professor Brightman has well 
pointed out, "coherence means inclusive systematic consis-
tency, thus going far beyond 'mere• or •rigorous• consis-
tencyn.3 · And he adds that nwherever there is inconsistenC'J 
there must be error, u4 though consistency by itself is of 
course no proof of truth. Both Riminuja and Bowne would 
subscribe to this view. Further, they would agree that ttthe 
meaning of consistency is given with the very fact of in-
1. Peter A. Bertocci, · An Introduction to Philosophy 
of Religion, p. 62. 
2. Ibid., p. 62. 
3. Edgar s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, 
p. 68. 
4. Ibid • , p • 68 • 
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telligent consciousness."! As already suggested, consis-
tency, at least in the ordinary sense of the ter.m, is not 
enough. If it were, we could proceed to apply our test 
independently of experience. But this ~ priori road is 
barred, apart from all other considerations, by the very-
nature of the synoptic method for which experience is the 
touchstone. · 
What then is the place of consistency when we adopt 
a coherence criterion of truth? Professor Brightman speaks 
of •systematic consistency.• Let us follow him a step fUr-
ther. He writes: 
If we are to meet the needs of truth as 
suggested by science and ordinary experience, 
then the test of truth, while requiring con-
sistency, must also require (a) that all the 
facts of experience be considered and (b) 
that propositions about these facts be re-
lated in an orderly and significant way; (a) 
refers to the inclusiveness, and (b) to the 
systematic character of the kind of consis-
tency that we call coherence. This concep-
tion is 2evidently connected witn the synoptic method. 
It is certainly so connected in Bowne, and also less stead-
ily in Riminuja. In words that throw still further light 
on the connection, Professor Brightman says: 
By coherence is meant literally "stick-
ing together." The coherence criterion 
looks beyond the mere self-consistency of 
propositions to a comprehensive, synoptic 
1. Edgar S. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosopbz, 
p. 68. 
2. Ibid., P• 69. 
view o~ all experience. It takes into ac-
count all our propositions, as a connected 
"sticking-together" whole. The coherence 
theory would then offer the following cri-
terion: Any proposition is true, if it is 
both self-consistent and coherently connec-
ted with our system of propositions as a 
whole. 
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Or as Professor Bertocci puts it, in effect, empirical 
coherence embodies the sort of hypothesis which, without 
denying or distorting what is given in quality and rela-
tion, helps us further to relate than to each other in 
order to reduce mystery. As for the data of empirical 
coherence, they consist or all that is thought, known and 
tel t up to the present moment~ No properly metaphysical 
enquiry can afford to limit itself to this or' that h:ypoth-
esis, but must rather search out new areas of development, 
and adopt new hypotheses for the old only because the new 
accounts better than the old, for the elements of exper-
ience as experienced. It follows from a coherence cri-
terion of truth, whether the coherence is rationalistic, 
as in the main it is in Rimanuja or empirical, as in Bowne, 
that truth is never tully achieved by finite beings, but 
is rather the goal and standard or all human striving to-
ward knowledge. 
l. Edgar s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosopb;y, 
p. 69. 
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A. The Idea of Coherence in Riminuja 
In Riminuja's view,_ while all true knowledge is rep-
resentative of reality, its truth consists not so much in 
its representational character as in the degree to which 
it encompasses integration and wholeness. Human knowledge 
is imperfect by virtue of its finitude, the possibility of 
error being constantly present. However, through repeated 
attempts to connect together all our experiences, our 
knowledge of reality grows in depth and comprehensiveness. 
As it progresses towards its highest level, which is Bran-
man, experience falls more and more into a systematic pat-
tern. Each part is seen to fit into a whole. 
Now Riminuja makes a great deal of self-conscious-
ness in connection with his criterion or truth. It is 
self-consciousness that is the supreme witness of truth. 
Thus he wri tea: 
The evidence of self-consciousness is 
the only trustworthy evidence, and 1f11t is denied nothing remains to hold to. 
The importance of self-consciousness is precisely that it 
alone brings together the various parts of knowledge into 
a unity. It is the basis of that •sticking-together' which 
is the essence of coherence. What decides in the last anal-
ysis between truth and falsity is self-consciousness. FOr 
1. s. Radhakrisbnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 
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"knowledge and being are supposed in each other."1 Reality 
is a system, so that our judgments must be consistent not 
only with other judgments, but with the whole of knowledge. 
Such an all-comprehensive judgment is reached by the self-
conscious personality in zoga where all other judgments are 
united to yield absolute knowledge or a sense of har.mony. 
Not that Riminuja always talks in this non-empirical vein; 
be does not always present ~elf, as he does here, as an 
epistemological monist and consequently as a type of abso-
lute idealist. 
B. Coherence in Bowne 
On occasion; Bowne speaks as if the whole inquiry 
into the criterion or truth were futile, yet even while 
deprecating the inquiry he lays down the criterion of em-
pirical coherence. Thus he writes: 
We learn that we can walk by walking, 
and in the same way we learn that we can 
know by knowing. Academic discussions ot 
the standard of certainty or of the cri~ 
terion of truth are barren or any valuable 
results. There is no general standard 
that the mind can mechanically apply. The 
standard is the mind itself, dealing with 
particular and concrete cases; and any 
given item of knowledge must stand or fall, 
not because it agrees or disagrees with 
'some asswned standard, but because of the 
1. Ashutosh Bhattacharyya Shastri, Studies in Post 
Sankara Dialectics, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1936), 
p. 21. 
evidence with which it presents itself to 
the living mind in contact with facts.l 
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It is this contact of the living mind with facts that is 
the important thing for Bowne. And in his Studies in Theism, 
he writes that, "A universal standard of certitude is a 
chimera; but certitude is possible for persons. n2 In this 
mood, be goes so far as to commit himself to a pragmatic 
standard o:r truth. The criterion is workability in life. 
There is no surer test of reality, he opines, than life 
itself. Beliefs are validated in the light of their prac-
tical necessity in helping man to live his best li:fe.3 
Yet Bowne also suggests another criterion of truth. 
It is that of system, coherence, wholeness. At any rate, 
such a criterion is fairly inferrable from his insistence 
that reality is intelligible, and by this he means that 
all .its parts exist together in an integrated whole. Wh7 
else should he insist that by truth he m.eans rational prin-
ciples? ttRattonal truth," he says, "is seen to be valid 
everywhere and always, and as a result of this insight, it 
is said to be necessary and universal.. u4 Whence comes this 
necessity and universality, if not from the nature of real.-
ity itself? F\lrther, the end of all knowledge is the abso-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theo!:l of 'Ihouet and Knowledse, 
p. 293. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Studies in Theolofil., p. 58. 
3. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. 27. 
4- Borden P. Bowne, Studies in Theism, p. 14· 
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lute personality, the informing principle of both knowledge 
and reality. What truth we achieve depends upon our suc-
cess in storing up the fra~ents of our knowledge in terma 
of this ultimate principle, which is a person. What test 
of truth does all this ~ply except the test of coherence? 
C. Swmnary and Comparison 
The terms synoptic, empirical and non-!-priori char-
acterize the method of Bowne and on occasion: that of Rima-
nuja. Both thinkers are concerned to do the fullest justice 
to experience, not this or that experience, but experience 
as a whole. Both are clear about the deficiencies of logic 
as an instrument in this enterprise; both place great empha-
sis upon the concrete character of truth and abjure all ab-
stract universals. And finally, both conceive of the prog-
ress of knowledge as consisting in the comprehension of that 
principle, Brahman in the case of Rlmlnuja, God in the case 
of Bowne, in terms of which reality is seen as a system of 
selves. To both thinkers life, not ideas, is the important 
thing. 
In so far as it is possible to make out a predominant 
criter.l.on of truth in Rim.inuja, it is coherence, and it is 
predominantly rationalistic coherence. Still there are sug-
gestions in his work of a criterion of growing empirical co-
herence as well. The case is much clearer in Bowne, though 
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it is true that be speaks of a criterion in no single voice. 
While he is speaking in a pragmatic vein, the criterion ap-
pears to be workability. Again, given his emphasis upon 
the intelligible character of reality, it would seem that 
rational coherence is his criterion. Actually, neither 
workability nor rationality are incompatible in Bowne with 
the criterion of growing EPJlpirical coherence. This is un-
doubtedl7 Bowne's criterion of truth. Such a criterion is 
the one most in keeping with the personalism of Bowne and 
the metaphysics of Rimanuja. 
CHAPTER III 
KNOWLEDGE: THE THEORIES OF RAMANUJA AND BOWNE 
When we confront Riminuja• s theory of knowledge with 
that of Bowne, we find, as in . other parts of their systems 1 
an impressive community of ideas. For both thinkers there 
is the utmost parity between knowledge and realit7. At the 
same time, whereas in Bowne epistemology is as independent 
as possible of metaphysics, in Riminuja, the two are iden-
tified.1 And this identification is one of the outstanding 
features of Riminuja•s philosophy. 
In the Indian thinker's view, all knowledge, Whether 
finite or infinite, is a dialectical process which illumi-
nates not only the nature or our self-conscious life, but 
or the infinite-life and purpose as well. Indeed growth in 
knowledge or the one is growth in knowledge or the other, 
for there ia no difference in nature between the infinite 
and the finite, only a difference in pawer. 2 In a manner 
reminiscent of Hegel, Ramanuja regards the animating princi-
ple of both knowledge and existence as completely logical, 
ao that for him ultimate reality is a kind of energizing 
1. Ashutosh Bhattacharyya Shastri, Studies in Post 
Sankara Dialectic•, (Calcutta: University or Calcutta, 
1936), p. 23. 
2. Ibid., p. 23. 
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reason.l No gap exists between thought and reality. The 
law which governs the development of our thought into a 
system or knowledge differs in no essential way from the 
law governing the expression or reality itself. 
Thus the epistemological inquiry is not only revela-
tory of the inward nature of our self-conscious being but 
of the inward nature of the divine being.2 This is not the 
case for Bowne, who starts all over again to prove his ideal-
ism, after his Theory of Thought and Knowledge in his ~­
physics. Rimanuja draws no distinction between absolute 
and relative truth, or between absolute and relative knowl-
edge. The appearance or a distinction between them is owing 
to a failure to see knowledge in the light of its fUll devel-
opment and concreteness. Relative knowledge is merely par-
tial and imperfect vision, and this partiality and imperfec-
tion characterizes both popular and scientific knowledge; as 
th6,1 do not characterize philosophic knowledge, whiCh yields 
infinite truth. Here all the relations implied in knowledge 
are seen as constituting a completely unified system. 
Epistemology is thus o:f the highest philosophic impor-
tance in the system of Rlminuja. It is confined neither to 
commonplace realism nor to subjective idealism. It is happily 
1. Ashutosh Bhattaeharyya Shastri, Studies in Post 
Sankara Dialectics, p. 23. 
2. Ibid., p. 24. 
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free of any tendency to deny the co-implication of subject 
and object, and it avoids the bare abstractions of a purely 
logical view. Along with realism it emphasizes the presen-
tation of the object to the subject, at the s~e time that 
it recognizes that the two do not merely confront one anoth-
er, but are brought together in a higher synthesis.1 
Accordingly, in Riminujats view, the development ot 
thought is from the abstract to the concrete, from the in-
determinate to the determinate, from relative impoverishment 
to an ever growing richness. Always the tendency of thought 
is to erect a concrete world of knowledge whose parts exist 
together in a system. Writing of Riminuja 1n this connec-
tion, Shastri observes: 
The necessity of thought is to build up 
a unity of system in which the parts are 
seen in the whole in their identity and dis-
tinctions. Riminuja thinks that when we 
perceive the whole we percei~e a synthe-
sized identity of existence. 
Such are the outstanding features of Rimanuja•s epis-
tem~logy; features which, as we shall see, appear in one 
form or another, or to a greater or less degree in Bowne. 
If, as already pointed out, Bowne does not go so far as to 
identify the theory o:r knowledge w1 th the theory of being, 
1. Ashutosh Bhattacharyya Shastri, Studies in Post 
Sankara Dialectics, pp. 24-25. 
2. Ibid., p. 26. 
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he yet emphasizes the intimacy of their connection. For a 
whole view of reality, he opines, the theory o:r knowledge 
and the theory of being must merge. 
Hence epistemology, (he writes) or the 
doctrine of knowledge, and metaphysics, or 
the doctrine of real existence, are the two 
grand divisions of philosophy. As already 
pointed out, these do not admit or any ab-
solute separation, as if the theory or one 
could be completed without a theory of the 
other. They are, then, different aspects 
of the whole question rather than mutually 
independent factors. At the same time, 
they are su tf'iciently dis tinct to ~ke it 
desirable to treat them separately. 
Bowne is at pains to avoid the kind of monism which 
depends upon the identification of thought and being. No 
less preoccupied than Rimanuja, with concreteness in knowl-
edge, Bowne•s way of overcoming the dualism between thought 
and thing differs somewhat from Riminu ja • s. Whereas the 
latter lays stress upon the dialectical activity of reason, 
which be correlates w~h the Absolute Reason, the for.mer 
singles out the element of creative activity in the thought 
and will of the Absolute. Bowne writes: 
Thought, then, is the supreme condition 
o:t any real monism. But this thought must 
be more than a passive conception in a mir-
roring consciousness. It must be a complex 
activity - must be, in fine, a thinker and 
a doer. Both elements are needed to meet 
the case. The production of reality cannot 
be reached by any analysis of conceptions, 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
pp. 4-.5. 
but only by a tree actualization of concep-
tions. The conception in the understanding 
must be completed by the energizing in the 
will. In other words, creation is the only 
solution ot finite existence in which our 
thought can rest. The finite subject and 
the cosmic object must find their common 
ground and bond of union, not in some one 
impersonal substapce, but in the absolute 
thought and will. 
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Bowne, it may be said, is more emphatic than Ramanu-
ja, about the creative character ot the Absolute Thought 
and or the contributory character or private thought, yet 
both thinkers are agreed that if thought and being are 
united it can not be in ''some one impersonal substance. n2 
1. Raminuja•s Theory of Kno~ledge 
We turn now to a detailed study ot Riminuja•s epis-
temology. As in his metaph1sics, Rimanuja•s approach to 
epistemology is by way or a critique of his predecessors, 
with the object especially or reconciling realism and 
idealism. Rimanuja recognizes tour sources or knowledge: 
sense perception; inference; testimony or sabda; and 
intuition. 
A. Sense Perception 
Ramanuja assigns perception to the rea~ of external 
events, where all is change and flux. This realm is the 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 313. 
2. Ibid., p. 313. 
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world o~ space and time, and it is perceived by the self 
or the ehie~ part o~ the self, that is, the mind. The mind 
can~onted with objects of a certain sort, becomes aware o~ 
tham through such sense modalities, as sight, sound, taste, 
touch and smell. These sensations are o~ brie~ duration, 
constantly shifting and changing and cease to exist in the 
absence of their objects. Yet they are preserved in con-
sciousness, even if in a faint form as memory. Now Rami-
nuja tries to show that the experience involved in percep-
t ion is not the same permanent undifferentiated substratum 
which underlies the flux or particular sense objects, but 
is itself always a determinate event which is capable of 
being sensed and points to an object. This is to say that 
sense experience is intentional, referring to an object. 
Further, he reject·s the notion that knowledge can be explain-
ed within the confines of a metaphysical self composed of 
states or consciousness, and be is thus led to reject as 
well the identification of knowledge with states of con-
seiousness. As one o~ RmmAnuja•s commentators has written: 
R§mAnuja undertakes to show that what 
experience involves in perception is never 
a mere 'is', the so called permanent behind 
the momentary •this•, but always a well-
~ormed isolated event which can only, because 
of these characteristics, point to a •this•. 
Nor does it mean that the activity of knowl-
edge is merely an •is• - the metaphysical 
reality of a psychical stuff. Nor can it 
be ever identified with consciousness as 
such.l 
129 
For Riminuja, then, it is ~possible to think of 
consciousness out of relation to an objeet. 2 Pure con-
sciousness is unthinkable, and even if it existed, it could 
not be proved to exist. The attempt to prove the self-lumi-
nous character of consciousness on the ground of its essen-
tial nature, which consists in revealing its objects, is 
self-defeating, for what is meant by the self-luminous char-
acter of consciousness is precisely its capacity to illumine 
the object. Deny this capacity and you deny its self-lumi-
nous character as well. Consciousness can only be grasped 
through the objects which consciousness reveals. Nor will 
it do to argue that objects can be dispensed with and con-
sciousness apprehended by another consciousness, for this 
involves us in an infinite regress and does away with the 
possibility ot knowledge altogether -- consciousness with-
out an object can never be cognized. And this is borne out 
by experience itself. 
2. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bbashzam, "trans. by George 
Thibaut, in The Sacred Books of the East Series, Vol. XLVII[" 
(Oxford: Claremon Press, 1904), p. 52. ~· Unless other-
wise indicated all references to Sri Bhashyam will be from 
this translation. 
1.30 
(1) Indeterminate and Determinate Perception 
By indeterminate perception Rlm4nuja means the appre-
hension of a relatively undifferentiated object; relatively 
undifferentiated and not devoid of all difference, for other-
wise the object could not be apprehended at a11.1 It is 
onl.y in so far as the object exhibits characteristics, that 
is to say, exhibits distinctions and differences that it 
becomes accessible to consciousness and hence capabl.e of 
being known. When we first encounter an object, say a cow, 
perception is indeterminate, but as we thereafter encounter 
other cows, perception becomes determinate. What happens 
is this. Our first perception of a cow is of a thing pos-
sessing structure, while fUrther perception of members of 
the class cow leads by comparison to apprehension of the 
structure itself, that is, of a universal. Riminuja is 
here concerned with bringing out two things with regard to 
knowl.edge. First, even at the level of ·indeter.minate per-
ception, knowledge is always an awareness of differences. 
Consciousness would not be possible without such awareness, 
and primary among these differences is the subject-object 
reference implicit in all knowledge from the least to the 
most highl.y developed. Second, the universal is present in 
all perception, with this difference that at the indetermi-
l.. Sri: R8minuja, Sri Bhasb.zam, p. qJ.. 
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nate stage, it is only implicitly present, While at the de-
terminate stage, it is explicitly present. In other words, 
at an indeterminate stage an object is seen as a mere object 
but at the determinate stage this is apprehended in its re-
lations. The more determinate the perception, the more are 
the relations. 
(2) Sensation and Perception 
To Raminuja, perception consists of two steps or mo-
·ments, of which the second is perception itself, the first 
being sensation. Perception, he holds, is the product of 
discriminative activity, of comparison and inference. At 
the same time he insists that sensation cannot be reduced 
to mere passivity and hence deprived of all cognitive sta-
tus. Rather sensation is to be considered as part of a 
dynamic process in which comparison and construction are 
present from the beginning. It is by the will of the agent 
that even the sense organs operate.l Rmm~nuja•s distinc-
tion, then, between the two moments in perception, is a 
distinction within a single active process which separates• 
distinguishes and compares. For ~ all cognition involves 
an act or synthesis.2 
1. K. c. Varadachari, Sri Ramanujat s Theory of Knowledge, 
p. 15 •. 
2. Sri Rim!nyja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 63. cf. K. C. Vara-
dachari, Sri Ramanuja•s Theory of Knowledge, p. 15. 
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But synthesis in Riminuja has nothing in colJDilon with, 
say, the transcendental apperception of Kant. There is no 
suggestion in Rimanuja• s conception o:r "indeterminate and 
determinate cognition," that in perception the raw ma~erials 
are gathered and then tused into knowledge in apperception. 
For Ramanuja, even at the indetenninate level, synthesis is 
not altogether absent. Fraa its inception, knowledge is a 
relating activity and involves relations, and it is this 
that makes judgment possible. Without determination knowl-
edge is simply not knowledge. Knowledge, to be knowledge, 
must untold the system of relations through which it ex-
presses its own existence. Cognition is also recognition, 
that is, the discovery of what is there. 
(3) Characteristic of Cognition 
Indeed, immanent in its very nature, is the necess-
ity which impels it to grasp the deter.minate relations that 
constitute the domain of recognition. There is a dynamic 
thrust to the process of cognition by Which knowledge con-
stantly overcomes its indeterminate character and becomes 
fully determinate. It would appear, therefore, that :ror 
Riminuja the distinction between determinate and indetermi-
nate knowledge, linked up as it is with the distinction he 
draws between sensation and perception as two moments in a 
single process, is a distinction of degree rather than of 
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kind.1 As knowledge develops in clearness and distinct-
ness, as it does with the active exercise of memory, an 
indeterminate cognition, passes into a determinate one. 
In other words, all cognition is recognition. ~en where 
knowledge fails of a complete synthesis, it is still in 
some measure determinate, or indeterminate only in the 
sense that its connotations and relations, if intimated, 
remain ungraaped. 
It is at this point that we may remark in passing 
that Riminuja•s analysis of knowledge passes over into his 
metaphysics and underscores especially the fundamental dif-
ference between him and Sankara. 
Whereas Sankara•s absolute transcends the operations 
of thought, Riminujats infinite is essentially a self-con-
scious principle which reveals its true nature in the syn-
thetic unity of apperception. Sankara•s absolute is pure 
consciousness devoid of all determinations, while Riminuja•s 
includes all detenninations, and although remaining self-
identical, expresses itself through an infinitude of quali-
fications. 
To return to Raminuja•s epistemology, Riminuja recog-
nizes a striving in consciousness to relate itself to objects. 
Now, this striving does not cease with awareness of the sub-
ject-object relationship, but is directed further to under-
1. S-ri Ramanuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 73. 
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standing that the illumination it casts upon the object is 
an integral part of its own being. In a ~ord, conscious-
ness strives toward an awareness of its character as self-
cognizer. It soon discovers its unity which remains in 
tact through the triple activity of positing itself, pro-
jecting itself, and finally understanding the projection 
and revelation of the object as parts of its own being.l 
Are knowledge, consciousness and conscious activity 
all one then? Are the knower and the act of knowing one? 
We turn to this question in the next section. 
<4> Consciousness, Cognition and Recognition 
Rimanuja•s answer to the above question is in the 
affirmative. Consciousness is a function of the knower 
evinced in the act of cognition. 
It ~onsciousnes!7, writes Varadachari, 
is .re&lizable as a function of the knower 
necessary for the purpose of life itself 
and it is inseparable from the existence 
of the knower. Every act of cognition 
reveals more or less simultaneously three 
term., the object, the subject and the 
cognitive relation. It is the essence of 
cognition to reveal both the object and 
subject within itself as two poles which 
connects them though it belongs insepa-
rably to the subject end. It is found 
that it is purposive in so far as it bears 
the message of the outer existence to its 
owner, the self, whose function it is re-
vealed to be. It is thus a dharma, a 
function, a quality, dynamic, purposive 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhashyam, pp. 83-84 
and essentially belongs to some self. It 
is not found apart from its1 substrate, the self, whose function it is. 
So consciousness and the self go together, nor is 
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this all. Consciousness, cognition and its object go to-
gether. To Rimanuja, the essential nature or consciousness 
consists in this, that "it shines forth or manifests it-
self, by virtue of its very being, so that it is instru-
mental in proving its own object to its substrate. tt2 These 
are cryptic words but they suggest two things which indi-
cate an affirmative answer to the question with which we 
began this section. 
First, it suggests, as R~anuja never tires or in-
slating, that consciousness is never a bare awareness with-
out content. Consciousness is always directed upon ~ ob-
ject, even Where there is a qualitative identity between 
subject and object, as in the cognition of other conscious-
nesses.3 But besides this realistic strain in Rimanuja's 
theory or knowledge, there is another, and seemingly op-
posed strain, which brings us to our second point. It is 
that consciousness and its objects are in the last analysis 
inseparable, so that the nature of consciousness is the 
1. K. C. Varadachari, Sri RimAnujats Theory of Knowl-
edge, p. 21. 
2. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhasbyam, pp • .52-.54. 
). This is a case where one self becomes aware of 
other selves as of similar character. 
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paradigm of the nature of reality. This is the idealistic 
core of Riminuja•s position. 
As pointed out earlier, in cognizing, according to 
Ramanuja , the object is presented to the mind or intelli-
gence. Objects filter into .the mind through the various 
senses, and cognition is always of real objects. But is 
there, then, no cognition of false objects, as for example, 
the stick that appears bent in water? Ramanuja, in answer-
ing this question, points out that there is nothing in the 
cognitive process as such which would lead to the apprehen-
sion of falsity · rather than truth. The case rather is that 
the human senses and the cognition based upon them are lim-
ited wi th.out being inherently defective. What we perceive 
is never anything unreal. Indeed, if the objects of per-
ception were delusory or unreal, we would have no means at 
our disposal for discovering the fact. To R~anuja, there-
fore, the at times apparently unveridical character of per-
ception is owing to the limitations of our sensory equipment 
and not to any intrinsic fault in them. As the senses are 
progressively purified, their objects come to be known more 
and more as they really are. -
We shall return to this matter in the discussion on 
Riminuja•s theory of truth and error. 
Cognition would not be cognition without recognition. 
In the same way as Bowne, Riminuja points out that recognition 
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is the very essence of selfhood which provides that identi-
ty and permanence in .the absence of which knowledge would be 
impossible. It is the existence of recognition that attests 
to this identity and permanence of the self. We say, for 
example, "This very same thing was formerly apprehended by 
me."1 But while the self is thus pennanent, consciousness, 
for Riminuja, is not. He points to the fact that we say, '~ 
know at present; 'I' knew at one time; •I•, the knowing sub-
ject, no longer have knowledge of this thing. "2 Riminuja 
argues that if consciousness, which thus changes and fluc-
tuates, were one with the cognizing self', it would be im-
possible for the latter to recognize the same object twice 
running. In his own words: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4-
If' consciousness which changes every 
moment were admitted to constitute the 
conscious subject, it would be impossible 
for us to recognize the thing seen today as 
the one we saw yesterday; for what has been 
perceived by one cannot be recognized by 
another.3 
Further he adds, 
Even if consciousness were identified 
with the conscious subject and acknowled-
ged as permanent, this would no better 
account for the fact of recognition. For 
recognition implies a conscious subject 
persisting from the earlier to the later 
moment, and not merely consciousness.~ 
Sri Rim'!nuja, Sri Bhas!!lam, p. 56. 
Ibid., p. 57. 
Ibid., p. 57. 
Ibid., p. 57. 
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B. In£erence 
Besides perception as a source of knowledge, there 
is inference. The immediate effect of sense perception is 
to arouse belief in the re&ity of obje~ts. Still what the 
senses report turns out often to be unveridical, yet if we 
confine ourselves to the senses no distinction can be drawn 
between true and false knowledge. The fault of empiricism 
is precisely the dogmatic acceptance of what is conveyed in 
sense perception. So long as we remain within the domain of 
the senses, its reports are all on an equal footing. They 
cannot be transcended and we are thus confined to th~ re-
stricted subject-object relations that constitute empirical 
consciousness. But the senses sometimes deceive us, as 
reason discovers, and hence knowledge depends upon inference 
which follows in the wake of perception. 
Inference produces a form of knowledge not by means 
of observation, but by means of some mark or sign that in~ 
variably accompanies an observation or perception. so, for 
example, we know tbe house is on fire because smoke issues 
from it, and wherever there is smoke there is fire • . Smoke 
is the sign from which we infer the presence of fire. The 
inference is based upon our previous knowledge that fire 
always accompanies smoke. In the same way, we know that 
Rima is mortal because he is a man, and all men are mortal. 
Not that _the mortality of Rima is now perceived but rather 
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that it is inferred from the manhood in him, which is per-
ceived. Inference, therefore, is a process or reasoning 
which moves from the apprehension or a mark (linga} to the 
apprehension or another thing, and this in virtue or an in-
variable eoncommittanee (Vyipti) between the two. Infer-
ence (anumana), then, is a form or knowledge whose possi-
bility depends upon the mediatory function or a mark.1 
(1) Logic of Inference 
In the process that leads to the inference that the 
house is on fire, there is first the apprehension or the 
smoke, secondly, recollection or the concomitance or smoke 
and fire, and thirdly, knowledge that the house is on fire. 
Thus the inference here involves the house, which is the 
minor ter.m (paksa), the subject under consideration; fire, 
which is the major term (sadhya), that which is to be es-
tablished with reference to the house; and smoke, which is 
the middle term (linga), the mark or sign, the reason or 
ground (~) or the inference. Accordingly, the minor 
term is the subject with which we are concerned in any in-
ference; the major term is the object or inferential cogni-
tion; and the middle term is its enabling principle, the 
bridge between the major and minor terms. 
1. B. N. Seal, The Positive Sciences of the Ancient 
Hindus, (Calcutta: University of CB!cutta Press, 1915), 
p. 256. 
As in traditional Western logic, so in Indian logic 
inference takes the form of a syllogism, with this differ-
ence, however, that in the latter the order of the proposi-
tion is reversed, so that in the formal statement of an in-
ference the conclusion is stated first and the major last. 
Aside from this difference, which is unimportant, there is 
another which distinguishes Indian from Western logic. 
Whereas in the Aristotelian logic, every syllogism contains 
three, and only three propositions, nmnely, the major prem-
ise, the minor premise and the conclusion, in Indian logic 
the syllogism, if it can still be called that, may consist 
of five propositions known as its members or avayavas. 
These members are called pratijna, ~~ ud&harna, upanaya, 
and nigsmina. An illustration is as follows: 
(a) Rima is mortal (pratijna) 
(b) Because he is a man (~) 
(c) All men are mortal (udiharna) 
(d) Rima also is a man (upanaya) 
(e) Hence he is mortal (nigamina) 
The first proposition (pratijna) makes an assertion; 
the second (~) states the reason for the assertion; the 
third (udiharna) states a universal by which the asserted 
fact and the reason for its assertion are related; the 
fourth (upanayana) is the application or the universal to 
the case in point; and the fifth (nigwmina) is the conclu-
sion which follows trom the preceding propositions.1 
(2) The Grounds of Inference 
The invariable concomitance (V'lapti) which is sup-
posed to hold between the major and minor ter.ms underlies 
the validity of any inference, and ~arantees its truth, 
provided of course that the conco~tanoe is itself a fact. 
We are confronted, therefore, with the question, what is 
Vyapti, how is it established and how is it known by us? 
Now Vyapti taken literally means a state or pervasion and 
tmplies a correlation between two things, one of which is 
pervaded and the other the pervader. One thing is said to 
pervade another when 1 t is an invariable accom.panime nt of 
the other.2 In this sense smoke is pervaded by fire since 
it is always accompanied by fire. A vyapti between ter.ms 
or unequal extension, as, far example, fire and smoke, is 
called asamavyapti or visamavyapt1;3 and signifies a non-
equivalent concomitance between two terms, from only one 
1. Not all Indian logicians, however, held that five 
propositions were necessary for a valid inference. The 
number might be two, three, four or five depending upon 
the context and upon the person to whom the argument was 
addressed. But whenever a fonnal statement is required, 
all five propositions were used. Satischandra Chatterjee, 
An Introduction to Indian Philoso , 4th ed., (Calcutta: 
, P• 186. 
2. Ibid., p. 186. 
3. Ibid., pp. 189-190. Note: Asamavzapti may be 
translated as unequal relation. 
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of which we may infer the other. Fire may be inferred from 
smoke, but not smoke from fire. A vyapti between two terms 
of equal extension is called samavyapti. Here vyapti hold 
equally between two terms which, as being co-extensive, 
allows us to infer either of them from the other. 
Essential to any inference then, is the existence of 
a relation between the middle and major terms. In other 
words, no conclusion can be drawn f'rom preaises unless one 
of them is universal. Now the relation or vyapti between 
the middle and major terms is generally a relation of co-
existence. But not every instance of co-existence is an 
instaooe of VIapti. Fire may co-exist without smoke snd in 
such cases the relation of co-existence fortuitous, that 
is, dependent on circumstance• other than the nature of the 
terms related. So the defin.ition of vya:pti, offered by 
Rimanuja is that it is a relation between the middle and 
major ter.ms which is independent of all conditions. It is 
an invariable and unconditional relation between the middle 
and major ter.ms of an inference. 
How then is a yzapti established or known? What war-
. rant is there .ror the universal proposition that fiery ob-
jects are smoky? The problem is the problem of induction. 
Implied in Rimanuja•s thought on the subject is the theory 
that a vyapti or universal connection is discovered through 
experience. At the same time he holds that induction is not 
an inference of the form, "some men are mortal, therefore. 
all men are mortal," which is obviously invalid. It would 
seem, therefore, that while induction is a process of gen-
eralization from particulars, it grasps the universal pres-
ent in these particulars in the act of enumerating them. 
So inferential conclusions always represent a combination 
of inductive and deductive reasoning. 
c. Testimony or Sabda 
No less important than the knowledge which comes 
about through inferent.ial reasoning is that derived from 
testimony or Sabda. The term itself' means "sound" or "word," 
and in an epistemological setting refers to the theory that 
knowledge co~s about through the use of words. The theory 
is not peculiar to Riminuja, but has a still earlier expo-
nent in the person of Bhartrhari, who went so far as to 
maintain that knowledge is only possible through the use 
of words, and indeed that word and knowledge are identicaLl 
such identification is an outgrowth of the metaphysical the-
ory according to which the universe stems from the eternal 
word (Sabdabrabman). 2 Further the word is made synonymous 
with consciousness and it is argued that, 
1. Ashutosh Bhattacharryya Shastri, Studies in Post 
Sankara Dialectics, p. 32. 
2. Ibid., p. 32. 
Consciousness without m rd is comparable 
to light without its illumination. Since 
word refers to something beyond itself and 
is thus by its constitution relational, all 
knowledfe is therefore relational and deter-
minate. 
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Cognition from the very first, it is argued, is a judgment 
and associated with verbal expression, even though the lat-
ter may be or the most general kind. 2 Particular verbal 
expression may be lacking, yet the perceived object will be 
referred to at least in its most generic verbal character, 
as tor example, in the statement, "It is a substance or 
something.~ The object in all its particularity is known 
only when the specifi.c word presents itself. And the woro 
may- be either spoken or written. 
Now this whole theory is intended to establish the 
authority uf the Vedas, since the Vedas are considered to 
be the written records or the words first heard by and 
then spoken by the great seers.3 As emanating from a trans-
cendent source, these utterances were brought together in 
the Vedas. Thus the body of literature as the Vedas, Vedan-
ta sutras, and Upanishads becmne the authoritative source 
of knowledge concerning Brahman or ultimate reality, and 
were called Sruti or Sabda-pramina. 
1. Ashutosh Bhattachurryya Shastri, Studies in Pos't 
Sankara Dialectics, p. 32. 
2. Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
3. K. c. Varadachari, Sri Rimanuja• s Theory of Knowl-
edge, p. 32. 
Still another reason was proffered for the reliable 
and authoritative character of Sabda-pramlna, namely the 
test or experience. Subjected to this test by the great 
seers and their followers, and subjected likewise to steady 
criticism, the Vedas and Upanishads have withstood the tooth 
of time, and hence are regarded as yielding knowledge of the 
nature or ultilm. te reality. Such knowledge has been the 
prime quest or the followers. 1 
We shall postpone detailed discussion of the validiv 
or sabda or testimony of the scriptures, as based upon ex-
perience, till we take up in a later section the tests of 
truth. 
The argument adduced by Riminuja for the validity of 
knowledge derived from sabda ties in with the realistic ~­
phasis of his epistemology in general. The objects of 
knowledge are in nowise dependent upon self or mind. They 
exist independently of the knower. Their esse is not deter-
mined by their percipi, rather their percipi is determined 
by their !.!!.!,• This position of Riminuja goes by the name 
of Satkyati, which means that objects are not dependent for 
their existence upon being known and further that only that 
which exists is cognized. Cognition without a real object 
is ~possible.2 If then sabda is a source or knowledge for 
l. K. c. Varadachari, Sri Ramanujat s Theory of Knowl-
edge, p. 33. 
2. H. Mohan Bhattacharyya, The Princ~~les of Philoso-
~' (Calcutta: University or-Calcutta, 19 ), p. 157. 
Riminuja, it is because he holds that the principles enun-
ciated in the Vedas exist in the mind of Brahman, who is 
the supreme person.1 In a word, these principles have an 
objective existence and are capable of being known. But 
the question arises, how is this knowledge available to hu-
man bein~ through perception? The answer lies in yogic 
practices. By means of such practices the individual 
achieves a degree of purity which enables htm to receive 
impressions of a high order, that is, impressions untainted 
by the sense organs or kar.ma. Underlying sabda, therefore, 
and the ground of its validity, are the superfine percep-
tions of the yogi cs, perceptions which are communicated to 
the world.2 In this way, Rimanuja brings sabda within the 
orbit of perception and into line with his realism. Per-
ception remains the test of valid cognition. 
D. Intuition 
In his commentary on Sri Bb.ishyam., Riminuja points 
out that an extra-logical knowledge of reality through in-
tuition is possible, though only in meditation, marked by 
the quality or devotion.3 What is intuition? The term 
has a variety of meanings in Western Philosophy, a variety 
1. lC~_a. Varadachari, Sri Riminuja•s Theory of Knowl-
edge, p. t.tJ-
2. Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
3. Sri Riminuja, The Thre.e Tatvas, trans. by, V. K. 
Riminujachari, (Madras: Vasanta Press, Adyar, 1932), p. B. 
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that may be owing to the fact that intuition is generally 
regarded as being opposed to that of reason on which phil-
osophic explanation is based. Yet there have been thinkers 
who maintained that intuition is alone competent to give us 
truth in its entirety, while reason, whiCh is discursive 
and analytical, yields merely partial views. To the ration-
alistic philosopher, for whom all that is real is rational, 
reason of course is the key to reality, the high road to 
the apprehension of truth. He is inclined to look down up-
on intuition, to regard it as a complex psychical phenome-
non, a mixture of inherited beliefs and manories. The mys-
tic deludes himaelf in supposing that he has a super-normal 
vision of things that are inaccessible to the mind ~ided 
by experience and reason. It is only too likely that the 
mystic reads his own desires and feelings into nature. He 
denies this, but it should be borne in mind "that the pecu-
liar feelings of certainty which attend the mystic vision 
1 is not itself a criterion of objective truth." 
As in Western, so in Indian philosophy there are var-
ious views of the nature of intuition. So Sankara claims 
that intuition is a type of consciousness or experience 
wherein the distinction of subject and object is superseded 
and the way paved to the realization of the truth of the 
1. William Pepperell Montague, The Ways of Knowing, 
(New York: .MacMillan Company, 1925), p. 58. 
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supreme self. Unlike the fragmentary perceptions of Sabda, 
intuition is a synthetic grasp ofreality. The intuitive 
experience is ineffable, beyond thought and speech. Once 
had, it yields the certainty of a divine presence and trans-
forms our whole life. It is a state of consciousness which 
the individual achieves when he has succeeded in stripping 
h~self of all that is finite, including intelligence it-
sel.:f'.l In Sankarats view, intuition and fact belong to 
wholly separate reaLms. Intuition itself cannot be intui-
ted, for "anything that is intuited is a fact, not an in-
tuition. n2 
Rlm§nuja rejects this view, pointing out that there 
is no principle in ter.ms of which it can be shown that as 
soon as an intuition is intuited, it ceases to be an intui-
tion. There is no ground for the divorce of intuition from 
fact. On the contrary, "introspection gives us conclusive 
evidence that moments of intuition are as much real as in-
tuition itself. An intuition has two poles of existence, a 
subject, its locus, and an object it reveals."3 The unity 
or intuition is a synthetic unity". Its moments may appear 
and disappear, but intuition itself with its twofold rela-
tion to a subject and object undergoes no change as a syn-
1. s. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, p. 511. 
2. Kahendranath Sircar, Com~rative Studies in Vedan-1!!!, {Oxford: Oxford Universityess, 1927), p. 12. 
3. Ibid., P• 12. 
thetic unity. FU.rther, , intuition has no transcendental 
character in the sense that it rises above all predicates. 
To Riminuja, intuition is a dynamic process and reveals 
itselr in the act o£ illuminating facts to the self and so 
assumes a self-conscious character. 
Now the knowledge attained through intuition is su-
perior to that attained through perception, which is frag-
mentary, or through inference, which rests upon the par-
tialities of perception. Not that Riminuja is concerned 
to disparage either perception or inference; · both yield 
genuine knowledge, but such knowledge is limited and never 
extends to the highest reality or the highest perfection. 
For the fUllest insight into real!~ intuition is indispen-
sable. But indispensable, it is not easily achieved, for 
intuition even though natural to the in-
dividual, is feeble, and has to be streng-
thened by practice of disinterested devo-
tion to knowledge and to the highest pur-
poses of the Divine.l 
Super-Sensory intuition is directed to the internal or spir-
itual, whereas ordinacy perception is ariented to external 
reality, trough the internal and external are the two as-
pecta of a thing itself. Whatever may be the means by which 
knowledge is obtained, the mind judges its object and the 
judgment itself may be ~ediate and deductive involving a 
process of mental activity. 
1. K. C. Varadaehari, Sri Ramanujats Theory or Knowl-
edge, p. 28. 
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E. Judgment 
In idealistic theories of knowledge the role of 
judgment ia central. No knowledge without judgment • tJay 
the idealitJts. Riminuja says much the same thing. We 
have tJeen that for him, knowledge involves interpretation. 
and it is necessary to add now that interpretation cannot 
take place without the help of judgment. Various, isola-
ted sense impressions stream in upon the mi~• but these 
impressions as such afford us no knowledge of reality. 
They are felt and not known. Knowledge arises only when 
the mind discerns a meaning in the impressions of sense, 
and this it can only do by organizing them into a system. 
Indeed, system is another name for knowledge, and the dis-
covery of system comes about through the act of judging. 
Knowledge, then, is tre interpretation of reality 
through judgment. and it is an interpretation that is never 
final, but in constant process of growth as the mind grasps 
more and more of, the aspects and relations or which reality 
is composed. And this progress is by way or perception. 
inference, testimony and intuition. And judgment is ~vo1-
ved in all of these. And so likewise is experience, self-
conscious, and moreover concrete. It is not an experience 
tha. t lies below or beyond relations. Further, whether it 
is human or divine experience, whether experi&nce is immed-
iate or ~ediate, uni~ is its characteristic. Its locus 
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standi is self-consciousness and in self-consciousness ex-
perience invariably reveals the duality of subject and ob-
ject. Self-consciousness is essentially relational and 
synoptic. If it were not, there would be no self-conscious 
apprehension and no experience. On the basis of this rela-
tional view of consciousness, Ramanuja rejects the possi-
bility of any purely sbnple apprehension. There are stages 
in perceptual consciousness, but the passage is not from 
the simple to the complex, but from the complex to the more 
canplex. We have seen that an indetermim te perception, 
that is, of an object by itself, is only relatively indeter-
minate, since an object is never quite perceived by itself. 
And judgment, however incomplete, is likewise present, even 
at the relatively indeterminate stage of cognition. So the 
foundation stones or Ramanuja' s theory of knowledge are the 
determinate perception and the judgment that is inseparable 
from it. 
F. Practice, Perception and Consciousness 
To Rimanuja knowledge is not merely contemplative 
but practical. It is subservient to action. "The Self'," 
he says, "apprehends cognitions in order to react to their 
objects. It does not apprehend than for their own sake. 111 
l. Jadunath Sinha, Indian Realism, (London: K. Paul 
Trench, Trubner &. Co., Ltd., 1938), p. 254. 
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It is this view of the practical character of knowledge 
that leads Riminuja to emphasize at the same time the re-
al.istic character of perception. He observes: 
To deny the existence of objects other 
than perceptions is not possible; for per-
ception is seen as possessing the character 
of making it possible for a knower lself) 
to speak about a particular object. EVery-
one, as is well known, perceives thus - 'l 
see a jar.• This act of perception is con-
nected with a person as perceiver and with 
a thing as its objects; and it is a valid 
perception of which all . the world is witness. 1 
Pursuing his argument in favour of realism, Rimanuja 
points out that while it is true that ideas and their ob-
jects are invariably apprehended together it does not fol-
low that idea and object are the same. Indeed such a con-
clusion is wholly false and untenable. 
The opponent's argument, that perception 
and object being invariably perceived to-
gether, the quality blue and its perception 
do not differ, is untenable. It conflicts 
with its own statement: for being together 
in the perception must result from differ-
ence in the objects perceived. The percep-
tion makes an object fit to be spoken about. 
How then can it be identical with the object?2 
Now this realism of Raminuja's is advocated together 
with what, as Professor Sinha points out msy be called a 
presentative theory of perception.3 However it should be 
1. Sri Raminuja, Sri Bhashyam., p. 542. 
2. Ibid., p. 542 • . 
3. Sri Riminuja, The Three Tatvas, p. 9. of. Jadunath 
Sinha, Indian Realism, p. 2$8. 
observed with regard to Rimanuja•s defense of his theory 
that it .is a defense rather of one of its consequences 
rather than of the theory itself. The theory of course 
is to the effect t~at what we know is not the mental sur-
rogates of objects but the objects themselves. And thus 
Ramenuja insists that 
The particular character of perception 
cannot be the character of an object that 
has disappeared and has ceased to exist. 
For such a thing has not been seen. When 
an object disappears, its attribute cannot 
be seen in another object. A reflection· in 
a mirror subsists only so long as an object 
is present before it; but not after it has 
moved orr. Even there it is not the attrib-
ute only that appears; the object too is re-
flected. Hence the peculiar character of a 
perception imported to it by an object needs 
the existenre of the object at the moment of 
knowing it. 
Further, Rimanuja argues that cognition is not confined to 
universals but is apprehension of the object in all its 
particularity. He writes: 
In reply to the assertion that percep-
tion causes the apprehension of pure Being 
only, and therefore cannot have difference 
for its object and that •difference• can-
not be defined because it does not admit 
of being set forth in definite alternatives; 
we point out tba. t these charges are com-
pletely refuted b'f the fact that the only 
objects of perception are things disting-
uished by generic character and so on, and 
that generic character and so - as being 
relative things - gives rise at once to the 
1. Sri Ram~nuja, Sri Bhasbyam, p. 538. 
judgment as to the distinction between them-
selves and the things in which they inhere. 
You yourself admit that in the case of knowl-
edge and in that of colour and other qualities 
this relation holds good, viz. that something 
which gives rise to a judgment about itself. 
The same may therefore be admitted with re-
gard to difference. \Colour reveals itself 
as well as the thing that has colour; knowl-
edge reveals itself as well as the object 
known; so difference manifefts itself as well 
as the things that differ.) 
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What Rimanuja appears to be concerned to anpbasize in this 
difficult passage is that perceptual cognition consists of 
a single act in which the object is directly given both in 
its generic· and specific character. But he never tires of 
insisting that the cognitive process is always present whe-
ther it be the object apprehended or the subject knowing. 
Thus be declares: 
Even if perceptive cognition takes place 
within one moment, we apprehend within that 
moment the generic character which consti-
tutes on the one hand the difference of the 
thing from others, and on the other hand the 
peculiar character of the thing itself; and 
thus there remains ~othing to be apprehended 
in a second moment. 
It appears, therefore, from R~uja•s · somewhat scat-
tered remarks on the topic that the object is directly pre-
sent to perception, and not as a mere identity but as possess-
ing attributes and therefore as a differentiated and struc-
tured thing. Involved in all this is a relation between 
1. Sri. Raminuja, Sri Bhasbyam., p. 44. 
2. ]bid., p. 44· 
subject and object, and this relation, is established by 
consciousness. What then is consciousness in Riminuja•s 
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view? He begins by telling us what consciousness is not. 
First, it is not to be identified with Being. He writes: 
And as the distinction between conscious-
ness and its objects -- which rests just on 
1his relation of object and that for which 
the object is -- is proved by perception, 
the assertion that only consciousneis has 
real existence is also disposed of. 
Consciousness, he goes on to say, is self-luminous and is 
an object at all only in virtue of this self-luminosity. 
And it makes its presence known to its own substrate, name-
ly, the self, precisely because its objectivity is self-
illuminating. Yet consciousness is never an object to the 
self in the act of knowing, nor is it always self-luminous. 
The matter is explained by R~nuja in the following long 
passage& 
The contention that consciousness is not 
an object holds good for the knowing self 
at the time when it illumines (i.e., con-
stitutes as its objects) other things; but 
there is no absolute rule as to all con-
sciousness never being anything but self-
luminous. For common observation shows the 
consciousness of one person may become the 
object of the cognition of another, viz. of 
appearance and the like, arrl again that a 
person's own past states of consciousness 
may become the object of his own cognition -
as appears from judgments such as •At one 
time I knew.• It cannot therefore be said, 
'If it is consciousness it is self proved •••• 
1. Sri Rimanuja, Sri Bhasb:ya.m, p. 47• 
nor that consciousness in becoming an object 
of consciousness would no longer be conscious-
ness; for from this it would follow that one's 
own past states and the conscious states of 
others -- because being objects of consci£Us-
ness -- are not themselves consciousness. 
If things, jars, for example, lack the attribute of con-
sciousness, it is not because they are objects of con-
sciousness, but because they lack the characteristic of 
self-luminosity. They are not by their own being objects 
to themselves. It is simply ridiculous to maintain as a 
general principle that something which is an object of con-
sciousness cannot itself be' conscious. 2 
If we made the presence of conscious-
ness, says Riminuja, dependent on the 
absence of its being an object of con-
sciousness, we should arrive at the con-
clusion that consciousness is not con-
sciousness; for there are things, e. g., 
sky-flowers, which are not objects of 
consciousness and ~t the same time are 
not consciousness.J 
Having disposed of by means of this dialectic the thesis 
that consciousness does not admit of being an object, R£ma-
nuja reiterates his view that the 
essential nature of consciousness -- or 
knowledge - consists there - in that 
it shines forth, or manifests itself, 
through its own being to its own sub-
strate at the present moment; or (to 
give another definition) that it is in-
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bh&Sbzam, p. 48. 
2 • Ibid • , p • 48 . 
3. I~d., p. 5o. 
strumental in froving its own object to 
its own being. 
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While, moreover, ccnsciousness cannot exist apart from a sub-
ject, it can exist apart from external objects, as for exam-
ple, in introspection, dreams, and imaginings. Even in 
these instances it is the subject that owns the conscious-
ness and not consciousness that permeates the subject and 
object.2 
Raminuja next turns his attention to certain impor-
tant features of consciousness. First, he points out that 
consciousness is the attribute of a pennanent conscious 
self. He writes: 
The essential character or consciousness 
or knowledge is that by its very existence 
it renders things capable of becoming ob-
jects to its own substrate, and of thought 
and speech. This consciousness (anubhuti) 
which 1s also tenned fe'b' av~at!, samvid, 
is a peculiar attribu e elong g to a con-
scious self and related to an object: as such 
it is known to every one on the testimony or 
his own self - as appears from ordinary judgments such as 'I know the jar,• •I under-
stand this matter,• 'I am consciou~ of (the 
presence .of) this piece or cloth.• 
And it would be difficult to say that consciousness is it-
self an agent, as difficult as saying that the object or 
action is the agent. 
1. Sri RamDnuja, Sri Bhash.yam, p. 48. 
2. Ibid., pp. 52-54. cf. K. C. Varadachari, Sri 
Riminuja•s Theory of Knowledge, p. 50. . 
3. Sri Rimanuja, Sri Bbasb.zam, p. 56. 
or this consciousness which thus clear-
ly presents itself as the attribute of an 
agent and as related to an object, it would 
be difficult indeed to prove that at the 
same time it is itself agent; as difficult 
as it would be to pr£ve that the object of 
action is the agent. 
As a still fUrther characterization of conscious-
ness Riminuja holds that consciousness is a transitory 
function of the subject in the sense that it is not con-
tinuously present, as tbe knowing self recognizes. From 
this he draws the conclusion that consciousness ~owl­
edg!l and conscious subject are not one. He argues as 
follows: 
The permanency of the conscious sub-
ject is proved by the fact or recogni-
tion. This very thing was formerly ap-
prehended by me? The non-permanency of 
consciousness on the other hand is prov-
ed by thought expressing itself in the 
following forms, •I know at present,• 
•I knew at a time,• •I, the knowing sub-
ject, no longer have knowledge or this 
thing.• How then should consciousness 
and the conscious subject be one?2 
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In R~nuja•s view further consciousness as a tunc-
tion or a subject is neither a stream nor an expanse, nor 
is it made up or discrete snatches or momentary experiences 
like links in a chain.3 As he puts it, 
1. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhasbymn, p. 56. 
2. Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
3. K. C. Varadachari, Sri Ramanujats Theory of Knowl-
edge, p. ~. 
the antecedent non-existence of conscious-
ness cannot be ascertained by perception, 
. for it is not something present at the time 
of perception •••• Hence in the absence of 
any valid instrument of knowledge the ante-
cedent non-existence of coisciousness can-
not be established at all. 
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But as he at once points out, "there is a valid means of 
knowledge whereby to prove the antecedent non-existence of 
consciousness, viz., valid non-perception (anupalabdhi)."2 
In effect the latter ter.m signifies what McTaggart 
has called a state of •suspended animation• in which con-
sciousness is not active, either because of the absence of 
body or lack of coordination.3 The non-perception named 
anupalabdhi is as valid as the perception of darkness or 
the colour black or non-existence.4 
FUrther yet, Riminuja conceives of consciousness as 
a power (dharma), sometimes called also Viseaana or quali-
fication. It is not a Siksi or witness, since to be a 
witness would imply that consciousness is a subject, where-
as the truth is that it is a fUnction of and belongs to a 
knowing subject or self. To Ramanuja 
1. 
2. 
3. 
edge, p. 
4-
The very existence of consciousness, 
its being a consciousness at all, and 
Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhasnyam, p. 51. 
Ibid., p. 52. 
K. c. Varadachari, Sri Ramanuja•s Theory of Knowl-
52. 
Ibid., p. 52. 
its being self-luminous, depend on it connec-
tion with a self; when that association is 
dissolved, consciousness itself camot be es-
tablished, not any more than the act of cut-
ting can take place when therr is no person 
to cut and no thing to be cut. 
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Finally, Riminuja maintains that consciousness is 
not the absolute Brahman, nor that it is the individual 
self. The dependence of individual selves and objects upon 
the existence of absolute Brahman does not entail giving to 
consciousness the status of a subject; for where Br&hman is 
the absolute knower consciousness appears only as a function 
or attribute which Brahman possesses. 
To sum up, we may say that for Rim.inuja. consciousness 
is the attribute of a knowing self and that without self or 
objects, both of them real, consciousness would be impossi~. 
Consciousness and its objects are perceived as different 
from each other; one apprehends and the other is apprehended. 
The two are correlative, so that in the absence of objects 
altogether, there would be no testimony to the presence of 
consciousness. Another point with regard to consciousness 
is its self-luminosity under certain conditions. Conditions 
that do always hold. Consciousness manifests itself to the 
cognizing self in the process of the self's apprehension of 
an object. Accordingly it does not manifest itself to the 
self at all times. Furthermore, the consciousness of one 
1. Sri Rimanuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 58. 
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person is inferred by another from the behaviou~ of the 
first, and is thus an object of inferential cognition. Our 
own past states of consciousness may become for us objects 
of present recollection. If consciousness as an object is 
not, any more th~ other objects, self-luminous, still, 
even as an object it retains its character as consciousness. 
Repeating what has already been quoted from Rim§nuja, the 
essential nature of consciousness consists in that "it 
shines forth, or manifests itself, through its own being to 
its own substrate at the present moment or •••• That it is in-
strumental in proving its own object by its own being. n1 
G. The Cognitive Relation 
According to RimAnuja two kinds of relation are invOlv-
ed in the knowledge situation, one external, the other inter-
nal. In cognition the subject apprehends an object and such 
apprehension is external, conjunctive and direct. No third 
element intervenes, as for example a representation, which 
in a dualistic theory stands for the object. To Rimanuja, 
perception is direct, or as he calls it, vivid. Now What is 
involved in the direct relationship of subject and object 
that characterizes knowledge is a particular, together with 
a class concept or universal. 
1 •. sri Ramanuja, sri Bhashy&m, p. 48. 
Sense perception is vivid perception, i.e., 
perception o~ an object with the shape, size 
and colour peculiar to it. In all perception 
there is a common character which is known as 
j£tl or (class concept). It cannot be describ-
e n words but must be lheraeterized by every 
one ~rom his experience. 
It is not easy to make out what Ramanuja means by jati or 
class concept, ~or, according to the usual notion, it is 
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just this that is the communicable part o~ experience, the 
particular as suCh being ine~~able. Obviously there~ore, 
jiti is not the logical conception which appears in Western 
thought, but an essence or universal in some special sense, 
which is no further describable. 
In any case, ~or Riminuja the relation that knowledge 
establishes is a relation between a spiritual subject on the 
one hand, and en object that might be •other• than the sub-
ject on the other hand. It is an experiential relation and, 
as existing in experience, establishes the significance of 
the outer world. Experience of the outer world is a direct 
transaction in need of no intermediary between it and the 
sense organs, such as image or representations. External 
objects, including space and time, are perceived directly mt 
the same time that their existence is in no senae dependent 
upon being perceived. Perception makes no difference to the 
thing perceived. Both subject and objeet are real and neither 
1. Sri Ramanuja, The Three Tatvas, p. 1. 
at the epistemological level is a creation of thought. 
But the external relation that characterizes knowl-
edge is not the whole story. For if the relata figuring in 
this relation were completely external to one another, knoWL-
edge would be impossible. For example, if the relation be-
tween the hand and the pen were merely external they could 
never come together. So in the case of knowledge if the ob-
ject were utterly outside the mind, it could not be known, 
just as, if the mind were completely self enclosed it could 
not know. It is at this po~nt that Rbanuja introduces his 
theory or the inseparable attribute or aprathasidhavisesana. 
In other words, he considers knowledge as being constituted 
not only of an external but of an internal relation. Con-
sciousness, which is a power of the self, illumines both 
the subject and the object and thereby relates them. It is 
this relation that R~nuja calls internal. In an attempt 
to throw further light on this view, Professor Srinivasa-
chari says that knowledge starts fram the self and by means 
of its intelligence and sense organs comes into contact with 
the object, assumes its tbrm and thus reveals it.l The rela-
tional principle here set up is supplied by intelligence as 
an attribute of the self. Further, the object in the knowl-
1. P. N. Srinivasachari, The Philoso)hy of Visistad-
vaita, (Madras: Vasanta Press, Adyar, 1943 , p. 24. 
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edge situation is not an idea or any mental modifications, 
nor is it the self appearing as object. Subject and object 
are interrelated reals, compresent to one another, and illum-
ined by attributive consciousness or viseaa of knowledge. 
Riminuja distinguishes the relatio·n between subject and ob-
ject, which is external, and the subject-object relation, 
which is internal. The latter may be compared to the rela-
tionship of hand and fingers, a relation that is internal 
and organic • 
The organic relation eailed by Riminuja the subject-
object relation is explainable ultimately only in ter.ms of 
the activity of the Infinite self or Brahman. It is known 
through religious insight which reveals the object as the 
immanent activity of Brabman. 1 A commentator on Rimanuja 
writes in this connection: 
The ultimate explanation of the subject-
object relation is afforded by the religious 
insight that the real subject of every judg-
ment is Brahman which is in all thin~ not 
as a tertium qu£1 but as their inner self. 
When I say •t t . nk,' it really means 
'Brahman thinks in me as my self. ' Brahman 
as finite intelligence is the prius and pre-
supposition of finite thought arid has more 2 affinity with it than with external things. 
H. The Self' in Cognition 
Knowledge always belongs to and exists for a self. 
1. Bote: It is not clear how Ramanuja arrives at this 
position. 
62. P. N. Srinivasachari, Philosophy of Visistadvaita, p. 2 • 
It is for this reason called dhar.ma-bhuta-jnana or attri-
butive knowledge. Knowledge is lik~ light; the self is like 
the lamp; and attributive knowledge is like the rays. The 
self is not mere consciousness; it is a knower. Rimanuja 
explains: 
Where there is light, it must belong to 
something as is shown by the light of a 
lamp. Hencf the self cannot be mere con-
sciousness. . 
Riminuja insists that the self is not consciousness. On the 
other hand he is equally emphatic in that the 
very existence of consciousness, its being 
a consciousness at all, and its being self-
luminous, depends on its connection with a 
self; when the connection is dissolved c~n­
sc1ousness itself cannot be established. 
He employs as illustration the act of cutting, which cannot 
take place unless there is a cutter and something to be cut. 
What then is the self? It is, concludes Ramanuja, 
the '!' present in all knowing, the anchorage of all knowl-
edge. He writes: 
The conclusion remains therefore that 
the self is nothing but the knowing t l'. 
Thus it has been said, 'As is proved by 
perception, the self presents itself as 
the knowing 'I'. And again, •that which 
is different from the body, senses, mind, 
and vital airs; whiah does not depend up-
on other means; which is permanent, per-
vading, divided according to bodies 3--that is the self blessed in itself.• 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhasbyam, p. 6o. 
2. Ibid., P• 58. 
3. Ibid., p. 72. 
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So it is the 'I' that constitute• tm easential nature or 
the iDward aeli'. If the 'I' is not identical with aelt-
consciousness whereby the individual is aware of himself 
as knowing, it is nevertheless comparable to self-conscious-
ness. Further, according to what is shown here self is eter-
nal and so is knowledge. 1 But though eternal the individual 
aelf differs rrom the absolute self. ~reas the individual 
a elf consists of knowledge and is a mode of the absolute 
aelf, the latter consists wholly of bliss. "And hence we 
hold," writes Riminuja, 11 that different from the a elf con-
slating of knowledge, i. e., the individual soul, is the 
self consisting of bliss, i. e., the highest selt."2 
It woUld appear that for Ramanuja t~ .finite or in-
dividual self is an attribute, in part material, of the 
absolute self. Whereas the one acquires knowledge piece-
meal through a variety of experiences, the other is the 
enjoyer of all knowledge at once. Does this ~an that there 
is an epistemological difference between the knowledge of 
finite selves and that of the absolute? Rlmarmja • s answer 
is that in the one oase as in the other, knowing is the 
direct apprehension of the object. Yet there is a differ-
ence. The sense organs of the absolute self place no 1~-
1. Chandradhar Shanna, Indian Philosopb.z, (Banara• a: 
Nand Kishare And Bros., 1952), p. 494. 
2. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhashtam, p. 229. 
itations upon htm. They serve his mind or intelligen e per-
reetly, adapted as they are to the demands or 
eat, fullest and most integral apprehension. What di tfer-
entiates the absolute self's knowledge from that of thl fin-
ite self is total, utterly unhindered comprehension. 
I. Truth and Error 
It would seem at first blush that there is no pl ace 
for error or illusion in Rimanuja•s theory of knowledgr · I~ 
perception is always of "real" objects and as far as i~ goes 
cognition is always unerring, as he appears to maintai , we 
apprehend and can apprehend nothing but the truth. Ev n the 
objects that appear in dreams are real, even if dim an · hazy.l 
How, then, does the dream objects come to be? Riminuja•s 
answer here throws sam~ light on his position in gener l 
with regard to truth and error. He writes: 
Knowledge not resting on a thing as ita 
object does not exist; for it is no where 
seen, i.e., knowledge without a person that 
knows and an object known. Even dream per-
ceptions do not rest on nothing. What is · 
seen in dreams is created by the highest 
Atma so as to be experienced only by the 
dreamer and that only for the time being. 2 
It is to retrospective thought that the dream object appears 
to be unreal. Not so, however, the perception itself. 
1. H. Mohan Bhattacharyya, The Princi les of Phi oso-
phy, p. 157. 
2_. Sri Rimanuja, Sri Bhaahyam, p. 544. 
The perception is not unreal. For in 
dreams what is unreal is the things per-
ceived; ard these alone are seen to be 
nullified. But the perception is not nul-
lified; ror the thougpt never cone s to one 
that the perception that he had when he 
dreamt was also unreal. The subsequent 
thought that nullifies is:- 'The perce~tion 
remains; but the things do not exist.r 
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Now Ramanuja does use the word •unreal' with regard to dreaa 
objects, but he must not be supposed on that account t J be 
saying that dream perceptions are false. For if the df eam 
perception is real, it must convey, on his presentativ r 
theory, some sort of knowledge. And this indeed is his 
contention, for he declares: 
The reali~ of the perception always 
goes with something that the perception 
can grasp; and for this purpose the mere 
appearam e of a thing will suffice. In 
the cognition of something that is pest 
or that is yet to come, though the thing 
is not present, its mere appearance suf-
fices. On the other hand, a thing may ex-
ist; but until it appears before one it is 
not cognized. It may therefore be conclud-
ed that the appearance of thi~gs is all 
that is needed for cognition. 
All this may appear like a darkening of counsel yet 
- - . I Ramanuja adheres to his paradoxical thesis that knowledge 
is always true, for the reason that all knowledge revehs 
some object. Is he then prepared to say that even in o 
called •illusory• perception we have knowledge without the 
appropriate objects? The answer appears to be yes, fo 
. 1. Sri Rimanuja, The Three Tatvas, p. 122. 
2. Ib~d, p. 122. 
Riminuja continues to maintain that even in illusory percep-
tion, as for example, to use his own instance, the peroep-
tion of shell-silver, there is true knowledge in so far as 
its content is real, and we may add that the content can nev-
er help being real in some sense.1 Yet if Riminuja seems m 
be evading the ordinary distinction between truth and error 
or illusion, he does so by redefining illusion. Illusion 
for him is not the perception of the unreal, but a case rath-
er in which one object is confused with another owing to the 
presence of a common substance present in the confounded ob-
jects in different proportions. It is in this way that Rima-
nuja upholds his doctrine that something real is always pres-
ent to perception, though •the something• may be misidenti-
fied. Such misindentification may result not only from the 
partial identity mentioned above, but from the limitations 
or defects of our sense organs. 
Defective as these arguments may be, and they are not 
entirely clear either, Riminuja insists that it is a mistake 
to distinguish cognition into true and false. Given in all 
cognition is a real presentative element which, because it 
is perceived in greater or less proportion, detennines the 
so-called distinction between truth and error. What the mat-
ter comes to is this: although all perception 1s true, its 
1. H. Mohan Bhattacharyya, The ~rinciSles of Philoso-
E!!Z' (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 194 }, pp. 157-158. 
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truth is of varioua degrees. There is always aome degree 
of parity between any given perception and ita object. 
Where •error' occurs it is owing to o.miasion, that is, in-
complete knowledge of the object presented to consciousness. 
Since such omission or incomplete knowledge may occur in as 
m8Il'f ways as there are individual knowers, the distinction 
between truth and terror• is an individual and private 
matter. 
The jaundiced peraon sees the conch-shell as yellow, 
or the sleeping person may see white elephants in his dream. 
In what sense may either of these be labelled erroneous per-
ceptions? For one thing they may not fit into a coherent 
scheme of experience; for another thing they may fail to 
tally with social experience, that is, the experience of our 
tellowmen.1 Neither the yellowneas of the conch-ahell, nor 
the dream elephanta are shareable. But Riminuja inaists 
that these experiences are of objects that are real for the 
individual, though their reality is not public. The yellow-
ness of the conch-shell is a real property transmitted to 
the shell by the perceiver. In the case o£ the dremn ele-
phant, it too is a real object, presented, it seems, to the 
dreamer's consciousness by God. If we withhold the ter.m 
true of such experiences, it is not because real objects are 
not present in them, but because their status is private 
. 1. H. Mohan Bhattacharyya, The Principles of P~loso-
E!!l,, p. 160. 
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rather than public. Further, we withhold the term true ror 
practical reasons. These private objects do no work, they 
cannot be handled, and when their status is realized, they 
lead to no action. In a word, they rail to pass the prag-
matic test. Yet Rimanuja insists that "in all these cases 
the perception is re&l," but the presented object "does not 
originate, nor can it do work as a real thing does."1 
Such is Riminuja•s theory or truth and of •errort in 
his peculiar sense of the ter.m. He appears to adopt two 
tests of truth, namely, coherence, and practice, and or 
these the first is comparable to Bowne's empirical coherence. 
We may note here in Rimanuja•s theory or knowledge, as well 
as in Bowne•s, a mixture of realism and idealism, with a 
suggestion of pragmatism in both thinkers. 
2. Bowne' s Theory of Knowledge 
Although the relationship between the theory or knowl-
edge and the theory of being is not as close in Bowne as it 
is in Rimanuja, where they tend to be identiried, yet ror the 
American thinker they are inseparably related. Bowne writes: 
Hence, epistemology, or the doctrine 
of knowledge, and metaphysics, or the doc-
trine of real existence, are the two grand 
divisions of philosophy. As already point-
ed out, these do not admit of any absolute 
separation, as if the theory of one could 
be completed without a theory of the other. 
1. Sri Riminuja, The Three .matvas, p. 123. 
They are, then~ different aspects of the 
whole question rather than mutually inde-
pendent factor& At the same time, they 
are sufficiently distinct to make1it de-sirable to treat them separately. 
The status of epist~ology in Bowne is clear from 
his account of the aim of philosophy, which is rational 
comprehension of reality. The instrument of such compre-
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hension is thought itself proceeding in accordance with 
certain laws. Adherence to these laws is the mark of nor-
mal mental activity, just as their abrogation is the mark 
of the abnormal. If there were no laws governing thought 
the distinction between rational and irrational would have 
no basis. Thu. philosophy is constituted of logic, whose 
domain is the laws of thought; of epistemology which ap-
plies these laws to the problem of knowledge; and of meta-
phys~s which inquires into the final conceptions reached 
by thougpt with regard to real existence, specifically con-
cerning man, nature and ulttmate reality. 
The following discussion of Bowne•s epistemology is, 
of course, oriented towards bringing out the resemblance 
between his views on the subject and those of Riminuja•s 
but not to the neglect of the differences between than. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
pp. 4-5. 
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A. Bowne • s Treatment of the Problem of Knowledge 
(1) Experience as the Pre-Condition of All Knowledge 
Fundamental to Bowne•s epistemology is his theory of 
experience, experience in its most inclusive sense, as en-
compassing a world of objects that consists of persons as 
well as things. He wri tea: 
By experience, then, we mean to world 
of objects, so far as they can be the sub-jects of a real or possible experience, and 
we imply1nothing beyond this by way of meta-
,Physics. 
Starting thus with experience in the widest sense, Bowne be-
lieves that the initial experience is of a personal world. 
Further, he believes that all that we experience constitutes 
an inter-connected system. From the start, he writes:. 
We are in a personal world •••• and all 
our objects are connected with this world 
in one indivisible system. And this world 
ot experience stands absolutely in its own 
right, and is independent of our metaphysi-
cal theories concerning it. We may have 
various theories about it, but the exper-
ience itself is what it is, and it•s con-
tents are revealed only in life .Z 
(2) The Personal Basis of Experience 
To Bowne, then, the personal basis of all experience 
is the initial and indefeasible fact about it. The attempt 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, pp. 26-27. 
2. Ibid., p. 25. 
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to consider experience apart from a personal reference has 
resulted in philosophical aberrations of the most serious 
sort. Naturalism is a good example. The theory takes its 
start in the consideration of matter and force under the 
conditions of space and ttme with the result at once of 
having on our hands an insoluble dualism of matter and mind. 
Start, however, with the recognition of the primacy of the 
personal world and you avoid the pitfalls or metaphysical 
dualism and the errors associated with it. 
For Bowne as for Rimlnuja experience is thus :fUnda-
mental, and it is not dissociable from persons. Of course, 
interpretations of experience differ according to the meta-
physical approaches to it; but whatever the approach, the 
reality of experience is in no way modified. In this re-
spect both Bowne and Rmnanuja are thoroughgoing empiricists. 
The thrust of experience is always towards reality, more-
over a personal reality, and it is hence the pre-condition 
of knowledge. 
B. Stages of Knowledge 
(1) Sensation 
Knowledge is initially anchored in sensation. Im-
pressions are produced in the mind by external stimuli and 
it is these impressions that the mind works over into for.ms 
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inherent in the nature of mind itself. In this activity 
the mind transcends the sense fact. For example, says 
Bowne, if r were struck by a stone, the resulting sensations 
would .consist simply of visual and tactual qualia, together 
with a feeling of pain. lf i go on to say that a stone hit 
me, I . have in that very act transcended the mere sense ex-
perience as such and attributed objective existence and cau-
sual efficacy to the stone.l Subtract these ideas from the 
experience and "there is nothing left but a succession of 
sensations in my own consciousness."2 Bowne uses another 
example to illustrate his point. When we observe a moving 
body all that we see really is a continuous set of visual 
appearance at adjacent points of space in successive moments 
of time. Yet knowledge of the moving body, while it rests 
upon sense experience, involves a passage from the facts of 
sense to the notion of an objective and identical thing. "If 
I suppose,'' says Bowne, "that I have successive experience 
of the same thing, the sense fact is merely a simUarity of 
successive sensations."3 It is impossible to get beyond 
this unless the sense fact is interpreted via the idea of 
abidingness and identity. Bowne, like Rimanuja, is convin-
ced that present in even the simplest experience is a pecul-
iar mental activity, an activity that is synthesizing and 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theo!:l of Thou~t ani Knowledse, 
p. 10. 
2. Ibid.' p. 10. 
3. Ibid.' p. 10. 
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ideational. Idea8 are not sensations, nor are th~ modiri-
cations of 8ense. They belong, says Bowne, to the unpictur-
able notion8 of the understanding. 
Consciousness exhibits two orders of movement or com-
b1 nation: one is the sensual order, the other is the ration-
al order. rn the first many things come together with no in-
ner connection between them, and the connection tends to re-
cur in accordance with the laws of association • . Now associa-
tion. which may bring together the most diverse things. im-
plies no internal but merely mechanical connection.1 It is 
only in the second order that accidental gives way to ration-
al conjunction. Here things do not merely come together but 
belong together. For example. sound and idea are only acci-
dentally associated, while on the other hand the properties 
of a triangle belong together. t'The fonner might conceiv-
ably be separated; the latter are fixed in changeless rela-
tions."2 
Yet if the two. orders of sense and reason are disting-
uishable rrom one another, it is no part of Bowne• s intent:Son 
to separate them. Thus he writes: 
At the base of our thought life is the 
life o.f sense. This i8 something given. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thougb.t and Knowledge, 
p. 12. 
2. Ibid., p. 12. 
By no ~ffort of ours can we produce this 
life or modify its laws. This, however, 
does not mean that sensations are poured 
into the mind from without, as if things 
threw them off, or as if they were pro-
duced by the nerves and furnished ready-
made to consciousness. On the contrary, 
the sensation itself is purely a mental 
product, an elementary reaction of our 
sensibility against external action. But 
these reactions r re no products of thought. 
They result from the structure of our sen-
sibility, and are strictly a datum for the 
rational nature. If they werf not given 
they could never be produced. 
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What Bowne is concerned to emphasize is that sensation is 
not a product of thought, but its basis, and further still, 
that, as the basis, there is an element of thought present 
in sensation even at its most elementary level. Sensation 
counts for knowledge only in and through the action of 
thought. An exploding Catherine-wheel provides Bowne with 
a neat example. As a result of the explosion, the impres-
sion left on the senses is only a blur. Only when the 
mind has fixed the impression into a single and abiding 
meaning does it become an object of thought. 2 Riminuja 
makes the same point in his own way when he speaks of deter-
minate perception, that is, perception coupled with judgment, 
as alone having a meaning. For both thinkers the apprehen-
sion of truth, even at the 1 evel of sensation, involves the 
play of thought. If sense experience provides us with a 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thougb.t and Knowledge, 
p. 37. 
2. lbid., P• 38. 
knowledge of objects, it is because the latter have been 
worked over by thought. Objects are_ never merely given, 
they are constructed. 
The work of the ~ntellect, as it is assessed in 
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Bowne•s epistemology, comes out especially clearly in 
connection with his discussion of the unity of sensation. 
Bowne writes: 
Let us suppose the impression to 
last through a certain time. It is 
plain that the earlier parts or this 
time are not the later parts. The 
time, therefore, as occurring is not 
one but an indefinite manifold. Lett 
to it self it would never becone one, 
for it has no unity in it. Such unity 
as thf time has it owes to the intel-
lect. 
Each ~pression, as it occurs, says Bowne, vanishes 
with its date, and since the time through which it perdures 
can be divided indefinitely into moments, the impression 
likewise is indefinitely divisible and so indefinitely many. 
Wherein, then, does ita uni~ consist? Bowne•s answer is 
that there is no unity in the impression itself, nor in 
the time in which it exists. It is only in thought that 
unity can be found. "The impression as occurring is a con-
tinuous flow, and thought transforms it into a fixed idea. u2 
Thought, then, is of the first importance for Bowne; 
l. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 39· 
2. Ib~, p. 4o. 
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and it is for Riminu ja as well. Accord :tngly we turn to the 
subject in the following se~tion. 
(2) Thought 
Bowne's view . of the fum tion of thought in the knowl-
edge situation is founded on his view of the activity of the 
mind itself, and is only fully intelligible in terms of this 
prior view. It is a view utterly opposed to that of Locke 
and Berkeley, and of empiricism generally, (or so be be-
lieves) according to which the mind is a tabula£!!!, a mere-
ly passive recipient of sensation. In opposition to all 
such views, Bowne is concerned to emphasize the active char-
acter of cognition which proceeds according to laws inherent 
in thought itself. While he is not in the least disposed to 
deny that knowledge is determined by both subject and object, 
still, in agreement with Kant, he specially emphasizes the 
importance of the cognitive agent •1 Accordingly he never 
tires or insisting that thought has laws and knowledge is 
only knowledge when it is in accord with them. If such laws 
did not exist, it would be impossible to distinguish ration-
al from irrational thought. Hence the importance of logic, 
which deals with these laws, for an:; theory of knowledge. 2 
It may be remarked here that for Bowne, as for Rima-
nuja, there are stages of knowledge, or at least appear to 
1. Borden p. Bowne, Theory of ThoufP.t and Knowledge, 
p. s. 
2. Ibid., p. 9 • 
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be, so that what is known at a higher stage is not known 
at a lower. The divine knowledge, therefore, which is all 
comprehensive, exceeds human knowledge, just as a higher 
stage in the latter exceeds a lower. 
It is plain, says Bowne, that many 
things may be true for cosmic thought 
which are not true for our human think-
ing; and many limitations may be af-
firmed of the latter which must be 
denied of' the f'ormer.l · · 
But Bowne's inquiry is focussed primarily upon human 
thought, though without any illusions concerning the limi-
tations of' purely epistemological theorizing. So, then re-
turning to human thought, Bowne points out that in the pre-
sentational continuum, which is consciousness at a certain 
level, events that are hopelessly mixed occur. All that is 
known about them is that they are facts, a brute given. 
Bowne here is signalling a stage of' mental activity which 
is comparable to what Raminuja calls indeterminate percep-
tion. But there is a fUrther aspect of' the mental lif'a 
whose distinguishing character is the apprehension of' truth 
in accord with the laws of' normal thought. Indeed this is 
the type of' mental activity which is called thought at a1.1l' 
Bowne writes: "Thought, then, is that form of' mental 
activity whose aim is truth or knowledge.3" And he goes on 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theorz of Thou8ht and Knowledse, 
pp. 8-9· 
2. Did., p. 9. 
3. Ibid., p. 9. 
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to say that "Thought may si~ify the mental activity, and 
it may signify the contente grasped through that activity.nl 
In the latter sense thought .encompasses sensations, 
feelings, in fact the whole universe in so far as it is 
known. From the standpoint or the peculiar function per-
formed by thought, "thought may be defined as the process 
whereby tm mind works over the raw material of the sensi-
bility into the forms of intelligence. 112 
Bowne himself admits that such a definition is not 
complete, yet it does call attention, he says, to one of 
the most tmportant aspects and fUnctions of thought activ-
ity in our experience.3 
Now, in agreement with Ramanuja, Bowne believes that 
what is of highest significance in the nature of thought is 
that it is not only a mental event which ends in itself, but 
that more than this, it is the apprehension and report of a 
truth or state of affairs beyond the mental event. Thi$-
ing considered as a process is like all occurring events a 
particUlar and so likewise are the contents of consciousness, 
themselves mental events. But a distinction needs to be 
drawn here, a distinction of vital import. While our tbouS'lt• 
may be viewed as mental events, which in one aspect they are, 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 9· 
2. Ibid. ,z p. 11. 
3. Ibid., p. 11. 
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they must be viewed also in their cognitive capac:tty-, and 
in that capacity they cla~ to be revelatory or an order 
whiCh is itself not created but discovered by thought. In 
other words thought claims to reveal a common reali cy. Bowne 
writes: 
Of course, thinking, as a process, is 
particular; and the entire contents of 
consciousness as mental events are partic-
ular, but our thoughts, though mental 
events, claim to be valid for an order of 
fact or reason which our thougnts do not 
make but discover, and which is cimmon to 
all and not merely special to me. 
Just how a mental event which is private to me can a:t 
the same time reveal an extra-private reality is a mystery 
whiCh Bowne does not pretend to be able to solve. 
How a particular thougnt which, as men-
tal event, is special to me can neverthe-
less affirm and apprehend something valid 
for all is no doubt a great mystery; but 
the fact is so involved in the nature of 
thought that tho~ght vanishes altogether 
with ita denial. 
The defining character or judgment lies precisely 
here in the extra-personal reference of our thougnt. If 
judgment were the merely private association of ideas, it 
would cease to be judgment and be cone s :bnply one event 
among others. It is reference to an order of reality that 
"constitutes the universality and objectivity of thought, 
~. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thouep.t and Knowledge, 
p. 14. 
2. I bid., p. 14• 
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and distinguishes the judgment -- at least, in its intention 
from a subjective union of ideas."1 
(3) Steps Involved in Thought: Notion, JUdgment, 
Inference 
According to Bowne three steps or phases are discern-
ible in the intellectual. process, that which he calls the 
notion, the judgment, and inference. All three steps are 
involved in the constitutive activity of thought, and are 
dissociable from it. Bowne proceeds to say that for thought 
terms are signs, but the important thing about such signs is 
their meaning. And it is this meaning that Bowne cal.ls the 
notion, or concept or idea. The fUnction of the notion in 
the economy of thought is "merely to form fixed conceptions 
which shall enable us to master and e:xpress experience. n2 
Indeed, fixity is the ideal form of the notion, but this fix-
ity is not something static, for if we apeak of a notion as 
fixed, it is yet a fixity that does not excl.ude change. For 
example, a notion may first appear as A is A. Now A may be 
increased by the appearance of a new factor ~' and so becomes 
~ which itself in turn is fixed as ~ and not something 
else.3 Change, then, introduced into a notion, so far from 
1. Borden p. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 14. 
2. Ibid., p. 118. 
3. Ibid., pp. 118-119. 
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alienating its fixity, serves to emphasize it. Yet it is 
tuue that the contents or a notion may undergo such drastic 
change as to destroy its fixity, but in that ease what has 
happened is that a new notion has taken the place of the 
old. And it continues to be the case that the meanings of 
the old and new notions are fixed, that is, identical with 
themselves.1 
In its progress towards a notion the mind begins 
with particular things or events as these are immediately 
given in experience. Preceded thus by experience thought 
is now prepared to do its work whiCh consists in the com-
parison of particulars and the notation of their coD'Dll.on 
character -- such characters are arrived at by a process 
of abstraction the result of which is a notion or concept. 
And this notion or concept comes later on to be "extended 
by generalization to all s~ilar individuals, and the work 
is complete. "2 
Likeness and difference, agreement and disagreement, 
these are relations fundamental to judgment, and unintelli-
gible apart from it. And fUrther, since such relations ap-
pear even in our most elementary consciousne.ss, it is evi-
dent that the latter already contains an element of judgment. 
In Bowne• s view, "any consciousness which has passed beyond 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thougb.t and Knowledge, 
p. 119. 
2. Ibid., p. 119. 
the stage or unqualified, unrelated feeling and become a 
consciousness of something has already reached the stage 
o~ judging. "l A question arises here. Do concepts precede 
judgment 'I Bowne• s answer is that "some ccncepts precede 
same judgments, and some concepts succeed some judgments. 
The concept is quite as often the product of the judgment 
as its antecedent."2 
It is important to be clear about the sense in which 
judgment may be defined as the comprehension of likeness 
and dirference, agreement and disagreement, for the defi-
nition is variously interpretable. It may mean that judg-
ment is a declaration of the agreement or disagreement of 
ideas as mental states; or that it is a declaration con-
cerning the contents of ideas; or finally that it is a de-
claration concerning the things which the ideas presumably 
represent. Bowne discards tre first sense on the ground 
that ideas have not the properties of their contents. The 
thought of ice is not cold and the thougnt of fire is not 
hot. These qualities are in the objects and not in the 
ideas of them. Hence it is tempting to say that it is things 
and not ideas that are joined in judgment. But the objec-
tion to this is that many judgments do not concern things 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 150. 
2. Ibid., p. 152. 
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at all, as, for example, in what Bowne calls the subjective 
sciences. And when judgments are concerned with things, i n, 
is not the things themselves that are in thought but the 
ideas.l To Bowne, therefore, judgments deal neither with 
ideas as mental states, nor with things as extra-mental ex-
istences. Instead the.y deal with the logical contents of 
ideas. He writes: 
Thought bas no way of dealing with 
things except through ideas, and hence 
the contents of our ideas must necess-
arily make up the whole sphere of con-
sciousness. But, on the other hand, 
we must equally allow that the judgment 
is never complete until these contents 
are related to a world of facts or rea-
son which 2hese contents apprehend or 
reproduce. 
It is not only through the judgment that logic is 
involved in thought, but through inference as well. And 
even more importantly, for the most part our judgments, 
Bowne pointe out, are not given as true in ~ediate ex-
perience or in direct insight. "We reach them," he says, 
"by analysing or combining other judgments which are given 
or a,ssumed. n3 Bowm calls this process inference. He fur-
ther says that "it is another phase of complex movement by 
which we attain knowledge. n4 Inference is the mark of 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
pp. 155-156. 
2. Ibid.' p. 156. 
3. Ibid., p. 166. 
4. Ibid., p. 166. 
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human thought, for if our knowledge were perfect, that ia 
to say, if we were not finite creatures, inference would 
be merely otiose. 
Inferential reasoning consists in drawing from one 
or more judgments, called premises, certain others called 
conclusions whose truth depends upon the truth of the prem-
isea. But the validity of an inference is not so depend-
ent. I t may be valid irrespective of the truth of premises 
or conclusion, for validity ia a formal property or reason-
ing and consists in purely logical relationships. Hence it 
is possible to draw perfectly valid conclusions from untrue 
or fictitious premises. 
They do not, of course, b econe true 
thereby, but . their necessary connection 
with the primises is shown; and this 
connection, as in the reduction to ab-
surdity, may be used for1overthrowing the premises themselves. 
If the falsehood or both premises and conclusion is 
quite compatible with the validity of the inference, it is 
the case also that the truth of both is no guarantee of the 
validity of the inference. Further, Bowne, points out, it 
is not always possible to express adequately the premises 
of an inference except in formal sciences such as mathema-
tics or sciences that have considerable mathematical formu-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 166. 
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lation. A great deal of valid reasoning may be carried on 
which does not admit of adequate formal statement. In such 
causes Bowne writes: 
The grounds of the inference are too 
subtle, delicate, complex for verbal ex-
pression. For instance, how do we recog-
nize a face or discern the trustworthi-
~ss of a friend? There is here an action 
of the whole mind, with its furniture of 
experience and tendency, which would only 
be caricatured by syllogistic formulation. 
Much of our practical reasoning is of this 
sort. It may be perfrctly valid but it 
cannot be formulated. 
In all this Bowne is emphasizing the fact that infer-
ence cannot be confined to purely far.mal reasoning, but 
plays a role in practical life and in this role probability 
inevitably attaches to it. Classify individuals under what 
universals we will, they each possess their unique incom-
municable character, so that reasoning about them as a 
class is beset with all the hazards of probable inference. 
These hazards arise especially in situations which admit 
only of subjective estimates or in cases where there is a 
choice of many possible premises. The personal equation is 
apt to colour the estimate or affect the choice of premises. 
Purely logical reasoning may as often as not mislead us in 
the practical situations of life. No amount of logic, says 
Bowne, "could compel an Irish Catholic and an Irish Protest-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thoug1lt and Knowledge, 
p. 179· 
ant to draw the same conclusions from Oliver Cromwell's 
life. 111 The syllogism plays a very small part in the ac-
tual reasonings of life. 
C. The Categories of Thought 
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In its commerce with objects the mind operates in 
certain ways. That these ways have as their object the 
establishment of rational relationships is not surprising, 
since thought is essentially a relating activity. 2 Further 
yet, it is for Bowne an organic activity. He will have 
nothing to do with the common sense conception according 
to which Thought is but a passive reflection of existing 
objects and relations.3 Nor does he look kindly upon the 
empiricist attempt to construe thought in terms of "a me-
chanical juxtaposition of mutually external elements. n4 
There can be no thought without an organic synthesis with-
in the unity of the mind itself. 
Now the categories with which the mina operates do 
not as such appear in consciousness. JUst as we walk with-
out being aware of the muscles in our legs, indeed in entire 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theo:2 or Thought and Knowledse, 
p. 181. 
2. Ibid., p. 62. 
3. Ibid!' p. 6o. 
4· Ibid., p. 6o. 
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ignorance of them, so we may think in entire ignorance o~ 
the principles which underlie and determine thinking. !~ 
these principles are to be brought to light and understood, 
it is only by means of an analysis of the products of 
thought. It is no use appealing here, says Bowne, to the 
natural or unsophisticated consciousness, a fact whicn 
it is imp <Or tan t to b ear in mind in the 
present inquiry, as it often happens that 
superficial stUd.en ts fancy the categor:fe s, 
as determining principles of intelligence, 
are sufficiently discredited by the fact 
that they are not revealed in the unreflec-
tive consciousness.l. 
(1) The Meaning of Categories 
The categories are immanent mental principles whose 
operation is in accord with what are themselves mental. 
laws. 2 If they are to be observed, it is not by the senses 
but by the mental product in which they manifest themselvea. 
The categories determine the form of knowing. But this is 
not to say that the categories, as form-determining, are 
abstract, vacuous, or inert. So Bowne writes: 
They are not empty forms of the pigeon-
hole type into which the mind sorts its 
experience; but they are the organic prin-
ciples by which experience is built up. 
They are as necessary to the uni erstanding 
or experience as the law of growth is 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 6o. 
2. Ibid., p. 61. 
necessary to the understanding of organic 
fbrm and they are equally unpicturable .1 
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The categories thus are not just names, and their 
role in thought is a highly involved one, for thinking it-
self involves "a highly complex activity of determination 
and relation, ani the norms of this activity must be imma-
nent in the activity itself."2 
Let us now look at each of Bowne's Categories in 
turn. 
(2) The Category o·f Relation 
We have seen that for Bowne, thought is essentially 
a relating activity and its progress "consists largely in 
establishing rational relations among the raw materials of 
our experience."3 Objects are to a great extent defined 
and constituted by their relations, and if these were elim-
ina ted nothing articulate would ranain. Now Bowne argues 
that it is a mistake to assume that without the activity 
of thought objects might still maintain their relation to 
the mind. Such a view is erroneous, for Bowne says 
1. 
p. 61. 
2. 
3. 
4-
the relation o:f things, so far as th~ 
exist for thought, are instituted by 
thought, and the relations instituted 
can only be viewed as objective expres-
sions ot principles immanent in thought 
itselt.4 
Borden p. Bowne, Theo!:l of Thou6at ani Knowl 9dse, 
!bid.' p. 61. 
Ibid.' p. 62. 
ibid., P• 62. 
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It is here in connection with the relating activity 
of thought that the idealistic side of Bowne•s epistemology 
is especially in evidence. "Things, tt he says, "can be re-
lated for our thought only as the,y are related by our 
thought. n1 Relations are known or revealed only in the 
relating activity, and this· activity is or the mind. In-
deed, in the last analysis relations would not exist with-
out a mind that does the relating, so that, Bowne concludes., · 
the "world of related things can exist only in and through 
a relating cosmic intelligence. 112 None of the important 
relations which constitute knowledge exists in the sensory 
world. The ease is rather that they are contributed by the 
understanding to the formation and interpretation of experi-
ence. So the relations of time, space, causality, identity 
and the like, are not given in sensation, but are the mind-
contributed forms which experience assumes in passing from 
impressions to objects. 
(3) The Category or Likeness and Unlikeness 
The discernment of likeness among objects does not 
consist of the passive reception of impressions from the 
outside, but consists of such activities as i'ixation, dis-
crimination, comparison and judgment. Ii' it is the case, 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Though.t and Knowledge, 
p. 62. 
2. Drid., p. 62. 
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Bowne points out, that likeness may exist apart from its 
recognition, the recognition or likeness or any other re-
lation is possible only through the activity of the mind. 
Of likeness and unlikeness he writes: 
These ideas arise only as two or more 
experiences or objects are at once dis-
criminated and compared in the same act 
of consciousness. When this act, which 
cannot be construed or fUrther described, 
is performed, then there arises the idea 
of likeness or unl1keness, 1according to the nature of t:D:! objects • 
. \4) The Category of Time 
T~e, as we shall see, constitutes one or the crucial 
problems of Bowne's metaphysics. But it constitutes also 
an epistemological problem, for as Bowne s-~ys, "whether 
time be ontologically real or not, apparent time is an un-
2 deniable element of experience." Ultimately real or not, 
ti:n'B is a concern of the epistemologist. Now, it is the 
mind itself which relates events ullier the form of time. 
1. 
Theory, 
2. 
p. 44· 
3~ 
Time is primarily a law of thought 
whereby the mind relates events under 
the form of antecedenee and sequence, 
and thus makes the temporal experience 
possible. Given the temporal experience, 
we may by abstraction get the idea of 
time; but the temporal experience itself 
is possible only through a ~eculiar re-
lating activity of thought. 
Borden P. Bowne, Introduction to Psychological 
(Harper & Brothers, 1886), p. 127. 
Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
Ibid.' p. 66. 
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Thus the essential elements of time are antecedence 
and sequence; and its dimensions are past, present and ru-
ture.1 The necessity of the temporal relation, as Bowne 
indicates in the passage quoted above, is a necessity that 
lies in the mind and not in events. As the law or scheme 
relating all events, time is considered to be one, infin-
ite and all-embracing. "But the unity and infinity of time 
are only consequences of the fact that the law of synthesis 
2 is one m.d extends to all events." 
Bowne thinks of this unity and infinity of time as 
commonly lying latent in the background of our thoughts, 
so that time is not something imposed upon our thought 
from without, nor is the consciousness of time a mere 
passive miiToring of objective succession. "Time," Bowne 
writes, "rest ultimately upon a mental activity whereby 
the contents of consciousness are temporally related to 
one another and to the abiding self. n3 The result is "the 
consciousness of subjective time. ,,4 Further, "this form 
of relation is next extended to the cosmic order, and thus 
the belief in objective t :Jme arises. "5 But tine is primar-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theorz of Thousht end Knowledse, 
p. 66. 
2. Ibid., p. 68. 
3. Ibid., p. 69. 
4- Ibid., p. 69. 
5. Ibid., p. 69. 
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ily a law or mental synthesis and it is in terms or this 
law that we relate events. The situation with regard to 
time, then, is this. If objective time does not exist, 
there is no alternative but to suppose that tie is a men-
tal product; on the other hand, if objective time does ex-
ist, it can only be known through a subjective activity 
according to a subjective law.1 
(5) The Category or Number 
To Bowne number is "preeminently the outcome of men-
tal activity. 112 It is ·not a simple consequence or sense 
experience, as sensationalism would have it. The very no-
tion or number involves the recognition or recurrence and 
succession. Bowne writes: 
Number is no property of things in 
themselves, but only or things as united 
by the mind in numerical relations. Nor 
can we allow that unity attaches to the 
sense object. The mind establishes its 
own unit, as appears from the fact that 
the same object may be one or many, ac-
cording to the unit which the mind adopts. 3 
True, events in experience can be counted, but they 
become counted only through a new and peculiar form of men-
tal action upon experience, an action that involves the 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory or Thougnt and Knowledge, 
p. 70. 
2 • Ibid • ' p • 7 0 • 
3. Borden P. Bowne, Introduction to Psychological 
Theory, p . 154. 
establishment of a unity and a process of counting. And it 
is through this process that number is grasped. In a word, 
"num'ber exists only as things are united by the mind in nu-
merical relations. 111 It is not a passive affection of the 
sensibility but the law and genesis of number lie in the 
mind itself. Bowne further is concerned to emphasize the 
relativity of number. In concrete application number pre-
supposes classification, and whatever units are employed 
in this activity they are relative and formal. It is clear 
that "mutual external! ty of parts and the resulting indefi-
nite divisibility of a~ assumed unit forbid us to find any 
ultimate unit in space and time. 112 
(6) The Category of Space 
Neither the naive realist view or space, according 
to which we see things in space because they are in space, 
nor the associationist view according to which our sensa-
tiona by their very nature give rise to the idea of space, 
is, according to Bowne, tenable. On the contrary space 
exists for the mind only when the mind endows objects with 
space relations. If it were not for the space relating ac-
tivity of thought spatial experience would not occur. 
However real •••• space may be as an ob-
jective fact, it can exist for the mind 
1. Borden p. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 71. 
2. Ibid., p. 73. 
only as we give our objects space relations. 
Until we relate them spatially they are not 
in space for us. Space, like time, is pri-
marily a law of mental synthesis, whereby 
the mind relates its coexistent objects un-
der tl:e form of mutual external! ty. Sec-
ondarily, space is tfe abstract form of 
external experience. 
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Bowne's theory of space is no more free of the prob-
lem of how it is that we have spatial intuition at all than 
any other theory. He recognizes that the stream of thought 
as a psychological process has no spatial qualities. "There 
may be ideas of bulk, but there are no bulky ideas."2 The 
introduction of spatial qualities bodily into consciousness 
would be incompatible with the uni~ of consciousness. 
Since, then, the stream of thoughthas no spatial qualities, 
how explain the fact that we do hsve ideas of bulk, distance 
and the like. Bowne is perfectly frank in admitting that 
we do not know. 
(7) Motion 
Involved in the categories ot both space and time, 
but not identical with either is the category of motion. 
Just as there is no motion if we take only the co-existent 
points of space, so there is no motion if we take only the 
successive moments of time. We get motion only if we define 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 74. 
2. lgid., p. 74. 
it as change of place, or as the passage of a body from 
one place to another. But there is something more that 
needs to be borne in mind here. As Bowne writes: 
If I suppose I see a moving body, the 
sense fact is only a continuous set of 
visual appearances at adjacent points or 
space in successive moments of time. To 
transform this into a moving body, I must 
pass from the fact of sense to the n~tion 
of an objective and identical thing. 
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In other words the experience of motion involves an 
activity or the mind. 
(8) Quantity 
The quantity of anything, no matter what, is primar-
ily its magnitude, whether of extension, duration, or in-
tensity. Described in this way there is nothing relative 
about quantity. It is only when we come to measure qu.an-
tity that there is no absolute unit of quantity. Nothing 
is great or small absolutely. Further, Bowne points out, 
the notion of quantity moves within the field of qualita-
tive likeness. Indeed, quantity is a less basic categor,y 
than quality. The first being, according to Bowne, a de-
rivative of the other. He will have nothing to do with 
the form or reductionism which seeks to explain quality 
in terms of qut:n t i ty. He writes a 
Quantitative likeness and unlikeness 
are perceived when two or more cases of 
1. Borden .t' . Bowne, Theory of Thougpt ani Knowledge, 
p. 10. 
a common quality are compared. Here the 
mind comparing two or more cases perceives 
a peculiar identity of changes in its in-
ner states as it passes from oneto another, 
which change, moreover, is renounced when 
the order of mental movement is reversed. 
This fact is the basis of all ideas of 
quantitative equivalence, or of greater 
and less in quantity. But these ideas, 
though ultimately based upon the sensi-
bility, are not functions of the sensi-
bility. They rather represent f new and 
higher form of mental function. 
In Bowne•s view, therefore, quantity the master-
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idea of physics, is itself an expression of the constitu-
tive action of the mind. Actually all the categories we 
have so far considered, namely, space, tim~motion and 
quantity, with number for their measure, are the great 
elementary categories of mechanica.J. science, providing 
the basis of pure mathematics and kinetics and thereby, 
the ground-work of physical science. However, "these 
categories alone would not carry us beyond groundless 
events and disconnected appearances. 112 If the visible 
world is a world of things and not a set of shifting and 
dissolving appearances without unity or identity, it is 
because o~ the metaphysical categories like being, iden-
tity, and causality. These categories are never present 
in the sense, but are the unpicturable notions of intelli-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Introduction to Psychological 
Theory, P• 127 . 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 81. 
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gence. Since Bowne treats or them not only in his metaphy-
sics but in his theory or knowledge, we shall say s an.ething 
about them here • 
(9) Being 
Among the metaphysical categories which Bowne con-
siders important ror knowledge the category of being comes 
first. He starts out by saying that in the wor1d or events 
all occurrences are real; indeed, their occurrence is their 
reality. Further, in the world or ideas likewise "any con-
ceptual object whatever has a sort or existence. 111 Again, 
in the world or consciousness actual thou~ts and :feelings 
are considered to be real, in distinction :from others 
which, as not actual, are unreal. In the broadest sense, 
then, being includes everything, that is, thought and its 
objects alike, for all of these exist in some fashion. 
In this general use or the term, the 
mind posits itself' and all its acts and 
objects as numbers or a system or real-
ity without rurther speci:f'ications. All 
that is involved in it is a possible ob-
jectivity ror thought. This act or pos-
iting results necessarily :from the anti-
thesis between thought and its object. 
Thought as act does not make but reveals 
its object; and even when thought grasps 
itself, it reveals itself' as a real ac-
tivity. Even the special to me has an 
aspect which makes it, at least poten-
tially, camnon to all; :for it is one phase 
or :factor or the real system or things and 
events. In this sense thought p»esupposes 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of' ThOUght and Knowledge, 
P• 82. 
being and has no stgnificance without ref-
erence to being. ln this reference we have 
the most general expression of that objec-
tivity which we hare seen to inhere in the 
nature of thought. 
201 
Being in this, its largest sense, while it implies 
a possible objectivity of thought, does not thereby imply 
any substantiality or identity in the object. At this 
stage being ~s compatible with the extremest solipsism, 
for it is the same being whether it is an abiding reality 
or whether it expresses itself as objective appearance, 
existing only in the perception thereof. For spontaneous 
thought, however, being is a fundamental category, that is, 
thought has always an outer reference. Qualities are al-
ways qualities of something. But while our objective ex-
perience is for Bowne, proof that being exists, just as 
logically there can be no doubt of being, yet objective 
experience is absolutely inarticulate and nothing for in-
telligence until it is fixed and defined with reference to 
an abiding and independent meanlng. 2 And such meaning is 
~possible without the categorical activity of the mind. 
According to Bowne the category or being appears in 
three leading forms, namely, thing, soul and God. In all 
three, being is the real ground and .Principle of unity in 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 82. 
2. Ibid., p. 83. 
1 the manifestations of the respective reaLms. 
(10) Quality 
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The thought of being in abstraction is only the 
empty form of ground and objectivity. If mere being as 
such is taken to be real, thought itself vanishes. It is 
only being as endowed with qualities and attributes that 
is actual. Thus pure being is objectively nothing. Sub-
jectively it is the bare category of objective position. 
There is a double aspect to the concrete act of positing. 
First, something is posited as real, and thus being is 
affirmed. But if it is asked what this real thing is, 
the only answer possible is in terms of its qual! ties. 
The two sides are essential to the act of positing, just 
as a judgment is nothing without both subject and predi-
cate. In the judgment we posit a subject which we unfold 
in the predicate, and neither is anything apart from the 
other. So reality is conceived through its attributes, 
and only so, and the attributes exist only in the reality. 
Either is an unreal. abstraction apart fran the other. 
It is this relation of being and quality, substance 
and attribute, that underlies our attributive judgments, 
as it underlies all our spontaneous thinking about the ex-
ternal world. The relation in its grammatical form of noun 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 84. 
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and adjective is one of the fundamental factors or lang-
uage.1 Now the senses give us only qualities, but these 
qualities form groups by association, and all that we mean 
by a thing is simply such a group~ 
What the notion of being or substance adds to the 
sense contents is nothing but Sl objective principle of 
ground and unity. And being in sone form is a necessity 
or thought. Without it qualities would be nothing but the 
flux or sensation. Since thought is largely concerned with 
sense objects 
our conceptions o:f qualities are mainly 
or the passive and spatial type. But 
as the thou~t or being grows more dy-
namic, or as we rise to the conception 
or spiritual beizg, our thought o:f 
qualities takes on the :fozm o:f powers 
energies, capacities, :faculties, etc.~ 
Here, again, in connection with the category or qual-
ity, Bowne is concerned to emphasize the ~inthetic and in-
terpretative action o:f the mind. Qualities at the level of 
mere sense experience are inert and discontinuous. It is 
only as the mind interprets them into a continuous world 
o:f things on its own rational warrant that they are seen 
as the manifestations of a single dynamic reality. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Though.t and Knowledge, 
p. 86. 
2. Ibid., P• 87. 
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(11) Identity 
The principle or identity is valid not only for 
thought, but for· an extra-mental reality. That is, it is 
not a logical and metaphysical category. To Bowne identi-
ty may siEPif'Y' either equivalence of logical value, in 
other words, sameness of meaning, or it may signif'y meta-
physical continuity of being. The one provides that our 
thoughts shall have fixed meanings, whU e the other applies 
to concrete reality. Without the first there could be no 
consistency or thougpt and without the second "experience 
would vanish into a groundless flux or perishi.Dg events. ;,l 
The fundamental character of the no-tion of identity 
is evident from the fact that, in Bowne's words, "until 
the notion or an identical subject is thrown into the flow 
of sense-experience there can be no judgment or any kind. n2 
Identity rules all experience as well as all knowledge. 
"There is nothing whatever in the sensations," says Bowne, 
which calls for the assumption or an iden-
tical subject; and if there were a mind 
without any necessity or rationalizing its 
experience, it might hawe a constant repe-
tition of similar sensations, without th~ 
least suspicion or an identical subject.) 
Identity, thus, is a mental addition to the sensible 
experience. 
J.. Borden p. Bowne, Theorz or Thou~ht and Knowledse, 
p. 88. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, :Meta:2!!Zsics, p. 507. 
3. :Ibid.' P• 507. 
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(12) Causality 
Apart trom the ideas of quality, identity and per-
manence, being itself is unthinkable. But even more pri-
mal than these is causality the essential meaning of which 
is, according to Bowne, dynmnic deter.mination. A logical 
as well as metaphysical category, causality, like identity, 
is bound up with the very notion of being. Fbr Bowne, 
next to purpose, this is the most important category. We 
shall have more to say about causality in our chapter on 
Bowne's metaphysics. Here we shall confine ourselves to 
noting what Bowne takes to be illustrations of the notion. 
He singles out the self-determination of a free agent; the 
determination of the consequent by the antecedent; and fi-
nally the mutual determination of different things. In 
the first we find freedom; in the second the connection of 
sequences; and in the third the connection of eo-existence~ 
or the interaction of thin~. It is evident therefore that 
causality is not only metaphysical but an epistemological 
category. As such, it is the very underpinning of knowledge. 
(13) Necessity 
Necessity, Bowne, explains, may mean simply a factual 
condition of thought without which thought could not go on. 
Or it may express merely a logical relation, as of primeses 
and conclusion, or of subject and predicate. Or it may 
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characterize a proposition which cannot be denied \vithout 
contradiction or without violating some clear intuition of 
reason. As referring to the nature of things, necessity 
is intimately tied to identity, in fact hardly distinguish- . 
able from it: for to think of a thing at all we must think 
of it as what it is, as A; and hence it seems as if there 
is some necessity whereby A is A.1 This seems like neces-
sitarian,ism, yet Bowne insists that the idea of :freedom is 
as necessary as the idea of necessity. The discussion of 
Bowne•s attempt to reconcile the two shall be left to a 
later chapter. 
(14) Possibility 
Concerning possibility, which Bowne considers to be 
a doubtful category, he declares that it derives what clear 
ne a.ning it possesses from the self-determination of a free 
agent. In ordinary usage, he remarks, "That is possible 
which involves rio contradiction. 112 In this logical sense 
possibility means merely conceivability. But the ter.m may 
be used also to express our ignorance, as when we say that 
is possible which, ror all we know, may happen or may have 
happened. Still another meaning of possibility is evident 
in its application to an order of conditioned events. So 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 102. 
2. Ibid., p. 103. 
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long as the condition ia unfulfilled the event is impossi-
ble, and when it is fUlfilled the event is not only possi-
ble but actual. 
(15) Purpose 
In Bownets view the categories so far considered, 
while they are indis pensable mental means to rendering ob-
jects intelligible, still operate within a world of rela-
tively isolated things and events, and provide for no sys-
tem. such provision is best achieved by the category of 
purpose by which causality is elevated "to intelligent and 
· volitional causality.n1 
The principle needed for a coherent, internal unity 
and systematization of our experience is not to be found 
in impersonal or mechanical causation. Causation of this 
sort "loses itself in the inf'inite regress," and thus "fails 
to reach any true unity."2 
Till reason raises itself above the mechanical cat-
egories and accepts the conception of self-deterrdning and 
intelligent personality as the supreme category ·ar being 
and causation, it is bound to remain unstable and unfilflll-
ed. Moreover, apart from its metaphysical there is an em-
pirical reason for afrinning purpose. The reason is to be 
l. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thougnt and Knowledge, 
p. 104. 
2. Ibid., p. 105. 
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found primarily in our experience of intelligence and sec-
ondarily in the varied peculiarities of objective experience 
WhiCh are said to point to intelligence as their cause. Ac-
cordingly Bowne finds that purpose is one of the categories 
involved in the nature of intelligence itself. Our exper-
ience of intelligence is always of an activity taking on 
the purposive form. Everywhere the mind seeks to relate 
-its objects as means and ends, to comprise them in a scheme 
of purpose or m all-embracing plan. "Thought must become 
teleological before it can complete itself, nl sa:ys Bowne. 
The crucial cha·racter of purpose as a principle of 
thought is a conclusion arrived at reflectively, that is, 
it is arrived at only as thougnt fails to find equilibrium 
in mechanical causality and moves on to a causality pattern-
ed after volition. unless it embraces the category of pur-
pose, thought cannot maintain itself ar.d "attain to system-
atic completeness."2 
(16) Conclusion 
The foregoing recapitulation of Bowne•s treatment of 
the categories will have made plain the importance he at-
taches to mind as agent and thought as creativity. Speaking 
of the categories in general, he says: 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thoug'ht and Knowledge, 
p. 107. 
2. Ibid., p. 108. 
That articulate experience is impossible 
without a constitutive action of the mind 
whereby the sense elements are given a ra-
tional form, is clear. That this activity 
must proceed according to principles imma-
nent in intellect itself is equally plain. 
That the source of these principles cannot 
be found in anything external to the mind 
is likewise manifest. They are not conscious 
possessions of the mind prior to all exper-
ience, but they. reveal themselves in and 
through etperience which they alone make 
possible. 
Again, this time in the Metaphysics, he declares: 
All our knowledge of the outer world, 
both the frame work and the filling-up 
alike, is an expression of mind's inner 
nature, and have further seen that the 
constructive action of the mind is such 
as to give the system qualities2which it has only in the mind itself. 
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But while Bowne thus emphasizes the ultimacy of mind 
and its creative character, he is also at pains to empha-
size that the mind does not create the categories. They 
lie in the nature of mini, neither imposed upon it from 
without nor from within. In this sense we may say even 
that the mind is passive, thougp in no other sense. Mind 
thus is not an arbitrarily creative agent. The most impor~ 
ant factor in knowing is still the object. "Knowledge is 
of the object, and the object must determine knowledge. u3 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thousht and Knowledse, 
p. 364. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphzsics, p. 492. 
3. Borden P. Bowne, Theorz of ThousE;t arrl Knowledse, 
p. 116. 
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If in his exposition, it appears as if the object were 
only a projection of mental conceptions, this appearance, 
says Bowne, has a reason. However real the object may be, 
it becomes an object for us only through our own activity. 
"The thing-world must be reproduced in the thought-world, 
and the 'forms of the thing-world must take on the forms of 
the thought-world. nl If the thoughts which arise in the 
mind do grasp existing things, this is possible only be-
cause there is an essential identity between the forms of 
thought and t be forms of things. 
While there is nothing like Bowne's elaborate cate-
gorical scheme to be found in Ramanuja, still, as we have 
seen, there is the same insistence in the Indian thinker 
that without the activity of the mind (intelligence), sense 
experience is incapable of yielding intelligible knowledge. 
D. The Self and Knowledge 
No one more than Bowne has developed the implications 
of the self for knowledge. In fact, for him the self is the 
chief key to understanding reality. Of course this view is 
foreshadowed, indeed involved in his treatment of the cate-
gories. And he writes in Personalism: 
Epistemology shows that it (the world) 
is all an inarticulate, phantas1uagoric flux 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thou5ht and Knowledge, 
p. 116. 
or dissolving view until thought brings 
into it its rational principles and fixes 
and interprets it. The sense world, so 
far as it is articulate, is already a 
thought world. Its per.manences and iden-
tities are products of thought. The com-
plex system of relations whereby it is 
defined and articulated is a thought prod-
uct, which can in no way be given to sense. 
The far-reaching inferences whereby our 
spontaneous thougpt of the world is so 
profoundly transformed, are sanething 
which exist for neither eye nor ear, but 
far thought only. The world of science 
differs from the world of sense as widely 
as the conceptions of the astronomer dif-
fer from the al,ebraic signs by which he 
expresses them. 
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Thus the sense world becomes meaningful only as the 
mind reacts upon it and by laws immanent to itself proceeds 
to build up the rational order of experience. 2 And this is 
as much to say that what brings about an intelligible rela-
tionship between thought and its objects is the knowing 
self. Without the self knowledge would be impossible, for 
knowledge is always for a subject and the subject is the 
self. The affinity between Bowne and Ramanuja at this 
point is complete. 
Now in looking around for the principle or pe~anence 
which, he holds, is at the basis of all knowledge, he re-
jects such things as the Ego Matter, Substances and even 
Being. Each of these raises difficulties peculiar to itself 
and all of them suffer from being abstract and intellectual-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, p. 68. 
2. Ibid., p. 69. 
istic. It is the self and the self alone that provides 
Bowne with that principle of permanence which he is in 
search of. It is not the abstract self but the real ac-
tive self of living experience. He writes: 
The self is not to be abstractly tak-
en. It is the living self in the midst 
of its experiences, possessing, direct-
ing, controlling both itself and them; 
and this self is not open to the objec-
tion of barrenness and worthlessness, 
being simply what we all experience when 
we say me or mine. The self can never 
be more than verbally denied, and even 
its verbal deniers have always retained 
the fact. The language of the pers~nal 
life would be impossible otherwise. 
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To Bowne accordingly the master principle or episte-
mology as of metaphysics is the self in the midst or its 
experiences. And Ramanuja takes much the same view. 
E. The Place of Authority in Knowledge 
It is with considerable reservations that Bowne as-
s~s a place to authority in knowledge. But he does as-
sign it a place and there is thus fUrther ground for com-
parison between him and Ramanuja. For both thinkers there 
is a body of revealed writing, a scripture, whose authority 
is such as to constitute a valid source of knowledge. But 
the authority of revelation in Bowne as in R~anuja rests 
in the last analysis upon tested experience; in Bowne's 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, pp. 262-263. · 
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case the tested experience of the Christian community. The 
probl.em of authority is one "which can never be settled ex-
1 
cept in practise," Bowne says, and the Indian thinker 
would have agreed with him. "To attempt to discuss authori-
ty in an abstract way, and get it drawn out on logical for-
mulae, always ends ·in confusion. n2 Bowne sums up his posi-
tion in this matter as follows: 
We have the authority of the Church and 
the Bible, the authority of the religious 
community, all the work or God, including 
great contlicts, vi tal fum tiona, but there 
is no possibility of separation. I do not 
believe for instance, that any church would 
long consent to accept statements in the 
Bible whiCh were agreed upon as distinctly 
contradictory to reason and conscience. On 
the other hand, I do not believe that reason 
and conscience would very long support them-
selves without the use of the Bible. I do 
not believe that either one of then would 
support themselves without the Cbristiaa 
life were going on.3 
F. Intuition 
Neither Bowne nor Ramanuja can be called intuition-
ists in their theory of knowledge, but both thinkers assign 
great importance to intuition in "coming to knowledge." To 
both knowledge is of the nature of certainty and not merely 
l. George Elliot, "The Orthodoxy of Bowne", (The 
Methodist Review, May-June, 1922), PP• 407-408. 
2. Ibid.., pp. 407-408. 
3. Ibid., pp. 407-408. 
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heuristic. In Bowne's view the certainty of the categor-
ies is a certainty guaranteed by intuition which provides 
a criterion or standard which itself can never be a matter 
of deduction. 
It must be judged by itself, by its 
own self-evidence. And this self-evi-
dence can be discovered and announced 
only by the mind. Ultimate principles 
must be accepted on the authority of 
the mind, for there fs nothing else on 
which to found them. 
No passage from the particular to the universal 
would be possible if there were no self-evident principles 
which the mind grasps without the intermediary of discur-
sive reason. Unless this were so, "proof would never come 
to an end and nothing would be proved. "2 Thus Bowne writes 
that "either we have to credit the mind with a power of 
knowing some things on its own account and warrant •••• or 
hold that we have no ground for believing that any truth 
is strictly universal. n3 
On this latter, empirical view, there is no account-
ing for mathematics. The validity of mathematics does not 
appear to be conditioned by time or place, and mathematical 
truths appear to have no source other than the mind itself'. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Meta;Ehzsics, p. 519. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Introduction to Psycholo5ical 
Theo!:_l, p. 294· 
3. Ibid.' p. 294· 
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But it is important to bear in mind that truth so appre-
hended is not "something above intelligence, but only above 
1 the human limitations of intelligence." 
G. Godts Knowledge 
Rounding out Bowne• s theory of knowledge is his con-
ception of tm Supreme Reason. "A rational cosmos," he 
says, " is the implicit assumption of objective cognition. "2 
Bownets discussion of the categories is designed, as we 
have seen, to demonstrate that we know the external phenom-
enal world only as the mind works over the appearances and 
projects the resulting conceptions under the form of the 
categories of thought. Yet, "if the knowledge is to mve 
any validity, the laws of thought must be laws of the uni-
verse itself. n3 Implied then in human knowledge is a ra-
-
tional or knowable universe; a knowing human mind; an !den-
tity of the categories of human thought with the principles 
of cosmic being; an adjustment of the inner to the outer in 
such a way that the mind reacting according to its own na-
ture to external stimuli produces of' itself' thought that 
truly reproduces the objective fact; and finally an identi iJr 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, pp. 77~78. 
2. Ibid., p. 64. 
3. Ibid., p. 65. 
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o:f rational nature in all human beings. With regard to 
this last Bowne observes that "i:f human reason were many, 
and not one, there would be an end to thought. "l 
To Bowne the universe as we know it is a vast systan 
o:f related beings variously categorized by the intellect, ~ 
that the universe has no meaning apart :from intelligence. 
Things are known by their relations and have no existence a-
part :from a constitutive intelligence. Thus Bowne writes: 
But the universe as we know it is es-
sentially a vast system o:f relations un-
der the various categories o:f the intel-
lect; and such a universe would have nei-
ther meaning nor existence apart :from in-
telligence. It does not avail against 
this conclusion to say that, besides the 
relations there are real things in rela-
tions; :for those th~selves are de:fined 
and constituted by their relations, so 
that their existence apart :from a consti-
tutive intelligence becomes an absurdity.2 
I:f the real as known exists only in and :for intelligence, yet 
this intelligence in and :for which the universe exists is 
not ours. And since it is not ours there must be a cosmic 
intelligence as its abiding condition, and in re:ference to 
which alone the af:finna.tion o:f a universe has any meaning.3 
So :for Bowne as for Ramanuja, God's knowledge is in-
volved in all aspects o:f human thought md knowledge. God 
l. Borden P. Bowne, Philosophy o:f Theism, p. 65. 
2. Ibid., pp. 79-80. 
3. Borden P. Bowne, Tb.f31sm, .PP• 143-144. 
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is an immanent reality without whose presence knowledge 
would be ~possible. In understanding the laws of the uni-
verse we are really understanding the laws of God. The 
greater our insight into the relations of things the great-
er our knowledge of the divine mind as it operates in work-
ing out the details of the creation. 
H. The Dualism of Thought and Thing 
In Bowne as in Riminuja there is the same insistence 
that thought always refers to something beyond itsel~. 
Thought implies consciousness and consciousness without 
objects is just nothing. 
In fact, aonsciousness is no simple 
homogeneous mental state antecedent to 
its objects, or apart from objects; it 
arises only in connection with particu-
lar objects, and is nothing by itself. 
~n consciousness is empt! of objects, 
there is nothing le~t ••••• 
Both Riminuja and Bowne emphasize the importance of the ob-
ject for consciousness, but they differ with regard to the 
relation between the two. Unlike Riminuja, whose theory 
may be characterized as a species of direct realism, since 
for him the object is directly present to consciousness, 
Bowne discards a monistic in favour of a dualistic episte-
mology. To him dualism is alone capable of explaining -truth 
1. Borden P. Bowne , Theory of Thou gb.t and Knowledge, 
p. 19. 
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and error. Whatever the relation between thought arxl being 
may be in ultimate reality~ it is clear to Bowne that at the 
human level dualism is inescapable. Thus he writes: 
From the standpoint of the Absolute, 
things may possibly be conceptions; but 
from the human standpoint it is impossi-
ble to identity things with our concep-
tions. Their conceptual existence in our 
thought is not their real existence. They 
do not begin to exist when we conceive 
then, nor do they cease to exist when we 
go to sleep. From the human standpoint, 
then, there is an ineradicable dualism _ 
of thought and thing. 
Yet along with this intransigent dua~ism of Bowne~ 
there goes a theory according to which~ as we have seen, 
knowledge is impossible without the categorie~ that is, 
~ priori principles contributed by the mind from within 
itself. 
Hence, (Bowne says) it follows that 
our apparent knowledge can have no ob-
jective validity unless our objects 
themselves are cast in the moulds of 
thought, or unless the laws and cate-
gories of thought are also laws and 
categories of being.2 
So there is a thought series and a thing series, and unless 
there were an essential correspondence between them, knowl-
edge would remain an inexplicable mystery, assuming knowl-
edge occurred at all. Now it would seem that given the 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thougb:t aiXi Knowledge, 
p. 296 • . 
2. Ibid., pp. 296-297· 
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creative role assigned to the mind by Bowne, that objects 
would be largely the product of mind. But this conclusion, 
at least at the epistemological level, is one that Bowne 
rejects without qualification. 
Historically the relation between the two orders of 
being, namely the thought series and the thing series, has 
been an ever recurring problem, as recurring as the attempt 
to solve it by the outright identification of the two series. 
Either thought bas been reduced to thing, as in materialism, 
or thing to thought, as in Berkeleyan idealism. Both have 
been conspicuous for their 1 ack of success. 
The materialist reduction leads only to scepticism, 
as Bowne is concerned to show. As a theory or knowledge 
materialism is obliged to posit "the invisible things of 
metaphysical theory," for it is obvious that "this chair, 
this pen, this paper, and no collection or similar things, 
could ever produce a knowledge of thamselves. 111 In what 
then does the activity of these invisible things {protons, 
electrons, forces, etc.) consist? It consists in the last 
analysis in motion, but thought, says Bowne, cannot be iden-
tified with motion or any configuration of motions. Even 
the slightest "acquaintance with the nature or thought can 
never be put together from the outside in any such way. n 2 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thou gh.t and Knowledge, 
p. 298. 
2. Ibid., pp. 298-299· 
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Hence the failure of materialism from the start to explain 
thought and the personal in terms of brute and impersonal 
entities like protons or electrons, or still more minute 
particles of matter. Further, how on the basis of a mater-
ialistic epistemology, is one to explain error and truth? 
The ideal distinctions between truth 
and error, rational and irrational, are 
meaningless. One notion is as necessary 
as any other, and as good as any other 
while it lasts. Scepticism, rather than 
knowledge, is the outcome, for no theoty 
of knowledge is possible on this view. 
Another form of materialist argument, one that espec-
ially arouses Bowne•s scorn, is that according to which 
thought is produced from a kind of mind stuff. Of this, 
he writes: 
There has also been a crude fancy that 
thought originates in a kind of raw mater-
ial, 'mind stuff,' and that this may be 
variously integrated and differentiated in 
connection with the organism, and by the 
aid of association, until the order of con-
scious thought finally emerges. ·Hence it 
has been viewed as a very simple thing to 
produce a world of conscious persons from 
a world of things, which are not only un-
conscious, but are essentially unrelated 
to consciousness. Recipes for the proc-
ess abound; but when reduced to their ne~ 
value they turn out to be purely verbal. 
If Bowne pronounces the materialist effort to explain 
away the duality of experience and utter failure, he does 
1. Borden p. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 300. 
2. Ibid., p. 299· 
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not regard the idealistic effort as any more successful. 
Thought is no more productive of things than things are of 
thought. The theory is variously interpretable. 
It may mean that things are nothing 
but a system of presentations, as in the 
common view of Berkeley's theory, and it 
may mean that tho~gh.t is the cause and 
source of things. 
But both these views in Bowne's opinion are ambiguous. He 
says: 
In the first view it is not plain where 
and -for whom the order of presentation ex-
ists. If it be independent of finite minds 
our knowledge of it is not explained •••• If 
it depends on finite minds, then each mind 
makes its own world. In the second view 
mentioned ~That of Thought being the cause 
and source of thingg, it is not plain whe-
ther finite thought or absolute thought be 
the cause of things. The former view is 
absurd /ror it results in solipsism!, and 
the latter does not advance the prOblems •••• 
(for) unfortunately it has never been made 
clear how these high considerations LQr the 
Absolute Thou~ solve the problem of human 
knowing. /!e~~s is the question of im-
mediate interest. 
It is not only the materialistic or Berkeleyan solu-
tion of the problem of knowledge that Bowne finds unsatis-
£actory, but other idealistic solutions as well, for example 
those or Kant, Fichte and Hegel. In arguing that things-in-
themselves are external to thought, Kant wrongly supposed 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 301. 
2. Ibid., pp. 301-302. 
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it followed that they were also independent of all thought, 
and wound up with the impossible doctrine of the unknowable. 
Fichte gets rid of the unknowable with the unfortunate re-
sult that for him "reality became thought, and thought be-
came all-embracing and all in all. 111 Traditional idealism 
with its thesis that there. can be no existence beyond 
thought finds its logical outcome in Hegel's attempt to 
explain everything within thought. Hegel, says BoWne, 
"sought to show principles of movement and development in 
thought itself, whereby it must necessarily pass through 
the various forms of existence until it emerges as absolute 
spirit."2 
Such an attempt to identify thought and being, to 
deduce the concrete world from pure thought, is repugnant 
to Bowne. For in his view the upshot of the Hegelian sys-
tem is thought without a thinker, whereas the fact is that 
the one without the other is an impossibility. 
rn his own solution of the problem of the relation 
between thougnt and thing, Bowne steers an extremely deli-
cate course between idealism and realism; so delicate in-
deed that it sometimes seems as if he himself embraces the 
traditional idealistic epistemology. Yet he never tires of 
asseverating the inescapability of dualism. Dualism is his 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 303. 
2. Ibid., p. 303. 
. 223 
starting point, whether he is discussing psychology or logic 
or epistemology. First o£ all there is his emphasis upon 
consciousness. He says: 
All knowledge begins at home. All that 
we know is known in consciousness, and 
whatever cannot report itsel£ there must 
remain forever unknown. All that is known 
of the outer world, is known only through 
modifications of consciousness. 
This has an idealistic ring, but he is equally concerned to 
point out the necessary duality that exists in the realm of 
human thought. Thus he writes: 
The general form uni er which conscious-
ness exists is that of the antithesis of 
subject and object; that is the object of 
which we are conscious must be distinguish-
ed from self as its subject, and objecti-
fied to self either as its state or2act, or as a quality of external things. 
This distinction is for Bowne primal. He says: 
When this primal distinction is sharply 
mad~, we have a clear consciousness; when 
it is vaguely made, we have an indefinite 
consciousness; and when it is altogether 
lacking, we have nothing that can be called 
consciousness at all. For to be conscious, 
we must be conscious of something; and we 
are conscious of that something only as we 
distinguish it from self, ajd place it over 
against self as our object. 
In explaining his own position with regard to the re-
lation of thought and thing, Bowne calls attention to two 
1. Borden P. Bowne, The Philosophz of Herbert Spencer, 
p. 167. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Introduction to Ps;rcholosical 
Theo!:l, p. 238. 
). Ibid.' 238. 
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aspects of Thought. He says that thought may mean either 
the psychological process called thinking or the rational 
contents grasped in that process. 1 For example, the 
thought of a triangle may refer to the mental activity of 
the conception or it may refer to the contepts apprehended~ 
Thought taken as a content rather than an event is 
said by Bowne to be identical with being. As an event it 
cannot be so identified. He writes: 
Thought, viewed as the process of con-
ceiving, reflecting, in which our mental 
life so largely consists, is in no sense 
identical with things. No particular oc-
currence whatever in the individual con-
sciousness is to be mistaken for objective 
reality. Our thoughts as mental acts, or 
mental products, are never things; it is 
only th~ir logical contents which are 
things. · · 
Bowne holds further that it is only with these log-
ical contents that the mind is alike to deal; they alone 
are subject to logic.4 Indeed the laws that govern mental 
contents are the laws of thought itself. And since these 
contents coincide with things, thought and reality, that 
is one of the distinguishable aspects, may be said to be 
identical. So far as thought and things are identical, 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theorz of Thought ard Knowledse, 
p . 304. 
2. Ibid., p. 304. 
3. Ibid., pp. 304-305. 
4· Ibid., p. 305. 
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it only remains to seek out in addition, the principle o~ 
movement in order to gain ultimate metaphysical insight. 
To Bowne, then, the principles of thought are the princi-
ples of things, and he writes: 
The laws of thought are their laws. 
There is no distinction; they are strictly 
the same. Having thus identified thought 
and reality, it only remains to find in 
thought some principles1of the deepest mysteries o~ existence. 
Bowne believes that he has discovered this principle o~ 
movement in the dialectic of thought. It is the dialectic 
which is behind the movement o~ thought ~rom a lesser to a 
greater completeness until it reaches systematic complete-
ness. 
If now we can persuade ourselves that 
thought is the active principle o~ real-
ity, then this dialectic of thought ac-
quires objective significance, and we 
seem to be ready to ~erstand existence 
through and through. 
At this point the problem o~ knowledge is projected 
into metaphysics. For we are driven by our epistemological 
inquiry to the conclusion that the world of things is one 
with the contents of thought, an absolute thought. "We 
have simply identified, 11 says Bowne, "the world of things 
with the contents of an assumed absolute thought, "3 admit-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 305. 
2. Ibid., p. 305. 
3. Ibid.' p. 305. 
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ting at the same time that be bas made no provision i'or our 
knowledge oi' these contents. Even it' we assume that there 
is a universal reason whose mental content consists oi' all 
things in the world, the problem remains oi' just how indi-
vidual minds are related to the universal mind, and its 
contents. Now it is Bowne•s point that the relation between 
thought and things is not formal or deductive. "Reason as a 
system of principles, n he says 
is only a for.mal outline of possibility, 
and contains nothing specii'ic and actual. 
The actual is found, not deduced; it is 
a i'act of txperience, not an implication 
of reason. 
In a word, Bowne is opposed to the kind oi' idealism repre-
sented by the system of Hegel. 
Bowne finds that within the objective order itself 
there are factors related to each other in ways other than 
the merely logical. First, there are the categories of 
reason acting as laws in both the inner and the outer world 
and so constituting a link between them. But Bowne at once 
points out that these categories provide only the framework 
of the possible, and do not contain the concrete reality as 
a necessary implication. Secondly, there are the general 
laws of the cosmos, and oi' these Bowne says that they "can-
not be deduced from the categories of reason, though they 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 307. 
are specifications under them. nl For example 
The various forms of force are specifi-
cations of the general category or. causal-
ity, but no consideration of the latter 
will yield the former. The actual exist-
ence and nature of these general laws 
have to be admitted as a fact without any 
hope ~f deducing them as rational necessi-
ties. 
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Finally, Bowne argues that neither the categories of reaso~ 
nor the general laws of the cosmos, in any way prefigure in 
the detailed facts of existence. 
No reflection on the eternal truths of 
reason or the general cosmic laws would 
deduce a bolder or any other concrete fact. 
These hgve to be admitted as opaque facts, 
so far as reason is concerned; and if we 
will have an explanation, it can only be 
found in the notion of purpose. The cosmic 
laws could serve other ends as well as the 
actual, and for the actual !e must have re-
course to the idea of plan. 
It is this idea of plan, so central in the philoso-
phy of Bowne, that makes it possible to say that even if 
existence is not deducible from reason, existence is still 
rational. For reason, Bowne argues, may be used in two 
different senses. 
Reason may mean the system of necessary 
truth involved in the nature of the intel-
lect; and it may be extended to cover de-
sign, purpose, fitness and character. In 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 307. 
2. Ibid., p. 307. 
3. !bid., pp. 307-308. 
the latter sense, existence may be ration-
al, or an implication of the highest rea- 1 
son, without being such in the former sense. 
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By means of this idea Bowne, as we shall see, builds up a 
metaphysics which is monistic. But his epistemology is 
dualistic. From the h\llD.an standpoint Bowne says that the 
dualism of thought and thing is ineradicable. Our thought 
cannot be identified with things, either as their source 
or as their product. 
I. Truth and Error 
"Our thought, " says Bowne, "cannot become the thing, 
neither can the thing pass bodily into our thought."2 How 
then can we ever discover whether our ideas are adequate to 
their objects. What positive proof is there or the validity 
of' knowledge? All we can do, in Bowne's words, is to "think 
about the thing and see if we reach any result which satis-
fies our reason and fits into the system of' experience so 
as to harmonize with it."3 As will be recalled, Rl!dnuja 
says much the same. In the last analysis knowledge is self-
vindicating. To Bowne accordingly 
1. 
p. 308. 
2. 
3. 
whatever mystery attaches to the process 
of knowledge and whatever verbal doubts 
Borden P. Bowne, Theo!:Z of' Thoueat and Knowledse, 
Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, P• 79. 
Ibid., p. Bo. 
may be raised about it, knowledge vindi-
cates itself within its own sphere by the 
clearness of our apprehension and by its 
consistency in experience. 
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In any investigation of knowledge, we have to assume 
that our faculties give us true knowledge. If this is cir-
cular, it is circularity that is unavoidable. Deny the es -
sential truth of our faculties and allow that in their nor-
mal working they lead us astray and "there is an end of all 
faith in reason and knowledge. 112 Yet it is a matter of fadt 
that "we often do go astray, "3 so we are confronted with 
the problem of "how to combine the assumption of the trust-
worthiness of our faculties with the recognition of actual 
and abundant error. n4 Now, Bowne argues that "freedom •• • • 
is the only solution of .the problem which does not wreck 
reason itself."5 For if we invoke a theory of necessity 
to explain truth and error we are bound to fail. Bowne 
here has in mind the theory of Herbert Spencer according 
to which every belief and thought, wnether true or false, 
is produced by an unknown cause and produced necessarily. 
Such a view provides no criterion for distinguishing be-
tween true and false. Bowne explains : 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, p. 80. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Theorl of Thou~ht ani Knowled~e, 
p. 239. 
3. Ibid.' p. 239. 
4- Ibid •. , p. 239. 
5. Ibid., p. 239. 
possibly we may say that there is noth-
ing in the notion o£ necessity to forbid 
that some thoughts correspond to reality 
while others do not, and thus the distinc-
tion of true and false is saved. Allowing 
this, we are still no better orr. For if 
of these multitudinous thoughts which are 
necessarily produced some are true and 
some are false, we need to have some stan-
dard for distinguishing between them one 
from another. At;td this standard cannot 
consist in the necessity or the true 
thoughts and tm contingency of the false 
ones, for all are alike necessary.l 
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In arguing that freedom provides the solution of the 
problem of truth and error, Bowne points out that 
the thought of a standard implies a power 
to control our thoughts to compare them 
with the standard, to reserve our deci-
sion, to think twice, to go over the 
ground again and again, until the trans-
parent order of reason has been reached.2 
Without freedom we could not control our thoughts and make 
the necessary comparisons and contrasts. Nothing would be 
left except a process in which thoughts appear and disap-
pear. Such a process would be meaningless, a flux like any 
other is governed by necessity. Reason as a human capacity 
is dissociable from freedom. "These considerations," Bowne 
writes, "make it clear that the question of freedom enters 
intimately into the structure of reason itself. n3 It is 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 242. 
2. Ibid., pp. 242-243. 
3. Ibid., p. 243. 
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not something that only "concerns our executive activities 
in the outer world;" it concerns as well "our inner ration-
al activ1ty."1 If there is any escape from the overthrow 
of reason involved in the fact of error, it lies in the 
assumption or freedom. 2 
or course, this assumption needs to be supplemented 
by another, namely, that our faculties are capable of yield-
ing us knowledge, provided they are rightly used. "Our 
:faculties,'' says Bowne, "are made :for truth, but they may 
be carelessly used, or wil:f'Ully misused, and thus error is 
born. n3 Bowne thinks that not even formal logic is a guar-
antee or truth, :ror reality is not something deducible trom 
the laws ·or thought. Indeed, formal logic suf:f'ers from 
what Bowne calls the .fallacy of the universal which "con-
sists in mistaking class terms :ror things, and in identify-
ing the procesaes of our classifying thought with the proc-
esses c£ reality. n4 Are there then any tests or truth? 
Yes, but they vary with different kinds of knowledge. On 
this matter Bowne observes: 
l. 
p. 243 • . 
2. 
3. 
4· 
Knowledge must be defined as that which 
is self-evident in the nature of reason, 
or which is ~ediately given in experience, 
Borden P. Bowne, Theorz of Thousht and Knowledge, 
Ibid.' p. 243. 
Ibid.' p. 243. 
Ibid.' p. 244. 
or which is cogently inferred from the 
given. The subjective form of knowledge 
is certainty of the truth of its con-
tents; but this certainty is so often 
the product of thoughtlessness that we 
have to test it by denying the alleged 
knowledge, and seeing if the mind can 
entertain the denial. If it can, then 
we have at best only probability. If it 
cannot, then we have t~ highest object-
1Te certainty possible. 
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This kind or certainty attaches to ultimate princi-
ples which by their very nature must be accepted on the 
authority of the mind, for there is nothing else on which 
to found them. Hence, Bowne argues that "the most certain 
knowledge we haTe is what Hamilton has most happily termed 
the tunpicturable notions of intelligence'."2 In addition 
to self-evidence as a criterion of truth, there is consis-
tency and correspondence, neither or them, of course, are 
absolute guarantors of truth. However, in the last analy-
sis, faith in our knowledge rests upon a metaphysical post-
ulation to the effect that there is a community between 
the thing series and the thought series. For Bowne, "knowl-
edge can ·have no objective validity unless our objects them-
selves are cast in the moulds of thought, or unless the laws 
and categories of thought are also laws and categoriea of 
being."3 Without this correspondence, whether of identity 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Th'eo!:l or Thought and Knowledse, 
p. 368. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, The PhilOSO;E~ or Herbert SEencer, 
p. 32. 
3. Ibid., p. 296. 
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or parallelism, "there mua t be a parallax between the eon-
eeption and the reality and a reaulting failure or lmowl-
edge."1 
JUst as no ayatem or neeeasity is capable of deal-
ing with the problem or truth, so it ia incapable of deal-
ing with the problem of error. In such a system "thoughta 
and belieta become effects, and to apeak of true and false 
tboughta aeema like speakiag or true and falae chemical 
aetion."2 For error to be error the self muat be free. 
Unleas freedom and rationality are united, the distinction 
between Talid and' invalid thought becomes unintelligible. 
Thus Bowne writea: 
The attainment or truth implies the ex-
istence or a standard of truth in the mind, 
and the possibility of directing our ration-
al activity accordingly •••• Freedom ia no 
leas necessary to rational action than it ia 
to moral action. Indeed, the purest illua-
tration we have of .aelf-deter.mination is in 
the ease or thinking. We direct and main-
tain attention, we criticize eTer,J step, and 
look before and after, until we reach the 
rational conclusion.J 
If the free self succumbs to error, it is because or 
the away of habit, instinct or other irrational forces, in 
other words, because the self relinquishes ita freedom. The 
1. Borden P. Bowne, The Philoso~~ of Herbert SEencer, 
p. 297. 
2. Ibid.' p. 242. 
J. Bo~den P· .. S'owne, Introdu:o tion to Pszcholosical 
Theo!:l, p •. 221. 
responsibility for error rests with the finite self', and 
do • ao because the m elf ia a :tree agent. Neither truth 
nor error have any meaning apart from .thia treedam. 
3. Slll1Dl1.8.ry and Conclusion 
It should be evident f'rom our discussion of their 
theories of knowledge that f'or both R~lnuja and Bowne, 
epistemology is ~portant for our understanding of meta-
physics. However, the epistemologist could hardly get 
started without some preconception concerning the nature 
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of' being in general. In the aystema of both thinkers God 
is His presence is the very guaran-
tee of the possibility of' knowledge and his constant un-
folding is the basis or tbl dynamic character of knowledge. 
Riminuja emphasizes this point in his own way by inaiating 
upon the deter.minate character of all knowledge, that is, 
knowledge distinguishes as it unites, and both the distinc-
tions and the unity are expressions of the divine mind as 
it manifests itself in reality. Bowne rejects this idea 
on the ground that Thought and thing are entirely distinct 
and di.ff'erent. 
Both philosophers agree that knowledge starts with 
sense experience; both agree that the mind is constitutive 
and its activity present at all stages of experience. If 
this were not so, experience would remain a meaningless 
nux. Concerning the ways of knowing, Riminuja and Bowne 
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accept the validity of perception, inference, authority 
(with reservations by Riminuja), and intuition. With re-
gard to the nature or intuition there is perhaps some di:t"-
terence between the two thinker• - if both agree that in-
tuition is the direct appropriation of truth without the 
intermediation of discursive reasoning, yet - for Rimanuja 
intuition is not instantaneous insight but involve• a proc-
ess WhiCh includes rational activity. As involving a sub-
ject-object relation, in tu ition is bi-polar in Character 
and thus is always qualitative. Perhap·a in the last analy-
aia all knowledge is intuitive for Riminuja, for if all 
knowledge involvea a procesa, its coming to fruition is not 
merely a logical result o~ such proceas. On the other hand, 
for Bowne intuition is mainly a synthetic grasp of universal 
trutha, trutha which he equates pr~arily with mathematics. 
To both philosophers jUdgment i a the prime unit of 
knowledge. At every stage of mental activity involving a 
knowledge situation judgment is present. For every such 
stage involves discrimination and discrimination involves 
judgment. It involves also tm categories or the uni er-
a tanding, but whereas Bowne goes into a detailed analysis 
of the categories, Rim~uja says practically not~ng about 
them. Yet it ma:y be said tbat they are implicitly present 
in Riminuja• s analysis of knowledge. 
Tile two thinkers are, however, at variance with re-
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gard to what is involved in the cognitive relation. Rimi-
nuja holding, as far as can be made out, to a presentative 
theory of perception and Bowne to a representative theo17. 
Tb the one the object as known is directly present to con-
sciousness; what we know are not mental events but the ob-
jects thenselves. To the other, knowledge is never a lit-
eral embracing or the object but is mediated by a mental 
event which represents or stands for the object. In other 
words, Ramanuja' s theory lll&'J be characterized as a realis-
tic epistemological monism, while Bowne's is an epistemo-
logical dualisa, which beca.ea a baaia for his metaphysi-
cal idealiam. 
Another point of difference between Riminuja and 
Bowne is the ~phasis placed by the Indian thinker upon 
practice both as a road to knowledge and a criterion of 
ita validity, an emphasis that ia largel,- absent from the 
work of Bowne. But both thinkers are at one in emphasizing 
the concrete character or knowledge and both are agreed 
that in the last analysis the only fully concrete realit,-
is the self. For the one as for the other the aelf is 
fundamental not Onl'J metaph'fsically but epistemologically. 
And to both, God is the Supreme Self in terms of which alone 
all else in intelligible and therefore knowable. 
CHAPI'ER IV 
- -THE METAPHYSICS OF RAMANUJA AND BOWNE 
It is in the metaphysics of Rlm!nuja, as in that of 
Bowne, that the core of their respective philosophies is to 
be found. In continuing our comparison or the two thinkers 
here, we shall find as before that despite considerable di-
vergencies of approach they come to roughly similar conclu-
sions, above all with regard to the personalistic character 
or real! ty. Since the nature of being is the fundamental 
problem or metaphysics, we begin our comparison with a stuq, 
of the two thinkers • views on this problem. But we sbouJ.d 
like first to say a few words about the category of being 
in general. 
Being is the most inclusive or all categories. In 
the definition of Professor Brightman "any entity or object" 
comes within its scope and "whatever may be mentioned or 
reckoned with. ul Being is not always equated with real! ty", 
but to Professor Brightman the two terms appear to be coter-
minous, for he defines reality as the "whole of actual bei~, 
including existence, values, persons, and universals. It is 
1. Edgar s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philoso~, 
Revised edition, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 19 , 
p. 321. 
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the total object of true thought. nl On the other band, 
Dorothy Emmett, in her work on the Nature £!Metaphysical 
Thinking, uses the term "being" to me an "that which exists ,"2 
and so presumably excludes from it the thin~ which Profes-
sor Brightman regards as falling within its scope. 
The fact is that the definitions of being that have 
been proffered throughout the history of metaphysics are 
not calculated to give us a clear notion or what being is. 
Whether it be considered as synonymous with reality, or with 
existence, values, persons, or universals, the result has 
not been helpful, since these terms are themselves vague. 
What we get are tautologies, or con.t\lsion of one term with 
another, or the reduction of several tenns to a single term 
Which itself takes on different connotations with different 
philosophers. 
Obviously, then, if we are to arrive at any clear 
. comprehension of the notion or being., it can only be by 
means or an investigation of what the notion involves. Does 
it involve existence? or essence? Is it prior to ideas? or 
can it be equated with ideas? What is existence? Is it in-
telligent, personal., or ~personal? What is its relation to 
the world of perceptual experience? The difficulty of the ~ 
1. Edgar s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, 
p. 336. 
2. Dorothy Emmett, The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, 
(London: MacMillan Co., Ltd., 1946), p. f4. 
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lem is well indicated by the French philosopher, Gabriel 
Marcel. He writes: 
This tyh.e definition of beinsl is not 
a question or an ordinary predicate, per-
haps even not a predicate at all •••• to be 
cannot be a property, since it is to-oe--
that makes possible the existence 01 an7 
property at all; it is without which no 
property whatsoever can be conceived, 
though it is true that we must be carefUl 
to avoid the sort ot scheme in which being 
exists in someway anterior to properties 
nothing could be more fallacious than the 
idea or a sort or nakedness or being which 
exists before qualities and propertief and 
which is later to be clothed by them. 
It it is indeed the case that no predicate can be at-
tached to being, it would appear that being is indetinabl.e. 
This is the position or Professor Stace. He holds that 
''being cannot be defined because it is an ultimate simple 
notion incapable or further analysis."2 To Professor Staoe 
whatever is, exists, is real, has being. Hence the term be-
ing ia wider than the terms existence and reality ao that 
"although all existences and realities have being, it does 
not follow that all being is existent or real. There ma7 
be beings which are neither. n3 Professor Stace proceeds 
to distinguish between being, existence and reality as tol-
lows: 
1. Gabriel Marcel, The !{ate}: ot Being, (Great Brit-
ain: The Harville Press Ltd., 951 , p. 26. 
2. W. T. Stace, Theor~ of Knowledge and Existence, 
(Oxford: G-larendon Pre !! s, l9 2), P• 294. 
3. Ibid., p. 29~. 
The term existence applies to all beings 
which are apprehended as belonging to the 
public independent world of things. By ex-
istence ••••• ! mean public independent ex-
istence. Thus a red .appearing to the sol-
itarr mind and apprehended merely as a red 
patch has being. · It .eertainly •is•. But 
it has not attained the level of •exis-
tence•. When, however, this same red patch 
is apprehended aa a pillar-box, when it ia 
believed to be visible to other minds and . 
to exist when no one is aware £f it, then 
it is credl ted with existence. 
On this theory being as suCh is indeterminate, while 
existence is always .determinate existence, believed to be 
publicly observable and. independent of the individual human 
minds. It wUl be obserTed that Professor Stace here is not 
defining existence, as some philosophers have done, as that 
whiCh fits into the systsmatic network of relations which 
we call public being as opposed to private being. Instead, 
it is reality that he characterizes in this way, reality 
being for him "that which is apprehended in veridical per-
ception. n2 At the same t:lm.e be is aware that . such charac-
terization is not derinition, for to say that reality is 
that which is connected by causation, or other systematic 
relations~ to other real things is as a definition obviously 
circular. Yet it suggests tbl t realities constitute an or-
dered system, while unrealities such aa dremns, hallucina-
nations and delusions do not. 
1. 
295· 
2. 
w. T. Staee, · Theorz of Knowledge and Existence, p. 
Ibid • . I P• 326. 
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1. The Theory or Being in Rildnu j a and Bowne 
The foregoing general remarks on Being, cited f'rom 
several representative thinkers, may serve to bring out 
some of the problems that arise in connection with that 
concept. They are problems which appear in R~nuja and 
Bowne to whose theories of' being we now address ourselves. 
First of all, both thinkers stress the dynamic as-
pect of being by which alone, in their view, being is rec-
ognizable. Further, as a corollary of' its active character 
being is causal, the engendering principle of' all things 11 
and is knowable precisely because of its causal activity. 
Real Being constitutes a system of dynamic relationships. 
Both philosophers are at pains to differentiate their posi-
tion from that Which sees being as something absolute or 
pure. To the one as to the other . suCh a conception is 
sterile and empty. 
A. Ramanuja• s Theory of' Being 
(1) The Notion of Pure Being Rejected 
Indeed, Ramt'nuja•s first step toward developing his 
own conception of being is through criticism of the absolu-
tist conceptions of his predecessors. Thus he is opposed to 
the views of' Bhiskara and Sankara that pure being (unrelated 
being) or pure intelligence exists. Such being, he argues 11 
is beyond the scope of' knowledge, and hence meaningless. Of 
Bhiakara Proressor Daagupta writes: 
Bhiskara believed that there is Brahman 
as pure being and intelligence, absolutely 
formless, and the causal principle, and 
Brahman as the manirested effect, the world.1 
If there is a contradiction in this view, it is one that 
Bh~skara refuses to recognize, for to him "all things have 
such a dual form as the one and the many or as unity and 
difference. "2 To Riminuja, on the other hand, unity and 
difference cannot both be affirmed of one and the same 
thing. For example, when we say •this is like this•, we 
are not saying that the same entity is both the subject 
and the predicate. Suppose •this• stands for a cow; then 
the predicate 'like this' stands for a particular and uniq-
ue description, say of the cow's bodily appearance. "There 
is no meaning in asserting," says Dasgupta, speaking ror 
,. 
Riminuja here, "the identitY of the subject and the predi-
cate or in asserting that it is the same entity that in 
one rorm as uni~ is •subject• and in another form as difrer-
ence is the 'predicat~•."3 In other words, Bhiskara holds 
to a theory or unity in difference which Ramanuja rejects. 
Bhaakara :turther argues that that which conditions 
is not wholly different from that which is conditioned. By 
the same token be .goes so far as to assert that being and 
1. 
p. 192. 
2. 
3. 
s. N. Daagupta, A History of Ind·ian Philosoplg, 
Ibid., p. 192. 
Ibid., p. 193. 
ita attribute• are not different but the same. 
There are no qualities without substance 
(being) and no substance without qualities. 
All difference is also unity as well. The 
powers or attri~utes of a thing are not dif-
ferent from it. 
In opposition to this Rimanuja takes an attributive view, 
so that in the oase of propositions, for example, _ he holds 
that the predicate is an attribute of the subject. Writ-
ing of Riminuja in this connection, Dasgupta observes: 
The same attributive view is applic-
able to all cases of genus and speciea, 
cause and effect, and universals and in-
dividuals. The •difference• and the 
•unity• are not two independent forms of 
things -which are both real; but the •dif-
ference• modifies or qualifies the nature 
and character of t~ •unity•, an~ this is 
certified by all our experience. 
Rimanuja is equally opposed to Sankara•s view. of pure 
being which he identifies with Brahman. According to San-
kara, Brahman "is the identity of pure being, intelligence 
and pure bliss, and is the true self of us all. Its nature 
is in some measure realized in dreamless sleep. n3 . For, as 
Dasgupta writes: 
So long as we are in our ordinar7 wak-
ing state, we are identifying the self 
with thousands of illusory things, with 
all that we call• I• or •mine•; but in 
1. S. N. Daagupta, History of Indian Philosopbz, Vol. 
II, p. 193. 
2. Ibid., p. 193. 
3 • Ibid • , p • XX. 
dreamless sleep we are absolutely without 
any touch of these phenomenal notions, 
the nature of our true1state as pure bliss is partially realized. 
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Ramanuja dismisses this view on the ground that there 
is no such thing as pure being. For him, as we have seen, 
being is dynamic and attributive, and it is in this dyn~e 
character of being that be finds the activity of self-
projection and self-integration, the possibility of a going 
out and a coming in. 
Above all, for Riminuja being is concrete or it is 
nothing. It is not consciousness, as Sankara thought, but 
rather a conscious subject. Consciousness is an attribute 
of the subject. What then is this conscious subject? Rimi-
nuja calls it Brahman. Brahman is being and he is this be-
cause of his power of activit7. And this activity is 
thought. At this point we may pause for a mo-ment to point 
out that Riminuja does not, like Bowne, equate being with 
activity, but infers being from its activity. But like 
Bowne he personalizes being. His argument is that if 
thought is characteristic of being and cannot be ascribed tD 
something impersonal, it must be ascribed to a person. He 
writes: 
•Thinking' cannot possibly belong to 
the -non-sentient Pradhina: the ter.m •Being' 
1. s. N. Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosoph{, Vol. 
II, p. 164. 
can therefore denote only the a11-knowing1 highest Person who is capable of thought. 
Now personal being has none or the absoluteness of 
pure being. Because being is personal it can express it-
self to itself, in other words, it is being-for-self. As 
such it involves self-analysis and self-difference within 
the infinite life. It is in this self-differentiating 
character of being that ita dynamism resides. The point 
is suggested in Riminuja•s remark that, "In Brahman, who 
is different from things seen in the world, powers not ob-
served in them exist by thousands."2 In the individual 
self, infinite being, being-tor-self, is realized when the 
'I' consciousness is in unity and fellowship with the infi-
nite being.3 Such realization of the self is capable of 
taking many forms, depending on the different ways in which 
being expresses itself. They may be intellectual, devotion-
al, or loving, .but whatever the forms they assume in the 
ind.i vidual self, underlying them is the activity of being-
for-self. This activity manifests itself in greater or les-
ser intensities of rhythmic expression. Thus the intellec-
tual, devotional or loving mode ot activity of the individ-
ual are in the last resort just the rhythmic expressions of 
l. Sri Rlminuja, Sri Bhas&am, ·trans. by R!manuja-
chari ~· .· p. 201. 
2. Ibid., p. 492. 
3. Mahendranath Sircar, Comparative Studies in Vedin-
!!.!.!!1 p. 1.13. 
being-for self. To Rimanuja these activities are really 
"being-for-expression", or the Sa.kti of Brahman. No activ-
ity can be considered as unimportant, for each phase or the 
activity or being-for-expression is tne activity or being-
for-self, and each phase makes i ~particular contribution 
to the different levels or understanding, devotion or love, 
as these occur in the individual self.1 
The relation or the individual self to being is, 
therefore, of the closest. In defining this relation Rimi-
nuja asserts that the individual self is nothing less than 
the attributive activity ot being-for-self. Far from being 
an inactive agent, the individual self is a dynamic entit,., 
a highly charged center, so to speak, which or itaelf adda 
to the activity or being-tor-expression. From the fore-
going discussion it follows that for Riminuja, existence 
means relatedness and reality means activity which contin-
ues to establish greater and greater relations and thus 
capable or being publicly experienced. 
(2) Brahman as Satyasya Satyam or True of the True 
Brahman is called 'true of the true•, for Brahman is 
the unconditioned reality. As unconditioned he stands over 
against the •conditioned• reality or the individual self. 
1. Mahendranath Sirear, Comparative Studies in Vedin-
tism., p. 113. 
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Further, Brahman is the pre-existent reality as be must be 
if he is unconditioned. The individual selves are the crea-
tions or the pre-existent Brahman in whom all auspicious 
qualities are to be found. Again, Brahman is •true of the 
true•, because all content exists in him. His creations 
are not out of nothing, bUt are produced from his own true 
nature. What is non-existent cannot become existent, and 
what exists cannot be unreal. There is still another rea-
son why Brahman is called •true of the true•. It is this. 
In meditating upon the self, the individual reaches a stage 
of bliss wherein he is conscious of nothing but Brahman. So 
Ramanuja writes: 
the teacher tells the pupil to recognize 
that bliss constitutes tre nature of that 
Brahman which is the aim of all his effort 
(tyou must desire to understand bliss•); 
and bids him to realize that the bliss 
whieh constitutes Brahman•s nature is 
supremely large and full ••••• And of this 
Brahman, whose nature is absolute bliss, 
a de1'ini t1 on is then given as follows : 
'Where one sees nothing else, hears 
nothing else, knows nothing else, that 
is Ohiima.n' • This means - when the medi-
tating devotee realizes the intuition of 
this Brahman, which consists of absolute 
bliss, he does not see anything apart 
from it; since . the whole aggregate of 1 things is contained within ••••• Brahman. 
As •true of the true• Brahman is free from the muta-
tions of matter and of Karma, or the results of acquired 
1. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 306. 
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characteristics in earlier stages of activity. While matter 
takes on form and perishes in the process, Brahman alone en-
dures. Brahman, it is true, is . in space, but is not limited 
by apace. He ia in space and yet apart from space. On this 
point Professor Srinivasachari writes: 
The universe of chit and achit lives, 
moves and has its berng-in Brihiin, and 
derives its form and function from ita 
omn.ipenetrativeness. Just as the self 
pervades the body, Brahman vivifies the 
universe as the life or ita life. Though 
Brahman is in space, it is not space or 
spatializfd, or limited to particular 
locality. 
(3) Brahman as Knower 
All things in the universe cone within the orbit of 
Brahman• s knowledge• Indeed, without Brahman, knowledge 
would be impossible, for there. would be nothing to know. 
He is always subject, never object. Individual existents 
are objects to the Supreme Self, who is Brahman. "The in-
dividual selves are in one sense objects of the supreme sub-
ject, who is the perceiver of all things in the world through 
his supreme sustaining vision."2 
Now with regard to the character or Brahman's knowl-
edge Riminuja is concerned to refute Sankara•s view which 
l. P. N. Srinivasachari, The Philosophy of Visistid-
vaita, p. 108. 
2. K. c. Varadachari, Sri Ramanuja• s Theory of Knowl-
edge, p. 146. 
would reduce it to pure qualityless thought. Such thought 
is a figment of the imagination. All experience is charac-
terized by differences. So if Brahman is pure conscious-
ness, as Sankara supposes, it is a fact about him that must 
forever remain in the realm of conjecture. For all things 
that enter into the realm of discourse and hence of proof 
are characterized by attributes. Hence, turning Sankara•s 
theaia against himself, Rimanuja argues that •pure• con-
sciousness must possess attributes and is therefore not 
pure. "Consciousness," he says, "is either proved (estab-
liahed) or not. If it is proved, it follows that it poa-
sessesl attribute~; if it is not, it is something absolute-
ly nugatory, like a sky-flower, or other similar purely 
imaginary things. "2 To Riminuja, then, consciousness has 
attributes. But he does not atop here. He points out that 
consciousness itself is an attribute and as such must be an 
attribute of something. And this •something•, if it possess-
es consciousness, cannot be material. It must be a spiritual 
being, which is to say it must be a conscious self. 
<4> Brahman as Personality 
Brahman is not merely consciousness but personality 
as well. And as a personality Brahman is not only all-
1. Sri Rimanuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 
~ossesses"here is a wrong translation • 
. attribute!'. 
2. Ibid. , p. 55. 
55. Note '•The word 
It shOU'id be "is an 
2~ 
knowing but the principle o£ permanence without which, 
life, growth and movement would be impossible. None of 
this means that the personality of Brahman is alone real. 
It means rather that finite selves have a reality of their 
own in the sense that they are the particular embodiments 
of the Supreme Self or Brahman. 
Above all Rimanuja is concerned to show that the 
highest reality is not merely a system of externally rela-
ted parts, but an all-comprehending individual person who 
is more than the mere sum of its parts, and logically prior 
to them. The supreme reality is inseparable from its parts 
and yet distinguishable from them. Ramanuja' s argument 
here is twofold: on the one hand, the individual selves 
are distinguishable and hence real; on the other they are 
comprehended within the Supreme Self, which is one with the 
system of being. Being, then, is that which integrates the 
individual selves and all else into a real unity. Brahman 
is at once "the transcendant and immanent ground o£ their 
being what they are. He is the concrete universal, the real 
Absolute. He is the ultimate subject ••••• an in£initely in-
telligent personality."! 
B. The Theory of Being in Bowne 
Together with Ramanuja Bowne rejects the notion or 
l. K. C. Varadachari, The Metaphy·sics of Sri Rimanujats 
Sri Bhasbzam, p. 56. 
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pure being, and like Raminuja further he develops his own 
view through a critique of earlier conceptions of being. 
Among the latter he is especially critical of that which 
would identity being with substance. To him being is not 
a substratum merely, which in any case is an abstraction, 
but consists of "thoughts, feelings, laws, relations, as 
well as of thing~."l Previous views of being have been 
largely verbal and their proponents have proceeded as if 
it were a word that needed to be construed rather than a 
notion that needed to be understood. Thus Bowne writes: 
The question which metaphysics pro-
poses is, How shall we think of the re-
ality or being or things? The aim is 
not to construe or construct existence, 
but simply to find out what we mean by 
it, or what conditions a thing must sat-
isfy i~ order to fill out our notion of 
being. 
So metaphysical inquiry should proceed by way of an 
analysis of the notion of being; indeed it can proceed in 
no other way. For it is a favourite argument of Bowne that 
there is no avenue of approach to reality except the concep-
tions we form about it. Further still, the only basis on 
which the conceptions themselves can be evaluated is their 
necessity and consistency. The basis cannot be correspond-
ence or the comparison of ideas with actual things. "Valid-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 13. 
2. Ibid., p. 13. or. ~, p. 3. 
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ity, Bowne insists, is the only correspondence, and this can 
be determined only by the self-evidence or necessity with 
which the conception imposes itself upon the mind. nl But, 
it is fair to ask, where does the conception come from? 
Bowne's answer is that it comes from experience, for the 
datum or thought is experience. And the key to reality is 
experience as interpreted by thought. This, then, tor 
Bowne, is real being. 
{1) Bowne's Criticism of Pure Being 
If reality can only be approached through thought-
interpreted experience, it is clear that absolute or pure 
being is an empty abstraction. It has no relation to ex-
perience and is therefore no datum tor tbougnt. But besides 
this epistemological objection to pure being, Bowne believes 
the notion leads to a logical anare, what he calls "the fal-
lacy of the class term or the universal. n2 From a logical 
point of view every object, Bowne argues, is a determination 
o~ the notion of being, so that the category of being "appea.ra 
alike in all, and the difference and determination are ~ound· 
in the attributes."3 And we are thus driven to the conclu-
sion that ever.1thing is an accident, which is to say that 
everything is a torm or modification of being, "a determina-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaph{sios, p. 3. 
2. Ibid., p. 13. 
3. Ibid., p. 13. 
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tion of the general notion to a particular case by means of 
some specific mark. nl And given this, "it is easy to imag-
ine that there is some element of real being corresponding 
to the concept, which is common to all objects, and which 
by receiving particular determinations, becomes the partic-
ular and specific thing."2 
It is in this way that the notion or pure being a-
rises. It appears as the necessary pre-supposition of all 
de.finite and particular being. But the appearance is de-
lusory, a logical abstraction without validity. "Class 
terms," Bowne writes 
pure being among the rest, may be valid 
for reality, but they never can be onto-
logical facts. Only the definite and 
the specific can be real in this sense. 
The con~ept, conceived as existing, is 
absurd.j 
In other words, logical formulations are purely formal. 
Things are not affected by them. Individuals logically 
brought together in a common class, still remain the same 
individuals. No identity is created and no difference a-
bolished. Further Bowne argues, there is no passage way 
out or pure being: 
In concrete and complete thinking it is 
impossible to pass .from complexity to sim-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metapgysics, p. 14• 
2. Ibid., p. 14· 
3 • Ibid. ' p. 14. 
plicity, or from simplicity to complexity, 
from definiteness to indefiniteness, or 
from indefiniteness to definiteness, so 1 long as we remain on the impersonal plane. 
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In Bowne•s view, then, pure being has no objective 
or ontological status. In this respect it is just noth-
ing. Even if, for the sake of argument, we granted it 
existence of some sort, it would still be the case that we 
could arrive at the notion, to make use of it, only by em-
ploying bad logic. Lacking definiteness, pure being is un-
intelligible, sterile and nonexistent. "Only the definite 
can exist; and only the definite can found the definite."2 
All efforts or philosophers ~0 derive the definite from the 
indefinite, to read differences out of identity, have fail-
ed, and must fail since they are infected with the fallacy 
of the universal. 
Being cannot be conceived unless it is conceived as 
something definite and specific. Bowne insists that "we 
have no insight into the meaning of being itself. u3 It is 
a simple idea and admits of no explanation. It cannot be 
defined by reference to anything else. It is ~ generis. 
Such is the logical situation with regard to being. Is 
there then no mark by means of which it is ·possible to dis-
tinguish being from non-being? There is such a mark and 
Bowne explains what it is: 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 14. 
2. Ibid., p. 14. 
3. Ibid. , p. 15. 
After much casting about in thought, he 
writes, it appears that the distinctive 
mark of being must consist in some power 
or action. Things, when not perceived, 
are still said to exist, because of the 
belief that, though not perceived, they 
are in interaction with one another, mu-
tuallY' dete:rmining and determined. Real 
things are distinguished from things hav-
ing conceptual existence b7 this power and 
fact of action. When this is omitted, the 
things vanish into presentations; and un-
presented things are only the ghosts of 
possible presentations. 
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Bowne arrives at this conclusion by a pragmatic anal-
ysis of the function in experience of the notion of being. 
The incessant manifestation, he observes, of change and mo-
tion in the phenomenal world, cannot be explained unless be-
ing is posited aa their ontological basis. To our observa-
tion or phenomenal activity we go on to add the notion of 
an agent or agents. Singular or plural, it is these agents 
that are the true beings, while the ch.anges and motions are 
merely phenomenal. For Bowne being must or necessity be 
viewed as essentially causal, ror otherwise the notion of 
being would be inadequate to its function. We cannot rest, 
he saya, in the thought of a groundless show. Hence, the 
notion or being, which is nothing elae but the abiding onto-
logical basis for the ceaseless flux or appearances. No 
conception or being ia adequate that does not view being as 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Me~aphysics, p. 16. 
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containing within itself the ground and explanation of the 
1 apparent order. Such for Bowne is the general character 
of being. We turn now to Bowne's more specific characteri-
zations of being. 
(2) Being as Concrete - The World Ground, Thought, 
Activit,-
With regard to the concrete character of being, 
Bowne's argument consists of several steps and certain dis-
tinctions. First of all, the term being ~hile it implies a 
possible objectivity for thought, does not necessarily im-
ply substantiality or identity in the object. They may be 
ways simply in which the individual subject orders his ex-
perience, and hence restricted to the phenomenal rea1m. In 
other words, being may be used either in the sense of an a-
biding reality or in the sense of events and appearances aa 
these have been ordered or categorized in the process of per-
ception. Now Bowne will not agree that what is given in per-
ception are only the attributes of being. In fact he rejects 
the time-honoured distinction between substance and attrib'• 
utea, and that between being and power. Instead he holds 
that being must "be af:f'inned as a causal unity, and, as Emc.:.b.. 
uncompounded and 1ndivisible."2 The idea that attributes 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metapb.ysies, p. 17. 
2. Ibid., p. 22. 
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inhere in being is an abstraction and therefore unreal. 
So far Bowne has been laying the ground for his as-
sertion that being is always concrete being. It is con-
crete because it is causal. Reality is always an agent. 
Further, it is a self-determining agent. And finally it 
constitutes a system. To Bowne, then, reality is the con-
crete, that which determines itself as a system of activ-
ity. "Being," he says, "has its existence only in its ac-
tion, and the action is possible only through being. ttl It 
is only in terms or its activity that being is measurable, 
so that what is meant when we say that being is infinite ia 
that the activity or being is unlimited. 2 As for finite 
things, they have being and are real to the extent that 
they are parts or a total system of reality and share in 
its activity. Accordingly, in "our finite experience we 
find ourselves working under a system of laws and princi-
ples which condition us and which all our acts must obey. u3 
Bowne is prepared to say that there is one basal be-
ing in action, the origin and source of all system, of all 
laws, principles, and realities. This basal being is called 
by Bowne the world-ground. But more important than an'Jthing 
else about this world-ground is Bowne's assertion that it is 
1. Borden r. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 24. 
2. Ibid., p. 2o. 
3. ~b1.d., p. 108 
free and intelligent. He reasons a$ follows: 
That the world-ground must be conceived 
as free and active intelligence is the result 
to which thought continually comes, Whatever 
the line of investigation. If we seek a ten-
able theory or knowledge we find it only as 
we reach a basal intelligence. If' we seek 
to find the many together in an all-embrac-
ing system, it is possible only in and 
through intelligence. If' we seek for unity 
in being itself we find it only in intelli-
gence. If' we aeek f'or causality and iden-
tity in being we f'ind them only in intelli-
gence. If we would give anr account or the 
intelligible order and purpose-like producta 
or the world, again intelligence is the only 
key. If, finally, we ask for the formal 
conditions of reality we f'ind them in intel-
ligence. The attempt to define reality it-
self fails until intelligence is introduced 
as its constitutive condition. The mind 
can save ita own categories trom disappear-
ing, can realize ita own aim and tendencies, 
can truly comprehend or even mean anything, 
only as it relates everything to free intel-
ligence as the source and administrator or 
the system.l 
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Here in the above passage Bowne•s fundamental con-
tention with regard to the nature or being is set forth in 
unmistakable terms. Being without intelligence is a nulli-
ty. Inf'inite being is infinite thought in the form ot con-
ception. It is all snbracing and, first and last, active. 
It involves a thinker and a doer. Not only does the inf'in-
ite thought embrace all things, but it must embrace them as 
what they are, that is, in their finitudep - jnst as Bowne 
is concerned to emphasize the point that the inf~te 
1. Borden ~. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. iii. 
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thought 1s not a resting thought, but a thinker and a doer. 
So he is equally at pains to show that the same thing is 
true of finite thought. "On the side or finite spirit, he 
says, we have no mere conceptions or the divine understand-
ing, but thinkers and doers also; and in that fact the.1 have 
an inalienable individuality and personalit,.."1 
Having said so much, Bowne, returns to his thesis of 
the primacy of intelligence as mind. In the absence or mind 
experience would mske no sense, yet we know that experience 
constitutes a realm or interrelated meanings. And such a 
realm, Bowne says, presupposes mental agency and rational 
order. 
A system or relations implies intelli-
gence as its source and seat. When we con-
ceive the world in its causality, we are 
brought down to active intelligence by · 
which it exists and from which it forever 
proceeds. The world has its form and mean-
ing in the divine t~ought, and its reality 
in the divine will. 
This re-emphasis upon intelligence thus leads Bowne to the 
affirmation of a t h eistic metaphysics. The infinite thought 
is divine and this divine thought is the reality behind all 
real! ty. We tum now to this topic. 
(3) Being as Supreme Intelligence 
In comaon with R&manuja, Bowne holds that unless 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Ketapbzsics, p. 103. 
2. .Ibid. , p. 141. 
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there is a unifying intelligence, a aupreme subject which 
itself experiences and correlates all experience, the world 
of things is a pure flux without ontological significance. 
The system of experience (and unless it were a system it 
would be nothing) which is common to all men is a function 
of an ultimate intelligence. It is this and not an extra-
mental fact, Bowne writea: 
It is this system of experience, and the 
coexistent minds that share in it, that phil-
osop~ has to interpret. And in both the ex-
perience and the interpretation, thought re-
mains within the intellectual sphere. Thought 
can neither use nor reach things lying beyond 
thought; and if we seem to reach such things 
it is only by mistaking the common to all in 
experience for a fact unrelated to intelli-
gence, or by abstracting the categories from 
experience, in which alone they have meaning, 
and projecting them as extra-mental facts. 
As such they contradict themselves as soon as 
reflection begins; and the perennial antino-
miea or reali8111 emerge. If, on the other 
hand, we refer the world of intelligible ex-
perience and intelligent spirita to intelli-
gence, as their source, our thought systan 
remains homogeneous with itself throughout, 
and we escape the chronic contradictions 
which haunt, in spite of all exorcisms, every 
realistic system of the impersonal and mechan-
ical type. As soon as realism is seen to be, 
not experience, but an interpretation of ex-
perience, its untenability becomes manifest.l 
In other words, what Bowne is saying here, is that 
idealism can be denied only at the expense or unempirical 
abstraction. Realism is the typical example. It affirms 
the extra-mental, but the extra-mental is itself a mental 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. ~2. 
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construct. Not that Bowne would deny all validity to real-
ism, for as we have seen in connection with his epistemolo-
gy, he is ready enough to grant that things may exist apart 
from human intelligence. What he is not prepared to grant, 
and indeed denies categorically, is that they can exist 
apart from all intelligence. And this leads us to the view 
of being as knower. 
<4> Being as Unity of Knowing 
We have considered being as a knower in our chapter 
on epistemology. In this section we shall include those 
aspects that have been left out in our previous discussion 
with special emphasis upon the practical aspect of knowledge. 
Bowne writes. 
The basal certainties in knowledge are 
not the ontological existence of material . 
and mechanical things, but rather the co-
existence of persons, the community of in-
telligence, and the system of common ex-
perience. These are not given as specu-
lative deductions, 1 but as unshakable prac-tical certainties. 
What Bowne means by practical certainty is the prediction• 
that can be drawn from the previous experience of individ-
ual persons and the community as a whole. 
Bowne believes that the practical character of life 
ia important because it brings together some of those aapects 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. 128. 
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of our experience, such as feelings which consist not only 
or individual desires but also fundamental hUJDan interests 
in which life itself roots.1 Thus for example certain be-
liefs and practices of persons may appear to be logically 
contradictory and may even appear to be unreasonable from 
a logical .analys1a. This is because "men has been consid-
ered solely as an intellect or understanding, whereas he 
is a great deal more."2 
Bowne points out that to treat human life purely 
.from a logical $tandpoint is to ignore such aspects of hu-
man li.fe as will, emotion, and aspiration which form more 
powerful factors than logical understanding. Bowne says: 
pp. 
1. 
Man is also a practical being, in highly 
complex interaction with his fellows and 
with the system of things. Before he argues 
he must live; before .he speculates he must 
come to some sort o.f practical understanding 
with himself, with his neighbours, and with 
the physical order. This practical li.fe 
has been the great source of human belief 
and the constant test of its practical va-
lidity; that is, of its truth. The beliefs 
of a oomnru.ni ty - scienti.fic, moral, and 
religious alike -- have a very complex psy-
chological and historical origin and a sort 
of organic growth. While reason may be im-
plicit in them, the reflective, analytic, 
and aelt-conseious reason commonly has lit-
tle to do with their production.3 
Borden P. Bowne, Theory o.f 
370-371. 
Thous;ht and Knowledse, 
2. Ibid., p. 376. 
3. Ibid.' p. 376. 
Bowne proceeds to point out that the praetieal cer-
tainties of life are produced by the mind reacting to envir-
onment but moving along the lines of least resiatance. As 
a result, what issues is a body of practical postulates and 
not reasoned principles. Bowne says: 
This •••• is the mind·• s reaction against 
its total experience, internal and external; 
it is the mental result ant of life; it is 
the mind's movement along lines of least 
resistance. The product is not a set of 
reasoned principles, but a body of practi-
cal postulates and customs which were born 
in life, which express 11fe, and in which 
the fUndamental interests and tendencies 
of .the mind find thelr expression and 
recognition. 
Now, the practical certainties of which Bowne speaks 
here are the foundation stones of his metaphysics. Prac-
tice, however, begins with experience. Thus Bowne's start-
ing point is experience and the deliverances of experience. 
But experience itself yields valid knowledge only to the 
extent that it can be subjected to the test of empirical 
coherence. Here, not only practice but also intelligence 
comes into play. Intelligence itself, he insists, cannot 
be understood · tbrough its own categories, that is, specula-
tively, for these categories · themselves can only be under-
stood through the experience of intelligence intelli-
gence as an active principle. The community of intelligence 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
p. 376. 
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and the system of common experience point unmistakably to 
a knower who correlates all the finite centers of intelli-
gence and impresses a _common pattern upon the flux of ex-
perience, so that knowledge, wbeth~ it is practical or 
empirical., is unified by a supreme intelligence. 
The unity of experience, itself, is an empirical 
fact. But what is the principle of this unity? Bowne says 
it is consciousness. "Only in the unity of consciousness 
can the category of unity be realized. ,l All things change 
and the knowledge of them changes • That, too, is a fact of 
experience. And it is a fact that would seem' to render 
knowledge impossible. Yet it is equall~ a fact that knowl-
edge exists and hence implies that flux is not the last 
word. Sanewhere there must be an element of unity and per-
manence. Bowne finds it in the knowing self. "The concep-
tion," he says, "of a permanent Thing with changing statea 
is rounded as conception, as well as realized in being, in 
fact of the conscious self. Apart from this personal ref-
erence, the categorie~ defy all attempts to give them an~ 
metaphysical significance."2 In this way Bowne prepares 
the ground for his assertion that as a knower the absolute 
being is an absolute person. The world of things reveals 
the activity of something deeper th. n itself, namely the 
absolute person. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metapb:tsics, "revised", p. 66. 
2. Ibid., P• 66. 
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(5) ·Being as Personality 
What does it mean to say that being is not only a 
unity of knowing, but a knowing personality? What is Per-
sonality? Bowne at once dissociates himself rrom the view 
that personality involves a form or type of corporeality. 
Spatial separation has nothing to do with personality, 
whose essence resides rather in "self-consciousness, self-
knowledge and self-control. nl Given this, it is plain that 
the finite self with its necessary dependence and subordi-
nation must remain, so far as personality is concerned, im-
perfect and incomplete. "Complete self-knowledge and self-
control," Bowne wri tea, "are possible only to the absolute 
and infinite being; and this finite personality can never 
be more than a faint and feeble image."2 
We shall have occasio~ to deal more fully with these 
things in our discussion of the personality of God. 
c. Su.mm.ary and Comparison 
Both our thinkers reject the notion or pure being, and 
on much the same grounds. Pure being is an abstraction. Nor 
is this the only objection that they bring against the not1Dn. 
There is another, which is far more serious. It is that we 
do not know pure being. Being always presents itself to us 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised", p. 116. 
2. Ibid., p. 118. 
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as determill8.te being. Indeterminate being is non-being •. To 
Riminuja being is always in process of determining itself 
and it is these determinations that constitute its intelli-
gibility. To the one thinker as to the other, therefore, 
what we know are the manifestations of being, indeed apart 
from these manifestations being is nothing but an empty 
sound. 
Again, for Rimanuja and Bowne being is concrete, and 
this concreteness means for them that being is a conscious 
subject. For a conscious subject alone is a unity and a 
system. In Rmmanuja this conscious subject is equated with 
Brahman; in Bowne it is identified as the World-Ground or 
God. Further, Rimanuja speaks of being as •real of the real': 
meaning thereby that ?eing is that which endures in the mi~ 
of flux. In the same way Bowne insists upon the enduring 
character of personal being. 
For both thinkers personal reality provides that ele-
-
ment of permanence without which knowledge would be impossi-
ble. FUrther still, they agree that being is not only the 
guarantor o:r knowledge, but as knower comprehends all know~-
edge. All things in the world, all individual existents, 
come within the scope of the Supreme knower or subject. .Fi-
nally, each thinker in his own way is concerned to emphasize 
that while the whole is logically prior to its . parts, the 
parts are yet distinguishable, if not separable, from the 
whole. This is to say that finite personality, although it 
is subordinate to the Supreme personality, is not lost in 
it. Bowne makes the same point when he sqs that the cate-
gories or knowledge have no metaphysical significance apart 
from an all-comprehending personality at the same time that 
he insists that these categories are real and not mere ap-
pearames. 
2. Causality 
For Riminuja as for Bowne, being is possessed or at-
tributes and these stand to one another in various relations 
of which the relation or interaction or reciprocity is the 
most ~portant both for science and philosophy. We have seen 
that for both thinkers being is above all an activity and is 
known through its activity. Now the notion or activity is 
inseparable from the notion or cause. And it is to the cau-
sal .relation, as this is treated in our philosophers, that . 
we now turn. But it may be helpful first to set the problem 
in an historical context. 
The problem has agitated the minds or philosophers 
throughout the ages, and has assumed a special acuteness in 
present day science. In western philosophy, Aristotle was 
the first to deal with causality in a systematic fashion and 
his influence in this respect .as inothers has lasted down 
to our own time. Aristotle's fourfold (or twofold) classifi-
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cation is well known. According to it aey- production, say 
a statue, may be viewed in terms of its material cause, that 
is, the material out of which it is carved; or it may be 
viewed in terms of its efficient cause, that is, the energy 
expended in its making; or it may be viewed in ter.ms of its 
formal cause, that is, the for.m or fignre imposed upon the 
material; and last, it may be viewed in terms of its final 
cause, that is, the purpose of the statue, for example, the 
perpetuation of someonets memory. Taking material and effi-
cient cause, on the one hand, and formal and final on the 
other, we can see that the two important aspects of cause 
for Aristotle are efficiency and finality. 1 
In subsequent philosophy the prevailing idea or cause 
was that of power or productivity. Causes generated their 
effects. Not only so, but causes existed for the sake or 
their effects. They are purposive. With the rise of modern 
empirical science, however, both these viewa or the nature 
of causality come to be questioned. Final causes particular-
ly came to be regarded as otiose. And empiricism acted as a 
dissolvent of Aristotle's notion of efficient causality. So 
HUme denies that causes are powers that necessarily give rise 
to their effects. All that experience tells us is that effects 
follow their causes, not that theJ are produced by them. The 
1. ~r H. Mohan Bhattacharyya, The Principles of Philos-
~~ pp. 198-204. 
idea of cause is no·thing but habitual conjunction of one phe-
nomenon with another -- in our experience. In fact, this is 
all that the idea of necessary connection amounts to, or, to 
put the matter in another way, deducibility exists between 
propositions but not between facts. 
If certain kind of modern empirical philosophy reduced 
the idea of efficient causality to mere sequence in experience, 
modern science tended to dispense with final causes. On the 
meeh&nistic view, characteristic of the physics of the Nine-
teenth Century, causation is nothing but motion, the trans-
formation of energy, whetm r such transfo nnation minutely as 
in nuclear activity or massively as in the steam engine. For 
example, when heat expands what is involved causally is t~a: 
molecular energy in the form of heat disappears only to re-
appear in the .. shape of molar energy. Again, when coal pro-
duces steam the causal relation involved is nothing else 
1 than the transformation of molar energy into molecular energy. 
Until recent times the empirical philosopher, follow-
ing in the footsteps of Newtonian Science, formulated his 
account of the nature of causal! ty in tenn.s of such concepts 
as "phenomenon", "invariability", and "antecedence". In ad-
dition to these empirical concepts he felt obliged to employ 
another, namely, the notion of the uniformity of nature, it-
1. ct. H. Mohan Bhattacharyya, The Principles of ~!los­
~' pp~ 200-202. 
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self anything but empirical. Mill is the great proponent of 
the uniformity principle, but struggle as he did to bring it 
into line with the presuppositions of empirical philosophy, · 
it cannot be said that he succeeded. In some form or another 
the p~inciple appears to be unavoidable, but attempts to 
justify it empirically have all been circular. 
Contemporary empiricists, or that group among them 
called logical positivists, hsve given up the attempt to 
justify the causal principl~ (everything that happens has a 
cause) on~ posteriori grounds, at the same time that they 
deny that it is ~ priori. It is neither an empirical state-
ment, they argue, nor is .it an a priori one. It is not a 
statement at all and so can be neither true nor false. What, 
then, is it? The answer is that the causal principle, since 
it is not a true description of any thing~or, as we have 
just seen, not being a statement, it is neither true nor 
false), is rather a directive to empirical investigation; 
and looks for uniformities in nature. As a directive the ~ 
ciple assumes nothing about the world and ~t is pertinent to 
any world whatever. Its justification, if indeed we may speak 
of justification here, stems not from the particular charac-
ter of the world, but rather from the fact that the scien-
tist acts in accordance with .it. No one will question the 
ingenuity of this theory, but it looks more like a parade 
or intellectual bankruptcy than a solution of the causal 
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problem. 
Convinced of the impossibility of a strictly empiri-
cal account of causality, the idealists, among them Rimanuja 
and Bowne, argue for a spiritual reality which in the last 
analysis is the cause of all that exists. Itself uncaused, 
this reality, in the view of Rimanuja, Bowne and others, is 
the dynamic principle at work in the universe, the ground of 
its intelligibility and the ultimate presupposition that un-
derlies every attempt at an explanation of things. Aristo-
1 telian-wise we may think of it as the Prime Mover. As spir-
itual, it purposively determines the world by what Bosanquet 
has called "pull" in contradistinction to "push", or again, 
in Aristotelian terms it is the final cause of things.2 True, 
efficient causes reign in the empirical world, but by them-
selves they do not explain that world. For in the last anal-
ysis all causality is teleological. The world process is 
goal-directed. Such is the answer of some idealists to the 
empiricist reduction of cause to sequence and the mechanistac 
rejection of purpose. 
Because it throws light on the subject generally, we 
should like, before turning to the study of Ri.minuja, to 
say something about the distinction that has been drawn be-
1. H. Mohan Bhattacharya, The Principles of Philosophy, 
p. 202. 
2. Ibid., PP• 202-203. 
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tween causation and causality. The tezm causation is tak-
en, as by Eddington, as a name for the ordinary conception 
of the relation of cause and effect in which there is an 
assumption of temporal sequence; while the term causality 
is reserved for that 1•elation in which it is not temporal 
sequence that is central, but the world, past, present and 
future, conceived as an interrelated whole. All events ir-
respective of their particular causes or particular effects 
are what they are owing to their place in a totality. It 
will be at once evident that on this view not time but sys-
tem is of the essence of the causal principle. The causal 
relation is not a one-way affair but is symmetrical. In 
Eddington• s words, in this view of things ''which knows noth-
ing of time's arrow, there is no discrimination of cause and 
effect; but events are connected by a symmetric·al causal re-
lation which is the same viewed from either end. nl Now such 
a conception, espoused today by physicists, has always lain 
at the heart of the idealistic theory of causal! ty, and the 
distinction between causation and causality is one that fig-
ures largely in the discussion that follows. 
A. Rimanuja•s Theory of Causality 
(1) Brahman in Causal Relation to the World 
In the Rimanujist philosophy' Brahman stands in a cau-
1. A. s. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, 
(New York: The MacMillan Co., 1928), p. 295. 
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sal relation to the world, indeed all things are ultimately 
referrable to him. What is the nature or this causal rela-
tionship between Brahman and the world? First of all, it is 
necessary to be clear about Rimlnuja's idealiam in general. 
It does not entail the negation of the reality of matter. On 
the contrary spirit without matter is inconceivable. The 
world is the material body of Brahman. Brabnan would not be 
Brahman without the world. The relation between spirit and 
matter is an organic, intrinsic relation, as indeed all gen-
uine causal relations. "There is no spirit without body, 
- . 
for then, spirit is ineffectual; nor a body without spirit, 
1 for then, the body is inconceivable. 11 But the intrinsic 
character of the relation between body and spirit does not 
mean that body is on the same status with the spirit. To 
Riminuja body is precisely that which spirit completely con-
trols, for its own benefit sustains and enjoys. On this sub-
ject he writes: "All sentient and non-sentient beings to-
gether constitute the body of the Supreme Person, for they 
are completely controlled and supported by him for his own 
ends, and are absolutely subordinate to him. n2 Again, he says 
that "8.1IY' substance which a sentient soul is capable of com-
pletely controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and 
l. K. C. Varadachari, The Metaphysics of Sri Rim«hujats 
Sri Bhashzam, (Madras: Universit,1 of Madras, 1928), p. 19. 
2. Sri Rimanuja, Sri Bb.asb1am, p. 424. 
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which stands to soul (self) in an entirely subordinate rela-
tion, is the body of that soul."1 
In the light of this it would seem that for Riminuja 
all effective causality is confined to Brahman. But the sen-
se in which this is so is not easy to make out from Rimanuja's 
own words. He writes: 
As Brahman has all sentient and non-sen-
tient things for its body, and constitutes 
the self of the body, there is nothing con-
trary to reason in Brahman being connected 
with two states, a causal and an effected 
one, the essential characteristics of which 
are expansion, on the one hand, and contrac-
tion, on the other; for this expansion and 
contraction belong (not to Brahman h±mself, 
but) to the sentient and non-sentient beings. 
The imperfections adhering to the body do 
not affect Brahman, and the good qualities 
belonging to the self do not extend to the 
body; in the same vray as childhood, youth 
and old age, which are attributes of embod-
ied beings, such as Gods or men, belong to 
the body only, not to the embodied self; 
while knowledge, pleasure, and so on, belong2 to the conscious self only, not to the body. 
· What Rimlnuja appears to be saying here is that while body 
is an effect of Brahman it does not in turn exercise any cau-
sal efficacy in relation to him. On the other hand, conscious-
ness as such is both effect and cause. 
Now it may help to make this whole matter clearer if 
we look into what Riminuja has to say with regard to the re-
lation between cause and effect. According to him, effects 
1. Sri R~anuja, Sri Bhashymn, p. 424. 
2. Ibid., p. 422. 
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are prefigured in their causes, present in them from the be-
ginning. The effect is only a changed state of the cause. 
Hence the manifested world of matter and of souls, which form 
the body of Brahman, were initially present in him, though in 
subtler forms. Brahman by his willing causes differentiation 
in matter and souls, but these two aspects or Brahnan always 
existed. And they are the two ultimate aspects of him. To 
Rimanuja further there is a difference between body and soul, 
and just as tre defects and deficiencies of the body do not 
affect the soul, so there is a difference between Brahman, 
the absolute controller and his body, the individual souls, 
together with the world of' matter, and the defects or the 
latter cannot affect the nature of Brahman. Brahman is 
therefore wholly unaffected by the deficiencies of the world. 
He remains pure and perfect in himself, possessed of endless-
ly benef'icient qualities. The only thing that can stand in 
the relation of cause to Braman is Brahman himself'. 
(2) Brahman and the World 
The relation between Brahman and the world is eternal. 
One ter.m in this relation cannot be stressed without stress-
ing the other. "Brahman is the cause and condition of the 
effect, namely, the universe (jagat), for being what it is."1 
We have already seen that f'or RimAnuja the universe in ita 
1. K. c. Varadachari, The Metaphysics of Sri Riminujats 
Sri ~byaBhyam, p. 20. 
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potential, or what he call~, ~ubtle form exi~ts in Brahman 
eternally. It i~ an act of Brahman's will that the universe 
become~ manifest. "Without his volition (iccha) nothing can 
take place. nl The effectuation of the various things and 
fo:nn.s of the world is, then, owing to the "will to manifest 
on the part of Brahm.an. 112 What is thus the effect is the 
cau~e made manifest, not however without real differences in 
the effect such, for example, as its pluralization. But ~ 
differentiation or the effect into a diversity of forms and 
names is still dependent upon the cause and sustained by i~ 
It develops out of the cause, a gradual unfoldment, a proc-
ess in time. In the cause, past, present and future are all 
contained. It is the condition of every possibility.3 Much 
in the manner of Bowne for whom to be is to act, Ramanuja 
argues that causes as well as their effects are dynamic in 
their very nature, their being is their manifestation. Thus 
the physical manifestation of things in the world i~ due to 
the activity of matter, while matter, as one of the aspects 
of Brahman, begins to act at the will of Brahman. Inhering 
in the activity o:r matter is the spirit of Brahman, which 
places matter in motion. 
1. K. c. Varadachari, The Metaphysics of Sri Rimanujats 
Sri Bhzashyam, p. 20. 
2 • Ibid • , p • 21. 
3. Ibid., p. 21. 
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Brahman's creation of the world is not without purpose. 
It is the very nature of Brahnan to will the good of the in-
dividual selves, selves which are organically related to him. 
By Brahman's design these selves grow and develop, thereby 
not only enriching their own experiences but the experience 
of Brabnan himself. Indeed the motive behind creation and 
evolution is to elevate individual souls to a position of im-
dependence, not of course of Brahman, but of all lower impul-
ses. Riminuja writes: 
In the past, this Prajapati -- the Bhagavan 
~rahm~ intently reflected at the time of 
creation, on the entities (chit~ entangled in 
matter (achit) from an immemorial past. They 
were destitute of a name, of a form, and of a 
distinction, and embosomed in Him. They were 
fit for fulfilling great aims, but were lying 
latent like inert or unintelligent substances. 
Prajapati out of infinite mercy looked on 
them, arid wishing t~ work out their deliver-
ance, created them. 
Thus the purpose of Brahman's action is, if we may use a mod-
ern phrase, soul-making. 
(3) Causality, Causal Unity and the Personality of 
Brahman 
Riminuja is especially concerned to point out that at 
the impersonal level purposive causal activity can have no 
meaning. Purpose is intelligible only with reference to a 
purposer. Thus sentient being is a progressive adaptation 
1. Sri Ramanu ja, Sri Ramanu ja' s Commentary on the 
Bha~avad Gita, p. 99. Of. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhash:yam, 
p. 32. 
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to the living intelligence of Brahman, which indeed sustains 
and directs all being. At the level of personality the char-
acteristic thing is inner growth, which again is the unfold-
ing of the infinite consciousness that is present in all 
selves. In this way causality, as conceived by Riminuja, in-
. . . 1 
volves continuity, immanent unity and freedom. It involves 
conti~uity since Brahman's creation involves every gradation 
of being; immanent unity since the one Brahman is present in 
all things; and freedom since all true being is self-deter.m-
ined. 
In summing up Raminuja • s theory of causal! ty we may 
say that causality is at work in the modifications that mat-
ter undergoes, modifications that are not the result of blind 
necessity, but of the wil·l of Brahman. Secondly, causality 
refers to the freedom characteristic of the self as it stri-
ves to re-enact past states of perfection. Finally, and a-
bove all, causality refers to the spiritual personality of 
Brahman, which comprehends all other personalities, that is · 
to say, both selves and bodies, governing and controlling 
them as a system of nature and a system of selves. In Ram~-
nuja thus causality provides the explanation of the nature 
of Brahman as the world-ground and goal of all that exists.2 
1. F. N.-. Srinivasachari, The Philosophy of Visistid-
vaita, p. 260. 
2. Ibid.' p. 261. 
Rimanuja himself writes: 
Brahman in all its states has the souls 
and matter for its body; when the souls and 
matter are in their subtle state . Brahman is 
in its causal condition; when, on the other 
hand, Brahman has for its body souls and 
matter in their gross statf, it is teffectedt 
and then called world..... . 
~gain, in a highly difficult passage he writes: 
There is no confUsion of the different 
characteristic qualities; for liability to 
change belongs to non-sentient matter, lia-
bility to pain to sentient souls, and the 
possession of all excellent qualities to 
Brahman •••• that Souls joined to non~sentient 
matter persist in a subtle condition and 
thus constitute Brahman's body must neces-
sarily be admitted; for that the souls at 
that time also persist in a subtle form •••• 
non-division, at that time, is possible in 
so far as there is no distinction of names 
and forms. It follows frcm all this that 
Brahman2s causality is not contrary to 
reason. -
B. Bowne's Theory of Causality 
(1) The Meaning of Cause 
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Bowne draws a distinction between causality in the 
inductive sense and causality as metaphysical efficiency.3 
By inductive causality Bowne means the order in which events 
occur. And here he distinguishes further between cause and 
adequate cause. He explains: 
1. Sri Ri'mlnuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 469. 
2. Ibid., p. 470. 
3. Borden P. Bowne, Metaph'ysics, "revised ed.", p. 68. 
280 
Any event with complex antecedents would 
have only one adequate cause, but it might 
be said to have as many causes as anteced-
ents, for any one of these might, on occa-
sion, complete the group, and thus be view-
ed as the cause.1 This is causality in the . inductive sense. 
Now Bowne is of the opinion that no study, however inten-
sive, of the antecedents of events can result in a satis-
factory eXplanation of an effect or event. For suCh a study 
still leaves unexplained the agency that brings about the 
2 
empirical conditions under which events occur. Bowne calls 
this agency productive efficiency of dynamic determination. 
What he is in search of, in a word, is metaphysical causal-
ity.3 
Events, he argues, must have a causal ground. Nor 
is this all. This causal ground, he believes, may take on 
a "volitional form";4 indeed we shall find him arguing that 
volition is the ultimate pattern of all causality. To "pop-
ular thought causation manifests itself in three great forms, 
the interaction of things, the determination of consequents 
by their antecedents, and in volitional self-determination."5 
In common sense experience, it is noticed that while things 
continue to exist in independence o:f one another, yet they 
1. Borden P. Bowne, MetaE!!lsics, "revised ed.", p. 69. 
2. Ibid., p. 70. 
3. Ibid., p. 70. 
4. Ibid., p. 70. 
5. Ibid., p. 70. 
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are also involved in an order of mutual change and concomit-
ant variation. It is a natural conclusion, therefore, that 
the place and function of each individual is determined by 
its relation to the whole. But the question at once arises, 
how can things which are independent of one another be 
brought together in any systematic connection? Bowne•s ans-
wer is interaction. 
(2) Interaction 
The problem of interaction involves us in a considera-
tion of the logical presupposition underlying a system, the 
given facts of experience or the empirical matrix of a sys-
tem, and finally the nature of interaction itself. Bowne's 
first point is that logical relations are establiahed by 
thought in terms of likeness and difference, of mutual ex-
clusion and inclusion into a logical whole.l Any system, 
if it is to be discoverable at all, must be a system of law; 
ard if it is to be known it must be amenable to thought am 
the laws of thought. 2 It must be a system of law, which 
means "that definite antecedents shall have the same definite 
consequents; and this in turn demands an exact adjustment or 
correspondence of all the interactingmembers to all the 
t n3 res •••• And Bowne adds that ''the whole of law upon which 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed.", p. 71. 
2. Ibid., p. 71. 
3. Ibid., p. 71. 
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Science builds is but the expression of this metaphysical ad-
justment or correspondence."1 
How this correspondence comes about or is secured re-
mains an unsolved problem, but Bowne is convinced of the fact 
itself. And he is so convinced because such correspondence 
is a postulate of all objective science. According to the 
scientific theory of cause, similar causes must have similar 
effects, fixed quantitative and qualitative relations must 
hold between one and the other. If this state of affairs 
actually prevails, it presupposes that everything must be 
adjusted to every other thing in an exact and all-embracing 
harmony. But while such a presupposition is undoubtedl7 
right in making it, yet that theory leaves causality unex-
plained. To Bowne, "this general connnensurability and ad-
justedness of things, while a pre-condition of system, founds 
none. It determines the possibility of combination rather 
than its actuality.n2 
What, then, is missing in the scientific account of 
causality? It is the activity of the intellect. In Bowne's 
view there is a conceptual system of causality. That system 
is characterized by two things, one as essential as the other. 
They are "first, the co:rmnensurability of the conceptions 
themselves; and secondly, the ·unity of the thinking mind.") 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, ''revised ed. "., p. 72. 
2 • Ibid • ' p • 7 2 • 
3. Ibid., p. 72. 
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Trs mind must "comprise'' the variety of conceptions in the 
unity of one consciousness, and fUrther it must distinguish, 
canpare, and relate them, and so order them into one system-
atic whole. In ahort, the unity of the thinker is the su-
preme condition. of the existence of aqr conceptual order. 
Now Bowne is not prepared at this point s :imply to interchange 
this conceptual system with the real system of causality. In 
the latter things do not exist merely in our minds, or in 
8.'!q mind. They do not form a conceptual system, but a real 
system apart from all mind. Thus we are confronted with the 
problem of what it is in the real system that fUlfills the 
function the unitary thinker fUlfills in the conceptual sys-
tem. By virtue of what agency or principle is the concrete 
system a system at all? Bowne believes that in the last 
analysis only one answer is possible. It is that the real 
systam is founded by a supreme thinker. 
To common sense this view is far-fetched and unaccept-
able, and the alternative it offers is that systematic rela-
tions are to be acccunted for by the fact of interaction.1 
The mutual changes of things demand a causal explanation; 
and spontaneous thought finds it in their interaction. Viewed 
as interaction, what, we may ask, is the form and location of 
of causality. Is there a causal ground for the phenomenal 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed.", p. 73.. 
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changes in thing8? First, with regard to interaction Bowne 
would point out to the common sense philosopher that it can-
not take place between things as independent agents. It is 
rather sons thing that takes place between .things as depend-
ent on one fundamental reality. 
Further, he argues 'that we have no experience of in-
teraction as suCh. It is easy to suppose ·that in the case 
of volition we have such an experience. But the experience 
here, Bowne answers, is in reality not one of interaction. 
Certain pbfsical changes occur consequent upon an act of 
will, but the fact is we know nothing about the nature of 
the connection. All that we know is antecedenee and se-
quence. How then can things that are mutually independent 
interact? It will not do to say that the "thing trans:fers 
its condition to the thing acted upon, and this transfer-
ence is the act."l For the notion of transference here it-
-
self needs explaining. Moreover, it is an excessively sense-
bound conception, and it is up against the fact that condi-
tions and attributes are nothing apart from a subject. Ac-
cordingl.y, there would seem to be no such thing as transfer-
ence. Bowne concludes that whether we take the view that 
forces play between ~things or that effects are only passing 
influences, we have to admit that there is really no way of 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed.", pp.74-75 
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proving beyond doubt that things interact. The traditional 
notions of interaction would appear to be untenable. 
The trouble lies in the notion of interaction between 
mutually independent things. As Bowne points out, in an in-
teracting system, eaehmember has to adjust itself to every 
other, because every other member does what it does. 
"The causality of each is relative to the causality 
of all. The for.mula for the activity of any one must be giv-
en in terms of the activities of all the rest. "l The impli-
cation is plain: "The being of each is relative to the being 
of all, for the being itself is implicated in the activity. n2 
There is no lump or core of being in a thing to which the ac-
tivities are externally attached. Things are what they are 
because other things are what th~ are. Thus interaction 
must be declared impossible so long as things are viewed as 
independent • Bowne writes: 
By definition, the independent must contain 
the ground of all its determinations within it-
self, and by analysis that which is subject to 
the necessity of interac~~on must have the 
ground of its determinations in others as well 
as in itself. The two con~eptions will not com-
bine. Ever.y attempt to bridge the chasm between 
independent things by some passage of forces, 
influences, etc. results in a purely verbal ex-
planatioD, which it is impossible to think 
through.;; 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed.", p. 79. 
2. Ibid., p. Bo. 
3. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "1st ed.", pp.125-126. 
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The theories so far ex~ined throw no light on inter-
action. Yet interaction itself must be affirmed. And it is 
clear to Bowne that the only way in which it can be affirmed 
is to deny the independence of the plur-
al! ty, m d reduce 1 t to a constant de-
pendence, in sone way, upon one all-
embracing being, which is the unity ot 
the many, and in whose unity an inter-
acting plurality first beoomes possible.l 
In a word, an interacting many cannot exist without a coordi-
nating one. 
We are about to see that the clue to this coordina-
ting one is personality. 
(3) Personality as the Basis of Interaction 
It should be plain by now that all attempts to fill · 
the gap between two independent things by means of influ-
ences or forces are bound to end in failure. ttThe simple 
analysis," Bowne writes, "of the notions of ~nteraction and 
independence shows them to be incompatible. 112 .,. One or the 
other must be given up, "and, as the notion of interaction 
is essential to the notion of a system, we give up the in-
dependence of the interacting members. n3 This done, it be-
comes clear that the interaction of different elements is 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "lst ed.", p. 126. 
2. Ibid., P• 126. 
3. Ibid., p. 126. 
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only possible through the "unity of an e.J.l-em.bracing one, 
which either coordinates and mediates their interaction, 
or of which they are in some sense phases of modifications. ul 
But is it so clear? Bowne himself is aware that if we deny 
the independence of the interacting msnbers, it is still 
possible to ask what need there is for going outside them 
:ror something else on which they depend. Bowne• s reply to 
this objection that dependent things themselves can consti-
tute an independent system is that you cannot make an inde-
pendent out o:f' a sum of dependents. 
Some one thing, he says, must be inde-
pendent, and all the rest must be, in some 
sense, fUnctions o:r that one. As inter-
acting, a state o:r each must imply a cer-
tain state of all; and this is impossible, 
so long2as there is not same being common to all. 
Now the paradigm for the kind of ·uni t;v Bowne is in 
search of is the mind as e~bracing all its thoughts, feel-
ings and other mental states, in the unity o:r its existence. 
In this way only is it possible to re-
. move, not the mystery of interaction, but 
· the contradiction of the notion. The in-
finite may freely posit the finite, and 
may, with equal freedom, posit an inter~ 
action between itself and the finite, but 
all interaction between mutually independ-
ent beings is impossible in thoug}:l.t; and 
hence unaffir.mable in fact, except through 
some ultimate being who3embraces them all in the unity of itself. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysi.cs, "revised ed.", p. 81. 
2. Borden p. Bowne, Metapb;,ysics, 11lst ed.", p~ 127. 
3. JBorden P. Bowne, Studies in Theism, p. 256. 
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Thus the ul tim. ate pluralism of spontaneous thousP.t must be · 
exchanged for a basal monism. Nor is this all. The unity 
thus reached is emphatically not the unity or a logical uni-
versal, nor of any ideal classification whatever, but the 
essential substantial unity of a being which alone is self-
existent, and in which all things have their being.1 
To Bowne this unity is the infinite self or the world-
ground, and it is intelligent. For "the order of nature is 
utterly opague without conceiving thls being as intelligent.. n2 
No other conception is possible on Bowne•s leadi~ postulate, 
namely, that the world is accessible to thought and therefore 
intelligible. Further, the only real unity we have any knowl-
edge of is the free and conscious self. All other unities are 
formal, and have only a mental existence. Active intelligence, 
then, supplies the unity which, if it does not lessen the mys-
tery or interaction, frees it of contradiction. And,as we 
have already seen, this active intelligence cannot be under-
stood through the metaphysical categories, but these categor-
ies rather are to be understood as realized in active intelli-
gence.) 
Thus the unity that is alone capable or explaining sys-
tem is characterized by activity, intelligence and personality. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "1st ed.", p. 130. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Studies in Theology, p. 258. 
3. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 91. 
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An impersonal unity can yield nothing but :f'lux. Ultimately 
all causality is volitional causality. "Volitional causal-
ity, that is, intelligence itself' in act, is the only con-
ception o:r metaphysical cauaali ty in which we can rest. nl 
Such a conception apart :rrom all else, has :ror Bowne the 
i.mm.ense advantage that 1 t enables us to escape "the abyss 
o:r in:f'inite regress." It has the advantage in viewing cau-
sality :rurther that as :f'ree and intelligent, it leaves the 
door open :ror an explanation o:r the problem o:r error. 
To Riminuja and Bowne causality can only be explained 
by the tmmanent action of one :rundwmental reality. The ln-
dian thinker would certainly have agreed with Bowne when he 
wrote: 
This being, as :tb.ndamental and indepen-
dent, we call the inf'inite, the absolute, 
the world-g1•ound. In calling it the inf'i-
nite, we do mean that it excludes the co-
existence o:r the :f'inite, but only that it 
is the sel:f'-su:f'ficient source o:r the fin-
ite. In calling it the absolute, we do 
not exclude it :rrom all relation, but deny 
only external restriction and determination. 
In calling it the world-ground, we do not 
think o:r a spatial support, and still less 
o:r a raw material out of which things are 
made, but rather of that basal causaJ.it7 by 
which the \lforld is produced and maintained. 
Everything else has its cause and reason in 
this being. Whatever is true, or rational, 
or real in the world must be traced to this 2 being as its source and determining origin. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 92. 
2. Ibid., p. 93. 
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0. Summary and Oomparis on 
For Riminuja as for Bowne, the world has a first cause, 
which is God, but whereas for the one thinker this cause oper-
ates upon a previously existent, if highly subtle, matter, 
for the other it operates by fiat, so to speak. But Ramin~J& 
no less than Bowne insists that the world•s coming into behg 
marks no alteration in God Himself. God does not change, 
though He is the initiator in the last analysis of all change. 
Both thinkers agree that causality is never merely meo~anical, 
but purposive. The clue to the nature of causality is to be 
found in the self and its activities. If this idea is less 
explicit in Rimanuja than in Bowne, it is yet indubitably an 
important item in the Indian philosopher• s thought. To the 
one thinker as to the other the highest expression of causal-
ity is the absolute selr which is the world-ground and the 
goal or all that exists. This Supreme Self is at once both 
immanent and transcendent, 1 and all comprehensive. It is 
free and has endowed the finite selves with freedom. And 
they like their creator, are the real exemplars of causality. 
3. The Problem of Change and Identity 
Experience is notoriously a flux, yet without some ele-
ment of identity experience itself would be impossible. Oh~ge 
and permanence go hand in hand. As Bowne says: 
1. For Bowne, God is not transcendent of the physical 
world, but only of persons. 
We think or a thing as active, but still 
more as abiding. It has changing states, but 
nevertheless it is always equal to and iden-
tical with itself. The laws of thought them-
selves seem to demand this, for a thing is 
nothing for us except as it canes under a 
fixed idea.l 
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Although there is nothing new about this statement, still it 
poses the problem of how a thing can change and at the same 
time remain the same (identical). Being cannot be all chang~ 
ror without some underlying unity talk of existence, knowl-
edge, law or pattern, even change itself becomes meaningless. 
Professor Bertocci grasps the core of the matter when he 
writes: 
For change as change, change as nothing 
but __ change (as opposed to change in some 
unchanging direction) is simply unintelli-
gible. There must be something in the 
universe which is contemporaneous sustain-
er or the changes that are. No being who 
is himself in absolute flux (nay, in any 
flux, these thinkers insisted) can serve 
the purpose or explaining change, for t~en 
he himself requires a permanent source. 
It may serve to delineate our problem more sharply if 
we distinguish, as Bowne does, between various types of change 
and identity. Bowne, in common with other thinkers, speaks 
of three kinds of identity, namely, logical, phenomenal and 
metapbysioal.3 Logical identity is simply sameness of def-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Uetapbzs1cs, p. 44. 
2. ~eter A. Bertocc1, Introduction to Philosophy or 
Religion, p. 280. 
3. Borden P. Bowne, Metapb:ysics, "revised ed.", p. 4.5. 
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inition. Phenomenal identity is either the equivalence of 
appearance or the continuity of equivalent appearance. On 
the other hand, metaphysical identity "applies to the real-
1 ity behind the appearance." Of these three sorts of iden-
tity it is metaphysical which offers the most difficulty. 
And it is not easy to say either what precisely is meant by 
change. In the abstract change may imply any kind of se-
quence, whether it be lawless or chaotic, continuous or di~ 
continuous. In this sense, change would be simply a depart-
ure from the present order in any direction whatever. 2 
In science and philosophy change is commonly consid-
ered to be sequence according to law. It is assumed that 
there is a causal continuity between the successive states 
of reality whereby each is founded in its predecessor, and, 
in turn, founds its successor. Excluded is the positivistic 
notion of anteoedence and sequence as the only relation be-
tween past and future. Such a notion would reduce everythmg 
to an absolute and groundless becoming, so that the present 
would not be founded in the past and would not found the 
.fUture. AJ.J. continuity would be dissolved. Every phenomenon 
would be a groundless and opaque fact. Not even Heraclitu~ 
the great upholder of change, wertt as far as this. For him 
all is flux, but flux according to law. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed.", p. 45.. 
2. Ibid., p. 46. 
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It has been argued that change cannot be real since 
it is contradictory. Bowne undertakes to refute this con-
tention. Take the body A which ceases to be A in becoming 
Al. The 
ceasing of A and the becoming of Al, Bowne 
writes, are the same fact seen from oppo-
site sides. Seen from behind, it is the 
ceasing of A; seen from before, it is the 
becoming of Al. Now it is only in this 
sense that change ~plies that A is both 
A and Al at the same time. There is no 
indivisible instant in which A rests at 
both A and Al, but one in which A ceases 
to be A and becomes Al; precisely as a mov-
ing body never moves with two velocities in 
the same direction at the same moment ••••• 
But the fact that the one indivisible flow 
divides itself for our thought into two fac-
tors -- a ceasing and a becoming involves 
no more contradiction than the fact that 
the same curve is both concave1 and convex when seen from opposite sides. 
On this view, there is no real contradiction between 
change and identity. They are like the opposite sides of a 
single medal. On the other hand, throughout the history of 
l philosophy, from Parmenides to F. H. Bradley, the view keeps 
recurring that change is contradictory and therefore unreal. 
Being is self-identical. In modern times, philosophers, es-
pecially Hegel and the Hegelians, have taken the bull by the 
horns and asserted that change is contradictory but not on 
that account unreal. Reality is a dialectical process, em-
bracing every variety of contradiction and yet remaining one 
1. Borden p. Bowne, :Metaphysics,·· p. 50. 
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with itself. We shall see in what follows that the views of 
Ramanuja and Bowne, though they differ in many respects from 
that of Hegel and Hegelians, yet agree with the latter that 
reality is one and also changes. 
A. Change and Identity in Riminuja 
The kind of identity with which Riminuja is concerned 
is concrete identity. He places great emphasia upon the iden-
tity of being and the logic of identity. But his is not a 
Hegelian logic in which thought is under the necessity ot 
bringing being and non-being together if it is to issue in a 
definite concept. To Riminuja being requires no reference 
to non-being, so that his concrete identity is not a dialec-
tical unity of opposites. A thing 1is' and it cannot be said 
of it at the same time that it 'is not'. Difference implies 
opposites, but identity is such precisely because ot the ab-
sence of opposite& Yet if identity does not hold within it 
the opposite• of being and non-being, it is not bare unchang-
ing identity. It is at this point that Raminuja introduces 
the theory or attributes. The theory is designed to preserve 
the identity or being, while emphasizing its changing states. 
And as emphasizing change, it emphasizes at the same time itne 
dynamic character or being.l 
1. Kahendranath Sircar, Comparative Studies in Vedan-
tism, p. 26. 
~~ 
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It is in the dynamic character of being that Riminuja 
finds the possibility of process, self-unfoldment, self-pro-
jection and self-integration. Within the total synthesis, 
whiCh is being, there goes on an endless process of synthe-
sizing.1 Thought discovers that it is never in contact with 
bein~ az such, but with tha attributes of being. It is thus 
obliged to posit attributes which together with the concrete 
beirljl of subata11ce, constitute the synthesis that satisfies 
the demands of thou~otht. The concrete picture of being which 
emerges :from the activity of thought is one that mediates 
between the two abstractions of substance without attributes 
or attributes without substance, one being as unintelligib~ 
as the other. 2 Unfortunately Riminuja provides us with no 
very clear idea of the relation between being and attributes. 
It would seem that the attributes are not merely relative to 
thought (though there is a suggestion of this doctrine) but 
are inherent in the very nature of being.3 
(1} Change Due to Being (Purus~) in Proximity to · 
Matter (Prakriti) 
As we have already noted, the world is ·ina~gurated b~ 
an act of Brahman's will. It is the absolute self or Purusa 
that initiates movement in the material body of Brahman; 
1. Mahendranath Sircar, Comparative Studies in Vedan-
~' p. 26. 
2. Ibid., p. 26. 
3. Ibid. ' p. 27. 
from which it follows that the locus of change is not in 
Purusa but in Prakriti or matter which exists as the body 
of the Supreme Self. But before it is thus excited to move-
ment matter exists in a subtle state, or as a potentiality, 
if one will, in the Self, so that for all practical purposes, 
it is really one with the Absolute Self. Rimanuja writes: 
Now, when this world which forms Brahman's 
body has been gradually reabsorbed into Brah-
man, each constituent element being refunded 
into its immediate cause, so that in the end 
there remains only the highly subtle, elemen-
tary .matter which scripture calls darkness; 
and when this so-called darkness itself, by 
assuming a form so extremely subtle that it 
hardly deserves to be called something sepa-
rate from Brahman, of which it constitutes 
the body, has become one with Brahman; then 
Brahman invested with this ultra-subtle body 
forms the resolve, •May I again possess a 
world-body constituted by all sentient and 
non-sentient beings, distinguished by names 
and for.ms just as in the previous aeon•, and 
modifies (parinimayati) itself by gradually 
evolving the worid=body in the inverse1order in which reabsorption has taken place. 
It may be remarked by the way here tha~ in this state-
ment Ramanuja recognizes space and time, for in admitting the 
existence. of matter, he admits the existence of space, and 
the mention of 'aeon • implies a time series. We shall return 
to this subject in our section on space and time which are 
better dealt with separately, though they have a bearing ob-
viously on the problem of change and identity. 
1. Sri Raminuja, Sri Bhasbyam, p. 403. 
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(2) The Unchanging Character of the Absolute Self 
Ramanuja is well aware that unless there is something 
permanent there can be no change, or at any rate no knowledge 
of change. If everything were mere flux there would be no 
way of knowing the fact. To Himanuja change is intelligible 
only in terms of the Absolute Self, which is permanent and 
unchangeable. The change which the world undergoes in the 
course of its evolution are changes not in Brahman but in 
the body of Brahman as it passes from a subtle to a gross 
state. Brahman's essential nature remains unchanged.1 Mat-
ter alone changes. At the same time Raminuja insists that 
changes in matter are owing to the tmmanent presence of 
Brahman himself. 
Of course, we are at once faced with the question, 
why change at all? Why the existence of the manifold? It 
is an old question -- one that no theory of creation can es-
cape. In the first place, the very idea of a perfect being 
who launches out upon a line of activity in order to fulfill 
a purpose is one that appears to be a contradiction in terms; 
for it implies a lack or imperfection in the being who by 
definition is perfect. How can creation add anything to the 
Absolute Self? In the second place, if it is argued that the 
individual souls are created in order to add to the sum total 
of goodness in the world, there is a ready answer. Given the 
1. Bharatan Kumaroppa, The Hindu Conception of the Deity, 
P• 229. 
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suffering in the world, it is not at all evident that crea-
tion has added to its goodness. Ramanuja, of course, is not 
unaware of these difficulties. Creation, he says, is the 
'sport' of Brahman. 
The motive which prompts Brahman ••••• 
to the creation of a world comprising all 
kinds of sentient and non-sentient beings 
dependent on His volition is nothing else 
but sport, play. We see in ordinary life 
how some great king, ruling this earth with 
its seven dvlpas, and possessing perfect 
strength, valou~, and so on, has a game at 
balls, or the like, from no other motive 
than to amuse himself; hence there is no 
objection to the view that sport alone is 
the motive prompting Brahman to the creation, 
sustentation, and destruction of this1world is easily fashioned by His mere will. 
Now this view is not as heartless as it sounds. The term 
•sport•, as Ramanuja uses it, is not to be understood as 
childish play, but rather in the sense of joyous and free 
activity on the part of the Supreme Self, as the spontan-
eous expression of his manifold powers. 
Be this as it may, the question still remains, what 
precisely is the relation between the Absolute Self, who is 
pure unchanging spirit, and the world of matter, sentient 
and non-sentient which is the locus of all change? Perhaps 
Ramanuja 1 s treatment of the mind-body relation, which we 
reserve for a later section, will help . to throw sane light 
on this matter. For the present we rest with Ramanuja•s 
1. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhashymn, - 477. 
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contention that the ground o~ change is in matter as exist-
ing in a space-time continuum; that change is initiated by 
the will o~ Brahman; and that it continues indefinitely un-
til Brahman withdraws ~rom the world at the end o~ a cer-
tain •aeon.• In all this, per.manence is guaranteed by the 
unchanging character of the Absolute Sel~, which is immanent-
ly present in all things, knows and controls them. 
B. Bowne • s Theory o~ Change and Identity. 
I~ we look at the world of things by itsel~, and try 
to explain change and identity, we should be baffled, for 
the phenomenal world shows nothing but unceasing flux. To 
Bowne r•spontaneous thought is very possibly right in demand-
ing permanence and identity",1 but in con~ining itself to 
the analysis of sense experience in the search ~or the en-
during and abiding in the midst of change, such thought can 
only conclude that all is change. The Heraclitean flux is 
inescapable if we stay within the framework o~ an extramen-
tal or external world. Even change itsel~ is unintelligible 
apart ~rom reference to an abiding intelligence. Thus Bowne 
observes that "while spontaneous thought cannot find ita 
identities in an extra-mental world, just as little can the 
doctrine o~ change be made intelligible without reference to 
l. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphy'sics, "revised ed.", p. 59-
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an abiding intelligellee. 111 
(1) Attempt• to Reoonoil.e Change ani Identit}' 
By way of deYelopiqg bia own view, Bowne takea up for 
critioiam three theoriea of the relation of change and iden-
tity. Firat, there ia what he calla the popular Yiew which 
consists in the notion of a changeleas thing with changing 
states or changing qualities. In this conception, Bowne 
sa~a, we haTe a diyision or labour &Dnilar to that in the 
popular conception or being. Be writes: 
There we had a rigid core of duration, 
which stapl~ supplied the being~ In addi-
tion to this there was a certain aet of 
:toreea, in aomewhat obscure relations to 
the being, which furnished the aotiTity. 
Here we have the same core of duration, . 
which proYidea for the identity, and a 
swarm of conditions, states and qualities, 
which look after the change. The identity 
is located in the core of being, and the 
change is ~ttributed to the states and 
qualities. 
The superficiality of this view is obyioua and Bowne 
plaees his finger on its weakness when he points out that 
tbe state of a thing is not &Cirlething externally attached 
to the thing. It is rather intrinsic to the thing, expresa-
ing what the thing ia at the moment. 
An~ other c oneeption throws us back into 
the external conception or inherence •••• and 
makes the thing useless as an explanation 
l.. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "reYised ed.", p. 59 .. 
2. Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
or ita atatea. For, if the thing itselr doea 
ftOt change in the chsngea or ita atatea, 
there is no reason why the states should 
change, or why their ctangea ahouli tollow 
one direction rather than another. 
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This is to aay that the thing itself must tound and 
determine its changes, or we tace the queation: what is 
changing? In other words, the thing itself must undergo an 
easential change; "for it A remains A, instead of becoming 
Al, there is no !round wh'1 any of the aanifeatations ot A 
should change."2 And Bown.e goes on to aay, 
The external change JD.Ust be viewed as the 
external manifestation or an internal change. 
A change between things must depend upon a 
change in thinga. Iiow when we remember that 
the only reason for positing things is to 
proTide some ground for actiTity and change, 
it is plain that the changeless core is ot 
no use, and must be dropped as both useless 
and unproTable ••••• it being is to explain 
change, change must be put into being, and 
being ~ t be brought into the circle ot 
.change. 
Iio more aucceaaful than this attempt to explain change 
and identity is that which Bowne ascribes to the ph7siciat. 
The difference between the two is more verbal than real. The 
physical Tiew assumes that things in themselves are cl'll. nge-
less, but that their relations change. we haTe the changing 
appearances, on the one hand, and the underlying realities, 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metap'h:ysics, "revised ed.", p. 51. 
2. Ibid., pp. 51-52. 
3. Ibid. , p. 52. 
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unaffected bl' them, on the other. On this view the phenoa-
enal world is appearance and beneath it is "a mass o-r change-
less and invisible atoms."1 Here again. aa in the popular 
coneeption, the thing in need of explanation is left unex-
plained. Why do relations change? No reason is given whJ 
a relation A should pass into a new relation B. If one paas-
es into the other 1 t can onll' be owing to a change in the 
activity o:f some or all o:f the elements. and this implies a 
change in the things themselves. I:f this were not so, i:f 
the relation is independent of things~ then the latter can-
not be invoked to explain the relation. 2 
In passing it .. ,. be remarked that the view here as-
cribed bl' Bowne to the ph7sieists is one that contemporary 
pbyaics would certainl7 disavow. But his criticism o:f the 
Newtonian view is none-the-leas valid. 
There is still another view that Bowne attacka, nam.:q 
that of Herbart. the Ger.man philosopher. It is the notion 
of "accidental view" that is the object or his criticiaa. 
According to this notion. the changes in things are in their 
appearance&, and changea in appearance are due to the chang-
ing position o:f the observer. As Bowne explains it, the 
same liDe, for example, "might be a ride, a chord, a tangent. 
a aine, a cosine, or a diameter, according to its relation to 
1. Borden P. Bowne, :Metaphzsics, "revised ed.", p. 52. 
2. Ibid., P• $2. 
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other liaea, and yet it would be the same line in all these 
relations. The relatione would be accidental. According to 
the position. of the obserYer, therefore, the same thing ma:y 
appear in widely different relations, yet without any change 
in itself."l The trouble here is that the problem of change 
is removed from the outer world to the inner. But thia 
shift gets us no where. For since the knowing also beloaga 
to the reala or being, "and is indeed, the only being of 
whiCh we have iamediate experience, the difficult~ remains 
2 the same. 11 It mq be that the physical world is onl'1 a 
succession or phenomena in our minds, yet it is a succession 
that aust be aauaed by somthing and pereeiTed b'1 somethin&e 
Consequentl'1 change, eliminated from the phenOJD.ena, must be 
found in the produei ng agent or in the percipient lllad. It 
is impossible, eTen on a Tiew like Herbart•s, to eliminate 
change from being, or reserye an unchanging core in being 
unperturbe4 b'1 the cycle of change. 
It ia thua eyident to Bowne that neither the popular,, 
ph:yaical, or Herbartian solutions of the problem of change 
and identity is acceptable. And he proceeds to offer his 
own solution. Both change and identity taken aeparatel,- are 
but mere abstractions of the intellect, instances of the fal-
lacy of the uniTersal. So long as we remaia on this leTel of 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaph{sics, 11reTised ed.", pp.52-53. 
2. Ibid.' p. 53. 
abstraction no aolution of the problem is possible. What 
is wanted, if we are to make any headwa,- with the problem, 
is a concrete principle. Flux is ever.ywhere, and escape 
from it possible on17 it there is something abiding. lfow 
it is Bowne's thesis that this something is revealed in ex-
perience.l More specifieall,-, it is revealed in the knowl-
edge or our selves. It is here in the consciousness or self 
aa identical throughout change that the clue to the solution 
or the problem or change and 1dentit7 is to be round. For 
here and here alone do we have the prbte exemplar of identi-
ty in change. Bowne wri tea : 
The conception or a permanent thing with 
changing states is founded as conception, as 
well as realized 1n being, in the fact of 
the conscious self. Apart from this personal 
reference, the categories defY all attempts 
to give them any m&tapbJaical significance. 
The formal identities of logic are intelli-
gible on their own plane; but the metaphysi-
cal identities or things are simply shadows 
or aelt-identir,-ing intelligence. Instead, 
then, of interpreting personality from the 
sti e of ontology, we must rather interpret 
oatology trom the aide of personalit,-. Only 
personality is able to give concrete mean-
ing to those ontological categories by which 
we seek to interpret being. Onl,- personal-
it7 is able to reconcile the Eleatio and 
Heraclitic philosophies, tor only the per-
sonal can combine ch~e and identity, or 
flow and permanence. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Ketapb(sics, "revised ed.", p. 66. 
2. Ibid., p. 66. 
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(2) The Permanence of the ·Absolute Self 
In Bowne•s Tiew, the impersonal abides in perpetual 
process, "a flowing f'orm of activity, to which, because of 
its eonstanC'f, we attribute thinghood, but Which is in real-
it,., only a form of the activity of som.ethiDg deeper than 
itself. nl And cleaTing to this view of the primacy of the 
self, Bowne concludes "that the absolute person, not the ab-
solute being, is the basal fact of existence."2 As abatract 
principles, change and identity are in mutual contradietio~ 
and they necessarill' remain so unless they are lifted to the 
plane of aelf-conacious thought where they are interpreted 
not as abstractions but as concrete manifestations of the 
living intelligence which is at once the source of both 
change and 1dentit,., and the principle of their reeoncilia-
tion. 
The soul knows itself to be the same, 
and distinguishes itself from its states 
as their permanent aubjeot. This perma-
nence, however, does not consist in any 
rigid sameness of being but in Jaeiii.OI'J and 
selt-consciousness, whereby alone we con-
atitute ourselves abiding persons. How 
this is possible there ia no telling; but 
we get no insight into its possibility by 
a:t'finn.ing a rigid duration of some sub-
stance in the soul. The soul, as substance, 
for eTer changes; and unlike what we assume 
of the pb7sical elementa, its series of 
ch.nges can be reveraed only to a slight 
.extent. The soul develops, but it never 
undevelopa into ita former states. Each 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphzsics, "reTiaed ed.", p. 66. 
2. Ibid., p. 66. 
new experience leayes the aoul other than 
it waa; but, as it advaneea trom stage· to 
stage, it is able to gather up its past 
and carry it with it, so that, at &n'J point, 
it possesses all that it has been. It is 
thia fact only which constifUtes tbe .perma-
nence and identit7 or self. 
(3) The Ultia te Cause ~ · Change 
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God as the creator ot the world 1a aJ.so the begetter 
ot all the changes in it. There is a logic in the aystem 
ot things Which absolutel'Y detennines all co-existences and 
· sequences; ao that the phenomenal order appears to be selt-
sutficient. Nevertheless, the fact is that this system is 
"only the outcome ot the consistent aetivi ty ot the all-
~bracing. God."2 It is the volition of the absolute person-
. alit,' that in the last anal,.sis accoun.~ ro~ change. Bowne 
will have nothing to do w1 th the Spinozia tic vi f!lfl that the 
world ia an attribute of the intini te substance. The world 
depends upon a divine activity and this activit7 is an ex-
preaaion of Godts will. · In Bowne•.s words, "the infinite is 
ror eyer energizing according to certain laws, and produci~ 
thereby a great Yariety of products. n3 
In a peaking or the will or the int1ni te se1r, Bowne, 
quite properly points out that care must be taken not to ap-
ply to the divine willing the limitations of the huaan. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaplgaios, "reTiaed ed.", p. 197. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Studies in Theism, p. 308. 
3. Borden ? . Bowne, PhilosoPh{ of Theiaa, p. 181. 
Aa in huaan consciousness there are man7 
~eatures whiCh are not essential to conscious-
ness, ani which arise troa our lilllitations, 
ao in human willing there are man7 features 
which are not essential to willing, and which 
reault from our finiteness. Since we get 
our objects of volition graduallT and by 
experience, we tend to think ot will as a 
maaentary activity Which com.s into our lite 
now and then, but which, tor the most part, 
is quieaoent. In this way we come to think 
ot an act ot will as havi.Dg nothing to do 
with the maintenance or a tfxed state, but 
only as producing a change. 
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The divine will has nothing ot this flickeriag charac-
ter. It is not to be atamized into acts ot will; it ia indi-
visible, never in abeyance, the cause ot permanence no lesa 
than change. 
0. SUDIII.ary and Comparison 
Both our thinkers approach the problem ot change .f'r<111. 
a aetaphysical point of view, that is to say, they are opposed 
to anJ' merely naturalistic explanation ot ch&Qge. ·In the 
Yiew ot both philosophers change is initiated by the will ot 
the absolute self'. But it Riminuja and Bowne coae together 
at this point, they also part compal11'• For Bowne the world 
is God's creative act, while tor Riminuja the world, although 
it canes into being at the bidding ot Brahman, existed in tihe 
form ot a highly subtle matter in Brahman, that ia, it exist-
ed in him as a potentiality. 
When the period ot a great §ralaza draws 
towards its close, the divine upreme Person, 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Philosophl ot Theia., pp. 186-187. 
rem.embering the constitution of the world 
preTiOUII to the sralaza, and forming the 
volition •Kay Iecome manifold', separate• 
into its constituent element• the whole 
mass ot enjoying aouls and objects of enjoy-
mellt which, during the pralaya state, had 
been .. rged in h~ so as to posaesa a sep-
arate existence (not actual but) potential 
onl1'1 and then em.i ts the entire world. 
Bowne somewhat in the same Tein says: 
God neither made the world from nothing 
as a raw material, nor trom him.aelf"; both 
notiou are absurd; but ~e caused that to 
be which bef"ore waa not. · 
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We haTe also seen that f"or Rimanuja, the indiTidual 
selvea and the world of" matter form the body of" Brahaan. 
This leaTes, or appears to leaTe, less independence ~o the 
finite aelf" than Bowfte ascribes to it. For Bowne, the fin-
ite self, oace created, is, so to speak, on ita own. It ia, 
in some aense autonoaous but recognizes a spiritual depend-
ence. 
Riminu j a • a1'• : 
In tbia sense, then, all sentient and 
non-sentient beings together conatitute 
the bod1' of" the Supreme Person, for thq 
are completely controlled and supported 
by ~ tor his own end1, and are absolute-
ly subord~nate to h~.J 
Bowne, in somewhat sim:Uar fashion points out that 
If an1' finite thing can be found which 
is capable of acting frOM itself and tor 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri BhaShzUl, p. 334. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, pp. 179-180. 
3. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhas&am, p. 424. 
itael~, it .has in that fact the only possi-
ble test of reality, as disttnguished from 
pbenomenality. But this posaibilit'J can 
be found onl'J in the ~inite spirit. It 
avails nothing against this conclusion to 
say that the world-ground ll&'J posit imper-
sonal agents as well as personal ones; tar 
the notion Gf the t.personal finite vaiish-
es, upon analysia, into phenaaenality. 
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Both thinkers agree that ~he absolute aelf is trans-
cendent and yet ~anent in the world. And this absolute 
self is considered by both thinkers as a pers cnalit7, that it 
is the source of change, as it is the principle of permanence. 
He (Brahman) brooded over himself, and 
haYing thus brooCled be sent .forth all what-
ever there is. HaYing sent forth he enter-
ed it. HaYing entered it he became Sat and 
tyat, defined and undefined, supporteu-and 
non-supported, ~owledge and non-knowledge, 
real am unreal. 
This ecmparea favourably, except .for selyes, with what Bowne 
writes: 
BJ virtue or its position as World-ground, 
the int"ini te aus t be viewed as the priaal 
source of all tinite existence. Since the 
finite has no ground ot being in itself, its 
na tur.e and rela tiona must be originally de-
termined by the infinite; and hence tbe ~in­
ite can be properly understood •r comp~ehend­
ed only fro• the side or the infinite._, 
!lei ther Riminuja or Bowne is partioularl,- lucid with 
regard to t}l, relation between the absolute self, the ~inite 
self and the world ot matter. In so far as Rimlnuja places 
1. Borden P. Bowne, 14etaph.tsics, "revised ed.", p. 99. 
2. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bb.aShzUl, p. 405. 
3. Borden P. Bowne, :Metaphzaics, "reTiaed ed.", p. 104. 
310 
aatter in Brahman itself, he aYoids the problema raiaed b~ 
a theory or creation such as Bowne•s. Pbr Rimiuuja matter 
is a •given' factor in Brahman. It is eternal!~ existing 
although it is under Brabman•s control. In the view or 
both Riminuja and Bowne pure identity apart from all differ-
ences is nothiBg but an empty abstraction, but whereaa the 
Indian thinker is able to explain differentiation .i~ ter.ms 
of elements present in Br&haan from the beginning, no such 
way is open to Bowne. 
4. The Problem of Space and Time 1n Riminuja 
and aowne 
A. Space and Time in Riminuja 
The idealiam of -Riminuja is not or the sort which 
would dettJ the metaphysical reality of time and space. In-
deed, he atrikes out against the Yiew that Brahllla.n exists 
beyond space and tt.e. The possibility of a~thing so ex-
isting is to h±a inconceiyable. Existence itself tmpliea 
time and place.l When it is said that Brahman is beyond 
time and space all that we mean or can mean is that Brabaan, 
unlike huaan beings, baa alwa~s existed. There was neYer a 
ttae when he was net, nor a place from which he was absent, 
which is to say that Bralman is "co-eval with tillle and co-
1. K. c. Varadachari, Sri_ Riminuja's Theorz of Knowl-
edge, p. 47. 
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existent with space."1 Yet he is limited by neither. He is 
the muter of eTen time and space. 
In RimiBujata Tiew tt.e and apace are not finite, al-
though in human reckoning time is divided into aomenta, just 
as apace is divided into points. T:fme and space contain all 
finite things, •substand• them., but as infinite time and 
space are not limited to tillite things, but~ as we have juat 
a aid, are · co-eTal with Brahman. However, to Bralman tiliLe and 
apace are f'inite, since they come within the eom.paas of the 
Divine Mind which 11ll11ts them. 2 While it is true that Brah-
man is eo-eTal with tille, he is beyond tiae in the sense that 
be is not time itself, but the master ot ttae. Things are 
brought within time as they are located in space through the 
actiTity of Bran.an. He himself remaias unaffected by the 
human judgments which make it possible to speak of •before, 
now and after'. Space-tillle categories are human and not 
divine. 
In all this Rlminuja is concerned to show that the ex-
ternal is in the temporal process and yet transcends 
it. Change is the play of the infinite in the temporal proc-
ess. And the splendour of the infinite is time as eternity. 
In the mutable world of phenom.ena time is fin.i te, eTen if 
1. K. C. Varadacha.ri, Sri Riminuja' s Theoq of Kaowl-
edse, p. 47. 
2. Ibid., p. 47. 
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endless. But since Brahman has endowed temporal existence 
with a meaning, there is an infinite aspect to the world 
which lifts it above the plane or space-time. It is true 
that the world can only be viewed in terms or a space-time 
series, but it is also true that the self determines this 
series, for space-time constructs are the work of the mind. 
In themselves neither time nor space yield any meaning, but 
become meaningf'ul only in terms of the overall purpose whose 
goal is soul making.1 
To the question whether time and space have an onto-
logical status or are merely phenomenal, Ramanuja•s answer 
is that they are both. They ~re ontological realities in 
the sense that they are co-existent with Brahman and they 
are phenomenal in the sense that they are experienced only 
in the sense world of change and becoming. 
B. The Treatment of Space in Bowne 
There is a contusion in Bowne withregard to his con-
cepts of space and time. While Bowne holds that space is a 
phenamena1 reality, he appears to treat time as an ontologi-
cal reality at times and at others as a phenomenal reality. 
This confusion is pointed out by Professor Millard and others. 
Millard says that Eowne "tended to relegate both space and 
1. P. N. Srinivasachari, The Philosophy of Visistad-
vaita, p. 499· 
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t~e to the realm of the phenomenal only in spite of his as-
sertion that time is the form of Change, and his equation of 
being and activity."1 We shall, therefore, treat space and 
time separately here. 
With regard to space, Bowne rejects the view accord-
ing to which space is an order of being, a pecUliar system 
of relations among the external objects, absolutely indepen-
dent of mind. Relations between things, he argues, keep chan-
ging, while space itself does not change. llow this unchang-
ing character of space is not for Bowne evidence of its ob-
jectivity, an objectivity Which he denies, but revelatory 
rather of the inherent nature of the mind. Space is a form 
of human intuition. It has no extra-mental reality. If' we 
necessarily experience things in space, it is because of the 
nature of our sensibility. Bowne writes in this connection: 
The nature of our sensibility determines 
us to perceive vibrating objects as colour-
ed, and we cannot perceive them otherwise; 
but the necessity is in ourselves. On this 
account the argument that things are colour-
ed because we must perceive them as such, 
loses all weight; and on the same account 
the argument that things are in space be-
cause we must i~tuit them spatially, loses 
all its weight. 
Space, then, is a form of intuition from human point 
of view. It belongs to the realm of phenomena. Bowne goes 
1. R. M. Millard, "Space, Time and Space-time", The 
Fhilosopbieal FOrum, Vol. XIII; 1955, p. 29. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphys,ics, "revised ed.", p.l25. 
on to say that space, although it is a form of intuition, 
may exist for the finite as well as the infinite. This is 
because the infinite 
comprises all reality in the unity of its 
immediate activity, and hence is every-
where. For by omnipresence we can mean 
nothing more then this immediate action 
upon all reality.l 
But this entails no limitation upon the infinite. For, to 
suppose otherwise is to confound space as principle with 
space as limitation. In the human view, space has a double 
aspect. "It represents not only a principle of intuition, 
but also a limitation of our agency. "2 The reason for this 
is plain. The organism which conditions our mental activity 
has space relations, and thus we naturally appear to be lo-
cated and limited in space. But this location is of the or-
ganism only and this limitation is only the result of our 
dynamic limitations. It consists solely in the fact that 
our immediate action upon reality is limited. In other 
words, "we are where we act·. n3 As comprehending all reality 
at once, the infinite, is obvious, is not limited in this 
sense and hence space, as limitation, cannot be affirmed of 
it. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed.", p. 155. 
2. Ibid., P• 154. 
3. Ibid., P• 154. 
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G. The Treatment of Tim.e in Bowne 
If there is no doubt in Bowne's mind about the phe-
naaenal character of space, he appears to be reluctant about 
. 
assigning the sa.e character to time. Is tiae an existence, 
or a mode of existence, or Onl'J a mode of our thiDkiag? In 
his epistemolegr, Bowme points out that "tiae is prtaaril'J a 
law of thou8at whereby the mind relates events under the tor.a 
ot anteeedence and sequence, md thus aakes the temporal ex-
perience possible."1 Whatever the case m&'J be with re8ard 
to space, Bowne is sure that tt.M is not merel7 a for.a of in-
tuition. He points out that "we grasp coexistences in a sin-
gle spaee-taage which is ~ generis; and when we think the 
things away, we are still able to outline the space as such."2 
But time is ditferent. "We cannot comprehend eTents in a 
single temporal image, and when the events are thou gat awa7 
there is nothing remaining, even in !Bagination, which has 
a temporal character. n3 The fact is that all our represen-
'• 
tations of time are 1aa.ges borrowed from. space, and all al:Ske 
contain contradictlons of the time-idea.4 For example, we 
think of t±ae as an endless straight-line, which belies tfte 
Tery nature of tim.e, for the points of such a line .coe&iat, 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theorz of Thoufi!!:t and Knowledse, 
p. 66. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Ket!E!!lsica, p. 164. 
3. Ibid., p. 165. 
4· Ibid.' p. 165. 
316 
I 
while of the tim.e-line only the present point exiata. EYen 
if we think of time as a flowing point which describes a 
straight line, we are forced to assume ~plieitly a space 
through Which the point moTes. Again, if we form a concep-
tion of earlier and later, here also we are positing a line 
over which we are to move 1n thouE!}lt, and we measure the 
time by the aotion and ita direction. "The temporal before-
and-after is represented only by the spatial before-and-
after. nl In wha teTer dilllens ion. we th1Dk of ti•e, we haTe 
only space-images, which are applied to tillle only by metaphor. 
But, we cannot call time a for.m of intuition since 
there is no special pres~ntation corresponding to it. Bowne 
says: "In itself it is rather a certain unpicturable order 
of eTents. WheneTer we attempt to pieture it we ·replace 
temporal sequence b,- spatial aequenee. 112 The popular view 
of time as soaething which exists apart fro• things_, losing 
nothing by their absence and gaining nothing by their pres-
ence, apart fraa its mistaken assimilation of time to space, 
errs especially in. that it divorces time !'rom realit,r. Such 
a divorce is contrar,r to reason which, in Bowne's view, for-
bids all plurality of independent exper~ences.3 Tiae cannot 
be considered aa independent of realit,r. But can it be con-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metapbzsics, p. 165. 
2. Ibid., p. 165. 
3. -rDid.' p. 167-169. 
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aidered as a real exiatence? Those who hold to the idea of 
a real, objective t~e, commonl7 argue that our mental life 
· itself proves ita validity. To this Bowne makes a lengthf 
answer. He says: 
The believer in a real ttme will aftira 
with great positiv8neas that our mental 
life itself bears witness to the realit7 of 
time •••• we know that we have lived through 
a real past, and that we are now able to 
compare it with a real present. Any attempt 
to deny tiae, it is said, aust shatter on 
this tact. But this objection largel'f de-
pend• on overlooking the distinction between 
tbe phenoaenal and the ontological. No one 
can thiDk of den7ing the relations or time 
in experience. But these relations are es-
tablished b7 the mind itself, and if there 
were not aaaething non-temporal in the aind 
the'1 could not exist for us at all. The suc-
ceasion in consciousness to which the realist 
appeals ao confidentl7 is the very thing un-
ch.nging and ttmeleaa in the aind, the knowl-
edge of sueeeasion could never arise. The 
llind must gather up ita experiences 1n a sin-
gle timeless act in order to becOllle aware of 
succession. The conceptions which are arran-
ged 1n a temporal order must coexist in the 
tfaeleaa act which grasps and arranges them. 
The conception of sequence not onl'1 does not 
involve a sequence of c:oneeptiona, but it 
would be t.poaaible if it did. The percep-
tion of time, then, is as ti:~eless aa the per-
ception ot apace is apaceless. The things 
which are perceived in tiae must 'Jet coexist 
in taeless thoug)lt in order to be perceived. 
The admission of ontological temporal differ-
ence• in thought would make thought tmpoasible.l 
The upshot of Bowne's reasoning here is that tiae cm 
only be allowed a phenaaenal existence and that thoug}Lt, ao 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaph7sics, pp. 173-174• 
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rar from being in ttae, is the source and founder or temporal 
relations. So far as supposed ontological t~e is concerned, 
Bowne calls it "a shadow or experience" whose "necessity is 
merely a consequence of the - temporal law as a rule of mental 
procedure. nl 
Yet Bowne doea so:metiaes speak as i:f time hlld more 
than a phenoaenal existence. Pbr example, in order to proTe 
that the concept o:f time is not ~ generis, he begins_ by 
saying that "memory and self-consciousness are necessary con-
2 ditions :for the e•er~enoe or tiae." But he then proceed• 
to state that "this reference to memorJ does not quite reach 
the root of the matter; :for while memory serYes to bring the 
idea into consciousness, memory in turn implies time."3 Now 
in terms of Bownets own premisea, either the reality of time 
antedates the :fact of meaory, or the reality of memory ante-
dates the fact or time. Yet if memorJ implies tme, time 
must be an integral. part of the self. And if time is thus 
an integra1 part of the self, it has an ontological status. 
By and large, boweTer, Bowne is concerned to proTe the phe-
nomenal character of time. 
D. SWIIII.ary and Comparison 
In their theories of space and time there appears to 
1. Borden P. Bowne, JtfetaE~sics, p. 174,. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Introduction to :P!leholosieal Theo!:l, 
p. 129. 
3. Ibid., p. 129. 
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be little in c011D1lon between Riminuja and Bowne. To the one 
apace and ttae, since they are co-eval with Brahman, are on-
tological in character; to the other apace has a merely phe-
nomenal existence, and so likewise has time, though with re-
gard to the latter, Bowne seems to vacillate, speaking on 
occasion aa if time were ontological. Time is conceived b7 
Bowne usually as the order of relations in our experience, 
whereas for Riminuja time is a •special power• by which Brah-
man unfolds his activity. And space is another such power. 
Both are under the control of the absolute Bra.bln.an. In the 
Indian philosopher• s view space and time are connected with 
the cha~e in aatter, and are means for the unfoldment of 
the activit7 of matter, matter in a subtle state constituting 
the body of Brahman. It may be added that neither thinker 
goes very deeply into the problems of space and time, though 
Rimanuja•s view appears to be the more consistent. 
5. The Problem of the Self' 
If' mind and self' are distinguished, as we believe they 
should be, and if' the chief characteristic of mind is thought, 
What is the sel:r? )(any answers have been given to this quea-
tion. One thing appears to be clear: The problem ia not 
merely one of explaining thought, but accounting f'or the in-
dividuality that owns these thou~ts. The empirical account 
of the nature of the self exhibits its own inadequacy. The 
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empiricist tends to use the terms mind and self interchange-
ably and to make mind equivalent to sensation. The result 
ie that the self appears as dissipated and unconnected bits 
of mental reactions with no unifying principle underlying 
them. 
Unlike the empiricist Whose view or the self does 
not reach beyond the level or sense experience, the ideal-
ist recognizes a trans-empirical level. Only so is it pos-
sible, he believes, to explain the unity and individuality 
which for him are indubitable characteristics · or the self. 
To the modern idealist the self is a dynamic unity of con-
scious functions, a unity which, on the human level appears 
as a stage in the process or self-expression or the ult~ate 
spiritual reality. The self emerges with "the evolution of 
the organic from the inorganic, and determines and is deter-
mined by the latter, and enters into cognitive and active 
relations with it. rtl In these cognitive and active relations 
the self realizes itself as a value in itself. In the view 
of idealists, such a conception or the self avoids the ab-
straetions of the empiricist. It sees the self as a concrete 
reality whose individuality is inalienable. Moreover, it 
is a conception which is consistent with the notion, dear 
to the idealist, of the universe as tending towards the 
1. H. Mohan Bhattacharya, The Principles of PhilosoP9& 
p. 268. 
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realization of Taluea. Individuality expresses itself as 
determinateness, as objectiTe continuity, in onner words, 
as a definite center of experience. FUrther, the absolute 
idealist holds that these definite centers of experience pre-
cede conscious self-hood in the finite, indeed turaish the 
presupposition and materials of such self-hood. To the ques-
tion, what is the finite self, we may accordingly say that it 
is the center !!, awakening of a determinate world which is 
it~ pre-suppGsition. Finite indiTiduality is self-conscious-
ness acting as an experiencer in any empirical situation. To 
the personal idealist like Bowne, the self is created as such • 
. In the foregoing general conception of the Self Rimi-
nuja ani Bowne, while there are differences between them, 
join hmds,e· To both pldlosophers the personal self is a ccn-
crete unity of experience, iDVolving self-consciousness and 
Talue, and expressing itself in d~amic - act1Tity. 
A. Riminuja's Conception of the Self 
Our IndiL~ thinker is _at great pains to show that the 
finite self is nothing but the knowing 'I'. "As is proTed 
py perception," he writes, "and as also results .from reason-
ing and tradition, and from its connectioa with ignorance, 
the self presents itself as a knowing 'I'."l It is aot en-
tirely clear whether Riminuja views the absolute self in the 
1. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhasb.zam, p. 12. 
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same light, although it may be .fairl7 inferred !'rom what he 
SJ.J'S that such is the case. · We haTe already seen that !'or 
b±m the Absolute Self is not an aggregate o.f unrelated reals, 
or a monad or monads, nor is it absolute absolving all fini-
tude. Rather the Absolute "is the Self of all creation im-
parting reality to the .finite self and through it to matter .• nl 
Since the .finite self' is tbus an essential unit in 
Brahman, the Vibhu, and is unrealizable apart .from h±m, it 
is called one of the aspects o.f Brahman. 2 JUst as the crea-
ted world is an aspect o.f Brahman, so likewise is !'inite 
sel.fhood. The infinite S·el.f is iJIIIlanent in the finite, but 
is not exhausted by it. "The relation between jiva (the 
finite self) and Brahman may be compared to the light radia-
ting .from a luain~us bodJ."3 What the caaparison is espec-
ially designed to bring out is that on the one hand the fin-
ite self is nothing apart !'rom Brahllan and on the other is 
not swallowed up in him. 
The principle or dharma bhiita jaina 
aayes Riminuja from the perils of' monad-
ism and pluralism (of the a tOlltic k1Dd ) 
and the idea of anutT4 makes the absolute 
a concrete universil. 
1. P. N. Srinivasacfta.ri, Riminujat s Idea of the Finite 
~~ P• 24. 
2. Ibid., p. 24. 
3. Ibid., P• 25. 
4- Ibid., p. 26. 
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It may be mentioned in passing that the s~ile of a l~noua 
body and its rays is used by some Christian Church Fathers 
to explain the relation or God and Son. 
(1) The Finite Self as an Aspect of the Absolute Self 
Considered as an aspect of the Absolute, it is possi-
ble to see the finite self as constantly etriTing to unite 
its fra~nts of insights and intuitions into a whole, and 
by employing such categories as causality and the subject-
object relation. It is in the last analysis bent upon es-
tablishing a logical tie between itself and the absolute 
thought. But what exact17 is the nature of the relation 
which Riminuja bolda exists between the absolute self and 
the finite self? The relation, it would appear, is in some 
sort a relation or identity. We may infer from this fact 
that RimAnuja subscribes to the identity or cause and effect 
in the sense of their unbroken continuity, rejecting any 
view such as atomism which would separate them or abstrac-
t ionism which would regard one apart from the other. To him. 
the cause is not only tanporally prior to its effect but alao 
logically prior. Causation involves consequence as well as 
sequence. The cause is not the contradiction of the effect, 
but is coordinated and continuous with it. Thus there is no 
break between the infinite self and the finite selves to 
whiCh it giyea rise. The process of self-manifestation whicn 
charac-terizes Br.-.n is one that 1mpl1es unity, continuity 
and agene~. But the infinite self is not to be confused with 
the finite self. The finite self comes into being through an 
act or will by which the absolute finitizea itself. The re-
lation of the absolute self to the finite self is as the re-
lation or self and bod~.1 
In an effort to make the matter clearer .ttiminuja ap-
peals to the logic of the relation of universal and partic-
ular, or genua and species. EYery term, concept, or thing 
refers ultiaatel~ to the absolute reality or absolute self. 
An~ reference to a particular self, sa~ the individual Raaa, 
is also a reference to the universal, namel~, Brahman. In 
this way the finite self is inseparable from the absolute 
self, just as the absolute self is inseparably related to 
the finite self. 
Involved further in the logic of the finite self in 
relation to the absolute is the notion or whole and part. 
The finite is an aspect or part of the absolute, but the re-
latioaship 11.uat not be taken in a spatial s .ense. For the 
self does not admit of spatial separation or division, being 
a ap~ritual unit~. Nor is the absolute aelf a quantitati~e 
infinite extended in space. We cannot, either, consider the 
finite self as an image of the absolute, as for example, the 
reflection of the moon in water is an image of the moon. What 
best suggests the nature of the relationship is again the ra-
1. Sri Riminuja, Bhagavad Gita, vii, 4-5. 
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diation of light from a luminous body. The rays are insepa-
rable from their ~ouree at the same time that they are differ-
ent from it. Or again the absolute self is like the power 
and the filli te self' is like that in. which the power 1nherea.1 
In Riminuja•s words, "As the light of a fire which abides in 
one place only spreads all around, ~hus this whole world is 
the power (sakti) of the highest Brahman. "2 But that in which 
the power inheres differs from the source of that power. For 
example, the finite self cannot create the world, whereas the 
absolute can. 
A quest ion confronts us here. If all individual sel"s 
are all equally aspects of Brahman, all equalll' actuated b:r 
the absolute self, all alike knowing subjects, how is it that 
among these selTes there are differences of quality, some 
leading noble liTes, others not? The question is an old one 
and Raminuja•s answer is neither better or worse than many. 
He says that the differences are owing to the differences be-
tween the bodies of selTes. He writes: 
Although all souls are essentially of 
the .. a ame nature in so far as the:r are parts 
of Brahman, knowing subjects, and so on, 
the permissions and exclusions referred to 
are possible for tbB reason that each indi-
vidual soul is joined to some particular 
bod:r, pure or impure, ·whether a Bralmma 
or Kshaterita or Vais1a or Sudra and so on. 
•As !n the case of fire and so on.• All 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhas!f~, p. 564. 
2. ~1~, p. 564. 
fire is ot the same kind, and ~et one wil- · 
lingly fetches fire from the house or a 
Brahmana, while one sbuns fire from a place 
where dead bodies are burned. And from a 
Brahmana one accepts food without any ob-
ject1on1 while one retusea food from a low 
person. 
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In this passage, as in others that might be quoted, it is 
clear that tor Rimlnuja the difference• between selves are 
ascribable to the differences between the bodies to which 
they are attached. 
(2) The Finite Self as tbe Ethical Ego 
... 
The conception or a bare absolute in philosophy can-
not satisfy the demands of the moral and religious conscious-
ness either with respect to moral freedom or personal aspira-
tion. Morality, if it means an~thil'lg at all, postulates the 
reality of the good and the conditions which bring it into 
relation to the individual life. So for R~lnuja the abso-
lute 1s not aloofness but fUllness of being, and the selves 
throu~ which it eXpresses itself are not just so many par-
ticulars, or duplications of one another, but each is a uni-
que individuality. This individualit~ is not saaething pas-
siTe or inert; it is an activity, in the last anal~sis, an 
activity of Brahman. Through this activity "the universal 
becomes the personal and the absolute becomes the aoral gov-
~rnor."2 In some such way, the self-activity of spirit grows 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhasnram, p. 565. 
2 • . P. N. Srinivasaehari, Rlmanujats Idea of the Finite 
Self, p. 28. · 
-
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iato the self-ooasciouaness of persoaality. 
As we have said, no absolutism is morally tenable 
which would deny the freedom of the finite aelf to act. It 
is just such absolutism that Riminuja rejects. He unequiv-
ooably •sserta the freedom of the self. 
It ~e indiYidual self7 is free; for if 
it were dependent on the higheat self, the 
whole body of scriptural injuJlction and pro-
hibitions would be U!Dleairl.ng. For command-
ments can be addressed to such agents only 
as are capable of entering on action or re-
fraining from action, 1according to their own thought and will. 
But this aaaertion of free will raises the question, what is 
the relation between the actiYity of the finite self and the 
absolute self? Riminuja•s answer is that while the finite 
self is capable of freely entering upon a course of action, 
the absolute self assists him in carrying it out. He writes: 
The inwardly ruling highest self promotes 
action in so ftr as it regards in the case 
of any action £he volitional effort made by 
the individual soul, and then aids that ef-
fort by granting its favour or permission 
(anuaati); action is not possible without 
permission on the part of the highest self. 
In this way (i.e. since tm action primarily 
depends on the volitional effort of the 
soul) injunctiQns ~nd prohibitions are not 
deyoid of meaning. 
All the activity of the indiYidual self is thus a 
joint activity. Eramanuja illustrates by means of an example: 
·( 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhas&am, p. 557. 
2. Ibid., p. 557. 
The case is analogous to that of property 
of which two men are joint owners. If one 
of these wishes to transfer that property to 
a third person he cannot do so without the 
permission of his partner, but that that per-
mission is given is after all his own doing, 
and hence the fruit of the action properly 
belongs to him only.l · 
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we may say, then, that the individual self is free tn 
so far as it can take independent action, but the process of 
carrying such action involves both the finite and the abso-
lute self. How the existence of evil fits into this scheme 
is a question with which we shall deal later. 
(3) Individual Self as the Body of the Absolute Brahman 
Although each individual self is in some sense a pa~t 
of Brahman, it has also, Riminuja never tires of insisting, a 
monadic existence of its own. "It persists for ever in its 
own atomic uniqueness. "2 Or as Raminuja himselt' puts it, 
"the self' is not omnipresent, but on the contrary of atomic 
size (!!!~:!). n3 If this were not so, it would hardly make 
sense to speak of the self as passing out of the body, as 
is affirmed by scripture. The self is not omnipresent, for 
"All this going, and so on, cannot be reconciled with the 
soul being present everywhere."4 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhasbymn, p. 557. 
2. P. N. Srinivasachari, Ramanuja•s Idea of the Finite 
~~ p. 56. 
3. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhash¥.am, p. 546. 
4. Ibid., P• 546. 
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Affirming that the self is atomic and unique, Rimi-
nuja declares fUrther that each self forms part of the body 
of the absolute self. We have already had occasion to men-
tion this doctrine. And we now raise the question, in what 
sense can the individual self be considered the body of the 
Absolute? Now Riminuja defines bod~ here in rather a pecu-
liar wa~. After ex~ining the traditional definitions, he 
sets forth his own. "An'J substance," he says, "(spiritual 
substance included)_ which a sentient soul is capable ·of caa-
pletel~ controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and 
which stands to the soul in an entirel~ subordinate relation-
ship, is the bod~ of that soul."1 In the light of this defi-
nition, Riminuja•s contention that the individual selves 
:form the body of the absolute self becomes intelligible at 
least. FUrther, because of this relationship it makes sense 
to speak of Brahman as both cause and effect, as actiTe and 
also as acted upon, as both doer and sufferer. Thus Riminuja 
writes: 
As Brahman has all the sentient and non-
sentient things :for its body, and constitutes 
the self of that body, there is nothing con-
trary to reason in Brahman being connected with 
two states, a causal and an effected one, the 
essential characteristics ofwhich are expan-
sion, on the one hand, and contraction, on the 
other; for this expansion and contraction belong 
(not to Brahman itself, but) to the sentient 
and · non-sentient beings .• 2 · 
1. Sri Ri.manuja, Sri Bhasl!Jam, p. 424. 
2. Ibid., p. 422. 
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Yet, with all his efforts to explain the relation or 
the individual self to the absolute, Riminuja•s position ia 
not easily grasped. And it has baffled his commentators. 
If his theory is not itself contradictory, the language he 
uses in describing it certainly is. He is veheaently crit-
ical of his predeceasors• view of identity and difference, 
and most puzzling of all is his theory of identity in dif-
ference. Some of his commentators believe that he advocates 
all these relations, while appearing to reject them. Accord-
ing to others he holds to still a fourth theory, one which 
is peculiarly his own. It is called aprathaksiddhi or in-
separable dependence. We belieTe that this is his theory 
and we shall concentrate upon it here. 
According to Riminuja the individual selves are or-
ganically related to the absolute self, so that apart from 
· the latter they have no independent existence. At the same 
time Rimlnuja insists that even though they thus qualify the 
absolute self, the finite selves have an individuality of 
their own, which is inalienable. As essence they are one 
with the absolute; as modes they are distinct from it. If' 
we were to give Riminuja•s position here a logical form, it 
would be as follows. Every judgment is a synthesis of dis-
tincts. Subject and predicate each represents a distinct 
meaning, though both have reference to the same substance. 
If S and P were wholly different, the judgment S is P would 
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be impossible, while if S and P were absolutely identical, 
the judgment S is P would be a mere tautology. Pure identi-
ty and pure difference are alike abstractions. It is just 
because S and P are neither wholly identical nor wholly dif-
ferent that S is P has propositional significance. So what 
Riminuja is affirming is identity - in and through - and 
because -- of difference, or identity as qualified-by-
difference.1 The view is called Vishistidvaita. 
(4) The Finite Self as Knower 
We have dealt at length with the self as knower in 
our chapter on Rlmlnujat s epistemology. Here we should like 
to place special emphasis on the self as an agent in the 
knowing process. CUriousl'1 enough there is a strong prag-
matic strain in Riminuja•s thinking in this connection. 
Knowledge is not mere receptiTity, but a form of work and 
inseparable from it. Rooted in sense experiences knowledge 
varies in accordance with the different sense organs inTol-
Ted in acquiring it. This knowledge is pertinent to the 
self onl'1 in so far as it is associated with the particular 
body the self possesses. These points are at least int~a-
ted in a difficult passage from Rimlnuja which we proceed to 
quote. 
Knowledge (the quality) which is in it-
self unlimited, is capable or contraction 
1. Chandradhar Sharma, Indian Philosoph:y, p. 510. 
and expansion •••• In the so-called Kshetragna 
condition of the sel~, knowledge is owing 
to the influence of work (Karman), of a con-
creted nature; as it more or less adapts 
itself to work of different kinds, and is 
variously determined by the different 
senses. With reference to this various 
flow of knowledge as due to the senses, 
it is spoken of as rising arid setting, 
and the self possesses the quality of an 
agent. As this quality is not, however, 
essential, but originated by action, the 
self is essentially unchanging. This 
changeful quali cy of being a knower can 
belong only to the self whose essential 
nature is knowledge; !ot fossibly to the 
non-intelligent ah•mkara. 
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The changeful character of finite knowledge is owing 
to its association with the body, while the capacity to know 
at all is associated only with selves. Further, absolute 
knowledge, the knowledge of Brahman, is differentiated from 
human knowledge precisely by its unchanging non-fortuitous 
character. 
(5) The Finite Self as a Religious Personality 
In the evolutionary process the finite self gets 
caught up in matter, and matter develops according to the 
previously acquired Character (Karma) of the self. If the 
spirit becomes ens1•ved to phenomena and crushed by suffer-
ing, the question arises as to how it is that spirit comes 
under the dominion of the material body. Such dominion, 
Ramanuja answers, is owing to mistaken identity or illusion. 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhaal17am, p. 63. 
I 
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It is an illusion that comes about simply as the result of 
the association between the finite spirit and matter. Spir-
it falls into the mistake of regarding itself as a part ot 
matter instead of ceaselessly recognizing its life as an as-
pect of the life of the Absolute.l The finite self never 
achieves its true satisfaction till 1t learns to disting-
uish itself from matter and comprehend its attributive rela-
tionship to the absolute self. 
Such comprehension is the goal of the process of 1.2.6.!• 
We can not here go into an~ lengthy account of 12!!• Suffice 
it to mention those faotors .which have a bearing upon the 
concentration of the finite self upon the absolute. On the 
moral level this concentration is called Kar.ma zoga. It is 
an attempt to overcome the self's attachments to matter 
through contemplation of the infinite spirit, and so achieve, 
however gradually, a detachment from the goals set bz sense 
and utility. In this way a worshipful attitude is developed. 
Detachment leads the self to turn inwards in an effort to 
achieve understanding of itself, a process called by Ramanuja, 
jnina ~· The soul comes to realize itself as an aspect 
of the Supreme Self and acquires a continuous loving devotion 
towards that self, bhakti ~~ as it is called. The object 
of this very brief survey is to make clear that Riminuja 
1. P. N. Srinivasachari, Ramanuja•s Idea of the Finite 
~' p . 69. 
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views the self from a religious point of view, that is, as 
an aspect of the highest self or God. 
B. Bowne•s View of the Self 
Self or personality is the central concept in Bowne•a 
philosophy. For in his view personality is the key to real-
ity and hence the answer to all the problems raised by onto-
logical inquiry. Self, then, is the pr~ary concept, a tool 
in the hands of Bowne by means of which he believes he · can 
dispose o:f, on the one hand, •aterialism - and all fo:nns of 
naturalistic empiricism which would deDJ the unity and iden-
tity proper to the self, and on the other hand, of those im-
personal absoluti~s which end in the denial of the integrity 
and individuality of the self.1 To Bowne, ~s we have seen, 
reality is above all an activity and the type of this activ-
ity is the self. In his view, as in that of Riminuja, the 
self is a thinking, acting, spiritual personality, which 
wills, feels, and is given in immediate experience. 2 
(1) The Self Not a Part of the Absolute 
It is in his view of the relation of the self to the 
Absolute that Bowne appears t~ differ most drastically fraa 
Rim4nuja. He will have nothing to do with the notion that 
the self is a part, or a modification, or a potentiality, or 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Studies in Theologz, pp. 375-376. 
2. Ibid., p. 11. 
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an emanation or the SUpreme Self. The whole conception, he 
argues, stems from the erroneous substantialization of the 
absolute. Thus he writes: 
When we speak of the infinite as sub-
stance, the misleading analogies of sense 
experience at once present it as admitting 
or division, aggregation, etc.; but when. 
we think of it as an agent, these fancies 
disappear of themselves. As an agent, it 
is a unit, and not a sum or an aggregate. 
It is, then, without parts; and the notions 
or divisibility and aggregation do not ap-
ply. Renee we cannot view the finite as a 
part of the infinite, as an emanation from 
the infinite, or as partaking of the infin-
ite substance; tor all these expressions 
imply the divisibility £f the infinite, and 
also its stuffy nature. 
In the same way Bowne rejects the notion that the 
finite is a mode or the infinite; he writes o~ •mode• as 
follows: 
In its ordinary use it is based on the 
notion or passive substance, or pure being. 
Being is said to be one in essence, but 
various in mode; as the same raw material 
ma,- be built into many forms. Accordingl,-
all finite things are call~d modes or modi-
fications or the infinite. 
Given Bowne•s notion of reality as agency first and last, 
it is obvious that the self is no more a mode of the abso-
lute than it is a part. But let us first complete the ar-
gument with regard to part-whole conception. 
The notion of division has no applica-
tion to true being, but only to aggregates; 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaph{sics, "revised ed.", p. 96. 
2. Ibid., p. 97· 
and second, if it has application, the re-
sult or dividing the infinite would be to 
cancel it, and replace it by the sum of the 
finite. But this would be to return to the 
impossible pluralism of uncritical specula-
tion. The attempt to divide and retain the 
unity at tm same tine is as if one should 
speak of the mathematical unity as produc-
ing number by self-diremption, and as remain-
ing a unit after division. The necessary 
unity of the infinite forbids all attempts 
to identity it wit~ the 'finite, either to-
tally or partially. 
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The upshot of the matter is that if the finite is any-
thing substantial, it must be viewed as ontologically dis-
tinct from the infinite, not as produced by it, but as cre-
ated by it. Creation alone is capable or explaining the re-
ality of the finite and <the unity of the infinite. Grant 
the reality of the finite and the way is open to conceiving 
of it in terms of agency, rather than as made of some stuff. 
And as agency the finite is posited by the infinite. 2 
To return now to the finite considered as a mode of 
the infinite, Bowne argues that "the unity of being is comp-
atible with a plurality of attributes only as each attribute 
is an attribute of the entire thing. n3 And he goes on to 
say that "any conception of diverse states which are states 
of only a part of the being would destroy its unity."4 Ac-
•' 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed.", p. 97· 
2. Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
3. Ibid.' p. 96. 
4· Ibid.' p. 96. 
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cordingly "the entire being must be present in each state; 
and this cannot be so long as the notion of quantity is ap-
plied to the problem. nl There is but one way in which the 
unity or the infinite and the modality or the finite can be 
preserved and that is by considering being as an agent and 
things as constant forms of the activity of this agent. And 
this indeed is Bowne's view of the nature of the self and 
its relation to the infinite. But he is careful to disting-
uish between two logically possible conceptions of the finite. 
It may be regarded either as merely a form of energizing on 
the. part of the infinite, in which case it has a purely pbe-
nomenal existence; or it may be regarded as a substantial 
creation by the infinite.2 Bowne takes the latter view, but 
· adds that in no case can the infinite be iden~ified with the 
finite either totally or partially. 
On Bowne's theory, then, the individual finite selves 
are relatively independent, endowed with capacity for tho~ts 
and feelings and volitions peculiar to them alone. They ex-
hibit some measure of self-control and self-direction, and 
hence a certain selfhood and relative autonomy. It is this :fkct 
that "constitutes us real persons, or rather it is the mean-
ing of our personality. n3 At the same time this life cannot 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaph;ysics, ''revised ed.", p. 96. 
2. Ibid., P• 96. 
3. Ibid., P• 102. 
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be regarded as self-sufficient or altogether autonomous, 
for we do not know how this life is possible; we only know 
that it is. 
(2) Memory and Self-Consciousness as the Essence of 
the Self 
The self is not merely a flux or experience or a bun-
dle of impressions, but exhibits permanence as well as 
change, or change in per.mane~ee. What is the basis of this 
permanence? Now Bowne point• out that "we are not conscious 
of a permanent substance, but a permanent self; and this 
permanence is not revealed, but constituted by memory and 
self-consciousness."1 He goes on to explain: "memory does 
not make, but reveals the fact that our being is continuous. 
If our being were discontinuous, or if we· were numerical!~ 
distinct from ourselves at an earlier ' date memory would be 
~possible."2 But Bowne poses a question at this point. 
How can the matter or a permanent self be reconciled with 
continuity of activity? Such reconciliation, he says, "can 
be done only as the agent himself does it;. and the agent 
does it only by memory and self-consciousness, whereby a 
fixed point of personality is secured, and the past and 
present are bound together in the unity of one conscious-
ness. n3 But if m.emoey may thus be taken as the basis of 
Borden P. Bowne, Met~pqsics, "revised ed. rr p. 
' 
1. 
2. Ibid., P• 64. 
3. Ibid., p. 64. 
64. 
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accounting for belieTing in the unit1' of the self, it ·is 
important to remember that for Bowne the self is a metaph-y-
sical ultimate, a key, as we have seen, to the nature of 
reality itself'. 
There seems to be con!'usion in Bowne between a self 
and a soul-psychology where he speaks of the self as though 
i t were a substance. We ignore it here because it has been 
discussed in other dissertations. 
(3) The Finite Self as Knower 
Knowledge presupposes a knower and this knower, as 
Bowne never tires of insisting, is rational and spiritual. 
Were this not so the world could never get itself known. 
Bowne writes: ''The world of experience exists for us onl-y 
througn a rational spiritual principle by which we repro-
duce it tor our thought, and it has its existence apart from 
us onl1' through a rational spiritual principle on which it 
depends, and the rational nature of which it expreases."1 
Unless we recognize the existence of selves and of a supreme 
self at their head, we cannot hope to explain the world of 
nature and experience. "A world of persons with a supreme 
person at the head," sa-ys Bowne, "is the conception to which 
., . 
we come as the result of our critical reflections."2 •eriti-
cal• here has a Kantian sense and a Kantian upshot, which is 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, p. 110. 
2. Ibid., p. 278. 
that "the world of objects which we call nature is no sub-
stantial existence by itsel~, and still less a self-running 
system apart from intelligence, but only the flowing expres-
sion and means of communication of those personal beings. 
It is throughout, dependent, instrumental and phenomenal. n1 
(4) The Finite Self as a Moral and Religious 
Personality 
Human life is not to be considered mechanically in 
terms of bodies, but rather in terms of the spirit. This 
indeed is the very burden of Bowne's philosophy. 
Out of the invisible comes the meaning 
that transforms the curious sets of motions 
into terms of personality and giYeS them a 
human significance. Indeed, our estimate 
eYen Of the body itself depends largely Up-
on its connection with the hidden life or 
the spirit. A human ror.m as an object in 
space, apart from our experience or it as 
the instrument and expression or personal 
lite, would have little beauty or attrac-
tion; and when it is described in anatomi-
cal ter.ms there is nothing in it that we 
should desire it. The secret of its beauty 
and value lies in the invisible re~.~ 
This invisible realm is the rea1m of infinite spirit and it 
is our dependence upon it that lends meaning to our experi-
ences in life. But this dependence in no way lends support 
to the view that tini te spirit is unreal. "The dependence 
of the finite spirit, in the sense of its non-self-suffi-
ciency, does not prove its nothingness or unreality •••• "3 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, p. 218. 
2. Ibid., p. 271. 
3. Ibid., p. 281. 
And Bowne adds that this dependence "must be interpreted by 
the facts and not by the dictionary."1 The facta suggest 
that such dependency does jeopardize the freedom. of the fin-
ite spirit, as any attempt to identity the finite and the in-
finite, and this because "their lll'Utual otherness is necessary 
"2 if we are to escape the destruction of all tb.ougnt and 11f'e. 
indeed the existence of the finite self' as a relig1ous and 
moral personality depends upon this mutual otherness. At tthe 
same time the otherness must not be interpreted as unrelated-
ness. 
That the self' is by nature religious ia for Bowne an 
indisputable f'act. It is a fact of' human experience, "and 
must receive its recognition and interpretation as belonging 
to reality~"3 And so interpreted we are preeminently led 
"to a perao~al conception of' existence. n4 Religion is a 
function of' our whole nature. "Intellect, heart, conscience, 
and will contribute to our religious cone eptions. u5 The 
life of religion consists not merely in the recognition of' 
the infinite, but worship of the infinite as a religious 
object which satisfies both the intellect and the emotions, 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, p. 282. 
2. Ibid. 2 p. 284. 
3. Ibid. z p. 292. 
4- Ibid. 1 p. 292. 
5. Ibid. 1 p. 293. 
and underlies our ethical strivings and aspirations. As 
religions evolve they ineTitably "take the direction of a:£-
firming not only a supreme reason but also a supreme right-
eousness.'~ Not onl7 does the religious life depend on 
worshipping the object which is supreme reason and supreme 
righteousness and supreme gpodness, but also aupreme love. 
All this is involTed in the religious personality, and in-
volved also is a worthy conception of man. 2 
Further, religion has no meaning ~nless it is lived, 
that is to say, "for the practical realization of divine 
presence, logic ~d speculation can do little for us."3 
The goal of religion is precisely this practical realiza-
tion of the divine presence;" this beliet must be lived to 
acquire any real substance o~ controlling character."4 If 
Bowne has no for.mula as to how one goes about acquiring this 
practical relation to divinity or giving expression to it, 
he is never in doubt about the practical character of the 
relationship with the infinite God. He points out that it 
must express itself in worship, in the service of the weaker, 
and in the belief in the ~anent presence of God. The role 
of philosophy, he thinks, is to replace "the infinitely tar 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, p. 295. 
2. Ibid., pp. 298-302. 
3. Ibid., p. 325. 
4- Ibid., p. 325. 
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God by the God who is infinitely near, and in whom we live 
and move and have our being. nl 
C. Summary and Comparison 
It is plain that our two philosophers, if they do not 
see eye to eye at all points with regard to the nature of 
the self, yet exhibit a substantial measure of agreement. 
ThOugh it is true that for Ramanuja the individual self is 
a part or aspect of Brahman, yet as we have tried to expUdm, 
the meaning whiCh he assigns to this conception is one that 
brings his view into line, at least in some measure, with 
that of Bowne. The self is not a part of Brahman in a spa-
tial or extensional sense, for Brahman admits ~r no divis-
ion or fragmentation. The whole or Brahman is not extended 
or material, and hence in speaking of the self as part of 
Brahman, Ramanujats meaning is that selves are so many dis-
tinguishing attributes (Visesbana) of Brahman. Each self, 
as he puts it, constitutes one place (~) of Brahman. 
Now Bowne also rejects any theory which would relate the 
selr to the absolute as part is related to the whole. Such 
a notion implies the idea of substance, an idea that is in-
applicable to the infinite being. we have already quoted 
Bowne as saying that 
· 1. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, p. 325. 
when we speak of the infinite as substance, 
the misleading analogies of sense, exper-
ience at once present it as admitting of 
division, aggregation, etc.; but when we 
think of it as an agent, 1these fancies disappear of themselves. 
It is Bowne's point that "as an agent , it is a unit, and not 
a sum or an aggregate."2 To this extent both our thinkers 
are largely in agreement. Yet whatever sense is assigned 
to 'part', it is impossible to suppose on Bowne's view that 
the self is a part of the absolute. In Bowne, there is a 
chasm between finitude and infinitude, while in Rimanuja 
the two, however obscurely, are brought together. 
Both thinkers emphasize the ethical significance of 
the self. For one as for the other action, motive and per-
sonality imply each other in any moral situation. Both 
agree that there is an ideal of right and wrong, so that 
the ethical activity of the self may be judged as moral or 
~oral according to the degree in which it realizes this 
ideal. In the physical order of activity the moral ideal 
for Ramanuja is determined by the law of Kanna or the pre-
viously acquired character of the self. But the individual 
is capable in his moral strivings of transcending the law 
of Karma. For the self is free and by the exercise of this 
freedom can act in accord with the will of the absolute self. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed.", p~ 96. 
2. Ibid., p. 96. 
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To Riminuja as to Bowne the self' is a knowing sub-
ject. Thus the former writes that that "which consists or 
um erstandi~ is the individual soul" and further that "the 
essent1&1 nature ut the knoWing subject is suitably called 
'knowledge•, and this term is transferred to the knowing 
subject itself', which is defined as possessing that nature. nl 
In other words, knowledge is an attribute, an activity of' 
the knowing self'. Em.phasiz.ing the place of the universal 
in knowledge, Bowne makes much the same point. 
In the field of simple sensation, he 
writes, recurrence is impossible for a 
merel~ registering intellect ~ it is pos-
sible onl~ for a universalizing intellect; 
that is, for an intellect for which the 
simple experiences are not merel7 partic-
ular Tanishing events, but also bearers or 
an abiding rational meaning which is common 
to all and identical in a11.2 
For both thinkers, then, it is the nature of the mind to 
know, and Rimlnuja would undoubtedly go along with Bowne 
in holding that the mind does not possess reason, but rea-
son possesses the mind. 
1. 
2. 
p. 41· 
3. 
Under the guidance of the immanent 
reason we see the mind lifting itself 
above the flux of impressions into a 
rational world which, while potential 
in it from the beginning, only sl~wl-y 
becomes its conscious possession. 
Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 213. 
Borden P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, 
Ibid-., p . 44• 
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We have mentioned the freedom of the self. Both think-
ers believe that the~ can maintain this freedom at the same 
t~e that they both insist that the finite self is dependent 
upon the absolute self. As one commentator on Riminuja has 
written: "Though the individual soul is an attribute or .ode 
(prakira) of God and for.ms part of his body, yet it is also 
- 1 
a spiritual substance and is absolutely real." In the same 
vein Bowne writes that "the dependence of the finite spirit, 
in the sense of its non-self-sufficiency, does not prove its 
nothingness or unreallty."2 To one thinker as to the other,, 
further, agency helps to explain the self as substance does 
not. It is agency that accounts for the unity of the self. 
-· 
But whereas for Riminuja the individual selves exist eter-
nally as potentially active agents in God, for Bowne they 
are the creatures of God. 
6. The Problem of the Physical World 
To the absolute idealist realit.1 in the last analysis 
is spirit whose essential self-manifestation is life and 
mind. In taking this position the absolute idealist is not 
concerned to deny the p~sical basis of life. Organic struc-
tures are themselves subject to the laws of physics and che-
istry. But to admit this is not to make a fetish of matter, 
1. Chandradhar Sharma, Indian Philosopb.y, p. 502. 
2. -Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, pp. 281-282. 
motion and its laws or to be under the obligation of apply-
ing them beyond their own sphere to the life force itself. 
For the latter belongs to a higher level of reality where 
mechanical laws cease to apply. It is the idealist view, 
then, that absolute spirit in the course of its self-evolu-
tion appears under certain determinate conditions as living 
centers. Reflexes, instincts, and feelings are the instru-
ments by which consciousness is evoked, and with the appear-
ance of still further determinate conditions, the Self. Ab-
solute spirit in the surge of its self-expression cannot 
stop short of the self, for nothing but the self can begin 
at all adequately to embody the creative spiritual force 
that is at the root or all things. 
JUst as the logic of the idealist position does not 
involve the rejection of the material world, so neither does 
it involve the denial of an evolutionary conception or the 
universe. The world and everything in it, including life 
and mind, is the result of the gradual self-manifestation 
of a single spiritual reality. It is only evolution in the 
sense o£ blind mechanical f'orce that the idealist would deny. 
Such reductionism is at poles apart fro.m the idealists' own 
principle of explanation. which is that the higher cannot 
be explained in terms of the lower, the whole by its parts. 
So physical and chemical conditions are inadequate to the 
explanation of life and the world. Spirit alone provides 
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such an explanation. 
Such in brief is the outlook of the idealist and we 
shall discover it with variations of detail in both Rimanuja 
and Bowne. 
A. Rim~nujat s Theory of the World 
The world, according to Riminuja, comes into existence 
as the result of an activity initiated by the gracious will 
of Brahman. In the all-comprehensive Brahman, both inanimate 
matter and the finite spirits once existed in a subtle state 
or, we may say, as potentialities. But the act of will wh.ich 
brought them into existence was also a process of thought, as 
is indicated by the text which reads, "Brahman swells through. 
brooding, that is, thought," and as a later text puts it, 
"brooding consists of thought in the form of an intention. ril 
''May I become many" is the sense of this intention, so that 
''Brahman becomes ready for creation. "2 Thus the creation 
which Brahman launches is wholly accord!~ to his desire, 
but it is not a~ arbitrary or irrational desire, but intelll-
gent a~d rationa1.3 The "brooding" mentioned by Riiminuja 
signifies knowing, namely, reflection on the character and 
shape of a world previously created by him and which he ia 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 285. 
2. Ibid.' p. 285. 
3. Bharatan Kumarappa, The Hindu Conception of Deit7, 
p. 211. 
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about to reproduce. Having an inward intuition of the char-
acteristics of the former world, Brahman creates the new on 
the same pattern. 1 Further, Riminuja states that it is in 
this brooding that Brahman recalls the constitution of the 
earlier creation. He writes: ~n the period of a great 
pralaza Li•oB/ draws towards its close, the divine supreme 
person, remembering the constitution of the world previous 
to pralaya, . and forming the volition "May I become manifold, 
separates into its constituent elements the whole mass of 
enjoying souls and objects of enjo,ment."2 
(1) The Status of the World in Relation to Brahman 
and the Finite Self' 
In so far as the world, as we know it, comes into ex-
istence by the will of Brahnan, we may call Riminuja• s a 
•creationist• theory. On the other hand •creation• takes 
place not out of nothing but out of pre-existent matter, 
and it is in this sense that Riminuja•s theory maz be called 
evolutionary. He writes: 
During a pralaza it ~atte!7 unites itself 
with Brahman and abides in its subtle state, 
without &nl distinction of names and foraa; 
it then is called the •uneTolTed•, and bz 
other si~lar naMes. At the time of creation, 
on the other hand, these reveal themselves in 
Prakriti goodness and other ~as, it divides 
itself according to names an forms. and then 
is called the •evolved•, and so on.~ 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhasb.zam, p. 405. 
2. Ibid., pp. 333-334. 
3. Ibid., p. 368. 
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And to this Riminuja adds: "In its causal condition it is 
aga, i.e. unborn, in its effected condition it is •caused 
by light •, i.e. Brahman; hence there is no contradiction~'1 
What Riminuja is presumably saying here is that involved in 
the world is an act or •creation• and a process or evolution. 
It would appear, therefore, that the one Brahman, 
considered in relation to the modification without which no 
world could be effected, is found to disclose a distinction 
within itself, a distinction, if one likes, between body 
and soul. Body represents the imperfect, changing element 
in Branm.n, While soul or self represents his essential un-
changing nature, ever one and perfect. The change under-
gone by Brahman in effecting the world is merely a modifi-
cation, as it were, of his body which passes from a subtle 
to .a gross state. But this leaves the self or the essential 
nature of Brahman untouched. The modifications in Brahman 
consequent upon his creation of the world, and reabsorption 
of it, are not modifications in his spiritual or real nature. 
Yet, for Riminuja, as his interpreters are agreed, 
tho world is an attribute or mode of Brahman. It will help 
us here to bear in mind Riminuja•s insistence that the thiqgs 
of which we know anything in experience are always character-
ized by differences, that these differences are real and yet 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhasqam, p. 368. 
held together ia the uni~ of the thing. It is just this 
uaity, discovered in experience itself, that characterizes 
Brahman . in relation to the world and its diversity. The 
world is different from Brahman and yet is completely depen-
dent upon him. Riminuja thus invokes the substance - at-
tribute relation when he speaks of tbt world as an attr1blte 
• ! 
or Brahman. And he also invokes the cauaal relationship. 
As we have seen, that relation for Riminuja involves nothing 
but the causal substance· which passes from one state or mode 
of existence to another. The piece of pottery as effect is 
nothing but a mode or modification of the clay, the causal 
substance. What is meant when it is said that an effect ia 
produced by or originated from a cause is that a substance 
at one moment characterized by a certain attribute, state 
or mode of exi'atenee, assumes another attribute, state or 
mode of exiatence, potentially present in it from the begin-
ning. To Rlminuja: 
A substance enters into different states 
in sueceaaion; what passes away ia the sub-
stance in its previous states, what originates 
is the sub stance in ita subsequent states. 
As thus the substance in all its states has 
being, there is nothing irrational in the 
Satkarza theory.l 
This theory is, that the effect is pre-existent in the cause. 
But let us look more closely at the sense in which 
Riminuja is using the term attribute. Now he does not mean 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri BhasbzGl, p. 456. 
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b~ attribute, or at lea8t does not limit its sense to what 
are usually understood as abstract qualities. As one o£ 
his commentators points out, "Al thou~ 1 attribute' is us-
ually understood to refer only to qualities, not to things, 
things may also be regarded as attributes i£ they complete-
1~ depend on someth1n~. else . £or their existence."1 Another 
commentator has attempted to clariry the position in the 
following wa'1: 
All things thus are predicatiYe to, or 
modes o£, Param-rurusa (Brahman), adjecti-
vated b,- eve17th ng else. All terms are 
thus connotations of Him by the rule of 
Siminadhikar~a, or the rule which ex-
presses the :nieparable relation existing 
between substance and attribute, or the 
invariable co-existence of subject and 
predicate.2 
Inseparable from Brahman as his attributes or modes 
are, they are ,.et different from Him, so that the vicissi-
tudes they undergo do not affect him. Speaking of this dif-
ference Riminuja declare• that 
•••• wherever we cognize the relation of 
distinguishing attribute and the thing 
distinguished thereby, the two clearly 
present themselvea to our mind as abso-
lutely different.J 
And so with regard to the world, wheDher in its potential 
state in Brahman or in its effected state, it is distinct 
1. Bharatan Kumarappa, The Hindu Concept~on of Deitz, 
p. 236. 
2. A. Govindicharya, Bhagavad~ita Bhas~a, (Madras: 
The University of Madras Press, 196 ) , p. 23~ 
3. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhashzam, pp. 42-43. 
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from Brahman. "Whether in manifest or unmanifest fonn, 
whether in creation or reabsorption, the world is distinct 
from Brahman, but completely dependent on Him."1 Accord-
ingly, Brahman "is the one substance, self-dependent and 
supreme, and all else is but a mode of Him."2 Seemingly 
incompatible as this idea of the dependence of the world 
upon Brahman seems to be with the idea of its independence, 
Riminuja asserts them both and with equal emphasis. 
(2) Prakriti or the Phenomenal World 
Prakriti is the principle of change, productive ot 
the world under the initiative and will of Brahman. The won-
dertul and manifold effects to which it gives rise are all 
equall~ perishable. It is thus inseparable from the world 
of phenomena, indeed is one with it. And as identical with 
the changeful and impennanent, it cannot be said to have 
true being. Por the realm of the phenomenal, the sphere of 
"non-intelligent matter, as entering into various states of 
non-permanent nature, i• called non-being; while souls, the 
nature of which consists in permanent knowledge are called 
•being'. ,,)· To Riminuja the notion of being can only be at-
tributed to that which is of uniform nature. Thus he writes: 
•••• we say •it is• of that thing which is 
of a permanently uniform nature, not con-
1. Bharatan Kumarappa, The Hindu Conception of Deity, 
p. 238. 
2. Ibid ; , p. 238. 
3. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 128. 
nected with the idea of beginning, middle 
and end, and which henee ·never becomes the 
object of the notion or non~existence; while 
we say •it is not• of non-intelligent matter 
which constantly passes over into different 
states, each later state being fut of con-
nection with the earlier state. 
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It would appear from this latter remark of Riminuja that the 
phenomenal worHrepresents no true system so that the con-
nection between its parts are purely fortuitous. But it is 
change or perishability that is the chief hall mark of non-
being. Yet non-being is not merely nothing, as Riminuja 
goes on to explain. 
The jar (he says) is something perish-
able, but not a thing devoid of proof or 
to be sublated by true knowledge. •Non-
being' we may call it, in so far as while 
it is observed at a certain moment in a 
certain form, it is at some other moment 
observed in a different condition. But 
there is no contradiction between two dif-
ferent conditions or a thing which is per-
ceived at different times; and hence there 
is no reason to call it some2hing futile 
(tukhkha) or false (mithya). 
Prakriti, then, is not non-being in the sense of non-
existence, but rather in the sense of the ever chan~ful, of 
a flux of for.ms. That change lies at the very heart of phe-
nomena is not merely evident from sense observation, accord-
ing to Riminuja. For the world, when it is reabsorbed into 
the infinite and passes back into its originally subtle 
state, loses all the qualities which characterize it for the 
1. Sri Rimanuja, Sri Bhasbzam, p. 128. 
2. Ibid ., p. 129. 
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hwna.n observer. 
(3) The Purpose or the .Phenomenal world 
As we have seen Prakriti is not merely nothing. It 
has its place in the scheme of things. Without it the plea-
sures . and pains meted out to a soul bound to worldly exist-
ence would be impossible. Thus Frakriti is spoken or as 
"the object or fruition, ul that is, Prakriti has a teleolog-
ical aspect. Riminuja begins by obserYing that ttthe soul 
abiding in nature experiences the qualities derived from 
nature, the reason being its connection with the qualities 
in its births in good and evil wombs."2 Now as a result of 
the qualities which Prakriti produces in accordance with the 
deeds of souls, souls are bound still further to action and 
hence to worldly existence. Concerning this Riminuja gpes 
on to say: 
This soul, barn in a series or retrospec-
tive births among devas, man, etc. - all 
variations or matter -- forms -- delights 
in ~-seated pleasures, etc., varying in 
thelr:SattYika and other characteristics 
accordfilg to the incidents or such births; 
and in so doing launches into activities 
good or evil, in order to procure for it-
self such pleasures. In order then to reap 
the fruits of such good or evil acts, it is 
inevitably born again in good or evil wombs. 
Born, he acts again, acting he is born again.3 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhaabyam, p. 299· 
2. A. Govindacharya, Bhagavadgita Bhasbyam, p. 431. 
3 • Ibid • ' p • 431 • 
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The idea here seems to be that Prakriti is a kind of 
principle of justice, assigning to souls their deserts in 
terms of pleasure and pain, thoqsh in so doing it also binds 
souls more than ever to the world of phenomenal existence. 
How, we may ask, does the finite soul become attached 
to matter in the first place, that matter which, if .it is 
independent of Brahman, is also under Brahman's control? 
Raminuja meets this question with the theory of Karma, the 
propensity of souls to attach themselves to particular bodies 
in accord with the characteristics the souls have achieved 
in previous stages of existence. And this propensity has 
developed througn so many series of evolutions as to be begtn-
ningless. "The jivis (selves) and their Karmas," says Rimi-
nuja, ••have had no beginning. 111 In the theory of Karma, "he 
who performa good works becomes good and he who performs bad 
works becomes bad. 112 Further, 
The being to be embodied (the finite 
self) requires nothing but an operative 
cause; it is its own potentiality (Kar.man) 
Which leads its being into that condition 
of being (which it is to occupy in the new 
creation). Potentiality here means Karman.3 
As operative cause Prakriti is essential to the moral 
unfolding of the life of the individual. The world is a prov-
ing ground, the means by which the individual souls work out 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhasb7am, p. 497. 
2. Ibid., p. 478. 
3. Ibid., p. 478. 
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their moral destinies. But it is not only a means to this 
end, but . also a ne ans to final release from material bondage 
itself, as Ramanuja asserts in the following passage. 
Pr&kriti is a non-intelligent principle, 
the causal substance of the entire material 
universe and constituting the means for the 
experience of pleaaure and pain, and for the 
final release of all intelligent souls, wiich 
are connected with it, from all eternity. 
B. Bowne•s Theory of the World 
The world tor Bowne, exists both as a conc~tion as 
well as mental activity of God and he refrains from saying 
that it is created as the individual selves are created. At 
the same tine he is opposed to an1' theory which savours of 
what he calls pantheism, or evolution, or emanation. Crea-
tion is an expression of divine causal agency. We have seen 
that there is a sense in which Ramanuja holds to a theory of 
creation, but it is not a sense which would be acceptable m 
Bowne, assuming that he would regard it as a theory of crea-
tion at all. Again Rlm§nuja t s theory of knowledge am meta-
pbJsics assign some degree of ontological status to the ma-
terial world, since the latter arises out of a pre-existent 
matter comprised within Brahman, and the law and pl.an of 
which issues f'rom the thought and will of Brahman. To Bowne, 
on the other hand, the material world is purely phenomenal, 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhasbzrun, p. 370. 
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providing simply the "forms and factors of our common exper-
ience. ul Further Bowne points out that, "the world is not 
merely an idea; it is also an act. It exists not only as a 
conception in the divine urrl erstanding, but also as a form 
of activity in the divine will."2 
(1) The Phenomenal world 
For spontaneous thought, as Bowne calls it, sense ob-
jects may seem to be substantial thi~s in space and time, 
yet the fact is that for serious reflection they exist only 
through divine intelligence. In Bowne•s own words: 
For spontaneous thougnt all sense objects 
exist as they seem, veritable substantial 
things in space and tine. Later · reflection, 
however, turns them into phenomena, that is 
things whic~ exist only for and through in-
telligence. 
Not that sense objects are illusions for Bowne, but 
they have no substantial and independent existence. Their 
reality, such as it is, consists, as we have already quoted 
Bowne as saying, in their being "forms and factors of our 
common experience. "4 The phenomenal character or space and 
tine follows as a. matter of course. Apart from the synthet-
ic and unifying activity of human intelligence time and 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, p. 112. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Theo!:l of Thought and Knowledse, 
p. 342. 
3. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, p. 111. 
4- Ibid.' p. 112. 
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space are nothing. For example, we do not grasp a piece of 
music by chasing the mutually external sound waves. Unless 
the various sounds which are successive and co-existent are 
comprehended in a consciousness which unifies them, there can 
be no such thing as a symphony. If there were not something 
abiding and non-successive, something that gives unity and 
permanence to the endless f'low of change characteristic of 
the phenomenal world, knowledge of that world would be 1m-
possible. 
All this is to remind the reader of an argument ex-
pounded in another section of this essay. The aim of that 
argument is to show that the existence of the phenomenal 
world is only through divine intelligence. Bowne retums tD 
the attack again and again. "The flowing world of change," 
he says, "exists for us only through a system of changeless 
ideas, and these are impossible and meaningless apart from 
intelligence. ,,l Again if things themselves are really pro-
ceases in space and time, they became articulate for us onlf 
through the ideas by which we fix the processes into a mean-
ing. And unless the things thsnselves are expressions of 
these ideas, we would not be able to grasp th~.2 Yet again, 
divine · ''intelligence appears as the supreme condition of the 
existence of those things which seem to us independent of 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, p. 118. 
2. Ibid., p. 118. 
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all intelligence."l Further still, these ideas, Bowne 
holds, are independent of us, so he feels justified in con-
eluding that there must be a supreme intelligence whose 
ideas the things express. Thus he writes: 
It would be incredible that we should 
know things by ideas essentially unrelat-
ed to them; and as the ideas by which the 
things are constituted are independent of 
us, there must be a supreme intelligence 
behind the things which makes them t~ 
bearer of or expression of the ideas. 
Hence to Bowne the phenomenal world is a .function or a re-
sult of the activity of a supreme mind, which is God. But 
how is the creation of the phenomenal world possible? We 
deal with Bowne• s answer to this question in the following 
section. 
(2) God and the _World 
Is the phenomenal world a part of God, or a mode of 
God, or is it a phase of God•s intelligence or mind? Bowne 
· considers these views one after the other only to discard 
them in favour of unmitigated creation.3 But he is not un-
aware of the difficulties of a creationist position. He 
writes: 
Creation means to posit something in 
existence which before was not. Concern-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, p. 118. 
2. Ibid., p. 118. 
3. Borden P. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 174. 
ing it two consistent questions are possible. 1 (1) Who is the agent? (2) How is it possible. 
With regard to the .first question his answer is that 
God is the creator o.f the world. But as .for the second ques-
tion his answer is in e.f.fect that there is no answer, at 
least no rational answer. Now, given his criticism of other 
theories, it would seem that the only alternative open to 
Bowne is creation!! nihilo. Yet he rejects this view, to~ 
ani on what appears to be purely verbal grounds. For he ar-
gues that creation !! nihilo itself assumes a pre-existent 
stuf.f, only that this pre-existent stu.ff happens to be Wnoth-
ingt, which is absurd. Nothing can never produce anything. 
According to him, it is no part of the theistic thesis that 
God took a mass o.f nothing and made 
something out of it, but rather that he 
caused a new existence to begin, and, 
that, too, in suoh a way that He was no 
less after creation than be.fore.2 
Whatever the merits of Bowne's view here, it has a history 
in medieval philosophy, and is not an idle invention of his 
own. In any case, "creation is a mystery" ,3 but Bowne is 
quick to add that "any other view is a contradiction of 
thought itself'. n4 For "creation is the only conception 
that reconciles the unity of God with the existence of the 
1. Borden P. Bowne, PhilOSO;E!!l of Theism, p. 178. 
2. Ibid.' p. 179. 
3. Ibid.' p. 180. 
4· IQ1d., p. 180. 
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finite. nl 
In holding that the world depends upon the will of 
. 
God, Bowne explains that "in estimating this result, care 
must be taken not to apply to the divine willing the limi-
tations of the human. 112 Further, if·· God • s will is temporal · 
in relation to the world, .it is eternal with reference to 
himself. 
Willing does not necessarily im.plJ pe-
ginning ••••• God's will in reference to him-
self must be eternal, that is, it is as un-
begun as God, being but that free3self-determinat1on whereby God is God. 
Since the world has a beginning in time, God•s will may be 
viewed under the aspect of time, but in its real nature as 
eternal it is of course not bound by time. 
What more precisely is the relation of the world to 
God? The relation is above all the conformity of the world 
to the dictates of Godts will, for the world is the form in 
which the divine purpose expresses itself. Bowne writes: 
We hold that the world is no self-
centered reality, independent of God, but 
is simpl'1 the form in which divine purpose 
realizes itself. It bas no laws of its 
own which oppose a bar to the divine pur-
pose, but all its laws and ongoings are 
but the expression of that purpose. In 
our dealing with nature we have to accam-
odate ourselves to its laws, but with God 
the purpose is original, the laws are its 
l. Borden P. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 180. 
2. Ibid. ' p~ '~ 186 
3. Ibid., p. 187. 
consequence. Hence the system of law it-
self is absolutely sensitive to the divine 
purpose, so that what that purpose demands 
finds immediate expression and realization, 
not in spite of the1system, but in and through the system. 
All of this is to say that God is related to the world as 
its creator and purposer. If the world were merely the phy-
sical system, the ter.m creation would adequately describe 
its relation to God, but since the world is more than a pby-
sieal system, God is not merely its creator but purposer as 
well. God is also the ruler of the world. But God as a 
ruler is significant due to the existence of selves which, 
though they have a "relative independence,"2 are neverthe-
less under the guidance of God. In fact the idea of God as 
a ruler or governor can only be applied when the governed 
have a certain measure of :freedom. 
We can speak of government, says Bowne, 
only where there are beings which by a 
certain independence threaten to withdraw 
themselves from the ge~eral plan which the 
ruler aims to realize. 
(3) Teleology in Nature 
To Bowne nature is no mere blind force, but the exp~ 
sion and realization of a thought or plan. Nor is the conti-
nuity of nature merely mechanical, it is intellectual. All 
the laws and phenomena of nature, its constants and variables, 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 201. 
2. Ibid., p. 203. 
3. Ibid. ' p. 203. 
become intelligible only in terms of a divine plan.1 And 
this plan is nothing less than the realization of a supreme 
good, as is implied in the existence of free spirits and 
the notion of a divine government. For the notion of a di-
vine government would make no sense unless a supreme good 
existed and were capable or realization. As Bowne puts it, 
the notion is one that acquires "rational meaning onl,- as 
some supreme good exists which is to be the outcome of cre-
ation, and which, therefore, gives the law for all personal 
activity."2 Above all, then, the plan or nature is a moral 
plan - the furtherance of the moral personalit,.. "A com-
munity or moral persons, obeying moral law and enjoying 
moral blessedness; is the only end which could excuse crea-
tion or make it worthwhile. n3 
c. Summary and Comparison 
In the view or both our thinkers - the world comes into 
existence as a result of the rational activity of the infin-
ite. The world arises out of the thougnt of Brahman,4 says 
Rimenuja, while for Bowne "intelligence appears as the su-
preme condition or the existence of those things which seem 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphzsics, p. 285. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, PhilosoE~ of Theism, P• 203. 
3. Ibid., p. 204. 
4. Sri Raminuja, Sri Bhas!!lam, p. 285. 
to be independent of all intelligence. 111 Further, accord-
ing to both thinkers, the creation eXhibits a pattern, with 
this difference, that Riminuja holds that "Brahman, having 
an inward intuition of the characteristics of the former 
2 ' 
world, creates tl:e new worlq on the same pattern." This 
idea or a previous creation is not to be found in Bowne. 
Again, in Riminuja the phenomenal world stems from the ac-
tivity or a pre-existent subtle matter which forms the body 
of Brahman. Bowne, on the contrary, subscribes to an out-
right theory of creation, though rejecting, it is true, cre-
ation ex nihilo. Finally, both Rimanuja and Bowne emphasize 
the purposive character of the world. To Riminuja the world 
is a moral proving ground and a means for meting out to the 
individual his moral deserts. It is through the world that 
.the selves achieve purification'. and ultimately release from 
continual birth and rebirth. Bowne posits a supreme good in 
accordance w:!t h which God has fashioned the world and for 
the sake of the attainment or which in individual selves and 
the world exists. 
1. The Mind~Body Problem 
The problem of the nature or mind and body and the 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Personalism, p. 118. 
2. Sri Raminuja, Sri Bhas&am, p. 405. 
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relation between the two is as familiar as it is complex. 
Nothing comes more intimately and constantly within the pur-
view of our experience than our minds and bodies, for it is 
these two fundamental entities that are involved in all 
life's transactions. Psychology, biology, and physics, all 
have something to say about the problem, but here we are 
concerned with its metaphysical aspect. Still more espec-
ially we are concerned with the general idealistic solution 
of the problem, purposing thereby to introduce t ·he theories 
of Rimanuja and Bowne. 
Generally, absolute idealism takes the view that mind 
or spirit is the fUndamental principle of reali~, differen-
tiating itself into the world of things, animate and inani-
mate, in the course of its development of self-expression. 
To the absolute id~alist minds and objects are not two es-
sentially different realities, but one reality with mind 
foremost. Such a theory with variations is to be found in 
Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Bradley, Bosanquet and Royce. 
All these thinkers agree in holding that consciousness, 
whether in the form of Mind, Spirit, Will, Experience or 
Self, is the final reality. FUrther, man bears an especially 
close relation to the spiritual principle that underlies all 
things and thus shares in its qualities, thougp on a finite 
scale. Hence the self in idealism occupies a central role., 
all other realities being expressions or for.ms of the self. 
Now idealism is divided with regard to the monistic or plur-
alistic character of the spiritual principle which it agrees 
in holding is ultimate. The absolute idealist stresses its 
oneness, while pluralistic idealists, like Leibniz -and Mc-
Taggart, and we may add Ramanuja and Bowne, are more inter-
ested in stressing its diversity and in showing that reality 
is not one self or mind, but a system of selves or minds. 
Finally there are pansychistic idealists, thinkers like Ward, 
Strong and Paulsen, who argue that bodies and brains are 
evolved by minds as the fit apparatus for their action and 
expression. 
A. The Relation of Mind and Body in Ram§nuja 
We have already seen that for Ramanuja human minds 
and bodies are both finite parts of the infinite body of 
Brahman. And it will be recalled too that these minds and 
bodies exist eternally as potentialities in God. Matter in 
contrast to mind is non-sentient and undergoes modification 
in accordance with the will and desires of the self. The boqr 
is always under the control of the selt,1 being an instrument 
which the self uses for its own purposes. Rrunanujats theory 
is best described as some for.m of interactionism. As to the 
question how the mind comes to be associated with a body, 
there is no real answer in Ramanuja, though how it comes to 
1. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhash:yam, p. 424. 
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be associated with a particular type of body is explained 
by the self's previous stages of existence, in other words, 
by Karma. 1 
There is no place for disembodied spirit in the phil-
osophy of Rirnanuja. Even Brahman does not exist as pure 
spirit. Yet this does not mean that mind and body are on an 
equal rooting, that the interaction between them is equal. 
In the case of Brahman, spirit is supreme, completely un-
affected by body. But finite spirit is affected by the body, 
yet only in accordance with the spirit's own inclinations 
· and actions. As we have already cpoted Ram§:nuja as saying, 
though in another context: 
As Brahman has all the sentient and non-
sentient things for its body and constitutes 
the self of that body, there is nothing con-
trary to reason in Brahman being connected 
with two states, a causal and an effected one, 
the essential characteristics of which are ex-
pansion on the one band and contraction on 
the other; for this expansion and contraction 
belong {not to Brahman itself, but) to the 
sentient and non-sentient beings. The imper-
fections adhering to the body doEB not affect 
Brahman, and the good qualities belonging to 
the self do not extend to the body; in the 
same way as youth, childhood and old age 
which are attributes of embodied beings such 
as gods or men, belong to the ·body only, not 
to the embodied self; while knowledge, pleas-
ure and so on belong t~ the conscious self 
only, not to the body. 
1. Satischandra Chatterjee, Introduction to Indian 
Philosophy, pp. 431-432. 
2. Sri Raminuja, Sri Bhasbfam, p. 422. 
All this holds for the absolute self, which, so to 
speak, is immune to its body. 
The case is different with the finite self. The fin-
ite self falsely identifies itself with the body and is there-
fore subject to bodily influences. ''Owing to the false iden-
t if'ication of the self with the body," says Ramanuja, '1i t is 
called the empirical self (dehi) -- and its life is influen-
ced by the three gunas of Prakriti, namely satva (balance), 
rajas (activity), and tamas (inertia). 111 Such mistaken iden-
tification betrays the self into subservience to the body. 
Different from the body, the self yet comes under the influ-
ence of the changes that take place in the body. If there 
is an answer to the question why the self becomes associated 
with a body at all, it lies in the pervasiveness of the self. 
In any case, Ramanuja insists that mind and body are always 
found together. At the same time the self is always con-
scious of holding the body in a dependent position. But 
this power of the self is confined to its own body. It is 
not all-pervading. Of course, the self does not vary in 
size as the body varies in size, but pervades through power, 
just as rays of light pervade a room, though their source is 
iimited to one place. All this is another way of saying that 
the individual selves are finite, their actions limited to 
1. P. N. Srinivasachari, The Philosophy of Visitad-
vai ta, p . 283. 
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their bodies. This finitude, moreover, follows from the fact 
that each individual self has a characteristic locus or per-
spective in the life ~f the Divine.1 
Given this view of the mind-body relation, can it be 
ai~ that the finite selves possess ultimate reality? Are 
they fragments of the absolute self? or are they unique, and 
if unique, how do they appear as bodies in relation to Brah-
man? We shall deal with these questions in the concluding 
chapter of this thesis. 
B. The Mind-Body Problem in Bowne 
It is in relation to the self as a thing that acts 
and is acted upon that Bowne considers the mind-body prob-
lem. The self, he observes "abides, acts, and is acted upon; 
and these are the essential marks of ontological reality."2 
Of the two members of the mind-body relation, it is the mind 
that possesses the greater neality, and this because of its 
permanence in contrast to the mutability of the body. "In 
comparison with the body, the soul is the more real of the 
two; f:or the t:ormer is in perpetual flu.x.."3 But the question 
remains: what is the relation between the two? That a rela-
tion exists is evident from the fact that the mind and body 
1. K. c. Varadachari, Sri RimanuJa's Theory of Knowl-
edge, p. 135. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, MetaEhzsics, p. 349-
3. Ibid., p. 349· 
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"begin together, advance together, decay together; and so far 
as our observation goes, they perish togetrer. ttl It would 
seem that "during life the mind is most rigorously conditim-
ed by the body; and we never find it apart from the body. n2 
May we say, then, that mind and body are interacting 
entities? Bowne takes up the various forms of the interac-
tionist hypothesis only to discard them all in the end. There 
is interaction, he says, in the inductive sense and in this 
sense it means simply the laws of' mutual change or of' con-
comitant variation among things. The problem is to discover 
the 1 aw or these changes' to that the task 0 r the psycholo-
gist is to find out what mental changes go with what physi-
cal states and what physical changes go with what mental 
states.3 Assume that the body is substantially real, or an 
aggregate of substantial realities, as we may from a common-
sense point or view, interaction would only mean that body 
and soul affect each other, indeed, ''the union or the two 
has no other meaning than this fact of mutual in!'luence. n4 
On the phenomenal level such a theory is acceptable enough, 
as for exampl·e, the theory which locates the -soul within the 
physical aggregate called the body. It regards the soul 
1. Borde.n P. Bowne, Studies in Theolosz, p. 375. 
2. Ibid., p. 376. 
3. Borden P. Bowne, Meta:E:stsics, "revised ed. 11 , p. 351 
4· Ibid., p. 351. 
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"eith~r as a manikin located within the brain and nervous 
1 
system, or as a pervasive and all embracing aura." Such 
a theory will not do. "The manikin soul is absurd; and the 
laws of continuity and the conservation of energy are af-
fronted by such a procedure. 112 No more satisfactory is the 
notion that interaction must be by impact.3 The upshot of 
Bowne's discussion is that the popular views of the mind-
body relation provide no satisfactory solution of the problem. 
Yet the view that he proposes on his own account is 
itself a form of interactionism. According to this view the 
soul is posited by the infinite, while the body is simply an 
order or system of phenomena connected with the soul which 
reproduces to some extent the general features of the phenom-
enal order, at the same time that the latter expresses an or-
der of concomitance with the mental life. Thus the phenomenal 
becomes a visible expression of the personality, a means of 
personal communion and also a means of controlling to some 
extent the inner life. Bowne writes: 
The concomitance is the only interaction 
there is; and its determining ground must 
be sought in the plan and agency of the in-
finite. Only in this sense of physical 
concomitance is it possible to speak of a 
physical basis of thought, or of a physical 
foundation of mental activity. And only in 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed.", p. 353. 
2. Ibid.' p. 353. 
3. Ibid., p. 353. 
the same sense of concomitance is it al-
lowed to speak of the soul as building 
and maintaining the organism. Each is 
adjusted to the other in accordance with 
the plan of the whole; but so far as the 
two factors are concerned, the connection 
is logical, not dynamic; and any dynamic 
relation which we may affirm1must be seen to be only a for.m of speech. 
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It is not easy to see what this distinction between 
logical and dynamic as applied to the relation of mind and 
body amounts to, except that the relation is not a real 
one, but part of a scheme in which the individual mind is 
alone real and the body is phenomenal. At any rate, the 
doctrine is a subtle one; it is not easy to see its exact 
bearings. Some scholars have interpreted it as a form of 
oceasionalism.2 
We cannot understand life, Bowne believes, unless 
we know the laws under which the physical basis of life op-
erates, but we must also assume that the infinite is the 
ever-present source of all things. "With this understand-
ing we may carry on the study of the physical basis of lite 
and mind without the least fear of seeing them vanish into 
mechanical by-products. n3 As we have said, mind is the re-
ality in the mind-body relation. "And seeing," says Bowne, 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "revised ed.," PP• 
368-369. 
2. Albert c. Knudson, The Philosop~ of Personalism, 
(New York: The Abingdon Press, 1927), p. 1. 
3. Borden P. Bowne, Metapb.ysics, "revised ed.", p.369. 
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"that the soul is that with reference to which the organism 
has its existence, we may also speak of the soul as the build-
er and maintainer of the organism. nl The f'act is, according 
· to Bowne, ''that there is no reason to think that there would 
be any organism if there were no inner life."2 
In Bowners view, then, no necessary connection exists 
between mind and body. The relation between them is contin-
gent and fortuitous. Mind without body is perfectly con-
ceivable. 
We donot see that the body is necessary 
to consciousness, but that abnormal physi-
cal conditions may derange or hinder the 
development of consciousness. On the most 
realistic view of the body, it might con-
ceivably be altogether, other than it is, 
and the mental life might go on just the 
same ••••• The relation, whatever it is, 
can only be viewed as factual and contin-
gent. The actual body, then, is no analy-
tically necessary factor of our inner life.3 
Nothing obliges us to believe that the fortunes of the 
mind are tied up with those of the body. 
1 • . 
2. 
3. 
4· 
The decay and failure of the body do not 
analytically ~ply the destruction of the 
soul, as would be the case if the body were 
its causal ground. The soul, when the body 
fails, has not to go wandering through space 
to find another home; it is continuously 
comprised in the thought and activity of the 
infinite •• God gave ~t life, and if He wills 
He will maintain it.4 
Borden P. Bowne, Meta;Ehzsics, "revised ed. ", 
Ibid., p. 369. 
Ibid., P• 378. 
Ibid., p. 379. 
p. 369. 
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c. Summary and Comparison 
Rmnanuja and Bowne, each in his own way, subscribe . 
to an interactionist theory of the relation between mind and 
body. Both assert the primacy of mind in this relationshi~ 
but in thus subordinating matter to mind, however, Bowne•s 
view is considered by some scholars as interaetionism and 
by others as occasionalism. But the status assigned to mat;. 
ter in relation to mind differs in the two thinkers. Rima- . 
nuja appears to assign a causal efficacy to the body which 
Bowne .expressly denies. The result is that the interaction-
ism of R~inuja is .of a more straightforward sort than Bowne• a 
and leaves no roam for the existence of disembodied souls. 
Bowne, it will be recalled, wri tea: "We do not see that a 
body is necessary for consciousness."1 This is in keeping 
with . his view that the relation between mind and body is one 
mediated by God, and in accordance with a plan. Body and 
mind are related, but not causally. It is a question wheth-
er suCh a theory may be called interactionism at all, yet 
the name is permissible, provided it is borne in mind that 
it is not a causal interactionism. In locating matter, 
though in a highly subtle form, in Brahman from the beginnin& 
Riminuja can more readily account for the association of matter 
and mind than is possible on Bowne • s theory. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphy:sics, "revised ed.", p. 378. 
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8. The Problem of Evil 
The metaphysician has as much difficulty with the 
problem of evil as has the moralist, indeed greater diffi-
culty, for it is his province to give the ultimate answers 
to such questions as what is evil, its origin, its effects 
upon man, the universe and God. It is not surprising that 
there are no generally agreed upon answers to these ques-
tions. 
How is evil to be reconciled with the wisdom and 
benevolence of God? How account for death and diseas.e, 
famine and flood, earthquake and holocaust, to say nothing 
of moral evil and sin. Could a beneficient deity allow 
such things? The traditional answer is that man as endow-
ed by his creator with free will can and indeed, must choose 
between good ·and evil and is responsible for his choices. 
This life is a probationary period and the world a moral 
school. Hence evil, ignorance and benevolence are no part 
of the deity or even of the nature of things. Evil, wheth-
er physical or moral, is the punishment meted out to man 
for the misuse of his freedom. Another answer, still tradi-
tional but far more sophisticated, is that given by Leibniz. 
To him this is the best of all possible worlds, his argu-
ment being that the compossible system of monads which are 
actualized by the divine will contains the greatest excess 
of good over evil. God might have created a world with no 
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evil in it, but su ch a mrld • oulcl no t have been as good as 
the aotu 1 world. Thus the presenoe or evil in the . orld 
is no argument gainst the goodness of God. A ore r dical 
solution of the problem of ev11 1 and one 71th a l ong hist-
ory, is that whieh relegates evil to the realm of appear-
ances. So Hegel argues that the orld is through and 
through r a tional, that the rational and the real are one, 
and hence that evil, since it is i~ational, cannot be real. 
But not all idealists have resorted to thi heroic solution. 
Lotze has no desire to deny the fact o r evil, nor look u on 
it o.s a d isguised good. But as t he wayt:J of God ar 1nscru ... 
table to human reason, the existence of evil need not be in-
terpreted as derogatory to divine wisdom, goodness and po er. 
In our own times the theological and 1dea.l1st1o so-
lutions of the problem of evil have been 1 a.rgely abandoned 
in favour of a naturalistic., evolutionary approach. J>Vil is 
seen as the inev1 t ble aooanpaniment of t he process of human 
adjustment to nature and to society. etaphys1oa1ly the im-
plications of such a view all point to a univers _ h1ch in 
itself is indifferent to moral values. If then good is not 
sanetbing embedded in the cosmo:s,. it is a creation by n, 
a creation that is never .finished and al·ta.ys changing, And · 
in the same way the existence of evil poses not only m t -
physical but also a practical problem~ And its solution 
calls for application of t he scientific intelligence . SuCh 
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a point of view is far removed from that of Riminuja and 
Bowne whose kinship, whatever the difference between them, 
is with the idealists. 
A. The Theory of Evil in RSminuja 
Concerning evil Riminuja lays down two proposi-
tions which seem to be irreconcilable. On the one hand 
there is his belief that the evils confronting us in life 
are ascribable to the possession by the self of freedom. 
On the other hand, there is his belief that the self is 
bound by the law of Kar.ma, that is, the previously acquired 
character of the selr.1 How then, as Rimanuja holds, can 
the self be held responsible for its actions? The self can-
not exceed the scope of the law of Kar.ma and this law itself 
is set by God.2 Evil exists. Ramanuja never glosses over 
this fact. And he is equally convinced that evil ought not 
to exist, as he is convinced also that it may be overcome. 
No question then, that his followers were so convinced. 
Hence if evil can be overcome by active endeavour, it must 
at some point came under the control of' the 1ndividua1 sel.f. 
We come thus to Rimanuja•s view of the origin and seat of 
evil. 
1. P. N. Srinivasachari, The Philosop~ of Visistld-
vaita, p. 152. 
2. s. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, p. 694. 
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(1) Origin of Evil 
From where does evil stem? Now, so far as natural 
evil is concerned, that is, evil that is not the result of 
human choices, Raminuja 1 s answer is plain. Such evil stems 
from the irrational activity of Prakriti or matter. Prak-
riti is the principle of motion and it is a non-intelligent 
principle. Unlike Brahman whose personality is unaffected 
by the modifications of his body, the finite selves are af-
fected by their bodies, though Ramanuja, as we have seen 
earlier, maintains at tbe same time that in their essence 
they are independent of them. Less plain is Riminuja•s 
answer to the question of moral evil. In this connection 
he once more emphasizes the role of Prakriti or the materiaL 
world. That role is of the first importance in the growth 
and development of the individual selves. But here the ar-
gument takes an interesting turn. If the individual selves 
are to exercise their freedom, the,y can only do so in the 
setting of a m~terial world. Indeed this appears to be the 
purpose of creation. And given this freedom wrong choices 
are inevitable, choices whose evil consequences can only be 
corrected by repeated good choices, and such repetition ne-
cessitates a succession of worlds through the aeons. It 
will be observed, therefore, that Prakriti does not play the 
same role in moral as it plays in natural evil. For the lo-
cus of evil is not really Prakriti, but is bound up with the 
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free choices of individual selves.1 
(2) Ignorance and the Way of Release 
Except for the details of its metaphysical frame 
work, the ethics or Ramanuja differs in no fundamental re-
spect from that of tm Bhagavadgita. The root of all evil 
is nescience and nescience consists in mistaking the soul 
for the body. Thus Kumarappa writes: "Since the root of 
all evil is nescience, whereby the soul identifies itself 
with the body and gives itself to the pursuit of bodily ends, 
it is necessary for it to see that its own true nature is 
quite distinct fran that of the body. "2 Addressing himself 
to the question, how do we know that this identification of 
the self with the body is false, R~nuja declares that 
"Brahman is that which witnesses (is conscious of) nescience, 
and the essence of a witnessing consciousness consists in 
being pure light (intelligence), and the essence of pure 
light or intelligence is that, distinguishing itself from 
the non-intelligent, it renders itself, as well as what is 
different from it, capable of becoming the object of empiric 
thought m. d speech (Vyavahira). "3 Rimanuja goes on to say 
that "all this implies the presence or difference - if 
there were no difference, light or intelligence, could not 
1. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhasnram, p. 128. 
2. 
(Lol)don: 
3. 
Bharatan Kumarappa, The Hindu Conception of Deity, 
Luzac & Co., 1934), p. 285. 
Sri Ramanu.ja, Sri Bbashyam, p. 161. 
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be what it is, it would be something altogether void, with-
out any meaning. nl What Riminuja is saying here is that 
Brahman, or consciousness generally, must have an object 
from which it distinguishes itself, and in so doing reveals 
both the nature of itself and of the object which is opposed 
to it. Hence the mistaken identification of soul and body 
would itself be impossible unless the one were different 
from the other. 
Until the self achieves the knowledge that it is dis-
tinct and different f'rom the body and adheres to the way of 
life implied in such knowledge, release from the yoke of. 
Karma is impossible. And this insight and practice must be 
coupled with the realization that the Absolute Self is the 
inner ruler of all selves at the same time that He is dif-
ferent from all of them. The way of enlightenment is the 
religious way, that of meditating upon the infinite self, 
doing good works and worshiping Brahman. "He from whom all 
beings proceed and by whom all is pervaded -- worsh+ping 
Him with the proper works man attains to perfection. 112 And 
Rimrnuja says .:fUrther, "what we have to understand by knowl-
edge in this connection has been repeatedly explained, viz. 
a mental energy different in character from the mere cogni-
tion of the sense of texts, and more especially denoted by 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhashyrun, p. 161. 
2. naa., p. 100. 
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such ter.ms as dhyina or Upasana, i.e., meditation; which is 
or the nature or remembrance (i.e. representative thought)~ 
but which in intuitive clearness is not inrerior to the 
clearest presentative thougnt (pratyaksha); which by con-
stant daily practice becomes ever more perfect, and .being 
duly continued up to death secures rinal release. 111 
The knowledge which Riminuj a is here recommending 
has little to do with logic and nothing at all with the 
study or texts. It arises from the depth of an experience 
and goes beyond words and concepts. Lire, which is dis-
sociable from religion, is deeper than logic. We find 
Bowne saying the same thing. Religious thinkers have re-
iterated it through the ages. 
B. The Problem of Evil in Bowne 
Bowne approaches the problem from the philosophical 
as well as the religious points or view. In keeping with 
his general methodology his starting point is inductive and 
proceeds througn inference. He points out that much or the 
discussion or the problem of evil is vitiated by theoreti-
cal and abstract considerations. Evil is not to be explain-
ed away by the niceties of logic or the sophistications of 
a speculative metaphysics. It is a problem that goes to the 
1. sri Ramanu ja, Sri Bhasbyam, p. 699. 
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heart of things, and this for Bowne mean~ the heart of re-
ligion. For how can an omnipotent, omniscient and all mer-
ciful God permit the existence of evil in the world? Bowne 
has no clear ~olution of the problem, especially as he i~ 
unwilling either to deny the perfection of God or the real 
existence of evil. 
(1) The Qpestion of Freedom 
The question of freedom, in Bowne's view, concerns 
not only our executive activities in the oute~ world, but 
also our inner rational activity. 1 Indeed the clearest il-
lu8tration of freedom is to be found in the passionless 
operations of thought i tsel:f'. 
If, then, we are looking, says Bowne, 
for . the most important field of freedom 
we should certainly f:fnd it in the moral 
rea~; but if we are seeking the purest 
illustration of freedom we should ~ind it 
in the operations of pure thought. 
Freedom of thougnt means that thought is a self-directing 
activity which proceeds according to laws inherent in it-
self and ideals generated by it~elf. Bowne is concerned 
here to combat any system of necessity which would turn 
thought into a mere shadow of things as they are, just as 
it would render the moral life meaningless. For freedom 
is as essential to the one as to the other. And Bowne 
feels that if it can be sho.vn, as he thinks he has shown, 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaph.ysics, ''revised ed.," p. 407. 
2. Ibid., p. 408. 
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that thought is free, that freedom, as he puts it, is im-
plicit in the structure of thought itself, it has thereby 
been shown that freedom is of tbe very essence of selfhood 
and evil. For thought involves choice and if choice is 
free in the intellectual realm, it is equally free in the 
moral realm. Indeed it is the same will that evinces it-
self in both our intellectual and moral activities.l It 
is not impossible, therefore, that the selves do make wrong 
choices and wrong judgments resulting in evil. 
(2) Natural Evil 
The moral life without freedom is meaningless and 
with freedom evil, the result of wrong choices, is at least 
intelligible. But what about natural evil, the evil that 
lurks in the scheme of things? How is it to be explained? 
Bowne is opposed to all efforts to explain it away. Theo-
logians and others who affirm that life is good fall back 
upon faith in God and his long term plan for human beings 
when confronted with such happenings as death, disease, · 
pain and suffering. To Bowne such a solution of the problem 
has a merely abstract validity and is of little practical 
significance. However, he does not say that a theory like 
Leibinizts is entirely without plausibility. 
A government by general laws necessarily 
implies individual hardship; yet the system 
1. Borden P. Bowne, :r.tetapqsics, "revised ed.", pp. 
407-412. 
ia not only good on the whole, it is also 
the best possible. The eternal truths of 
reason and the inevitable might of logical 
sequenle forbid the system being other than 
it is. 
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As thus described by Bowne Leibniz' s view is not to be light;.. 
ly dismissed. But Bowne finds he cannot aQeept it, for if 
this is the best of all possible worlds, then any attempt 
to change it must only result in a change for t~ worse. 
This is an intolerable corollary to Bowne. Further, the 
theory places the responsibility upon God for all the evils 
in the world. It is hard to believe, for example, that the 
non-existence or pain in its present degree, or even its ut-
ter absence, involves a contradiction or runs counter to sOE 
eternal truth. 2 At any rate, it is a proposition that is in 
need of proof. Continuing his argument against Leibniz, 
Bowne writes: 
So far as rational necessity, the only 
necessity of which we know anything, goes, 
the whole order or the world, for good or 
evil, is purely contingent. Whatever good 
purposes toothache and neuralgia and pesti-
lence and fang and venom and parasites may 
serve, there is no proof that any eternal 
truth is to blame, for their presence, or 
would be damaged by their absence. These 
facts have all the DB. rks of c cntingency, 
not or necessity.3 · 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, pp. 264-265. 
2. Ibid., p. 265. 
3. Ibid., p. 265 
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Evil is thus a brute fact and cannot be conjured 
away by a theory. If Bowne is opposed to the Leibnitzian 
optimism, he is no less opposed to the attempt to paint the 
picture all gloomy. The fact is that the picture is not 
all black, for good is as undeniable a factor in our exper-
ience as is evil. Again, the trouble here is abstractionimn. 
Pain isolated from all else is an abstraction and belongs 
only to abstract man. But "abstract man cannot be miserable, 
but only concrete conscious man. nl Finally, Bowne dismisses 
the argument, advanced from the standpoint of' an evolution-
ary theodicy. That the universe is in its raw beginnings 
and the good is yet to came. The evolution here posited is 
a mechanical process anft any veering toward the good is a 
chance departure. But in a mechanical system chance depart-
2 
ures are strictly impossible. 
(3) The Theistic Solution of the Problem 
A great deal of evil, Bowne says, is man-made, and is 
attributable to our ignorance of the universe in which we 
live. Yet evil is not pure loss. It has contributed to 
man's development, moulding his character and refining his 
sense of' values. ''Only in life are life's values revealed; 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. 267. 
2. Ibid., p. 270. 
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and only in life can they be tested."1 And it is fair to 
say that the "highest manif'estations of' character spring 
mainly from the soil of' sorrow. 112 Even death has helped 
to draw men closer together and to understand each other. 
Pain and suffering have helped to a richer manifestation 
of' man• s highest qualities. 
In the last analysis, however, we must f'all back 
upon God for a solution of our problem. Illustrating this 
Bowne writes: 
The net result of human experience is 
faith in the goodness of God. The problem 
is not abstract and academic but concrete 
and historical. This faith, with all that 
it implies, will remain until human nature 
. changes, or experience enters into a co.ntra-
dictory phase. The f'acts logically and ab-
stractly considered, neither compel nor for-
bid this faith. They permit it, and to some 
extent illustrate it; and the mind with that 
f'aith in the perfect which underlies all its 
oper~tions ref'uses to stop short of the high-
est. 
The God to whom Bowne is here appealing is a moral 
being, not a metaphysical abstraction. He is a God of ex-
perience. At tines Bowne verges on the view that God him-
self is not perfect and needs man to round out his moral 
nature. Finite existence is the means by whiCh God camea 
into full possession of himself. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. 280. 
2 • Ibid • , p • 278 • 
3. ~bid., ~ 286. 
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We say there is a suggestion of this view in Bowne, 
but on the whole his is the traditional orthodox conception 
of God. And in terms of it he struggles sincerely with the 
problem of evil. He would be the first to admit that no fi-
nal solution is possible, certainly no theoretical solution. 
As he says, "speculation can only call attention to diffi-
culties and suggest possibilities without being able to say 
anything positive. 111 
c. Comparison and Summary 
The philosophical idealist, if we may venture to gen-
eralize, tends to gloss over the problem of evil. But this 
is not true of either Ramanuja or Bowne. Both grapple with 
the problem with the utmost honesty, and they are under no 
illusions that they have succeeded in solving it. To a great-
er extent perhaps than Bowne, the Indian thinker writes out 
of the depths of his personal experience, but Bow~, too as 
we have seen, abjures clear cut theories and abstractions. 
The agreement between Rim~nuja and Bowne goes farther than 
this. Neither thinker will place the responsibility for 
evil upon the absolute. To Riminuja it is Prakriti or the 
' 
material principle that is the source of evil, while Bowne 
ascribes no one source to evil. Like Rimanuja, however, he 
looks upon the material world as a moral proving ground, as 
1. Borden p. Bowne, Theism, p~ 290. 
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a means to the development of character. To both philoso-
phers morality without freedom is a contradiction in terms. 
If it is by the exercise of his free will that man errs, .it 
is by the same exercise that he redeems himself. And this 
redemption for both Rlmanuja and Bowne consists in man's 
conforming his will to the will of God. • 
The Ultimate Person in the Philosophies of 
Ramanuja and Bowne 
It is evident to Raminuja and Bow,ne that there is an 
ultimate principle explaining all things and sustaining than. 
They are also agreed on the nature of this principle; it is 
personal. Thus the concept of personality contains the most 
vital clue to the nature or reality. Allowing for all the 
differences between our two thinkers, we may aay that the 
characterization or Bowne's system as theistic idealistic 
personalism is one that comes as close as any to character-
izing the thought of Riminuja. 
The background of Rimllnuja •s thought here is largely 
uncertain, but in the West theistic personalism has its 
roots mainly in the speculations of five men. On the whole, 
its spiritual individualism is traceable to Leibniz; its 
immaterialism to Berkeley; its epistemology and ethics to 
Kant; its emphasis upon concrete wholeness to Hegel; and its 
first distinctive formulation to Lotze. Bowne continues the 
Lotze an strain of thought. His theism is of the traditional 
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sort. It stresses the absoluteness of God; it makes the 
creation of the world and of the finite selves in it, a 
free act of God; and this world exists not in God but out-
side Him. Above all God is a person, the ultimate Person, 
and the reality of which He is the fount consists of a sys-
tem of active selves. 
In this conception of God, as we shall see in what 
follows, our two thinkers have much in common, though here 
again the differences between them may not be overlooked. 
A. Ramanujats Conception of God 
To Riminuja God or Brahman is the supreme person, 
himself changeless, though he is the initiator of change. 
But why is it necessary to conceive of God as a personality 
at all? Riminujats argument is this. Realit.1 cannot be 
conceived as a bare identity. Rather it is a determinate 
whole which maintains its identity in and through differ-
ence.1 Now such a unity in difference !s possible only if 
there exists a comprehensive principle that embraces them 
both. The best ex~ple we have of this variety in unity is · 
consciousness. Accordingly the comprehensive principle, of 
whiCh we have just spoken, must be spiritual or conscious. 
If the world is an order, above all an order of selves, .it 
1. Sri Riminuja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 458. 
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is because of the existence of a supreme self. 
But Ramanuja offers another argument of a more prac-
tical kind for supposing that the ultirm te reality is per-
sonal in nature. The religious consciousness can find no 
substance in a qualityless absolute, without feeling, will, 
or thought. Such an absolute fails to meet the deepest 
needs of the self, especially its need for communion or 
real fellowship with a supreme 'other', which if it is to 
satisfy this need must itself be a personality.1 Can the 
existence of such a personality be proved? Rimanuja•s 
answer to this question is considered in the next section. 
(1) Problems in Connection with the Proof of God•s 
Existence 
In his account of the nature of Brahman, Ramanuja, 
it is evident, accepts the idealistic view that reality in 
its ultimate nature is spiritual and personal. Brahman is 
the immanent principle of order in the universe, an active 
and pervasive principle. At the same time Brahman is also 
a transcendent reality embracing all experience. If Brah-
man is the whole, can the finite self know h~? The answer 
is no. For the finite reason or understanding, while it 
can infer correctly about •this• or •that•, "can never in:fer 
correctly about the whole."2 In other words, in Riminuja•s 
1. s. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, pp. 682-683. 
2. _K. c. Varadache.ri, Sri Ra1ninuja•s Theory of Knowl-
edge, p. 29. 
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view, human reason, which is limited and discursive, is de-
barred rrom knowing Him who transcends the finite. Accord-
ingly, he rejects those arguments ror the existence of God 
which are based upon reason or finite experience, that is 
to say, he rejects not only t~ ontological and cosmologi-
cal arguments, but the argument from design.1 All empiri-
cal arguments are based on comparison and analogies drawn 
from an experience that is necessarily fragmentary and there-
fore inconclusive. Moreover, such arguments, if they prove 
anything, prove the existence of a substance, not of a per-
sonality or spirit. Further still, if they prove the ex-
istence of a creator, they do not prove that He is all 
powerful.2 
Tnus the traditional arguments for the existence of 
God do not satisfy Riminuja. or the cosmological argument 
he complains that while it establishes a first cause, it 
does not establish the nature of this cause. It is a fair 
presumption that it is intelligent, but still a presumption. 
As for tie ontological argument, it suffers ft'om. the obvious 
fallacy that the idea of a perfect being does not warrant 
the assertion of its existence. Further, existence as we 
know it is always existence in space and time (desakala -
1. P. N. Sr.inivasachari, The Philosophy of Visistad-
vaita, pp. 12-14. 
2. K. c. varadachari, Sri Raminuja's Theory of Knowl-
edge, p. 30. 
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ikara), so that inference to a being who transcends space 
1 
and time is especially invalid. The teleological argument 
suffers from the fact that experience can be appealed to as 
sb:>wing that the world, so far from being all beauty and 
order, is cruel and irrational. The moral argument is in 
no better case. It may be that reason demands the union 
of duty and happiness and thus permissibly postulates a 
moral being who unites them.2 But postulate is no proof. 
But Riminuja•s criticisms are especially directed 
agmnst those efforts to establish the existence of God by 
means of empirical evidence. For example, there is the con-
tention that just as it is possible to infer from the liv.mg 
body a soul or intelligent principle that animates it, so 
it is possible to infer from non-sentient matter an intelli-
gent principle un:lerlying it.3 But the finite self does 
not bring into existence the body which it animates, and 
yet it is just this which we wish to prove with regard to 
the creator in relation to the world. Further, if it is 
argued that motion in the inanimate world, even as motion 
in the body, requires an animating intelligent principle 
to explain it, it may be pointed out that there is nothing 
1. K. c. Varadachari, Sri Ramanuja•s Theory of Knowl-
edge, pp • . 30-31. 
2. P. N. Srinivasachari, The Philosophy of Visistid-
vaita, p. 13. 
3. &ri Rbanuja, Sri Bhasbzam, p. 163. 
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in the analogy which establishes the existence of only one 
such principle. For, just as there are many souls animat-
ing many bodies, so it may be that the material world is 
animated by a plurality of intelligent principles.1 
Again, the argument f'rom the world as an effect, 
falls short of its goal. For we have no ril#lt to inf'er a 
supreme creator till it has been shown that lesser beings, 
of special religious merit, though of finite intelligence, 
could not have created the world. On this subject Ramanuja 
writes: 
As we both L3ankara and Ramanujy admit 
the existence of individual souls, it will 
be the more economical hypothesis to ascribe 
to them the agency implied in the construc-
tion of the world. Nor must you object to 
this view on the ground that such agency can-
not belong to the individual souls because 
they do not possess the knowledge of material 
causes ••••• for all intelligent beings are 
capable of direct knowledge of material 
causes, such as earth, and so on, and instru-
mental causes, such as sacrifices and the 
like, are directly perceived by individual 
beings at the present time (and were no doubt 
equally perceived so at a for.mer time when 
this world had to be planned and constructed). 
Nor does the fact that intelligent beings are 
not capable of direct insight into the unseen 
principle -- called apurva (a blind principle) 
or by similar names - whl ch resides in the 
form of a power in sacrifices and other instru-
mental causes, in any way preclude their being 
agents in the construction of the world. Direct 
insight into powers is no where required for 
undertaking work; what is required for that 
1. Sri R~inuja, Sri Bhasbyam, p. 163. 
purpose is only direct presentative knowl-
edge of things endowed with power, while of 
power itself it suffices to have some kind 
of knowledge. Potters apply themselves to 
the task of making pots and jars on the 
strength or the direct knowledge they poss-
ess of the implements of their work -- the 
wheel, the starr, etc. -- without troubling 
about a similar knowledge of the powers in-
herent in those implements; and in the same 
way intelligent beings may apply themselves 
to work (to be effected by means of sacri-
fices, etc.) if only they are assured by 
sacred tradition of the existence of the 
various P£wers possessed by sacrifices and 
the like. · 
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We have quoted this passage at length ·in order to 
show Ramanuja• s manner of arguing against the all too fa-
cile empirical demonstrations of God•s existence. The man-
ner may be called dialectical. For example, assume, as in 
the foregoing passage, that the world is an effect, then it 
may be the effect of some agency less than divine, even 
human. On the other hand refuse to make this assumption 
and the inference to an intelligent creator becomes super-
erogatory. The upshot of Rim!nuja•s reasoning here is 
this : "The inference of a creative Lord which claims to 
be in agreement with observation is refuted by reasoning 
which itself is in agreement with observation. 112 Whether 
we proceed on the analogy or a body that presupposes a 
presiding intelligent principle or on the analogy of a 
1. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhasbymn, p. 164. 
2 -. Ibid., p. 159• 
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product that presupposes a producing agent, in either ease 
it is impossible empirically to es.tablish the proposition 
that theworld presupposes a supreme being as its creator 
and animating principle. 
Is the existence of God, then, altogether undemon-
strable? If empirical reasoning can give us no certain 
knowledge of God and if the logical intellect is equally 
powerless, what alternative is left? To Rimanuda there 
is an alternative and it lies in intUitive perception. It 
alone is capable or assuring us of God's existence. In 
describing intuitive perception Ramanuja falls back upon 
scripture. Scripture tells m of the experience of others 
who have had this intuitive knowledge and it is in follow-
ing directions of scripture that we can achieve it ourselves. 
or course, scripture is no substitute for knowledge itself. 
But it is an indispensable means to it. RamAnuja writes: 
He who wishes to attain Brahman must 
acquire two kinds of knowledge, both of 
them having Bralman for their object; an 
indirect_ one whi cl:l s pri ngs from the study 
of the sastras, viz. The Veda, Siksha, 
Kalta, and so on, and ·a direct one whiCh 
S,Er n~s1.rrom the concentrated medit_ation Lyogy. 
But such meditation does not occur without the •grace' of 
the Supreme Person. It originates, says Ram~uja, "in the 
mind through the grace or the supreme person, who is pleased 
1. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhasbzam, p. 284. 
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and conciliated by the different kinds of acts of sacri-
fice and worship duly perfonned by the devotee day by day. nl 
Again, "it is only in the state of perfect conciliation or 
endearment, i.e., in meditation bearing the character of 
devotion, that an intuition of Brahman takes place, not in 
any other state. n2 
Thu~ the existence of God is a truth that only a 
certain type of experience oan reveal. And it is an exper-
ience which, in the last analysis, is indescribable. This 
is not to say that moral experience, empirical observation 
and discursive reason count for nothing in the search for 
God. True, their deliverances are inconclusive when employ-
ed for the purpose of demonstrating God's existenc~, · but as 
throwing light upon his nature they are indispensable. 
(2} God as the Principle of Relation 
The world and the finite selves in it are not swal-
lowed up in the infinite self. About this Ramanuja is 
clear. It is in describing their relationship that his pro-
nouncements become less lucid, which is not surprising con-
sidering that the problem is one of the thorniest of all 
metaphysical problems. If a relationship exists, it must 
be of a peculiar kind since the terms involved, the finite 
and the infinite, are strictly incommensurable. Rltnanuja 
1. Sri Ramanu ja, Sri Bhashyam, p. 699. 
2. Ibid., p. 617. 
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is clearer about what the relationship is not than what it 
is. So he says that it is not a relationship in the sense 
of ground and consequent; nor is it comparable to the rela-
tion of substance and quality; and finally it is not a re-
lationship of inherence (smnaviya). ·It must be thought of, 
1 Rim'inuja suggests, in terms of functional dependence. But 
more than this he hardly tel:Js us • All things depend upon 
the supreme mind or personality which supports, cqntrols and 
enjoys than for his own supreme purposes. 2 "God alone is 
the absolute self of all, who supports all forms of matter, 
its unm.anifested nature and its mutable existences, far He 
it is who destines {wills) their changes and transformations 
and as such is their master.") In using the term functionall. 
to describe the relationship between God and the world, 
Riminuja is intent to bring out that God is a person and that 
his relation to his creatures cannot be conveyed by categor-
ies that more properly describe the world than God•s relation 
to it, such categories as causality, inherence, ground and 
consequent. For that matter they do not properly describe 
even the relation between finite selves. 
Further, the relationship is such that it detracts 
neither frcm the unconi i tioned reality of tp.e Supreme Self 
1. 
edge, p. 
2. 
K. C. Varadachari, Sri Ramanujats Theory of Knowl-
143• 
Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhasbymn, p. 207. 
). K. C. Varadachari, Sri Riminuja•s Theory of Knowl-
edge, p • 144-. 
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nor from the reality of the finite selves that depend upon 
it. In it the unity of God is preserved, as are the indi-
vidual selves, and also the world of matter. The relation-
ship does not obli terata the distinctive features of each 
of these three orders of existence. Again, by his use of 
the phrase functional relationship, Ramanuja is concerned 
to emphasize the pervasiveness of the divine nature. Of 
Brahman he writes: "T.hey call him Sa.myadvima, for all 
blessings go towards him. He is also Vamani, for he leads 
all blessings. He is also Bhimani, for he shines in all 
worlds. And all these attributes can be reconciled with 
the highest self only. 111 In a word, Braham is the univer-
sal bond, the goal of all things. Reference to the finite 
selves is always reference as well to Brahman, who is the 
inner self of all of them. 2 On the one hand, he is the in-
finite unity in the sense that he has infinite apprehension 
and direct intuition, on the other the finite self to the 
extent that it shares in such apprehension and intuition 
participates in the life or the divine. 
(3) The Divine Personality as Unifying Principle 
The world is a process of change and it is also a 
uni~. Now, according to Rimanuja the enabling principle 
of this unity in difference, or this oneness in manyness, 
1. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhasbyam, p. 272. 
2. K. C. Varadachari, Sri Ramanuja•s TheoEl of Knowl-
edge, p. 130. 
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is not mere consciousness, still less a generic universal 
or concept or idea. No mere abstract principle can account 
for the kind of organic unity that permits or differences. 
It is only in the activity of a concrete spiritual being 
that the answer to our problem is ·to be_ found. This being 
or person subordinates the multiplicity of the world to his 
will and pleasure, and ordains its course. As conscious he 
is the very principle of unity, as concrete, he embraces 
difference within himself, and as personality 'he is active 
and self-propagating. This being is of course God or the 
S~preme Self (Purnsbottruna). 
To Rimanuja, then, God is a person, and because he 
is a person, is the great unifying principle that brings ·ala 
things together, not into a featureless but . organic unity. 
In such a un1ty we have an ordered system of relations in 
which the relations are not all of the same type nor the re-
lata all of the same kind. In RB.manuja' s view this is the 
highest kind of unity and belongs peculiarly to personality 
or spirit. It is in personality alone that unity comes to 
express itself in purpose, in works, cognition, enjoyment 
and freedom. At the poles apart from personality is prak-
riti which neither organizes nor sustains vital life. But 
-
prakriti itself, while it represents, . so to speak, a princi-
ple of entropy in the philosophy of Rimanuja, and is thus 
totally opposed to personality or the principle of order, 
is yet overcome in Brahman or the divine self, and is a 
hurdle that the finite self is capable of overcoming.l 
B. Bowne•s Conception of God 
To Bowne likewise God is the supreme personality. 
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Indeed the concept of personality is the key to the prob-
lems of metaphysics. The final realities are persons, and 
if the world of experience is meaningful it is because of 
the existence of a supreme personality of which it is in 
some sort the expression. Nothing exists but what it is 
ascribable to the activity or the divine person. But God 
is not only the source, he is as well the goal of all activ-
ity. Further, personality is not only metaphysical but .is 
a moral principle. Persons are the seat and source of val-
ues, and the Supreme Person the final seat and source. God 
is the guarantor of the objectivity of values and of the 
possibility of their realization. We turn now to the ques-
tion whether the existence of a God of this nature can be 
demonstrated. 
(1) The Proveability of God 
Historically two types of argument have been used in 
the attempt to prove the existence of God, namely, the in-
ductive which appeals to experience and the speculative which 
1. Sri Ramanuja, Sri Bhasbyrun, p. 488. 
invokes epistemological and metaphysical considerations. In 
the inductive class Bowne places the cosmological and teleo-
logical arguments, together with the argument from finite 
intelligence. 
The cosmological argument takes its. start from the 
fact that tbe universe appears to be governed by law. It is 
an order, not a chaos. Now it is open to us to attribute 
this order either to an intelligent or non-intelligent cause. 
If we choose the second alternative, we are bound to see in 
matter the ultimate cause of things. Needless to say Bowne 
rejects such a position. His chief argument against it is 
that a non-intelligent agency is incapable of producing an 
intelligent order. But since this is the very point at is-
sue, Bownets contention appears to be question-begging. In 
any case, he is convinced that it is by postulating a livi~ 
intelligence that the laws of nature beconB meaningful. So 
it is the first alternative that occurs to him. He believes 
it is the most coherent answer that can be given to the ques-
tion as to the source of order in the universe. It assimi-
lates the !'acts, he says, "to our own experience and offers 
the only ground of' order of which experience offers any sug-
gestion. nl Accordingly, "if we adopt this view, all the facts 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, pp. 69-70. 
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become luminous and consequent. ,.l It will be observed that 
Bowne is not saying that the cosmological argument amo'Qllts 
to a demonstration, ~~t that it is a reasonable hypothesis. 
In Bowne•s view the trouble with the teleological 
argument is that the appearance of plan and purpose in the 
universe on which it is based is that the appearance is not 
proof of the reality. Mechanism Cal explain the facts of 
nature and we need not go behind it. Moreover, the argument 
suffers from the untenable analogy it draws between human 
and cosmic purpose. Bowne declares: 
There is no analogy between human ac-
tivity and cosmic activity. We know that 
purpose rules in human action, but we have 
no experience of world-making and can con-
clude nothing concerning cosmic action. 
The distance is too great, and knowl~dge 
is too scant to allow any inference. 
Nor is Bowne satisfied with the argument that passes 
f~om the experience of minds in the universe to the affirma-
tion or a world-ground that is intelligent. This argument 
is merely a variant of the teleological argument, and is 
open to the same objections. The fact is that the existence 
of minds is not inconsistent with cosmic mechanism, just as 
mechanism is not incompatible with purpose. 
If inductive considerations fails to carry us very 
far towards proving the existence of an intelligent world-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. 10. 
2. Ibid., p. 89~ 
ground, there are speculative arguments that carry us fur-
ther. And Bowne proceeds to formulate his own version of 
such arguments. First he launches an attack on the mechan-
istic position, especially 'its conception of thought ·as it-
l self being a purely mechanical occurence. Mechanical cau-
sation rules out the possibility of freedom of thought, for 
if the acceptance or rejection of a belief depends on the 
relative strength or weakness of its antecedents, and not 
upon a judgment of its ·truth or falsity, then rationality 
is at an end. 2 Only where there is freedom can truth and 
freedom have any relevance. So Bowne writes: 
free. 
The rational mind must not be control-
led by its states, but must control 
them. It must be able to stand ·apart 
from its ideas and test them. It must 
be able to resist the influence of 
habit and association, and to undo the 
irrational conjunctions of custom. It 
must also be able to think twice, or to 
reserve its conclusion until the inner 
order of reason has been reached. Un-
less it can do this, all beliefs sink 
into effects, and the distinction of 
rational and ir~ational, of truth and 
error vanishes • .J 
Thought makes sense only on the assumption that it is 
Rationality demands freedom in the fin-
ite knower; and this, in turn, is incompat-
ible with necessity in the world-ground. 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. 124. 
2. Ibid.' p. 125. 
3 • Ibid • ' p • 12 5. 
This freedom does not, · indeed, i mply the 
power on the part of the mind to coerce 
its conclusions, but only to rule itself 
according to pre-conceived standards •••• 
there must be a law of reason in the mind 
with which volition cannot tamper; and 
there must also b·e the power to determine 
ourselves accordingly. Neither can dis-
pense with the other. The law of reason 
in us does not compel obedience, else er-
ror would be impossible. Rationality is 
reached only as the mind accepts tfe law 
and determines itself accordingly. 
Bowne's argument so far is then that the finite 
knower is free simply by virtue of being a knower, and 
further that this freedom is "incompatible with necessity 
in the world-ground. 112 Having established so much, Bowne 
turns to certain epistemological considerations in favour 
of tbe existence of God. The study of objective reality, 
he asserts, assumes the fact of law and system, or a uni-
versal adjustment of "each to all in a common scheme of 
order. n3 He says further that all study assumes that 
this system is an intelligible and rational one. "A ra-
tional cosmos is the implicit assumption of objective 
cognition. u4 Now this system appears to be extra-mental, 
yet the fact is: 
That the basal certainties of knowledge 
are not the ontological existence of mater-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. 126. 
2. Ibid., p. 126. 
3. Ibid., p. 127. 
4· Ibid., p. 127. 
ial and mechanical things, but rather the 
co-existence of persons, the community of 
intelligence and the system of common ex-
perience. And these are not ·given as spec-
ulative deductions, but as unshakeable 
practical certainties. We cannot live in-
tellectually at all without recognizing 
other persons than ourselves, and without 
assuming that the laws of intelligence are 
valid for all alike and that all hale the 
same general objects in experience. 
In this emphasis upon the co-existence of persons 
4o6 
as the basal certainty of knowledge, what Bowne is leading 
up to is that thought is not a mere passive reflection of 
thi17-gs, but an activity by which "the mind in knowing 
things is simply manifesting itself by putting its own laws 
and forms into and upon its experience."2 Bowne now moves 
a step towards abolishing the dualism between thought and 
thing. · Unless the thing-world has some semblance to the 
thought-world, knowledge would be impossible. And if it 
is possible, it is because thought and thing.s have the same 
laws. Hence "the thing-world is essentially a thought-world 
which roots in and expresses thought. •• 3 
To Bowne, therefore, knowledge involves a rational 
universe, a knowing human mind, or a community or such 
minds, and the identity of the categories of human thought 
with the principles of cosmic being. It presupposes fur~her 
that the mind's thought truly ponders the objective facts, 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. 128. 
2. Ibid., p. 130. 
3. Ibid., p. 130. 
and finally it involves an identity or rational nature in 
human beings.1 The whole process of knowing the world ap-
pears to suggest that here is a thinker at both ends - a 
supreme thinker behind the world and finite thinkers capa-
ble or knowing the world. "If nature," says Bowne, "ex-
presses the thought of a thinker beyond it, it is quite 
credible that we should find thought in it. 112 The exist-
ence of knowledge proves that the world is knowable, and 
this knowability testifies to the existence of a supreme 
thinker, who is God. Such is Bowne•s demonstration by way 
of epistemology, of the existence of God. 
Metaphysics to which Bowne turns next, reinforces, 
he thinks, this epistemological argument for God•s exist-
ence. It does so by adding considerations of its own to 
the argument against an independently existing material-
mechanical world. "Here metaphysics takes up and completes 
the argument for epistemology by showing that the self-
existent mechanical world on which atheism builds is a 
product of superficial sense thinking which understands 
neither itself nor its problem."3 Thus Bowne addresses 
himself to showing that neither space nor time can be con-
sidered as real existences apart from thought. They exist, 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. 132. 
2. Ibid., P• 134• 
3. Ibid., p. 135. 
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no less than sense objects, only in and for thought. Bowne•s 
position here seems to be weak and unclear. He writes: "All 
that takes place in space and time is at best only the move-
ment for translating the world of ideas into act and making 
it accessible to finite minds; but in itself and apart from 
this teleological ~~nction, the spatial and temporal fact 
is .nothing articulate or intelligible."1 
Time can have no final reality, Bowne further argues, 
because nothing can exist for the mind except through fixed 
timeless ideas. The case is that the mind grasps and fixes 
the temporal flow by timeless ideas which give the abiding 
meaning of which the temporal movement is the bearer of ex-
pression.2 Ideas as meanings are timeless realities and · 
"the world in space and time is a movement according to 
ideas and for the setting forth of ideas behind the movement, 
or immanent in it. 113 In other worlds, the real world is the 
thought world. This world, it is true, manifests under the 
forms of space and time, but does not exist in space and 
time as extra-mental realities. 
In Kantian :fashion Bowne asserts that ''space and 
time themselves are no proper existences apart from Mind. ,.4 
He goes further, maintaining that nothing that is really in 
1. Borden P. Bowne, . Theism, p. 137. 
2. Ibid., pp.l37-138. 
3. Ibid.' p. 138. 
4· Ibid.' p. 138. 
succession can exist at all, even time itself. And Bowne 
thinks the reason is simple. If everything were only in 
succession, everything would break up into an indefinite 
plurality; so that all unity, and hence all reality, would 
disappear. Assign an ontological status to time and real-
ity in any comprehensible sense must disappear. For real-
ity is either a unity or it is nothing. And this unity 
stems from the mind, Bowne claims. 
Again, 
Metaphysics shows that active intelli-
gence alone fills out the true notion of 
being, unity, identity, and causality. On 
the impersonal and mechanical plane these 
categories all vanish or contradict them-
selves.I 
A world of meanings presupposes mind, 
A system of relations ~plies intelligence 
as its source and seat. 
Now this intelligence in and for which the universe 
• exists ~s obviously not ours, so that "there must be a cos-
mic intelligence as its abiding condition, and in reference 
to which alone the affirmation of a universe has any mean-
ing. u3 But it is not to be supposed that world is merely a 
conception in the divine understanding; it is above all a 
form of divine activity. The terms real and rational as ap-
plied to the world signify its activity on the one hand and 
and its intelligibility on the other. Abstract as this argu-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. 140. 
· I 
2. !bid.' p. 141. 
3. Ibid~, p. 144· 
ment is, and unlikely to find favour except in speculative 
circles, it is yet, Bowne feels, in agreement with the 
facts. 
If we suppose the world is founded in 
intelligence, we find the facts in their 
great outlines agreeing thereto. There 
is a rational work according to methods, 
for intelligible ends. To be sure, our 
knowledge is limited, but, so far as we 
can understand, we find the marks of 
transcendent wisdom. 
Bowne puts the case for holding that the universe is found-
ed in intelligence even more strongly in the following pas-
sage. 
It seems plain that the belief in a 
free and intelligent ground or things is 
as well founded as any objective belief 
whatever, and that this belief is one 
which enters so intimately into our men-
tal life that philosophy and science, 
and even rati~nality itself stand or 
fall with it. 
(2) The World-Ground as Unconditioned Reality 
God is the supreme unity, self-dependent and self-
determined. As such he necessarily contains all his deter-
minations within himself, and can never be subjected to any 
law or development without self-contradiction. Only the fin-
ite and dependent can be so subject. · Of the divine reality 
Bowne writes: 
It is the source of law, not its sub-
ject. It founds necessity, instead of 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Theism, p. 148. 
2 • . Ibid~' p. 148. 
being ruled by it. Hence the infinite, or 
the independent, must always be regarded 
as the highest term of the universe in 
every respect. It is the complete and 
perfect fullness of life, power, wisdom, 
and goodness, of which the high~st fin-
ite is but the imperfect image. 
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Yet Bowne, while he insists that God is not condi-
tioned by anything beyond Himself, speaks as if there were 
limits within Himself. In The P.hilosophy of Theism he 
writes: 
The world-ground is, indeed, uncondi-
tioned by anything beyond itself; but it 
must be conditioned by its own nature in 
any case, and the question arises whether 
this conditioning involves temporal 2se-quence in the infinite life itself. 
Bowne is well aware of the serious speculative difficulties 
that are involved in such a view. He goes on to say: 
We should have to hold that the world-
ground is subject to ~ law of development, 
and comes only gradually to itself, or, 
rather, that there is some constitutional 
in the world-ground which forbids it always 
to be in fUll possession of itself. In 
fact we should have to limit to the extent 
of this necessity that free and self-center-
ed cause which reasons demands as the only 
adequate world-ground. In consequence rea-
son will always assume that the world-ground 
is strictly unconditioned until same necess3 ity is found for viewing it as conditioned. 
What is involved here is nothing less th~ the problem of 
· the relation of time to eternity. Elsewhere Bowne has been 
1. Borden P. Bowne, studies in Theism, pp. 269-270. 
2. Borden P. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 151. 
3. Ibid., pp. 151-152. 
concerned to show that time has no ontological status, yet 
he is here prepared to admit the possibility that God exists 
in tbne or time in God, who is the supr~e reality. It is 
clear that Bowne doesnot speak with one voice on this sub-
ject. In the Metaphysics he categorically asserts that God 
is changeless and eternal, selr-possessed and unconditioned. 
And of a being thus self-possessed, he writes: 
A being which is in fUll possession 
of itself, so that it does not come to 
itself successively, would not be in 
time. Such a being can be conceived 
as having a changeless knowledge and 
changeless lire. As such, it would be 
without manory and without expectation, 
but would be in the absolute enjoyment 
of itself .1 
It cannot be said that Bowne ever satisfactorily re-
solves this apparent contradiction in his ideas of God or 
the world-ground. If we may venture a guess as to the rea-
son ror Bowners vacillation between the idea or God as eter-
nal and God as being in time, it is this. More fundamental 
. . 
than anything else in Bowne's thought is the notion of per_; 
sonality, above all the personality of the divine being. 
Now it is difficult to ascribe personality to a being, who, 
ir he is out of time must be, in Bowne•s own words, "without 
memory and without expectation."2 Accordingly, he is prepar-
ed to say definitively that God is timeless, and he resorts 
to the somewhat makeshi:f"t theory that while God is not in 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 240. 
2 • Ibid • , p • 24 0 • 
time, time is in God. Bowne does the best he can with an 
old and intractable problem. 
(3) God as Supreme Personality 
Bowne will have nothing to do with the sort of theory 
which ascribes doubleness, of whatever sort, to. the personal-
ity of God. He is especially opposed to the view, associated 
with the name of Spinoza, according to which, God consists 
of thought on the one hand and extension on the other. He 
writes: 
Some have proposed to conceive the world-
ground as a double-faced substance; on the 
one aide extension and for.m, and on the other 
side life and reason. These two sides con-
stitute the reality of the outer and inner 
world respectively. This conception finds 
expression in Spinoza, and in many modern 
monistic systems. It is based upon the 
antiquated notion of substance as extended 
stuff, and jpon the fictitious abstraction 
of thought. 
No less antipathetic to Bowne is the conception of God as a 
transcendental x, as a pure something, whether pure will, 
intelligence, or what not. 
The world-ground has been called pure 
will, unconscious intelligence, imperson-
al reason, impersonal spirit, universal 
life, -etc. But these too are emp~ phrases, 
obtained by unlawf'ul abstraction. 
All such views are incompatible with personality 
properly understood. Personality is not to be confused with 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 123. 
2. Ibid., p ~ 124. 
pure corporeality, or pure form, or pure intelligence. Such 
things are mere abstractions. To Bowne personality is self-
knowledge and self-control. 
By personality, then, we mean only self-
knowledge and self-control. Where these 
are present we have personal being; wheri 
they are absent the being is impers·onal. 
It is personality in this sense that finds its highest ex-
pression in God, and exists only imperfectly in human beings. 
God is the infinite personality and he is unchangeable. But 
Bowne is quick to explain the sense in which he is using the 
term •unchangeable•. 
The unchangeability of God means only 
the constancy and continuity of the di-
vine nature which extends through al~ the 
divine acts as their law and source. 
Personality alone is capable of providing that abiding and 
identical principle which is superior to change and constant 
in change.3 And God is thus superior, always present, in 
that He comprehends all experience at once. In him all 
things exist as a totum simul. So far as the finite world 
is concerned, God is the law of ~ts activity, and the change 
that takes place in it is not a change in God but in thing& 
Bowne is here contending that "there may be a grasp of real-
ity which shall constitute it all present. If this were al-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, p. 128. 
2. Ibid., p. 146. 
3. Ibid., p. 147. 
lowed, the non-temporality of the world-ground would offer 
no dif.ficulty. 111 · 
c. Summary and Comparison 
It will have been evident from the foregoing that, 
without overlooking the differences between R~nuja•s con-
ception of God and Bowne• s, we may yet say that the like-
ness between them is still greater. Bowne's position is, 
of course, that of theistic personalism and there are su.f-
ficient indications in Rimanuja that his position is rough-
ly similar. To both thinkers God is the ground of all be-
ing, at once an immanent reality and at the swne time trans-
cendent. The immanence of God entails His agency in the 
world, while his transcendence emphasizes that He is more 
than the world and hence His apartness from it. In this 
way both thinkers avoid pantheism, though the case is less 
clear in Ram~nuja than in Bowne. Above all, to the one as 
to the other, the world-ground is of a personal nature. It 
-is only in personality that a truly unitary principle is to 
be ~ound. And God is such a principle. God is the ~ree and 
intelligent ground of things. He is the initiator of change 
in the world, while remaining Himself unchanged, While both 
thinkers deprecate all abstract approaches to God, Bowne be-
lieves that there are certain epistemological and metaphysi-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Philosophy of Theism, pp. 154-155. 
cal consideration which go some way towards proving His ex-
istence. But Ramanuja holds that His existence is evident 
only in what he calls direct perception or intuition. Fi-
nally for both thinkers God or the supreme personality is 
the seat and source of all such values as supreme bliss, 
supreme consciousness and absolute goodness. 
CHAPTER V 
CRITICAL CuMMENTS AND CONCLUSION 
The pitralls of a comparative study such as we have 
pursued in the foregoing pages are obvious enough, though 
by no means as avoidable as they are obvious. They are 
chiefly ef two sorts: on the one hand there is the tempta-
tion to see similarities where. none exist, or to magniry 
those that do. And on the other hand there is the danger 
of minimizing differences, even of overlooking them alto-
gether. And when the comparison is of two philosophers 
as far apart in time as Ramanuja and Bowne, the need for 
caution becomes especially great. While Bowne presents 
no special problems of exegesis, Rimanuja is an excessive-
ly difficult philosopher. No really definitive or criti-
cal text exists of his works, nor any tradition of commen-
tary upon them. It is as if we were to undertake a study 
of Aristotle's Metaphysics without the advantages of a good 
text of that work and in ignorance of the numerous commen-
taries, ancient, medieval and modern, that have served to 
illuminate it. 
Such are the difficulties, or some of them, that 
have attended our study, difficulties that we hardly dare 
claim to have surmounted altogether. The interesting thing 
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is that our philosophers, living in worlds as utterly dis-
similar as that of India in the 11th century and America in 
the 19th, yet have enough in common to make comparison be-
tween them fruitful. 
In this final chapter we shall recapitulate the 
agreements as well as disagreements between Rimanuja and 
Bowne, af~er whiCh we shall proceed to a consideration of 
certain crucial issues posed by their respectiye philoso-
phies. 
1. The Similarities Between Ramanuja and Bowne 
No philosopher starts his thinking in a vacuum, and 
Ramanuja and Bowne are no exceptions. The one as well as 
the other was well acquainted with the work of his prede-
cessors and drew generous l y upon them in constructing his 
own system. It is not surprising that both thinkers are 
most indebted to their idealistic forerunners at the same 
time that they are critical of them. In the case of Rima-
nuja he was influenced by such systems of thou~t as the 
Jaina, the Buddhistic, the Sankhya, the Yoga, and the 
Vedllntie. In the same way, Bowne learned his philosophy, 
thou~ as no merely passive pupil, from the idealisms of 
Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, and Lotze. He also owes 
a debt to Herbart who was not strictly an idealist. 
Ramanuja takes over from the Jaina system the idea 
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that reality consists of a plurality of selves, that these 
selves constitute a system in ter.ms of which all merely 
partial experience is to be judged. Again, inspired b7. 
ths Yogichira school of aubjectiTe idealism RUJ.Inuja is 
led to regard ultimate reality as being of the nature of 
mind or consciousness. F\lrther, he borrows from the Yogi.-
chira the notion that the Absolute Mind preaeryea in memo-
~ the entire past and that it is with the aid of this ac-
cumulated experien0e that God creates a new world upon the 
dissolution of the old. From the Sautrintika school of 
Buddhism, Rimanuja adopts the idea of levels of knowledge 
with its corollary that sense experience yields knowledge, 
albeit partial. In agreement with the Sa~a system 
Riminuja regards the self and matter as independent real-
ities, but be adds to this Tiew by his contention that the 
two are related or comprehended in God or Brahman. Like 
SankhJa he considers matter as eternal and unereated. Rami-
nuja•s link with the Yoga ayatem derives fram his emphasis 
upon purification of mind and body through concentration on 
Brahman as a means of final release. 
But it is especially to the absolute idealism of Sank-
hara that Rlmanuja is indebted. As in the one thinker, so 1n 
the other, consciousness is central, the basis of all knowl-
edge and experience. To Riminuja, howeTer, the absolute is 
not only a conscious personality, but a synthesis of all ita 
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deter.minations, a point which he emphasizes as against Sank-
hara for whom the Absolute ia pure undifferentiated thought. 
All knowledge, Riminuja insists, involves relation, as is 
testi~ied to by the very nature of judgment. Together with 
Sankara he holds that being is the absolute categor,, but 
unlike his predecessor he emphasizes the concrete mature o~ 
being. To emphasize anything else is to emphasize an abstrac-
tion, as indeed he accuses Sankara of doing. It is in this 
connection that Riminuja exhibits an affiliation with the 
dualistic system of thought represented -chiefly b,- lladhava. 
To both thinkers all knowledge is dete~inate knowledge. As 
for Riminuja's relation, finally, to the system of unity in 
di~ference, he agrees that the world can only be understood 
in relation to Brahman. It is with regard to this relation 
between the world and Brahman that Riminuja seems to differ 
from the proponents of unity 1n difference. To a greater 
extent than the,. he is anxious to preserTe the identity of 
the absolute self and at the same time 4o justice to the 
:ract o~ change. 
It is thus evident that Rimanuja chooses tboae ele-
ments in the thought of his predecessors 'which he is anxious 
to emphasize and develop in his own philosoplq. And Bowne 
does the same thing, and there is a parellelism between the 
things he borrows and those ~at Riminuja borrows, though 
this parallelism must not be pressed too hard. Leibniz, as 
Bowne himself tells us, furnishes the sta~ting point o~ 
his philosophy, though it is "~or the most part b7 atrict-
ly independent re~lections 11 that Bowne reaches his conclu-
sions.1 The theory of monads no doubt suggested to Bowne 
his conception of a plurality of selYea; just as Lei~niz•s 
theory o~ pre-established har.mony finds its counterpart in 
Bowne's notion of interaction according to which the very 
possibility of interaction depends upon the mediation o~ a 
supreme selt or God. FUrther, in describing his metaphJsi-
cal system aa Kantianized Berkeleianism, Bowne acknowledge• 
~s debt to Kant and Berkele7. The idea of realit7 as con-
sisting of immaterial aubstanoea, that is to say, spirits, 
human as well as divine, which undergoes a great develop-
ment at Bowne•s hands, bespeaks the influence o~ Berkele7 
aa well as Leibniz. But the important thing 'for Bowne is 
not so much Berkeley's tmmaterialism, bUt his emphasis upon 
the actiYity o~ spirits. Indeed, for Berkeley the proot o~ 
the existence o~ spirits is precisely their activity, their 
reality being proportionate to the degree or their activity, 
so that the auprem. reality ia God, who is pure actiTity. 
To Bowne, likewise, a distinctive mark o~ being resides in 
some power o~ action. In other words, to be is to act. But 
the conception o~ personality, as deYeloped b7 Bowne, while 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaphysics, "1st ed. pre~ace", 
p. Tii. 
ita seeds are to be found in Berkeley, goes beyond him, es-
pecially Bowne, more than Berkeley makes the will crucial 
in personality, and it is in personality that Bowne finds 
the model tor permanllJ).ce in change. For both Rim.inuja and 
Bowne God is the immanent principle of activity and order. 
Bowne's debt to Kant is great, though his divergen-
ces trom that thinker are perhpas still greater. To the 
one, as to the other, the categories are immanent mental 
principles in the absence or which experience would be im-
possible. What Bowne misses in Kant is a sufficient empha-
sis upon purpose, a category which for Bowne 'is the highest 
of all and to be round only in a self-active, self-dete~~ 
ning person. And Hegel was no doubt an influence in helping 
Bowne to develop this notion. For what Hegei has written 
about the character or mind is at many points in accord with 
what Bowne bas written about the character of the self, aboye 
all its purposive character. FUrther, Bowne•s emphasis upon 
the necessary intelligibility of reality echoes Hegel's dic-
tum that the real is the rational. He accepts, too, the He-
gelian notion that reality is an organic whole, though the 
notion undergoes a great em nge at his hands. It comes to 
mean an organic whole of purpose, in which the individual 
and his freedom so far from disappearing, play a central role. 
And in line with his conception of the primacy of personalit7, 
Bowne unlike Hegel, undertakes to explain the categories in 
terms or the self. To both thinkers reality is, above all, 
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conscious experience. 
In Bowne•• words it is Herbart who supplies Bowne 
with his method.1 The German thinker held that the task 
of metaphfsies is to bring experience under the law of non-
contradiction and so render it consistent and comprehensi-
ble. And the method he elaborates to this end is one which 
he calls the method of relations. Yet, in adopting this 
method of Herbart•s Bowne does not limit it merely to the 
search for logical consistency. Although BoWne is concern-
ed to reconstruct and correct the common sense categories 
b~ developing a critical and coherent view of tne concepts 
of experience, and ao employs Herbart•s method, he is also 
concerned to take a synoptic Tiew of experience and so do 
justice to experience in all its aspects, even those that 
cannot be brought within the scope of formal logic. 
If it ia Leibniz who "furnishes the starting point" 
and Herbart who "supplies the method n2 Bowne• s conclusions 
are largel7 Lotzean in character, although he reached them 
in hia own w~.3 As in Lotze, so in Bowne the distinctiTe 
mark or being is action, indeed, ~or both thinkers, being 
and action are inseparable. Realit~ is thus change, but it 
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metaph:fsics, "1st ed. pre:f'ace", 
p. vii. 
2. Ibid., p. vii. 
3. Ibid., p. vii. 
is also pennanence. And this permanence in change is best 
exemplified in the self. The self is the type of reality 
and it is by analogy with the self and its inner experiences 
that all else is to be interpreted. Space and time have no 
ultimate metaphysical reality, rather they are the forms or 
mental activity. In thus making the self the central fea-
ture of their metaphysics, both Bowne and Lotze sought to 
reconcile monism and pluralism, mechanism and teleology, 
realism and idealism. 
In the light of all this, it is fair to say that the 
philosophic influences that counted for most in the develop-
ment of' the thought of Ramanuja and Bowne were those spec-
ially calculated to fUrther a personalistic outlook. Both 
thinkers shy away from everything abstract in their philo-
sophic heritage and concentrate on those ideas and concep-
tions of their predecessors which emphasize the centrality 
of' the self. 
We turn now to a review of the ideas that Rama:nuja 
and Bowne share in common. First their methods of approach 
to the problems of philosophy are alike, though method is 
not a central preoccupation of either philosopher. Both 
are concerned to do justice to experience in all its as-
pects, extra-logical as well as logical, and to this end 
they employ a method which may generally be characterized 
as synoptic. It is a method that involves than in a re-
jection of the ~ priori and of all abstract universals, in 
the place of which they emphasize the concrete character 
of truth. Wholeness is the ideal of both thinkers, and 
the progress of knowledge is a progress towards this ideal, 
in a word, progress towards comprehension of the infinite 
self. Given their view that reality is intelligible, it 
is not surprising to find that Ramanuja and Bowne see the 
criterion of truth as lying in coherence. Such a criter-
ion is bound up with what they envisage as the truth about 
the world, namely, that it is a system of selves or a com-
munity of persons. 
In their epistemologies both thinkers hold that knowl-
edge to be trusted demands a metaphysical ground, so that ::fbr 
:Ramanuja as for Bowne, the theory e>f knowledge is inseparable 
from the theory of being. In the last analysis it is God who 
is the guarantor of the possibility of knowledge, just as 
God • s unfolding in the world is the basis of the dynamic cb.aiL 
acter of knowledge. In Bowne the point is expressed in his 
insistence that human knowledge .is not merely a passive re-
f1ection of the world, but an activity underlying which is 
the divine activity. To Ramanuja, all finite knowledge in-
volves a passage from the indeterminate to the determinate~ 
an activity which distinguishes as it unites, and both the 
distinctions and the unity are expressions of the divine 
mind in the process of its unfolding. Both philosophers 
agree that the starting point or knowledge ia aense exper-
ience, and agree further that at the sense level, as at all 
others, mind or consciousness ia the conatitutiYe principle. 
Again they agree that among the aources or knowledge, in ad-
dition to perception and inference, there ia intuition by 
whicn truth is directly appropriated witnout the intermedia-
tion or discursive reasoning. And both accept authority as 
a still fUrther source or knowledge. To both alike the judg-
ment is the prime unit or knowledge, the exemplar on the log-
ical level or the pervasive principle or unity in difference. 
In their metaphyaics the two thinkers are agreed in 
their rejection of the idea of pure being as an empty abstrac-
t ion. Being as known. to ua is always qualified and determi-
nate being. Further, being is not an inert aubstam e, but a 
process of activity. It is causal, a system or dynamic rela-
tionships. The most significant point or resemblance between 
the two thinkers is their conception of being as a conscious 
subject. And it is this conception that 1 eads them both to 
stress the concrete character of being. In Riminuja this 
conscious subject is equated witft Brahman, while in Bowne 
it is equated with the world-ground or God. In either caa~ 
it is the principle of all ~t exists, one and eternal, yet 
manifesting itself in time and in change. Taking their cue 
from this supreme principle, whose nature is personal and 
conscious, both thinkers conc•ive of causality not merely as 
mechanical but purposive. For both believe that the clue 
to the real nature of eausalit'1 is only to be found in the 
aelf and its activities. The highest expression of this 
causalit'1 derives from the activity of the abaolute self, 
whiCh is at once the cause and the goal . of all process, 
immanent and transcendent at the same time. 
Central to both Riminuja•s and Bowne•s conception of 
the world is the notion of self. Both emphasize the self aa 
knower, both agree that the self is the baaia of the uni"tl' 
of knowledge, both ascribe causal agency to the aelf. Fur-
ther, they agree that the finite selves are in some wa'1 com-
prehended within the supreme a_elf, ,-et not lost in it, ha~ 
an autonomy and freedom of their own. But it is by virtue 
or their relationship to the infinite aelf that the finite 
selvea achieve any measure of truth or insi~t. 
To both thinkers the world comea into being as a re-
sult of the activity or God, but whereas Bowne subacribea to 
an outright theory or creation~ Riminuja appears to believe 
that the world develops out of the matter of Brahman. But 
the two thiakera are at one in holding that this world once 
was not and came into existence by an act of t .he divine will. 
Further, the will of God continuoual,- manifeata itself in 
the world, and the world is under His constant auperinten-
denee. What transpires in the world can only be understood 
ultimately in terms of a divine plan and purpoae. Indeed, 
it is this teleological character of the world which ia its 
moat perTasiYe and deepest teature. Thus no merely mechan-
istic explanation can reYeal the whole truth about the world. 
Mechanism itself ia Onl'J intelligible in relatioa to the 
absolute aelf and its purposes. To the · question Wh'J a world 
exists at all, Riminuja and Bowne give similar answers. To 
the one as to the other, the world is a moral proving ground. 
Im Riminuja• s somewhat paradoxical view, it is a means to the 
release ot the indiYidual aelvea trom the law of Kar.ma; while 
in Bowne•s Yiew the world exists to further a supreme good, 
which is a camnunity ot moral persona. 
Neither thinker is disposed to oyerlook the problem 
of evil in the world; both grapple with it honestl"J~ and both 
seek to aYoid the usual cut and dried tormulas in dealing 
with it. They are both agreed in retusing to place responsi-
bility tor the existence ot evil upon the absolute selt. 
Both endow the selt with free will, and it is by the exerciae 
or his tree will that man errs, just as it is by the same ex-
ercise that he redeems himself. It is open to man to bring 
his will into conformity with the will ot God. Thia is hia 
highest good, one which he is free to choose or not. But it 
should be pointed out that Riminuja's conception ot human 
freedom is 1 ess absolute than Bowne • s. 
To bring our sUJmnary to a head, we :may sa'J that tor 
both Riminuja and Bowne there ia an ultimate principle which 
explains all things and sustains them. And most important 
of all~ they are agreed that the nature of this principle 1s 
personal. And all selves less than this ultimate principle 
are themselves active personalities distinct from each other 
and from the divine personality. The real is the personal~ 
and there are a plurality of reals~ and hence of selves 
which are welded into a system by the activity of the supreme 
self. This supreme self is the free and intelligent ground 
of all being~ resident in the world where his agency is evi-
dent~ yet transcending the world. He is the initiator of 
change~ while remaining himself unchanged. He is the source 
of all values. And these values are all anchored in perso-
nality. Can the existence of such a God be proved? Both 
our thinkers adduce proofs, but neither is under the illus-
ion that these proofs amount to absolute demonstration. To 
Ramanuja, though less so to Bowne, more important than proof 
is the religious life itself, the conviction that comes not 
from speculation but from religious practice. 
2. Differences Between Rimanuja and Bowne 
No student of the philosophies of Ramanuja and Bowne 
can help being struck from the beginning by the difference 
in the feel and texture of the tl"x>ught of the two men, struck 
as he may be at the same tine by the resemblances between 
them. Of course, •feel• and •texture• are subjective things~ 
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but they are nonetheless real tor that, as real as the par-
ticular points or difference that we shall proceed in a mo-
Bent to enumerate. Our philosophers move in two different 
worlds, and though we are not prepared to go as tar as a 
recent writer in accentuating the chasm between East and 
Weat,l indeed our whole theaia would remove this chasm, at 
least so far as Riminuja and Bowne are concerned, it ia yet 
true that there are profound differences between Eastern 
and Western modes of thought. The recent writer who.m we 
.. 
have just mentioned puts his finger on an eapeciall7 far-
reaching difference. He writes: 
The Eastern mind, attracts and pene-
trates the non-subject in manifold ways 
ao as to divest it of as much of ita 
otherness as possible. But it reaches 
its clearest expression when the subject 
returns to and is alone with itself. Tbua 
the central problem of the East consists 
in the relation of the aubjeet to itself. 
And inseparable from this relation, is ita 
discovery of the real subject. · It can 
thus be seen how identification is opera-
tive in the subjective attitude and how 
it triumphs in the subjeet•s coincidence 
with the absolute subject • . The West, oa 
the contr&l'J, aims at the discovery of 
the absolute object as ita main target 
and revolves round tbe problema of the 
relation between subject and object ·. Uni-
ting the variet7 of things which ita ob-jective attitude creates in every field 
of existence, is the method 1~ employs 
to achieve its final purpose. · 
l. William s. Haas, The Destiny of the Mind, (Mac-
Millan Co., New York, 1956). 
2. Ibid., p. 119. 
And he goes on to say: 
When as in the East the subject is posi-
ted first, it becomes the central unit. Cor-
respondingly the non-subject - the other -
will then appear as multiplicity, as the in-
different, unorganized juxtaposition of the 
phenomenon. And the appropriate way of deal-
ing with and disposing of this multiplicity 
will be to reduce as much as possible the 
number .of its components and to bring the 
rest closer to the subject for potential ul-
timate identification with the subject. This 
then is the structure of the Eastern mind -
juxtaposition and identity. On the other 
hand, in the West it is the object that is 
posited first. And in this case the world 
facing the subject constitutes the great 
object. Despite its multifariousness it 
does not fall apart. Man enters the cosmos 
as a part and his effort to organize the 
phenomena assumes quite consistently the 
form unity in variety. In the end we see 
therefore that these two structures are can-
posed of two parts. The base consists of 
variety in the West as juxtaposition in the 
East. The operative device is unification 
as contrasted with identification.l 
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This is a shrewd observation, though like all histori-
cal generalizations it is not to be taken too absolutely. It 
is precisely Bowne's emphasis upon the subject or self that 
brings him into relation to Indian thought, and to Ramanuja 
in particular. But whereas Ramanuja was working within a 
tradition, Bowne in some measure was revolting against a 
tradition. It is for this reason perhaps, that Ramanuja•s 
personalism is more thoroughgoing than Bowne•s. It is more 
single-minded, more focused upon consciousness itself in 
1. William s. Haas, The Destiny of the Mind, pp. 119-
120. 
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co tradistinction to the objects of conaciouaness. With re-
gard to this preoccupation with consciouaness in itsel~, Haaa 
writes with such perceptiYenesa that we cannot ~orbear quot-
ing bim once more. 
In exploring the potential states of con-
aciousmeas the East disregards to the utmost 
possible degree contents and objectiTes. More-
OYer, this exploration is not aohieYed by the-
oretical speculatiom on their nature, but by 
realizing them. Or te expreas the same ~act 
in another way, the East uses speculation 
mainly as a means to realization. Because 
or the intrinsic relation between b!ing and 
cognition this cannot be otherwise. 
Raminuja illustrates the point well. For him philosophy is 
not merely an exerciae of the thinking power and thought o~ 
man, but or his whole being. It is a vray or li~e. Haas 
further states: 
Western cognition •••• is preoccupied with 
the objects o~ consciousness, be they ·p~­
sioal or non-pbJaical, and it is intent on 
building them into conceptual systems. In 
Plato's realm ef ideas all the ideu which 
constitute the huaan soul are to be round, 
such as unit7, the good, the just, or the 
ideas pertinent to reason as the true and 
the ltke. This should be stressed because 
one looks in Tain for the idea of the sub-ject, the self, the personality. So like-
wise When Aristotle defines the supreme 
beiag, the absolute, in the ~personal ter.m 
of the knowing of knowing, this definition 
is open to misinterpretation if translated 
by self-knowledge. ¥owhere is there an 
tmmediate relatioBship between knowledge 
and the object of knowledge on the one hand, 
and the subject on the other. Still less 
is there an7 inherent dependence on the 
1. Wi lliam s. Haas, The Deatinz o~ the Mind, p. 171. 
subject of knowledge and the contents of 
knowledge.1 
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Bowne is leas subject to this charge than most Western think-
ers, but subject to it he is in some measure, and the degree 
of that measure is the degree or his difference from Raminuja. 
With this general but real difference between East-
ern and western thought in mind, we proceed to a ~r.J of 
the particular differences between Riminuja and Bowne. We 
begin with their theories of knowledge. 
There is far less emphasis in Rimanuja than in Bowne 
upon the conceptual aspect of cognition, not that the Indi~ 
thinker is unaware of the importance of the concept, but 
knowledge for him is more than conceptualization. All knowl-
edge, he recognizes, involves a process which comes to fruit-
ion not in a concept but in a state of being. True, knowl- . 
edge inyolves perception, inference, intuition, even author-
it~, but it involves these only as it involves the whole 
being of the knower. Again, Rimanuja is aware that involved 
in all knowledge is the subject-object . relation, or better, 
the subject-other relation, but the otherness that confronts 
consciousness is not the antagonistic substantial1t~ suggest-
ed by the term object. RatO,r it is qualitative and as such 
absorbed in the activit7 or consciousness. Indeed, the whole 
object of experience, cognitive and other, is the achieve-
ment or an immediate relation between the world and subject. 
1. Wtlliam s. Haas, The Destinz of the Mind, p. 171. 
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In contrast to Bowae • s theory which, we think, may be char-
acterized as epistemological dualism, Riminuja holds to a 
presentative theory according to which what we know are not 
mental entities which stand tor the objects known, but the 
objects themselvea. In line with our Indian thinker's view 
of knowledge as a form or being, a state or consciousness, 
that is lucid and selt-autricient, rather than theoretical 
insight, he does not, like Bowne, draw up a categorial 
scheme. Such a scheme, while it serves to link subject and 
object, also bas the effect of keeping them apart, at least 
of separating the known object from the metaph~sical object. 
For Raminuja the progress or knowledge consists precisely 
in a recession from otherness. Hence, he has little, if 
anything, to say about epistemological categories. Indeed, 
the concept generally plays a lesser role in Rlminuja than 
in Bown•, for in the one the aim is to overcome the gap be-
tween subject and object, while in the other it is to med-
iate between than, and to this end the concept is an indis-
pensable instrument.1 In justice to Bowne, it should be 
added that, as illlportant as the concept is :for him, it is 
the aelr which heals the disparity between subject and ob-
ject. On the whole it is true to say that the mind playa 
a leas creative role in Riminuja than in Bowne. 
In the m.etaph:ys ies or Riminu ja we find no such a 
l. cf. William S. Haas, The Destiny of the Mind, p. 182. 
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searching examination of the notion of cause such as is to 
be found in Bowne, though both thinkers agree that purpose 
is inseparable trom true causation. But the dif':t'iculty is 
that we tind no clear notion of cause in Rlminuja, nor does 
he appear to regard the problem. as an important one. And 
this is no doubt owing to the fact that nature ard natural 
science play little part in his system. He baa little or 
ao idea or aature as ruled bJ the law ot Gauaation. Hature 
la.erself' is esaeatially life and ita lawa are thoae of' li:t'e 
and consciousness. And it is f'rom ianer experience that we 
understand •auaality. We f'ind the idea in Bowae, too, but 
we find much more besides, aboTe all his critique of' mech-
anistic eauaatioa. Such causation has only a limited Talid-
ity and stands in contrast to the true type of' causality 
Whieh manitests itself' ia a aelf-aotiye and self-determd~ 
person. As compared with Bowne's highly deTeloped personal-
iatie theory of causality, Riminujats treatment remains 
leas clear and meagrely· deTeloped. 
As in the case or causality, so with regard to the 
problem of change and identity, both our thinkers look to 
the self tor a solution of the problem. But here again we 
f'ind differences between Riminuja and Bowne, Riminuja dia-
t1nguishea the self or soul trom consciousness, the one be-
ing permanent and unchanging, the other experiencing both 
the changing and the permanent. So it is not the soul that 
~6 
changes but consciousness. Now Bowne, on occasion, speaks 
as if both change and identity were fUnctions of the self. 
At other times he appears to espouse ~Anuja•s view that 
it is the self or soul as such which is per.manent and un-
changing. Change itself is ascribed by both thinkers to 
the activity of God, with this difference, that the activity 
of Brahman, in whom matter in some form exists, is a mater-
ially mediated activity, while in Bowne God's activity in 
the material world is the energizing of his will. Thus the 
phenomenal world for Bowne comes into being by an outright 
act of constant creation on the part of God, while for Rima-
nuja the material of the world is in some sort present in 
Brahman from the start, though for the one thinker as for 
the other all change is initiated by the supreme self. 
It is with regard to the status of space and time 
that our two thinkers appear to be farthest apart. Raminu-
jats treatment of the problem is anything but clear, but in 
whatever sense he is using the terms space and time, he ~ms 
to assign to them an ontological co-existence. What else 
can he mean when he speaks of space and time as coeval with 
Brahman? It might be said that by space and time here Ri-
m§nuja has in mind not the space and time of the phenomenal 
world, but a noumenal space and time. But there is no 
trace of such a distinction in Ramanuja, assuming that the 
distinction has any meaning in the first place. True, RmmA-
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nuja., assuming th.at the distinction has any meaning in the 
first place. True, Rim~nuja does speak ot time as a special 
power by which Brahman unfolds his actiTity, but there is no 
reason to belieTe that by •special power' he means time in 
some special sense. Ot course, given his Yiew of cycles of 
existence, Ramanuja, it may be, conceiTes of time as being 
more than one dimensional and linear. But whether he does 
or not, the question remains, what precisely is the status 
of t~e and space in the philosophy of Riminuja? We are in-
clined to think that he assigns them an ontological status, 
as Bowne does not, certainly so far as space is concerned. 
For the latter thinker the reality of space and, perhaps, of 
time, is a purely phenomenal reality. Concerning this whole 
question or space and tine in Riminuja, it should be borne 
in mind that what he is trying to do in his metaphysics is 
to so interpret ult~ate reality as to diminish the distance 
between it and the finite subject. And it is in keeping with 
this effort that he should regard time and space as objective. 
So, too, it may at first sight seem odd to assign a body, 
howeTer ethereal, to Brahman, but when we remember that in 
Indian thougnt the aniaate and inanimate do not stand in 
sharp opposition to one another, the oddity becomes less. 
And t'urther, it is on this account that Riminuja has less 
trouble than Bowne with the mind-body problem. Since the 
psychical and the physical are not for Riminuja stark oppo-
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sitos, he can adopt a relatively straightforward theory ot 
interaction, as Bowne, tor whom they are opposites, cannot. 
Bowne is obliged to tall back upon God as tm mediator be-
tween the two. Nor is he able to explain how two such di-
Terse things as mind and bod~ coae to be associated in the 
first place, except to say that mind and body are created 
together through the energizing of God•s will. 
Although the self plays a central role in the philoa-
ophies or both men, it cannot be said that Riminuja and 
Bowne view the self in quite the same wa,.. For one thing, 
they differ in their views of the relation or the finite 
self to the infinite self. Although Bowne allows or an in-
teraction between them, it is difficult to see how this 
takes place, given the gulf that separates man from God. 
Riminuja aToids this dilemma by making the aelvea parts or 
aspects or the •body' of Brahman. The selTes, he says, 
proceed from Brahman as rays proceed from the sun. Accord-
ingly the finite self tor Rlmlnuja enters into the closest 
possible relation with the supreme ~eality, which is Brah-
man, so close iadeed as to suggest the loas of the self in 
the Absolute. But as Haas points out "the idea or a Godhead 
which exists in and tor itself and is essentiall1' independent 
or man•s selt,"1 is one that does not exist in Indian phil-
osophy at its peak. Nor is this all. In Riminuja the ea-
1. William s. Haas, The Destin7 of Mind, p. 140. 
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sence o~ the sel~ is consciousness divested of all that 
stands in opposition to it. The polarit~ of subject and ob-
ject which is characteristic o~ Western wa~s of thought and 
which b~ Tarious deTiees Western thinker• haTe sought to 
oyercome never appears with the same sharpness in Riminuja 
as it appears in Bowne. The decisiTe datQm tor Rimanuja ia 
not the self that reasons and conceptualizes, but selrhood 
as a condition of being, as a state of consciousness striT-
ing to become an untarnished mirror, so to speak. 
In contrast to Bowne's ~ar more empirical view of the 
sel~, Rlmiauja's aa~ be characterized as ·~•tical. And aa 
mystical, it is open to the criticism that it involves not 
the at~irmation ot selthood, but its dissolution in Brahman. 
In behalf o~ Bowne, it should be pointed out that he is thor-
ough!~ aware ot the risk he runs in emphaaizing the all-
embracing character of the ultimate one. Accordingly, he 
iasists that, unlike anything else in the universe, it is 
ael.thood alone, finite spirit, that "attains to substantial 
otherness to the infinite."1 
Both our thinkers assert the treedom o~ the wi11, but 
here too there are differences between them. We have seen 
that the category or causality plays a far more important 
role in the philosophy ot Bowne than in that of Riminuja. 
And because ot this, Bowne is faced with the problem ot re-
1. Borden P. Bowne, Metap~siea, p. 137. 
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conoi1ing freedom with causal necessity, or at any rate is 
faced with it in a far more -important form than is Riminuja. 
To an unsympathetic critic it might appear that for Bowne 
freedom is simply the negation of necessity and that man as 
endowed with freedom is aet over against the rest of the un-
iverse. Now, with regard to the 1atter charge, if charge it 
be, there is a meaaure or truth in it. Indeed, more than a 
measure, for Bowne is concerned to anphasize that selfhood 
alone or all things in nature marks off the finite from the 
infinite. As for the self's freedom it exists not as the 
negation of necessity but as an expression of the infinite 
purpose of which necessity itself is a part. None of these 
refinements is to be found in Riminuja. Unhindered by any 
considerations of oauaality, be views freedaa as something 
achieved, though the latter idea is present in Bowne, too. 
The fact ia that free wi11 1s not a problem in the philoso-
P~ of Riminuja, certainly not a problem to be solved by rea-
son. The freedom with which he is concerned ia not so auch 
freedom of the will as the freedom of consciousness, con-
sciousness which is tor h±m, the very life of the se1f. 
This disposition to set up experience, especially 
mystical experience, over against reason, is more aarked in 
Riminuja than in Bowne. Indeed, mystical eXperience hardly 
figures in the philosophy of Bowne. Moreover, his transcen-
dental eMpiricism rules out such opposition. Reaaon is it-
self a part of experience. There are intimations of this 
idea in Riminu ja, but his lapses from it are numerous. The 
intimations as well as lapses are evident in his attitude 
towards the possibllit~ of proying the existence ot God. On 
the one hand, he insists that the existence or God is evi-
denced only in and ·through a certain state of consciousness. 
God is not a matter or demonstration, or rather the demon-
stration itself is the state of consciousness. On the other 
hand, he is not disposed to dispense with reason altogether. 
If its deliverances are inconclusive with regard to the ex-
istence of God, it is yet able to throw light upon His nature. 
3. Same Critical Issues 
To the positivist temper of mind, which is today the 
prevailing temper in philosophy, Riminuja and Bowne must ap-
pear as hopelessly vague and their metaphysics a farrago or 
nonsense. But one need not subscribe to the fashionable 
shibboleths of the moment to see that there is much vague 
language and confused thinking in both our philosophers. 
There is nothing surprising or objectionable in this, cer-
tainly no cause for dismissing the possibilitJ of metaphy-
sics altogether. In fact, it may be said of 'metaphysics, 
as Emerson said or reason, that'when me you fly, lam the 
wings." The positivist who decries metaphysics will usual-
ly be found with a metaphysical proposition or two. What 
for example, is the verification principle, if not a meta-
p~sioal hypothesis? And those who devote themselTes to 
linguistic analysis, are they completely innocent? One 
need read only Gilbert Ryle's ~Concept 2! Mind1. to con-
vince oneself that they are not. 
Neither the metaphysics of Riminuja nor that of Bowne 
is preposterous, but both are fairly open to criticism at 
certain points. In the preTious section we touched upon 
some of these and we call attention to some crucial issues 
in what follows. 
We begin with Riminuja. His philosophy is not easy 
to criticize, for it depends less on clear cut concepts than 
on insight and intuition. First, it is difficult to make out 
precisely what Riminuja means by "identity-in-and-through-
and~because or difference." . The phrase is a translation of 
the name he gives his philosophy, namely, Visistidvaita. It 
is thus apparent that the idea is or the first importance 
ror him. What, in the most general way, he means to suggest 
by it is a type of qualified non-dualit7. At the same time, 
as we have seen, Riminuja is highly critical of such logical 
and metaphysical categories as identity, difference, aDd 
identity-in-difference, and of ' the philosophies which at~ 
from them. Hence it appears, since he bdmaelf is a propo-
1. Gilbert Byle, The Concept of Mind, (New York: Barnes 
and Nohl,e, 1949). 
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nent or identity-in-difference, that he must be using the 
phrase in some special sense. But it is extremely difficult 
to discover what · this sense is. It refers no doubt to his 
conception of self-experience; it refers also to his partic-
ular brand of empiricism. So far as it affects his view of 
the relation of the finite selves to the infinite self, the 
situation is this. On the one hand he ·ts not quite prepared 
to admit that the finite selves are different from the in-
finite self; on the other hand he is concerned to preserve 
the distinction between them, and for this purpose he em-
ploys the notion or juxtaposition, itself hardly a lucid 
idea. 
According to Riminujat s interpreter$, be is primar-
ily opposed to two types or identity-in-difference theory, 
as these bear on the self. Accordir.g to the first, the 
self is nothing but Brahman imagined as limited by some ex-
traneous or accidental adjunct; according to the second · the 
self is merely a mode of Brahman, or Brahman as he asSUllles 
a finite fora. To the first of these theories Rimi~uja's 
objectioa is that since it holds that the .self is reallT 
Brahman (the distinguishing or limiting adjunct being iaa~­
in&rr) it follows that imperfections or the self are aiso 
the imperfections of Brahman. In the s~e way, the second 
theory, by reducing Brahman to the dimensions of the finite 
self, is bound to ascribe to the for.mer the imperfections 
or the latter. In the one case, identity becones diversity 
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owing to a misconception; in the othe~ identity ceases to be 
identity and becomes a plurality. As against these views, 
Ramanuja argues that the whole is a whole of distinguishable 
parts, though as a whole it differs from its parts. At the 
same time the whole is in every part, though it does not on 
that account cease to be one. Yet it is difficult to see 
how, if the whole is present in every part, it escapes being 
a plurality. Nor is it any easier to see how, if the whole 
is distinct from its parts, it can have any relation to its 
parts. 
The infinite self is one. Ramanuja insists upon that. 
He also recognizes the existence o£ multiplicity, indeed, the 
one is the ground o£ the many. Yet it cannot be said that 
Ramanuja ever satisfactorily explains the relation between 
the one and the many, the finite and the infinite. In strug-
gling with the problem Ramanuja tends to sacrifice difference 
to identity. Not· that this is his intention, but identity 
in the history of philosophy has proved to be a voracious 
category. Nor does Ramanuja manage to right the balance be-
tween the one and the many by placing the relationship in a 
special category, a category called •inseparability• or 
aprataksthiti. For the category is itself in need of ex-
planation, and it receives none. It marks a mystery rather 
than throws light upon it. 
God, the £inite selves, and the material world are 
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the chier counters in the philosophy of Ramanuja and all 
of them are regarded as indefeasibly real. Now souls and 
matter are said to be attributes of God. · We are left in 
the dark as to the sense in which they are attributes. Cer-
tainly, it is not in a Spinozistic sense, for Ramanuja 
speaks as if souls and matter were also substances. But 
substance is no better defined than attribute. If substance 
is that which exists in itself and is conceived through it-
self, how can souls and matter, as Rrom~nuja conceives them, 
be dependent upon God? And if they are attributes, how can 
they have, as Ramanuja supposes, any independence of God? 
It hardly helps to say, as Ramanuja does, that considered 
in themselves souls andmatter are substances, while in re-
lation to God ' they have to be considered as His powers or 
inseparable attributes. But the whole point is that if 
souls and matter are attributes, they cannot be considered 
in themselves, and if they are substances ,they cannot be so 
only relatively. For while there may be degrees of truth, 
it is dirficult to conveive of degrees of substantiality. 
If we look at the matter from the side of Brahman, another 
difficulty comes into view. It will be recalled that the 
selves and matter are regarded by Ramanuja as constituting 
the body of Brahman. But along with this, by no means eas-
ily grasped conception of Brahman, Rimanuja maintains the 
unlimited and autonomous nature or Brahman. Yet it seems 
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clear that if Brahman has a body, he must be limited by it, 
however subtle that body may be. 
happens to the unity of Brahman? 
And what in that ease 
It is not easy to make 
sense of all this, shrouded as it is in mystery. 
Nor is it easy to make out the exact sense of Rima-
nuja' s pluralism. When he talks about the relation of the 
selves to Brahman, it is in terms largely of their insepa-
rability. Yet with regard to the actiyities of the sel£, 
its striving to conform with the will of Brahman, he ·speaks 
as if the self were independent, capable of free choice. Now 
if the selves belong to Brahman, either this free choice 
is illusory, or else Brahman has two wills, one finite, the 
other infinite, whiCh is to introduce a disunity into the 
divine nature. True, Ramanuja holds that the individual 
selves exist as independent units within Brahman. But the 
manner of such existence is not explained, at least in t~s 
that are not disruptive of the self-identity of Brahman. 
Still another difficulty plagues the pluralism of Ramanuja. 
If, as he seems to hold, the individuating principle is mat-
ter, so that what distinguishes one self fram another is its 
body, it follows that, their bodies apart, there is no real 
plurality of souls. And since, according to .R!miinuja the 
souls are engaged in freeing themselves of the encumbrances 
of matter, it would appear that they are engaged in freeing 
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th~selves of their self-identity. 
It is by the will of Brabna.n that all change occurs, 
though Brahman h±aself never changes. Other philosophers, 
of course, haTe maintained a doctrine of the same sort, but 
Rimanuja is faced with a special difficulty. For, as we 
have seen, Riminuja endows Brahman with a body constituted 
of the aelTes and matter, and all changes in the world, as 
indeed the world itself, haTe Brahman•s body as their effi-
cient cause. How then can change occur without change in 
Brahman himself? The fact is that with regard to this whole 
problem of change Raminuja is singularly unilluminating. 
If we were to sum up our criticism of Rimanuja in a 
word, it would be that he bas failed to explain how, given 
the absolute unity of God, a plurality of independent 
selves is conceiyable. Yet in all fairness we must add 
that the problem is of all metaphysical problems the thorn-
iest, and if Riminuja has failed to solye it, so likewise 
have all other philosophers who have grappled with it. 
We turn aow to our critic!~ of Bowne. »one of the 
criticisms that may be leTelled at Bowne's philosop~ ia 
suCh as seriously to impair the validity of his insight in-
to the personalistic nature of reality. He ia a profoundly 
serious thinker, deToted to system, but not at the expense 
of the facta. The temper or his thought is empirical. Ab-
stractions are anti-pathetic to him, and his attention is 
always focused on the field of life and action rather than 
on what are to him the barren wastes or formal logic. A 
metaphysician in the great tradition, Bowne takes all exper-
ience for his province, intent on distilling its deepest 
significance. He is a moralist ·to the core, but he does 
not try to deduce the moral life from a theory, but a theo~ 
from moral lite.l If' .he is concerned to establish the ra-
tional character of' the world, it is not by OTerlooking the 
other aspects of· reality, such as feelings, interests, and 
urges. The result is that Bowne, to a greater degree than 
most philosophers, aToids the common fallacy of' mistaking 
the part f'or the whole. 
But the excellences or Bowne's system of philosophy 
need no defense here. That there are also weaknesses in it 
is certainly no cause tor surprise. Among these is Bowne •a 
general assumption that the universe must be rational. We 
have every sympathy with the assumption, but can it be jus-
tified in the wholesale fashion in which Bowne adopts it? 
Is it not rather a working hypothesis whose justification 
can neTer be anything but piecemeal? Reality is rational 
only to the extent to which we find rationality in it. To 
go beyond this is to belie the very empiricism which is so 
marked a feature of Bowne•s procedure in general. Either 
i. E. c. Wia=, Studies in Philoso~b:y and Theology , 
(New York: Abingdon .Press, 1922), pp. l. .;.;zo. 
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Bowne's principle of intelligibility is a tautology, so that 
whatever is not rational is simply dismissed as unreal; or 
else, if taken as . a universal principle, it .must be as an 
assumption. And the question arises whether it is a necess-
ary or even reasonable assumption. One might admit its rea-
sonableness without conceding its necessity. We do not 
think that Bowne has succeeded altogether in showing its 
necessity. 
Bowne's emphasis upon wholeness is admirable, but 
such emphasis as it bears upon the theory of truth is beset 
by the danger of scepticism. If nothing is wholly true ex-
cept the whole truth, human knowledge is condemned to a 
perpetual partiality. Truth becomes a humanly unattainable 
ideal. Now Bowne is no sceptic, yet he seems to propose a 
theory of truth which if pressed very hard leads to scepti-
cal consequences. For entering into that theory, at least 
as one of its elements, is the notion of coherence. The 
fact is that Bowne's discussion of the nature of truth 
suffers from his failure to distinguish clearly between a 
theory and a criterion of truth. In other words, it is not 
clear whether he is proposing coherence as the key to the 
meaning of' truth, or whether he is setting up coherence as 
a criterion of truth. And with regard to this latter there 
is an ambiguity. It may mean that coherence is an important 
criterion after an attested body of truth has been acquired. 
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Or it may mean something far more dubious, namely, that co-
herence is the test of truth in general, and in this sense 
the coherence criterion is inseparable from the theory that 
the meaning of truth is coherence. On a sympathetic read-
ing of Bowne, it is doubtless the case that what he has in 
mind is the coherence criterion in the limited sense in 
which it is separable from a coherence theory of truth. 
And what makes this all the more likely is his acceptance 
of such other criteria as workableness and verifiability, 
an acceptance which would be ~possible if he were pledged 
to a coherence theory. In any event, it is not easy to fol-
low Bowne•s discussion of the problam of truth, plagued as 
it is by ambiguities. The whole matter constitutes one of 
the darker places of his philosophy. 
Bowne•s theory of knowledge is a massive achievement 
I 
and it is not to belittle that ~chievement to say that his 
theory raises as m ey questions as it answers. And there 
is one question which we should like particularly to deal 
with ner e. It is an old question, though it is also new in 
the form in which it is posed by Bowne's theory. Bowne ho~ds 
that the significant thing about thought is that thought is 
not only a mental event but that it is the apprehension and • 
report of a truth beyond the mental event. Thinking consid-
ered as a process is, like all occurring events, a parti~ 
and so likewise are the contents of consciousness. At the 
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same time that our thought may be viewed as mental events, 
which is to view for what the,r are, they must be viewed 
also in their cognitive capacity, and in that capacity 
they claim to be revelatory of an order which is itself 
not created but discovered by thought. It ia at this point 
that a difficult problem arises. It is not only the old 
problem of how a mental event which is private to me can 
be said to reveal an extra-priTate reality, but how such 
an event can reveal, as Bowne maintains the infinite miad 
or thought. Nor does this exhaust the difficulty, tor 
Bowne argues fUrther that it is of the very nature of fin-
ite thought to refer to the infinite. Yet for all Bowne•s 
elaborate reasonings on the matter, we fail to discern just 
what it is in finite thougnt which makes this reference to 
the infinite in the least ineluctable. It can hardly be 
maiDtatned that either a logical or psychological analysis 
of thought reveals this transcendent reference. So we must 
look to metaphysics for its possible justification. And 
what we find is Bowne's contention that things cannot inter-
·act and be independent at the same t~e, and since they in-
teract, they must be dependent, so that the hypothesis or 
an all-embracing being on Wham they deperid becomes a necess-
ity of thought. But is such an bJPothesis really unavoid-
able? Cannot things both interact and be independent in 
some respects? And does their independence involve us in 
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the sort of hypothesis that Bowne thinks 1s a necessity of 
thought? Bowne is acutely aware of the prOblem, but yet it 
remains a problem in his philosophy. Nor is the problem ad-
Tanced any by Bowne's argument that the rel•tion between fin-
ite thought ani the infinite thought is causal. Indeed, 
this Tery argument raises a still fUrther problem. For if 
this is the relation between the two, how aaye the auton~ 
of the finite thinker, an autonomy which Bowne insists upon. 
Still another crucial issue in Bowne•s philosophy is 
his conception of purpose. Illuminating as his discussion 
of the p\lrpoaiye character or thought is, he yet fails to 
explain how purpose is involTed, as he supposes, in the. very 
life or the mind. Here again, we may ask, is the contention 
based on logical or psychological grounds? Neither seems to 
bear Bowne out on this score. Do metaphysical considerations 
bear ~ out? The trouble is that purpose is a rather Tague-
. 
ly defined category in Bowne•s system. It is most11 a denial 
ot meohanisa. But this apart, is it not fair to sa1 that 
Bowne, in postulating purpose wholesale, so to speak, is go-
ing beyond the facta? Is it true that thought cannot be ex-
plained without inToking purpose? And it so, how preciselJ 
is it not only inTolTed but necessarily involved in thought? 
And does Bowne justify his view that the laws of thought 
must be the laws of the uniTerse itself, if knowledge is .to 
have any validity? What is a law? And :O.an we speak of lawa 
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of thought, let alone assume that they legislate for the u-
niverse. We feel in all this that Bmvne is leaving his em-
piricism far behind, even the empiricism which he calls 
transcendental. 
Is Bowne a dualist in his epistemology? We have re-
ferred to him as such, yet the characterization might be ob-
jected to on the ground that while he distinguishes between 
thought as a mental occurrence and thought as a cognitive 
content, yet as a cognitive content it is, when veridical, 
one with its object. Whether this is Bownets actual view is 
open to doubt. There is a good deal of vagueness in his 
discussion of the problem, a vagueness that stems from the 
fact that he provides us with no proper definition of knowl-
edge, declaring that knowledge is sui generis, and what is 
less excusable, he provides us with no adequate discussion 
of its nature as a relation between subject and object. Ex-
cept in the absolute mind the thought series and the thing 
series are distinctly two, according to Bowne. Yet the thdng 
series in his view is so largely the work of thought, that 
the dualism between them, which however much he insists is 
ineradicable, is in danger of disappearing. Such an amalgama-
tion of thought and thing runs the risk of abolishing knowl-
edge altogether, certainly of knowledge in the usual sense. 
Not that Bowne is minded to escape dualism in this way, but he 
is tempted to soften its asperities, and he does so at the 
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expense of the object. We may appropriately say something 
at this point concerning Bowne's view of the mind-body re-
lation. Concomitance, he says, is the only interaction there 
is; and its determining ground must be sought in the plan 
and agency of the infinite. At the same tLme he is critical 
of Leibnizian parallelism, so by conco~tance he evidently 
does not mean parallelism. But then what does he mean? We 
are at a loss for an answer. Perhaps his conception of the 
interaction of body and soul is that of occasionalism. Per-
haps be is more of an interactionist than either the ter.m 
occasionalism or parallelism suggests. 
One of the crucial distinctions of Bowne's metaphy-
sics is that between phenomenal reality and ontological re-
ality. He is disinclined to use the term noumenon because 
of its Kantian association with the notion of the unknow-
able. It is clear that Bowne is using the word reality bare 
in two different, even opposed senses. True, in calling ~ 
phenomenal real, he wishes to emphasize the fact that the 
phenomenal is not merely the illusory. Still, it cannot be 
real in the sense in which the ontological is real, am it is 
confusing to call them both real. And this brings us to 
Bowne•s failure to distinguish clearly the senses of such 
crucial terms as being, reality, existence, and experience. 
About one thing Bowne is perfectly clear: it is that tpure 
being' is incapable of real existence. Being is always 
455 
something specific. Its distinctive mark consists in same 
power of action. Yet 'being' in its most general sense, as 
the first or the metaph~sical categories, is defined by him 
in a way that makes it virtually indistinguishable from pure 
being. For in this general sense being means only a possible 
objectivity tor thought, and it does not imply any substan-
tiality or identity in the object, certainly no power of ac-
tion. Is this not a sense of being that comes close to pure 
being, which Bowne rejects? Be this as it may, Bowne uses 
the terms being, reality and existence interchangeably. Whe-
ther he is speaking or phenoaena or noumena he calla them 
both real, as we have just aeen, and he refers to than also 
as being and existing. The trouble perhaps lies with the 
English language which has no terml! with the clearly demar-
cated senses which would express the distinctions Bowne seems 
to hue in mind. In a:t1.J case, there is no mist&k ing the fact 
that ror Bowne only active being is ontological. 
Of all met~pbJsical problems the most puzzling per-
haps is that or change and identity, am while Bowne's 
treatment of it exhibits great depth and seriousness, the 
m.~ster~ of permanence in change remains • To Bowne the ex-
planation of change lies in the constant energizing of Godts 
will, just as the explanation of permanence lies in His a-
biding intelligence. In a word, the clue to the m~stery ia 
the Absolute Self. But ma~ we not say that if the Absolute 
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Self experiences change, it cannot be per.manent, while if 
it is permanent, it cannot experience change. Now, to put 
the dilemma in this barefaced fashion is no doubt to do an 
injustice to the subtlety of Bowne•s position. Yet how 
precisely do permanence and change come together in the 
Absolute Self without in the least impinging upon its iden-
.tity? It may be said that tte finite self offers an exam-
ple. Yet do we ·not find that so far as our experience goes 
permanence is always relative. Bowne appeals to memory, 
but this is a very slender thread on which to hang the mo-
mentous thesis which he is anxious to prove. But what per-
manence and change exist together, and in what sense or man-
ner; it is not easy to see, despite Bownets extreme care 
over the problem. 
The difficulties of Bowne•s solution come to a head 
in his vacillating treatment of time. It is clear to him 
that space possesses a merely phenomenal character, but he 
appears to be uncertain about time. Thus he argues that 
memory and self-consciousness are necessary conditions for 
the emergence of time, but he also argues that while memory 
serves to bring the idea of time into consciousness, memory 
implies time. Now either the reality of time antedates the 
fact of memory or the reality of memory antedates the fact 
of time. If memory implies time, time must be an integral 
part of the self, and so possess an ontological status. Yet 
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Bowne speaks or the phenomenal character of t~e, or time 
as being only the subjective appearance of things. On this 
view time or course cannot be in God. But it must in some 
sense be in God, if the divine activity, as Bowne insists, 
is essentially tempora1.1 
To the extent that Bowne is ambiguous with regard 
to the status of time, whether it is merely phenomenal or 
a metaphyaioal reality, his treatment of personality as the 
fundamental principle is weakened and vitiated. F9r, as 
Professor Bright.an has poiated out, 
To be a person is to act and endure, 
while at the same tt.e experiencing change-
leas truths in the changing process or con-
sciousness. The temporal is just as neces-
sary to the eternal as the eternal is to · 
the temporal. Without both we have a mere 
abstraction~ no explanation of experience 
as a whole. 
It is doubtfUl, though, that Bowne could have brought him-
self to agree with Brightman that the temporal character of 
the self points to the tanporal character of God. For one 
thing, while Bowne emphasizes the activity or the self, it 
is not at all certain that he places the essence of that 
activity in time; far another he is above all anxioua to 
save the ~utability of God. There are two sides to Bowne, 
1. On this whole problem see, J. A. Franquiz Ventura, 
Borden Parker Bownets Treatment of the Problem or Ghanfe and 
~dent!tz, (The University of Puerto Rico Bulletin, Ser ea 
XIII-No. 1, Sept. 1942). 
2. Edgar S. Brightman, "A Tem.poral1st View or God", 
Journal of Religion, 4, (Oct. 1932), 552 ft. 
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one empirical, the other Eleatic, and he never managed to 
reconcile the two. 
Yet this conflict in Bowne, and it is discernible 
also in Riminuja, so far from detracting the Yalue or his 
philosophy, only enhances its interest and poignancy. The 
personalism or both men is one or the great and abiding in-
sights in the history or thought. Neither thinker professed 
to have a key that unlocked all doors. It is the human lot 
to see through a glass darkly, as both Rimlnuja and Bowne 
were aware, yet neither wavered in his taith that the image 
discerned there is or reality itself. In Bowne•s words, 
As we think ot the infinite past and 
the infinite to come, it becomes plain 
. that the.re is much in the Intini te One 
which we. can never hope to understand, 
but upon which we can only gaze; yet 
must not all ' be wrapped in shadow; 
something must pierce througi to the 
sunlight and the clear blue. 
This aomething that piercesthrough to the sunlight is, tor 
R~minuja as it is for Bowne, the infinite worth ot personal-
it'J'• 
1. B. P. Bowne The Philosoph{ of Herbert Spencer, {Hunt & Eato~, New York, 1B7'~4~)-,-p~.~7~7~.~~--~~~~~~~~ 
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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
This dissertation is a comparative study o~ the meta-
physics o~ Rimanuja and Bowne. The following points summa-
rize the positive results of the investigation. 
1. Both thinkers shy away from everything abstract 
in their philosophic heritage and concentrate on those 
ideas of their predecessors which emphasize the centrality 
of the self. 
2. They are concerned to do justice to experience 
in all its aspects, and to this end they employ a method 
which may generally be characterized as synoptic. 
3. In their epistemologies both thinkers hold that 
knowledge, if it is to be trusted,- must be provided with a 
metaphysical ground, so that the theory of knowledge for 
them is closely related to the theory of being. In the 
last analysis it is God who is the guarantor of the possi-
bility of knowledge, just as God•s unfolding in the world 
is the basis of the dynamic character of knowledge. In 
Bowne the point is expressed in his insistence that human 
knowledge is not a passive re~lection of the world, but 
involves an activity underlying which is the divine activ-
ity. To Ram~nuja all finite knowledge depends on a passage 
from the indeterminate to the determinate, an activity which 
distinguishes as it unites, and both the distinctions and 
the unity are expressions of the divine mind in the process 
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of its unfolding. 
4. The two philosophers agree that the starting 
point of natural knowledge is sense experience, and agree 
further that at the sense level, as at all other levels, 
mind or consciousness is the constitutive principle. With 
regard to what is involved in the cognitive relation, they 
are at variance, Ramanuja appearing to hold a presentative 
theory and Bowne a representative theory. For both philos-
ophers the self is fundamental not only metaphysically but 
epistemologically. 
5. In their metaphysics the two thinkers are agreed 
in their rejection of the idea of pure being as an empty ab-
straction. They ins.ist that being is not an inert substance, 
but a process of activity. Being is causal, a system of dy-
namic relationships. Most significantly of all, both think-
ers conceive of being as a conscious subject. 
6. Central to Riminuja•s and Bowne's conception of 
the world is the notion of the self. They emphasize the 
self as knower, and agree that the self is the basis of the 
unity of knowledge. They also ascribe causal agency to the 
self, and insist that, while the finite self is within the 
comprehension of the supreme self, it is yet autonomous and 
free. 
1. For Ramanuja as well as Bowne, the world comes 
into being as a result of the activity of God. Further, 
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they agree that the will of God continuously manifests it-
self in the world, and that the world is under His constant 
superintendence. What transpires in the world can only be 
understood in terms of a divine plan and purpose. Indeed, 
it is this teleological character of the world which is its 
most pervasive and deepest feature. 
8. The dif'f'erences between Ramanuja and Bowne are 
as follows: In contrast to Bowne's epistemological dualism, 
Ramanuja holds to a presentative theory according to which 
what we know are not mental surrogates which stand f'or the 
objects known, but the objects themselves. Further, While 
agreeing with Bowne that the mind contributes categories 
of' its own to knowledge of the object, Rimanuja assigns, 
as Bowne does not, ontological status to space and time. 
Again, unlike Bowne, who takes an empirical view of the 
self, Riminuja's view may be characterized as mystical, 
that is, he does not emphasize as Bowne does the substanti& 
otherness of the self from the inf'inite. Finally, the free-
dom, which both thinkers are concerned to emphasize, is for 
Ramanuja not so much freedom of the will as the freedom or 
consciousness. 
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